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Abstract  
 
This thesis opens up the black box of ÔmarketsÕ by scrutinising the process of market 
formation and examining its complexities in the context of ShanghaiÕs development 
as an international financial centre. The financial markets in Shanghai are framed, 
understood and acted upon differently by the Chinese local and central governments, 
regulatory institutions, local and foreign financial institutions and transnational 
interests. The construction of a financial centre in Shanghai is thus not only an 
outcome of its own historical context and development trajectory but also 
intrinsically bound up with the interests and decisions of other agencies acting across 
spatial scales and negotiated amidst conflicts of interests and power struggles. Based 
on empirical research that includes field observations of financial markets 
development in Shanghai, archival research and personal interviews conducted with 
local and foreign financial institutions, and Chinese government and regulatory 
officials in Shanghai (with some conducted in London), this study focuses on the 
banking sector, the securities market and strategies of foreign banks as they negotiate 
between the local regulatory environment and market conditions and the wider 
context of their global operations and strategies. I examine the relationship between 
state institutions and global finance capital in Shanghai and tease out how these 
different ÔframingsÕ of markets are played out in Shanghai. In doing so, I critically 
engage with the concept of ÔmarketsÕ and Ôfrom-plan-to-marketÕ economy to expose 
its multiple identities and conceptualisations and the contested nature of the 
ÔmarketisationÕ process. I also analyse the factors contributing to ShanghaiÕs success, 
identify future challenges and highlight the complementary roles played by Shanghai 
as a Ôbusiness and commercial centreÕ, Beijing as a Ôpolitical centreÕ and Hong Kong 
as an Ôoffshore financial centreÕ.  
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Chapter 1   
 
Introduction 
 
 
Roller-coaster rides are not unusual for ChinaÕs stock markets, which sometimes 
resemble a casino in Macau. What happened next, however, was decidedly unusual: 
investors in New York's equity markets woke up, saw that Shanghai had tanked, and 
had a collective heart attack: they sent the Dow Jones industrial average down more 
than 400 points [É] The drop in New York, in turn, fuelled fear in markets across 
Asia the following day, and suddenly investors were seized by visions of a rerun of 
1997Õs ÒAsian contagionÓ [É] On Feb. 28, as this new outbreak of investor gloom 
spread, IndiaÕs main stock index tumbled 4%, SingaporeÕs dropped 3.7%, JapanÕs 
fell 2.9%, South KoreaÕs lost 2.6%, and Hong KongÕs slipped 2.5%. (TIME 
magazine, 28 February 2007) 
  
On 27 February 2007, ShanghaiÕs stock index dropped 8.8 per cent and resulted in 
knock-on effects in stock markets around the world. This chain reaction 
demonstrated the increasingly influential place China now occupies in the minds of 
global investors. But while investors are aware of ChinaÕs economic importance to 
the world, they are still confused about how to interpret a decline in Chinese stocks. 
The reaction to ChinaÕs market swoon was clearly overwrought as all major stock 
markets bounced back within a week (including ShanghaiÕs), but the event raised 
some intriguing questions about the role of the stock market in ChinaÕs economy. Its 
limited participation by local and foreign investors, small market size vis--vis its 
huge economy and its minor role in company financing and assessment points to the 
effect of expectations and hyperbole more than the impact of actual market 
transactions on the stock exchange.  
For the past 10 years, Shanghai has recorded double-digit overall annual 
economic growth and is at present seen as the most attractive place for setting up 
local control offices and production facilities by many transnational corporations 
(TNCs). Finance and foreign trade have been heavily promoted and it possesses 
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ChinaÕs premier stock market and only foreign exchange centre. Since the early 
1990s, Shanghai has been actively promoting investment in the tertiary sector with 
the backing of the central government. Foreign insurers were initially allowed to 
operate only in Shanghai, and all foreign banks currently licensed are located in 
ShanghaiÕs Pudong New Area (the largest Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in China). 
The latter is a key initiative in developing ShanghaiÕs international financial and 
business capacities. Within Pudong, the Lujiazui Finance and Trade Zone (LFTZ) 
forms the focal point of development. It is envisaged to be a revitalised central 
business district (CBD) for Shanghai, with particular emphasis on financial services, 
retail, real estate, business consulting and government services. In promotional 
materials, Lujiazui is envisaged to be the ÒManhattan of 21
st
 century ShanghaiÓ 
(Yeh, 1996; Olds, 1997) and ChinaÕs ÒWall StreetÓ (W. Wu, 1999: 214). The current 
frenzy of international interest surrounding ShanghaiÕs urban and economic 
development and its international aspirations is not without basis. Expectations for 
ShanghaiÕs future run high because of its illustrious history as a centre of trade and 
industry of national importance. It was one of the most cosmopolitan cities in the 
world in the early-20
th
 century and the most advanced and important financial centre 
in Asia before 1949, particularly notable for its receptiveness to international capital 
and influence. Under the new orientation, Shanghai is targeted to be the new flagship 
city, connecting China into an increasingly integrated world economy.  
A financial centre is an agglomeration of financial and service enterprises 
and corporate headquarters, particularly foreign ones. Other than providing retail 
services such as branch banking, a financial centre also provides expertise in high 
level financial and professional services that serve a much larger area on national, 
regional and even global scales, as evident in the presence of head offices of 
 3 
multinational financial and non-financial institutions. International financial centres 
typically develop as national centres that subsequently assume wider regional and 
global status from a rise in demand to service international capital transactions with 
increased international trade. Such growth requires that national centres expand their 
financial markets to include regional neighbours. Many international financial 
centres, therefore, gain their international status by operating at two levels of 
regionalism Ð subnational and supranational. In recent years, Shanghai is emerging 
as an important centre for financial activities within the Chinese economy. Can that 
influence extend to the supranational scale? How is this process of market formation 
implemented and interpreted by official and business communities in Shanghai? The 
translation and adoption of capitalist ideas and principles in developing financial 
markets in Shanghai is a highly complex and contested process. How is this process 
envisioned and implemented at the governmental level and how are the changes 
interpreted and acted upon by the business community?  
Whether as an idea(l), a system or as economic practice, markets lie at the 
heart of capitalist societies but they remain one of the most elusive concepts within 
social sciences. In this thesis, I open up the black box of ÔmarketsÕ by scrutinising the 
process of market formation and examining its complexities through the experience 
and context of Shanghai. The development of Shanghai as an international financial 
centre can be seen as part of a global process servicing finance capital but this 
conceals the complex reasons behind why such processes are taking place in 
Shanghai and at a particular point in time and space. The process of market-making 
in Shanghai and the actors involved are also spread across scales and much of what is 
happening within the city is determined by economic, social and political 
considerations elsewhere on the national, regional and global levels. The financial 
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markets in Shanghai are framed, understood and acted upon differently by the 
Shanghai municipal government, the central government in Beijing, local financial 
institutions, and foreign financial institutions in Shanghai within the wider context of 
their global operations and strategies. Transnational interests and roles of 
organisations such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and agencies in other 
financial centres such as the City of London are also important actors in this process.  
The actors listed above are many and varied in terms of their institutional 
capacities, financial clout, regulatory power and geographical location. This 
recognition of the variety of actors and interests within a market setting and an 
emphasis on power, conflict and negotiation is central to my analysis. The form, 
structure and pace of market formation taking place in Shanghai is a contested 
process that has to be negotiated amongst the different interests of ÔincumbentsÕ and 
ÔchallengersÕ (Fligstein, 2001), involving a variety of actors including local and 
foreign firms, national and local state bodies, foreign state institutions and 
transnational practices. The dominant Ômode of exchangeÕ (Lie, 1992, 1993) that 
emerges in Shanghai is the outcome of a conflictual process between multiple parties 
but is also itself constantly Ôunder threatÕ due to shifting agendas and contexts. 
Markets are understood and experienced by actors in a variety of ways, invested with 
different meanings and acted upon according to different interests and contingent 
social relations (see, for example, Zelizer, 1988, 1993, 1994). This discursive 
construction of markets has material consequences in affecting policies and practices. 
The central Chinese state and Shanghai government have particular understandings 
and visions of financial markets in Shanghai; the local and foreign financial 
institutions in Shanghai are also Ôframing marketsÕ according to their own interests, 
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agendas, experience and interpretations of what a market should be. How are these 
different ÔframingsÕ of market played out in Shanghai?  
In this thesis, I use the term ÔmarketisationÕ to refer to the on-going process 
of instituting market-led practices into the Chinese economy. I do not take 
ÔmarketisationÕ to refer to an unproblematic and progressive journey from centrally-
planned to market economy. Rather than the wholesale adoption of neoliberal market 
practices and principles, the Chinese state continues to exercise considerable control 
over the pace and structure of reforms with clear political and social objectives in 
mind. My placing of the word in inverted commas is intended to highlight its unique 
conceptualisation and utilisation by the Chinese state and institutions and to distance 
myself from the conceptual baggage of ÔWest is bestÕ often implicated in popular 
discourse about market-based economies and practices. This process of 
ÔmarketisationÕ is complex and highly contested at various levels. Regulatory 
changes, technological innovations and the globalisation of markets and monetary 
flows are remapping the financial landscape towards deterritorialisation, but states 
remain important arbiters in determining the shape and speed of such processes. The 
state and its institutions continue to exert significant influence within their national 
space economy as well as on the international arena through channels of 
supranational organisations (such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
European Union (EU) and WTO). The case of ChinaÕs journey towards 
ÔmarketisationÕ in its financial sector reforms demonstrates this complex and fluid 
relationship between states and finance capital.  
In acknowledging that markets are the products of social relations that vary 
across time and space, empirical research needs to examine how financial markets 
are being constructed, regulated and reproduced. Who are the actors involved in the 
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making and maintenance of a market? What are the historical, social and cultural 
factors affecting these processes and in what ways? Whose vision of ÔmarketÕ is 
more persuasive and what happens when different visions collide? In this 
dissertation, my objectives are as follows:  
1) To critically engage with the concept of ÔmarketsÕ and Ôfrom-plan-to-
marketÕ economy, exposing its multiple identities and conceptualisations 
and the contested nature of the ÔmarketisationÕ process;  
2) To analyse the development of regulatory frameworks and ÔmarketÕ 
practices in China, focusing on the actors involved, their interpretations and 
agendas, how power is exercised, and the process of contestation and 
negotiation.  
3) To analyse the different perspectives of foreign and Chinese actors in the 
banking market, examine how and why they might hold different views on 
the pace, structure and direction of financial sector reforms and their 
business strategies in response to such changes.  
4) To evaluate the development of financial centre capacities in Shanghai and 
implications at different geographical scales (e.g. for Shanghai, the Chinese 
economy as a whole, the wider East Asia region and the global financial 
space-economy) 
These processes will be examined through the lens of ShanghaiÕs experience and 
aspiration to become an international financial centre. In particular, I focus on the 
development of the Shanghai stock market and the strategies and experience of local 
and foreign financial institutions (mainly commercial banks) located in Shanghai to 
examine how contested visions of markets are negotiated in the process of instituting 
market reforms in the capital markets and banking market.  
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The next chapter (Chapter 2) provides the background to current 
developments in Shanghai. The changing roles of Shanghai within the national 
economy and its history in the early-20
th
 century in particular, are vital to 
understanding ShanghaiÕs current aspirations and in contextualising the perspectives 
and strategies of officials, regulators and the business community located in the city 
and elsewhere. The development of the Lujiazui Trade & Finance Zone in Pudong is 
also significant in signalling the central governmentÕs commitment to developing the 
financial sector in Shanghai and confirms ShanghaiÕs status as a ÔdragonheadÕ to link 
China to the global economy and serves as a gateway through which foreign 
investors are permitted to enter the Chinese market.  
The experience of Shanghai as it develops its financial markets and pursues 
the coveted status of international financial centre offers exciting opportunities to 
(re)examine various theoretical issues within geographies of money and finance, the 
global cities literature, and, in particular, the concept of ÔmarketsÕ. Chapters 3 and 4 
consist of literature reviews of different approaches to conceptualising global 
financial flows and framing markets, and through which I develop the theoretical 
basis of this thesis. In Chapter 3, I highlight the contribution of the political economy 
approach in emphasising the interconnectedness of economics and politics across 
international as well as national scales, and argue for an analytical approach that 
embeds local phenomenon within an international context, emphasising flows, 
interconnectivity and power. At the same time, I am also keen to emphasise the 
social and cultural embeddedness of finance capital and financial markets as the 
world of money is discursively constructed through particular social-cultural 
practices. To do so, I focus on four main areas of existing research on money and the 
international financial system, the state and finance capital, the making of 
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international financial centres, and framing markets. The latter is taken up more fully 
in Chapter 4 where I further develop my theoretical framework by focusing on the 
meanings and treatments of ÔmarketsÕ and how that might affect the lenses through 
which we analyse economic processes and phenomena. To do this, I consider the 
lineage and contributions of identifying and theorising markets in fields such as 
orthodox economics, economic sociology, political economy, economic 
anthropology, social studies of finance and economic geography, and I argue for an 
actor-focused, contextual, socialised and political approach to framing markets. I 
then combine some of the key insights from these approaches to inform my empirical 
research into ShanghaiÕs financial markets and, in turn, to reflect on the implications 
for issues of power, states and market formation.   
In Chapter 5, I present the choice of research instruments used in this 
empirical study as well as elaborate on the process of research practice, such as how 
the topic evolved, its ongoing and dialogic character, and the way the project 
changed in the process. The research themes and empirical work of this thesis were 
derived and conducted in a circular rather than linear fashion, as is often assumed to 
be the case, and my reflections on the research process highlights this. The research 
methods employed are predominantly qualitative in nature, comprising 
archival/library research, analysis of secondary data (e.g. press releases, news 
articles, government/official reports, and industrial publications), in-depth semi-
structured interviews and the maintenance of a field journal. At the end of the 
chapter, I also comment on issues of research practice and positionality, paying 
particular attention to how my complex ethnic identities have influenced the 
fieldwork process and possible implications for the resultant analysis and claims of 
this study.  
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In Chapter 6, the first of three analytical chapters, I examine how the state, 
through government institutions and regulatory bodies, manages tensions between 
the desire to maintain regulatory control and the various imperatives of global 
finance capital. ChinaÕs approach to the ÔmarketisationÕ of its finance sector has been 
fairly conservative and remains tightly controlled by the state. However, there are 
also clear indications of international influence and cooperation with regulatory 
counterparts in the City of London, New York, Hong Kong and Singapore, the 
influence of global institutions such as the WTO and the involvement of foreign 
financial institutions in Shanghai in pushing for reforms. I examine how particular 
knowledge networks are constructed to build up the expertise and skills required for 
the legal and regulatory frameworks needed by Shanghai in building its financial 
markets. The case of ChinaÕs WTO accession illustrates the tension between the 
imperatives of the state and international pressures. Specific regulations and 
Ôsociological powerÕ are also used to control the activities of foreign banks in 
Shanghai and thereby the pace of ÔmarketisationÕ.  
In Chapter 7, I focus on the development of the Shanghai stock market and 
the strategies and experience of foreign banks in Shanghai to examine how 
contesting visions of markets are negotiated in the process of instituting market 
reforms. My objective is not to point out its ÔpeculiaritiesÕ or simply present a Ôstock-
market-with-Chinese-characteristicsÕ but to highlight the process of market reforms 
in which the structure and meaning of ÔmarketÕ in the context of the Shanghai stock 
market evolves through contingent social relations amongst market participants. I 
also highlight the implications of scalar politics as much of what is happening in 
Shanghai is arguably the outcome of political and economic processes elsewhere, 
with institutional forces in Beijing still determining the pace and process of 
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ÔmarketisationÕ in Shanghai, and the influence of the international business 
community on developments in Shanghai depending on how Shanghai (or China as a 
whole) fits into their globalisation strategies. The experience of foreign banks in 
Shanghai, the history and strategies of their involvement, relationships with their 
global headquarters and other (local and foreign) banks in Shanghai is used as a 
window through which to gain insights into the process of instituting market reforms 
in ChinaÕs banking sector.  
In Chapter 8, I focus on why this particular process of market formation and 
reforms are taking place in Shanghai. Based on the insights and experience of 
regulatory authorities, local government and foreign and local financial institutions, I 
examine the key factors influencing the development of Shanghai in its financial 
centre aspiration to date and future challenges. Beijing and Hong Kong are 
commonly seen as other competing regional centres for the title of international 
financial centre for China. I assess their comparative advantages and place-based 
characteristics and their influence on ShanghaiÕs role in national and global financial 
services and flows. I then identify the most pressing issues faced by Shanghai that 
need to be addressed in order for Shanghai to capitalise on its advantages and 
achieve its aspiration, which will be of particular interest to policy makers and 
planners.  
The final chapter (Chapter 9) summarises the theoretical and empirical 
strands of the thesis, situating this research within broader debates in geographies of 
money and finance and the literature on ÔmarketsÕ in the social sciences more widely. 
I also reflect on the major strengths and weaknesses of the research as a whole and 
suggests ways in which it might be extended empirically, to include comparisons and 
co-analysis with other Chinese cities and international financial centres, and 
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theoretically, through developing a research agenda centring on the complex and 
contested nature of market formation and issues of global standards and governance. 
By engaging with existing literature on ÔmarketsÕ and empirical research in 
Shanghai, I aim to draw economic geography into the debate and explore the 
contribution of a spatial perspective on the market in understanding financial centres 
and global capital flows.   
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Chapter 2  
The Transformation of Shanghai:  
From ÔParis of the OrientÕ to ÔNew York of AsiaÕ?  
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
The current frenzy of international interest surrounding ShanghaiÕs urban and 
economic development and its international aspirations is not without basis. 
Expectations for ShanghaiÕs future run high because of its illustrious history as a 
centre of trade and industry of national importance.  It was AsiaÕs most significant 
financial centre prior to 1949 and was notable for its receptiveness to international 
capital. Following the implementation of the Open Door policy by Deng Xiaoping in 
December 1978, ChinaÕs economic development has captured intense international 
interest. In the economic reforms that followed to develop ChinaÕs 
internationalisation strategy, Shanghai emerged as one of the key cities of national 
strategic importance for China to achieve its development objective. Apart from 
rapid urban and infrastructural changes, the industrial and financial structure of the 
city has been dramatically transformed over the past two decades. There has been 
much discussion around the (re)emergence of Shanghai as a world city (Leman, 
1994: 86-87; Thant et al., 1998; Yusuf and Wu, 2002; Zaloom, 2003; Ng and Hills, 
2003) and in a recent comparative study of prominent Asian Pacific cities such as 
Tokyo, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taipei (Ng and Hills, 2003), Shanghai was 
specifically included as Òa rising star in the reforming socialist market economy of 
ChinaÓ (p. 155). This chapter explores ShanghaiÕs history as the ÔParis of the OrientÕ 
at the beginning of the 20th century, its subsequent development during the post-1949 
reforms and the remaking of the city into an international economic, financial and 
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trade centre since the early-1990s. Knowledge of ShanghaiÕs historical roles and 
development trajectories enables better understanding of its current position in the 
context of national economic development and its global aspirations, and this 
provides a sound basis from which to analyse the actions and perspectives of the 
different actors and interest groups both within and outside of Shanghai.  
As with other cities in China, the development of Shanghai is closely tied to 
the countryÕs national development strategy. A large proportion of the recent 
literature explores the complex relationship between state and market imperatives in 
the urban and economic transformation of the city (see, for example, Ho and Tsui, 
1996; Yusuf and Wu, 2002; Zhang, 2003). While the state plays a key role in 
determining the timing, pace and economic and spatial configuration of ShanghaiÕs 
development, market considerations feature prominently in the decision-making 
process. Moreover, the role of the state in the recent development of Shanghai is 
rendered more complex by the rescaling of governance as greater financial and 
political/institutional power is transferred from central state to local municipal 
government in the process (Thant et al., 1998).  
In the next section, I outline the changing roles of Shanghai as it moves 
form being a ÔbridgeheadÕ to a ÔlocomotiveÕ and then ÔdragonheadÕ of ChinaÕs 
economy. The development of Pudong New Area and especially LFTZ were pivotal 
in the transformation of Shanghai into an economic and financial force. Section 2.3 
focuses on PudongÕs conception, development and international reception. In section 
2.4, I outline some of the key financial reforms in recent decades and ShanghaiÕs 
ambition to be an international financial centre for China and the wider region.  
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2.2  THE RISE AND FALL OF SHANGHAI: FROM ÔBRIDGEHEADÕ TO 
LOCOMOTIVEÕ TO ÔDRAGONHEADÕ
1
  
Shanghai used to be a financial centre where people exchanged currency freely, and 
it should continue to serve as the centre. To attain an international seat in banking, 
China has to rely on Shanghai first. (Deng Xiaoping in 1992; quoted in Olds, 1997)  
 
Between 2000 and 2010 we want to turn Shanghai into a financial and trading 
centre of the Asian and Pacific region. Our objective is to achieve complementarity 
with other regional financial centres. (Shanghai Mayor Huang Ju in 1993, quoted in 
Olds, 1995: 111) 
 
2.2.1 Shanghai as ÔBridgeheadÕ 
Shanghai is located at the estuary of the Yangtze River, one of the richest agricultural 
areas in China (the Yangtze River Delta accounts for about one-third of ChinaÕs 
population and 40 percent of its GDP), and its development has been linked to its 
history as ChinaÕs largest seaport (Figure 2.1). Shanghai had always been prominent 
amongst other Chinese cities due to its size (with a land area of 6,340 square 
kilometres), population density (more than 22,700 persons per square kilometre in 
the central city) and its importance to the national economy (accounting for more 
than 5 percent of national industrial output) (Yusuf and Wu, 2002: 207).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 These three metaphorical periods of ShanghaiÕs development are identified in F. Wu (2003).  
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Figure 2.1 The Shanghai metropolitan area. (Source: Yusuf and Wu, 2002: 208) 
 
 
First established as a fishing village in the tenth century, Shanghai became a 
county in 1271. Merchant families from nearby Ningbo (in Zhejiang province) were 
instrumental in transforming the city into an integral part of the coastal trading 
system and Shanghai developed steadily into an important regional commercial 
centre, such that it surpassed Guangzhou (Canton) as ChinaÕs premier trading city by 
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1853 (Yusuf and Wu, 2002). Often called the Òcrucible of modern ChinaÓ (Yusuf and 
Wu, 2002), Shanghai entered the stage of modern commercial and industrial 
development in the second half of the 19th century. After it was named one of five 
open cities, provided by the Treaty of Nanking in 1842 following the Opium War, 
Shanghai was opened to Western trade and residence.2 The British, which 
subsequently governed a large part of Shanghai, ran the city according to mercantile 
principles and ShanghaiÕs location at the mouth of the Yangtze River made it the 
chief conduit for trade to and from ChinaÕs interior. The combination of Western 
capitalism, Chinese entrepreneurialism and strategic geographical location produced 
more than a century of unprecedented and dramatic growth for the city. The result 
was startling as Shanghai rapidly transformed itself from a small town into a thriving 
and leading international metropolis. It developed vibrant commodity, stock and 
foreign exchange markets, with nearly 30 percent of the worldÕs most important 
foreign banks setting up branches there by 1935 (Yatsko, 2001: 56). It became the 
largest international financial centre in the Far East with 28 foreign bank offices, 58 
headquarters of domestic banks and 182 branches. About 90 percent of the nationÕs 
financial assets and over half its foreign trade were concentrated there (F. Wu, 
2000b). By 1936, Shanghai was the seventh largest city in the world with a 
population of 3.81 million (Y. Yeung, 1996: 2). In its pre-1949 glory days, Shanghai 
boasted the most sophisticated urban amenities and cosmopolitan reputation in Asia 
outside of Tokyo (Figures 2.2 and 2.3). It functioned as a ÔbridgeheadÕ during this 
                                                
2 During the late-18th and early-19th centuries, the British and other European traders were importing 
expensive tea and silk from China but the Chinese had little interest in Western products. Faced with a 
significant and growing trade deficit, the British discovered opium and started to export to the Chinese 
market in 1820. By the 1830s, opium had become a vice in China. Stocks of British opium were 
seized and publicly destroyed by the Chinese government in 1839, which sparked off British 
hostilities. The Opium War lasted from 1840 to 1842 with the Chinese army defeated and the signing 
of the Treaty of Nanjing. Under the treaty, the Qing government was forced to pay reparations for the 
destroyed British opium and war costs, Hong Kong Island was ceded to the UK, and the Treaty Ports 
of Guangzhou, Xiamen (Amoy), Fuzhou (Foochow), Shanghai, and Ningbo were established.  
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period, as a channel through which foreign products were imported and agricultural 
and mineral materials were amassed (Yusuf and Wu, 2002: 1681-1682).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Prosperous Nanjing Road in the 1930s (Source: AuthorÕs own photograph of display at 
Shanghai Development Museum) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 The first Western system for goods exchange was the Shanghai Stocks and Goods 
Exchange founded in 1920. This is a recreation of the Shanghai Wheat Exchange in 1921 (Source: 
AuthorÕs own photograph of display at Shanghai Development Museum)  
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2.2.2 Shanghai as ÔLocomotiveÕ  
Development in Shanghai after the establishment of the PeopleÕs Republic of China 
(PRC) in 1949 was radically different. ShanghaiÕs new role in state socialism has 
been described as that of a ÔlocomotiveÕ of state-led industrialisation (Yusuf and Wu, 
2002: 1682-1683). The development of Shanghai was associated with the stateÕs new 
priority of developing national defence capacity via industrialisation. Its role 
therefore changed from that of a trade, finance and distribution core to that of an 
industrial city. During the first three decades of Communist rule, Shanghai was 
officially viewed as problematic due to its former capitalist success; it was viewed as 
an unwelcome legacy of a humiliating and resented semi-colonial past. Skilled 
labour, goods, tools and even whole factories were relocated from the city to assist 
the development of new inland industrial centres and Shanghai subsequently grew 
more slowly than in the past (Murphy, 1988: 158). Nevertheless, Shanghai became 
one of the largest industrial bases in China during the post-revolutionary period. In 
the 1970s, ShanghaiÕs industrial output accounted for more than 10 percent of the 
national total and contributed more than 15 percent to national fiscal revenue (F. Wu, 
2000a: 350).  
Despite its significance to the national economy, Shanghai did not 
particularly benefit from early economic reforms which sought to address regional 
imbalances between urban and rural regions. In 1979, when the post-Maoist reform 
programme first started, and with the designation of four SEZs (Shenzhen, Zhuhai, 
Shantou and Xiamen), central government policy emphasised the development of 
Guangdong and Fujian in the south. Although Shanghai was one of the 14 Open 
Coastal Cities (OCCs) designated in 1984, which were granted some of the special 
policies available to SEZs, its financial power in generating revenue for local 
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development was still very limited. Thus, while cities such as Guangdong and Fujian 
enjoyed the benefits of the open-door policy with preferential fiscal contracts with 
the central government and experienced rapid economic and urban growth, Shanghai, 
on the other hand, experienced only modest growth during this period. Its ranking 
and share in the national economy fell rapidly during the reform period as its 
economic dominance was increasingly challenged by other thriving coastal 
provinces. On the list of ChinaÕs top contributors to national income, Shanghai fell 
from first place in 1978 to sixth in 1985 and to 10th by 1990. Compared to other fast-
growing provinces in the 1979-1989 period, ShanghaiÕs growth rates in national 
income was considerably lower and below the national average (Table 2.1). In 
summary, despite the reform programmes, the city remained a major manufacturer of 
industrial products, ranging from steel to chemicals to domestic electrical appliances, 
although it was being overshadowed by the emergence of new industrial bases.  
 
Table 2.1 Percentage growth of national income in selected provinces, 1953-1989  
 Shanghai Shandong Jiangsu Zhejiang Guangdong National average 
1953-1978 8.7 5.7 5.6 5.6 5.3 6.0 
1979-1989 7.6 10.4 11.0 12.8 11.6 8.1 
(Source: Cheung, 1996: 53) 
 
Various studies also alleged strained relations between Shanghai and the 
central government due to the unfair distribution of revenues (Cheung, 1996; Ho and 
Tsui, 1996; Lam, 1996). Between 1949 and 1983, as much as 87 percent of 
ShanghaiÕs revenue of RMB 350 billion was remitted to Beijing, leaving only 13 
percent for its own use (Cheung, 1996: 55). This contrasts with the average of 30 
percent available for local spending in cities like Beijing and Tianjin (Lam, 1996). 
Consequently, Shanghai was often described as the Ôcash cowÕ of the planned 
economy during this period (Ho and Tsui, 1996; Thant et al., 1998; Zhang, 2003). 
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Some scholars believe that had Shanghai kept the revenue for its own development, 
it would have been on par with Hong Kong or Singapore in terms of economic 
strength and standards of living (Thant et al., 1998).  
 
2.2.3 Shanghai as ÔDragonheadÕ  
The reversal of ShanghaiÕs fortunes did not come about till the late 1980s, when the 
need to expedite the opening and development of ShanghaiÕs economy was declared 
by Deng Xiaoping, the architect of ChinaÕs economic reforms. In particular, a 
consensus emerged in Beijing that China must prepare itself for a globalising world 
economy and Shanghai was deemed strategically important for success on the 
international stage. The re-globalisation of Shanghai was of national significance 
from the onset, and the role of the central government was instrumental in the level 
of economic freedom and preferential policies granted to the city in the 1990s 
(Cheung, 1996; Thant et al., 1998; Yusuf and Wu, 2002; Zhao, 2003). Shanghai has, 
since 1949, always enjoyed strong political representation in the Communist Party of 
China (CPC) and state hierarchy and the politics of the city has been closely 
associated with the new generation of ChinaÕs leadership. For example, former 
presidents Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji, and former Vice Premiere Wu Bangguo 
were all leaders of Shanghai before moving to Beijing to further their political 
careers, a connection that could only be useful to ShanghaiÕs aspirations (Thant et al., 
1998; Yatsko, 2001: 56) (Table 2. 2).  
With the adoption of an export-oriented development strategy in the coastal 
region, China needed a global city to strengthen its link to the world economy with 
increased international trade and creating competitive city-regions became a top 
priority. Due to its strategic location in the Yangtze River Delta (YRD) and its 
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unique history as the largest financial centre in East Asia, Shanghai was chosen to 
fulfil this ambitious role. In 1992, the 14th Congress of the China Communist Party 
announced that the primary role of Shanghai was to: 
seize the opportunity of development and [the] opening of Shanghai Pudong, and to 
build Shanghai as the dragon head and one of international economic, finance, and 
trade centre, so as to drive the growth of the [Yangtze] River Delta and in turn the 
take-off of the whole economic region. (Gu and Chen, 1999 quoted in Yusuf and 
Wu, 2002: 1684) 
 
Table 2.2 ShanghaiÕs Communist Party of China and state leadership 
CPC Shanghai Committee secretary   Mayor of Shanghai 
Rao Shushi (1949-1950) 
Chen Yi (1950-1954) 
Ke Qingshi (1954-1965) 
Chen Pixian (1965-1967) 
Zhang Chunqiao (1967-1976) 
Su Zhenhua (1976-1979) 
Peng Chong (1979-1980) 
Chen Guodong (1980-1985) 
Rui Xingwen (1985-1987) 
Jiang Zemin (1987-1989) 
Zhu Rongji (1989-1991) 
Wu Bangguo (1991-1994) 
Huang Ju (1995-2002) 
Chen Liangyu (2003-2006)  
Xi Jinping (2007-present) 
 
Chen Yi (1949-1958) 
Ke Qingshi (1958-1965) 
Cao Diqiu (1965-1967) 
Zhang Chunqiao (1967-1976) 
Su Zhenhua (1976-1979) 
Peng Chong (1979-1980) 
Wang Daohan (1980-1985) 
Jiang Zemin (1985-1988) 
Zhu Rongji (1988-1991) 
Huang Ju (1991-1995) 
Xu Kuangdi (1995-2001) 
Chen Liangyu (2001-2003) 
Han Zheng (2003-present) 
(Sources: Cheung, 1996: 61; various news articles) 
  
Greater emphasis was placed on the goals of enhanced economic efficiency, 
rapid economic growth and an increasing role for markets in the circulation and 
distribution of goods, services, capital and waged labour; Shanghai was to connect 
China to the global system in this process. In 1988, Shanghai was granted a fiscal 
contracting system that was previously exclusively enjoyed by Guangdong and 
Fujian (Yeung and Sung, 1996). In this context, Shanghai was empowered to have 
more control over its financial resources, using the principle of zong er fen cheng, yi 
nian yi ding (妛既休洩J倡瀧倡勧; share of the total revenue between the local and 
central states according to proportions fixed annually) to redefine its fiscal 
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relationship to the central state and allow the city to keep a larger share of its revenue 
(Thant et al., 1998: 2094).  
National reforms and increasing levels of political support for Shanghai 
from Beijing also led to a process of urban development that is arguably unmatched 
in scale and speed in recent urban history. According to state officials, Shanghai was 
to take on three principle economic roles (Olds, 1995: 111, emphasis added):  
! As ChinaÕs major transactional city providing access to what was expected 
to become the 10th largest trading nation by 20003;  
! As the principal economic powerhouse, or Ôdragon headÕ of the countryÕs 
largest integrated economic basin in the Yangtze River Basin (in which one-
third of the national population produces more than 50 percent of the 
countryÕs industrial and agricultural outputs);  
! As the major economic anchor in the Yangtze Delta Region in which 160 
million people (13 percent of the national population) account for more than 
27 percent of ChinaÕs industrial output.  
A wide variety of initiatives were launched to accomplish these goals, 
developed by various arms of the Shanghai Municipal Government (SMG) and state-
supported institutions (some based at universities) which assisted the relevant 
bureaus and commissions of the SMG. The role of foreign firms and institutions was 
also important from the onset in the SMGÕs efforts to strategically plan ShanghaiÕs 
restructuring. The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank funded 
transportation projects such as bridges and road systems and strategic planning 
initiatives to guide the cityÕs territorial and sectoral restructuring. The SMG also 
hired consultants such as the Paris-based Institut dÕAmnagement et dÕUrbanisme de 
                                                
3 In 2003, China ranked fifth in terms of volume of trade, after the US, Germany, Japan and France 
(PeopleÕs Daily Online, 24 April 2003). In 2004, it replaced Japan as the worldÕs third largest trader 
following the US and Germany with its trade volume hitting US$1.15 trillion (Zhou, 2005).  
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la Rgion Ile de France (IAURIF) to assist in the development of metropolitan 
planning (Olds, 1995) (Figure 2.4).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Map of the central city of Shanghai (Source: Yusuf and Wu, 2002: 210) 
 
 
In contrast to the industrial development of past decades, Shanghai was to 
develop its tertiary sector as part of its transformation into an international economic, 
financial and trade centre. In 1978, the proportion of ShanghaiÕs GDP derived from 
tertiary trade was only 18 percent. By the end of 1990, this increased to 30.8 percent 
and grew steadily to 39.6 percent in 1994. A mix of policies was implemented to 
relocate industries out of the central city, reduce population density there, and to 
attract overseas capital, foreign technology, management skills and knowledge about 
development strategy. These policies, together with central government reform 
initiatives were designed to facilitate the restructuring of ShanghaiÕs economy in a 
similar fashion to that experienced in other world cities such as Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Tokyo and New York (Olds, 1995). An ambitious infrastructural scheme, 
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largely funded by foreign capital flows, was also conceived which included the 
construction of bridges, inner and outer ring roads, subway lines, port upgrading, a 
new international airport in Pudong, a new national fibre-optic cable network and 
massive construction of new housing and office spaces. Specific development zones 
were also identified, in the older parts of the city as well as Pudong, for high-tech 
parks, financial and trade services (Figure 2.5). The objective was to reorientate and 
reintegrate Shanghai (and the wider region) into the global economy.  
With the above policies and investments, Shanghai has recorded double-
digit overall annual economic growth for the past 10 years. Table 2.3 shows that 
ShanghaiÕs economic power has become far greater than any other city in China. Its 
GDP was larger than that of Beijing, Tianjin and Chongqing combined, and also 
more than the combined values of Guangzhou and Shenzhen, the most important 
cities in the Pearl River Delta. With the largest total volume of wholesale and retail 
sales and high residentsÕ savings and total premium income, it is the biggest trading 
centre and market in China, only moderately challenged by Beijing and Guangzhou. 
The latter were however left far behind in terms of  FDI of which Shanghai 
accounted for up to 15 percent of the countryÕs total since 1990 (see Table 2.4). 
The development of the Pudong New Area is clearly instrumental in the 
economic transformation and growth of Shanghai; it was specifically designed for 
the city to resume its former role as ChinaÕs leading international financial, trade and 
economic centre. The next section focuses on the development of this remarkable 
urban project.   
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Figure 2.5 Development zones in Shanghai (Source: Olds and Yeung, 1999: 520) 
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Table 2.3 Comparison of overall economic strength among key Chinese cities, 1999  
Cities Population 
(million) 
Area of city 
(km
2
) 
Built-up area 
(km
2
) 
GDP (billion 
RMB) 
GDP per capita 
(RMB) 
Shanghai  11.1 3924 550 361.6 32577 
Beijing  10.5 6496 488 182.5 17381 
Tianjin  6.0 4335 378 114.5 19083 
Chongqing 8.4 12449 243 57.2 6810 
Guangzhou 4.1 1444 284 145.2 35390 
Shenzhen 1.2 1949 132 143.7 119750 
Nanjing  2.8 1026 194 67.5 24107 
Hangzhou  1.8 683 171 60.5 33611 
Shenyang 4.8 3495 202 84.3 17563 
Dalian  2.6 2415 234 58.6 22538 
Wuhan  7.4 8467 208 108.6 14676 
(Source: Zaloom, 2003: 437)  
 
 
 
Table 2.4 Comparison of utilised FDI in 1999 (billion US$)  
City  Utilised FDI  
Shanghai  3.05 
Beijing  1.15 
Chongqing 0.29 
Guangzhou 2.26 
Shenzhen 1.78 
Nanjing  0.56 
Hangzhou  0.30 
Shenyang 1.02 
Dalian  1.09 
Wuhan  0.48 
(Source: Zaloom, 2003: 438) 
 
 
 
2.3  THE REMAKING OF SHANGHAI: PUDONG NEW AREA  
In April 1990, former Premier Li Peng announced the central government decision to 
develop Pudong into the largest SEZ in China. PudongÕs strategic importance in 
ChinaÕs modernization trajectory was further consolidated two years later. According 
to the 1992 Report of the 14th Chinese Communist Party Congress, Pudong was to 
act as a Ôdragon headÕ for the cities along Yangtze River and that it was urgent to 
build Shanghai into an international economic, financial and trade centre in order to 
stimulate a new economic leap forward in the Yangtze River Delta and valley (Thant 
et al., 1998: 2096).  
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For the central government, the development of Pudong contributed to more 
than just ShanghaiÕs revitalisation. Firstly, the Pudong New Area project signified 
the commitment of the central government to continue its reform and open-door 
policy (MacPherson, 1994; Thant et al., 1998; Yusuf and Wu, 2002).4 Secondly, the 
Pudong project was to facilitate the spread of investment and stimulate economic 
development along the Yangtze River. Thirdly, Pudong could also be seen as an 
economic experiment in higher levels of foreign investment and economic 
restructuring (Thant et al., 1998). Preferential treatment was allowed under specific 
policies approved by the central government, including tax breaks, greater foreign 
investment permitted than elsewhere in China and the retention of financial income 
for further development (Table 2.5). Financial support was also provided for the 
development of Pudong under the Eighth and Ninth Five-Year Plan period (1991-
1995; 1996-2000) (Table 2.6) and it was guaranteed US$0.1 billion in foreign loans 
and US$0.2 billion from the Bank of China every year (Yusuf and Wu, 2002: 213).  
 
 
 
Table 2.5 Preferential policies implemented by the central government for the Pudong New Area 
project 
¥ Tax deductions and breaks for enterprises operating in the new area.  
¥ Enterprises were to be assessed for income tax using a special low rate.  
¥ Tax-free import of materials and equipment and export of products.  
¥ Foreign investment allowed in projects such as airports, seaport, railways, highways and 
power plants, as well as in financial and retailing establishments (These areas were not 
open to foreign investors in other areas of China).  
¥ Preferential tax treatment given to domestic investors similar to that given to foreign 
investors.  
¥ Land-use rights could be transacted in the market.  
¥ Foreign investors could be directly involved in the development of large parcels of land.  
¥ Financial income from Pudong was allowed to be retained for further development and 
improvement of Pudong, instead of being submitted to the central government.  
(Adapted from Thant et al., 1998: 2097) 
 
 
 
                                                
4 It was hardly a coincidence that the announcement to develop the Pudong area was made following 
the 1989 Tiananmen Square student demonstration, as the incident led to criticisms from the 
international community and cast doubts amongst investors on ChinaÕs reforms.  
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Table 2.6 Some examples of financial support provided by the central government for the 
development of Pudong (1991-1995) 
¥ US$100 million of foreign investment per year (US$500 million in five years)  
¥ RMB200 million from central government finances per year (RMB1 billion in 5 years)  
¥ RMB300 million as a technology improvement loan per year (RMB1.5 billion in 5 years) 
¥ RMB400 million of special development loan from the PeopleÕs bank per year (RMB2 
billion in 5 years).  
(Adapted from Thant et al., 1998: 2097) 
 
 
Based on the model of ChinaÕs SEZs, Pudong has a total area of 522 square 
kilometres (roughly 1.5 times the size of urban Shanghai). Designed to relieve the 
spatial pressure on old Shanghai, Pudong has become a new centre of industrial, 
commercial and financial activities with four key development zones: Lujiazui 
Finance and Trade Zone (ShanghaiÕs new CBD), Jinqiao Export Processing Zone, 
Weigaoqiao Free Trade Zone and Zhangjiang High-Tech Park (Figure 2.6). The new 
Pudong International Airport and Weigaoqiao port are especially crucial to the 
development of Shanghai as an international commercial and trading centre.  
 
 
Figure 2.6 The Pudong New Area project (Source: Olds, 1995: 113) 
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Major industrial and property developments have been established in 
Pudong over the past decade. Baoshan Steel Corporation, ChinaÕs biggest steel 
conglomerate, has leased over 80 acres of land for a giant steel plant. JapanÕs retail 
giant Yaohan group has built the largest shopping centre in Asia in Lujiazui, at a cost 
of US$100 million. The Shanghai Security Exchange and other major financial 
institutions have also moved to new facilities in Pudong. Large TNC operations have 
also located production capacities in Pudong, including Shanghai-Bell, Eriksson, 
Phillips, Xerox, General Motors, Mitsubishi and Hitachi. During 1990-2000, a total 
of US$50.8 billion of inward foreign investment was utilised by Shanghai, of which 
US$31.2 billion (61 per cent) was in FDI (Zhang, 2003: 1557). Figure 2.7 shows the 
marked increase in FDI following the opening of Pudong in 1990. This success in 
attracting FDI was attributed to ShanghaiÕs strategic location (midway along the east 
coast Ð ChinaÕs paramount economic belt), its impressive industrialisation and 
urbanisation tradition as well as opportunities available in Pudong with its array of 
preferential policies (Olds and Yeung, 1999; Zhang, 2003).   
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Figure 2.7 Annual growth of GDP and utilised FDI in Shanghai, 1981-2000. Note: No data available 
for 1986 and 1996. (Based on Zhang, 2003: 1558)  
 
The LFTZ, situated immediately opposite the Bund in the old city centre, 
across the Huangpu River, formed the focal point of development. The traditional 
centre of the city surrounded by two commercial avenues, Nanjing Road and Huaihai 
Road, was approaching saturation; a revitalised CBD for Shanghai was to house a 
variety of business activities, especially financial and tertiary services that are the 
backbone of major world cities. This was taken up by Liujiazui, which was 
envisaged to be the Manhattan of 21st century Shanghai (Yeh, 1996; Olds, 1995). 
The new CBD in Lujiazui was to help revitalise the Bund, which housed over a 
hundred financial buildings before 1949, and transform it into ChinaÕs ÒWall StreetÓ 
(Yusuf and Wu, 2002: 214); it would thus become a modern extension of the 
colonial-era Bund, or a Ô21st century BundÕ (Olds, 1995) (Figures 2.8 and 2.9). 
Historic layers of built form and social formation had been replaced by what Olds 
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(1995: 114) conceptualised as an Òinternational standard Ôlanding stripÕ to Ôlure inÕ 
deregulated foreign finance capitalÓ.5 The Lujiazui Finance and Trade Zone was thus 
planned as ShanghaiÕs new tertiary sector centre with particular emphasis on 
financial services, as well as retail, real estate, business consulting and government 
services.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8 The revitalised Bund along Huangpu River (Source: AuthorÕs own photograph)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
5 Although my research indicates that the process is more complex due to how different actors 
interpret and respond to the nature of regulation in Shanghai. 
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Figure 2.9 The Pudong skyline across from the Bund (Source: AuthorÕs own photograph)  
 
Shanghai needed the long-term support of both Beijing and international 
investors in order to achieve its aspiration. The Chinese gatekeepers of global flows 
were certainly operating within the context of the global economy in the planning 
and transformation of Shanghai and Pudong. However, these flows were invited and 
guided into specific territorial ÔwindowsÕ, shaped into specific forms with regulatory 
restrictions and preferential policies, and subsequently exploited for various political 
and economic purposes. While Pudong was built with the aim of attracting 
international capital, its conception and development was intrinsically tied to national 
development strategies.  
 
2.4  FINANCIAL REFORMS AND SHANGHAI AS FINANCIAL CENTRE  
Watching ShanghaiÕs capital markets in the 1990s was like riding a rollercoaster 
whose brakes had failed because the ride operator had neglected to install and 
service them properly (Yatsko, 2001: 51). 
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More than just a symbolic model of ChinaÕs global aspirations and urban 
transformation, Shanghai is also the site where much of ChinaÕs financial reforms are 
implemented as the city aims to reclaim its role as an international financial centre. 
Before 1979, the Chinese financial system was characterised by mono-banking 
practices as there were only three state banks Ð the PeopleÕs Bank of China (PBOC), 
the Bank of China (BOC), and the PeopleÕs Construction Bank of China. A sphere of 
responsibility and a clientele of enterprises were specified for each bank such that the 
influence of these banks in resource allocation was minimal and their role in 
promoting economic development was very limited and passive. Subsequent reforms 
promoted more efficient resource allocation and raised economic performance 
through the mobilisation of savings, better credit allocation and macroeconomic 
stability (Xu, 1998: 2). In the mid-1980s, one of the major developments in the 
financial sector was the introduction of financial markets in bonds and securities. 
Although such markets were very small, they represented the outcome of new 
thinking about building up a more diversified financial system.  
Xu (1998: 94-98) identifies four periods of financial development from 
1979 to the early 1990s. The first was the emerging period from 1979 to 1984. 
Various forms of Ôraising funds from societyÕ (社会集?; shehui jizi) were used to 
finance the operations of township and village enterprises, raising funds directly 
from surplus units instead of through the intermediation of the formal banking 
system. The State Council also started issuing state treasury bonds in 1981 to cover 
fiscal deficits. The emergence of new financial instruments and markets during this 
period was not the outcome of explicit government policies; rather, it was wider 
economic reforms that created opportunities and new demands. The spontaneous and 
rudimentary nature of financial market development was typified by the absence of 
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professional financial bodies to direct the issue of various kinds of securities. As 
such, there were no standards for issuers to follow in setting terms and conditions 
and there was also a general lack of knowledge regarding liquidity, risk, rate of 
return and other key aspects.  
The developing period (1985-1988) saw the emergence of a money market 
for interbank transactions and a secondary market for trading securities. In 1986 
Shanghai was permitted to issue bonds in the international capital market, guaranteed 
by the central government. This raised US$3.2 billion, which was used to improve 
urban infrastructure and upgrade industrial facilities. A new fund management 
system was also introduced (Xu, 1998: 95-96). In 1985, financial institutions were 
allowed for the first time to issue financial bonds and the first such issue was made 
by the Industrial and Commerical Bank of China (ICBC) Shanghai branch to a value 
of RMB 500 million. Following the establishment of the Shanghai Short-term Fund 
Market in 1986, more than 300 fund markets appeared at provincial, regional and 
county levels. During this period, various kinds of bonds and securities were 
introduced and the term Ôfinancial marketsÕ began appearing frequently in the press 
and the concept of raising funds directly through issuing securities become more 
widely accepted.  
ShanghaiÕs financial system then entered a semi-stagnant period in 1989 
and 1990 as ChinaÕs economy started to overheat in the second half of 1988. The 
central government then adopted an austerity programme under which financial 
activities were restricted. Money markets in particular suffered from the credit 
squeeze pushed through by the PBOC. Trading in financial markets was largely 
suspended while the bond markets continued to develop albeit at a much slower 
pace.  
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Financial markets activities rebounded after 1990, during the recovery and 
expansion period, with the establishment of the first securities exchange in Shanghai 
in November 1990. After Pudong was designated a SEZ in 1990, Shanghai attracted 
four foreign bank branches later that year. The Chinese stock market was formally 
initiated in 1990 although access to the stock market was tightly controlled by the 
state through a quota system, which strongly favoured the larger state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) (Zhang, 2003). The establishment of the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SSE), one of only two in China (the smaller being in Shenzhen), was a 
milestone. Its total market capitalisation at the start of 1999 reached RMB 1.06 
billion (US$128 billion), compared with RMB 888 million (US$107 billion) at the 
countryÕs second exchange in Shenzhen, with some 480 companies listing shares (53 
more than Shenzhen). Shanghai also handles most of the countryÕs treasury bond 
trading in primary and secondary markets. In terms of companies listed and volume 
of turnover, it seemed destined to eventually surpass Hong Kong; indeed, during the 
bull markets of 1996 and 1997 the exchangeÕs daily turnover exceeded Hong KongÕs 
on some days (Yatsko, 2001: 61).  
By 1998, 41 major foreign banks had branches in Shanghai, including the 
Bank of America, Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Credit Lyonnais 
and Standard Chartered Bank, representing about 30 percent of the countryÕs total. 
Another 119 foreign financial service firms had set up representative offices in the 
city (Yatsko, 2001: 59). By early 1999, the number of foreign bank branches in 
Shanghai had climbed to 64. Major commercial banks such as Citibank and Standard 
Chartered declared Shanghai their China headquarters and moved senior executives 
in charge of China business to the city. By the end of 1998, a total of 18,984 foreign 
invested enterprises had been approved and 1,490 foreign firms had invested a total 
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of US$5.8 billion, despite the Asian financial crisis. According to the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC), there are now 72 foreign banks in Shanghai.  
Shanghai had a pioneering role in the market development process in the 
country as whole, with most of the initial experiments in financial markets formation 
originating from the city. Perhaps the most important development of the Shanghai 
stock market was the issue of so-called ÔBÕ shares in late-1991. B-shares were 
normally issued by large SOEs and targeted at foreign investors (while A-shares are 
restricted to local investors).6 They were denominated in local currency but traded in 
US dollars (in Shanghai) or HK dollars (in Shenzhen).7  The number of B-shares was 
not to exceed 49 percent of the total issued capital of the enterprises. The issue of B-
shares was intended to tap foreign funds for the countryÕs economic development. 
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 indicate the dramatic growth of the securities market in Shanghai.   
 
Table 2.7 Value of securities traded in the Shanghai market, 1986-1991 (RMB million)  
 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
State Bonds - - 236.01 764.63 2,361.19 9,810.00 
T-bond - - 263.01 760.60 2,359.30 9,154.99 
(Fiscal bond)  - - - - - - 
State construction bond - - - - 0.47 - 
Key construction bond  - - - 4.03 1.42 655.01 
(Special T-bond)  - - - - - - 
(Indexed bond)  - - - - - - 
(State Invest. Co. Bond)  - - - - - - 
(Key enterprise bond) - - - - - - 
(Capital construction bond)  - - - - - - 
Financial Bond  - - - 11.84 1.14 671.00 
(Local) Enterprise Bond  0.11 27.58 37.32 18.64 17.52 594.00 
Enterprise share .0575 2.62 4.45 7.77 49.63 1,620.00 
Total  0.685 30.2 304.78 802.88 2,429.48 12,695.00 
Note: Bonds in brackets were allowed to be traded but the value of trading was negligible.  
(Source: Xu, 1998: 115) 
 
 
 
 
                                                
6 This division in types of shares was meant to restrict foreign participation in the Chinese stock 
markets so that the Chinese state could maintain control over flows of foreign exchange into and out 
of the country. More details in Chapter 7.   
7 Similar products called H-shares are also traded in Hong Kong. See Chapter 7 for details on the 
different types of shares.    
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Table 2.8 New issues and volume of stock trading in Shanghai, 1986-1991 (RMB million)  
 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
New issues 5.80 785.60 44.90 23.30 9.00 130.60 
Trading 0.58 2.62 4.45 7.77 46.60 1620.00 
(Source: Xu, 1998: 115) 
 
 
2.5 CONCLUSION     
Over the last two decades of rapid economic development, a number of cities in Asia 
have devoted themselves to attaining global city status and climbing the urban 
hierarchy as a key development goal. Competition is intense between traditional 
rivals such as Singapore and Hong Kong, as well as other emerging nodes like Kuala 
Lumpur, Bangkok and Taipei. As ChinaÕs relationship to the global economy 
changes, cities such as Shanghai are increasingly participant in the global city 
network and active players in the emerging world economic system. In examining 
inter-city relations, Taylor (2006) noted the increasingly global orientation of 
Shanghai and its integration into the world city network. In The Global Financial 
Centres Index commissioned by the City of London (Mainelli and Yeandle, 2007) 
Shanghai was ranked 24th, ahead of Dubai, Brussels and Milan and just behind 
Amsterdam and the Channel Islands.8  
Shi and Hamnett (1998) argue that only Hong Kong, Shanghai and Beijing 
have the potential to attain leading positions in the global urban system in the future. 
Hong Kong already occupied an established spot in the global cities network, 
especially in terms of financial services and connections. Shanghai had long been a 
commercial and financial centre in the Far East before 1949 and its recent economic 
and urban transformation and international interest lend further credence to its 
aspiration of achieving its former glory. However, ShanghaiÕs development 
trajectory towards a national financial centre status had been questioned by some 
                                                
8 Beijing was ranked 36th.  
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commentators, especially with regards to its relationship with Beijing (Zhao, 2003, 
Zhao et al., 2004). BeijingÕs most significant competitive advantage lies in its role as 
the capital of centralist, socialist China for almost half a century, being the primary 
location for institutions and organisations responsible for managing and determining 
the economic and political life of the country. It is the location of the countryÕs 
central bank, along with the head offices of the many of the largest state-owned 
banks and major national companies. However, considering that it possesses the 
largest stock market, the only foreign exchange centre in the country and other 
important financial markets such as commodities exchange and futures exchange, 
Shanghai has an undisputedly important role as an economic and financial hub.  
The remarkable success of Shanghai in attracting investment in the 1990s 
needs to be understood in the context of its historical success, the rise of the 
Chinese economy and ChinaÕs historical transition towards a market economy 
towards the end of that century. In this process, the central stateÕs ambition to 
develop China into an industrialised and globalised economy and the local 
governmentÕs desire to join the ranks of global cities produced one of the 
most dramatic instances of urban and economic transformation in the 20th 
century. Official rhetoric about the development and progress of Shanghai 
often harks back to its glorious past. This is still physically evident in the 
Shanghai Pudong Development BankÕs headquarters on the Bund, which was 
formerly occupied by the Hong Kong & Shanghai Bank prior to 1949 (Figure 
2.13) (Yatsko, 2001: 56-57). On the ceiling of the neoclassical buildingÕs 
enormous lobby is a colourful mosaic depicting Shanghai, New York, 
London, Calcutta and Tokyo Ð the worldÕs most important financial and 
trading hubs in those days. The fact that Shanghai once climbed to such 
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heights makes its current aspirations all the more plausible to many in the 
international financial services industry. ChinaÕs recent entry into the WTO 
has been hailed as a milestone for its development trajectory. Amongst other 
promises, it grants foreign commercial banks the right to conduct local-
currency transactions with domestic companies within two years of ChinaÕs 
accession and with individual retail customers after five years. Overall, 
ChinaÕs WTO entry is expected to accelerate the reform of ChinaÕs state 
enterprises, banking system and financial services industry, which will almost 
certainly benefit Shanghai.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.10 The former Hong Kong & Shanghai Bank building on the Bund (Source: AuthorÕs own 
photograph)  
 
However, ShanghaiÕs success in its aspiration to be the ÔNew York of the 
EastÕ remains to be seen. Compared to developed market economies, its financial 
markets are still in their infancy and remain problematic due to the following issues. 
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First, there is a lack of self-regulating mechanisms to oversee the operations in the 
market. The role of the government in the market generally remains one of market 
creation rather then market supervision. Second, the functions of the securities 
market in promoting optimal capital flows between different industries and sectors 
remain weak as the main attraction of the stock market to both securities issuers and 
investors is its almost guaranteed short term profit. Finally, this speculation remains 
widespread, due to the lack of sound regulatory infrastructure and the general 
publicÕs ignorance about securities investment.  
In this chapter, I have examined ShanghaiÕs current development and 
aspiration in the context of its historical roles within the broader Chinese economy 
and its particular advantages in terms of its geographical location, PudongÕs SEZ 
status and special policies sanctioned by the central government to aid its 
development. In the following two chapters, I explore how we could conceptualise 
ShanghaiÕs aspiration to be a financial centre and the development of its financial 
markets within extant literature on the spaces of global financial flows, and how an 
examination of ShanghaiÕs experience could extend the theoretical boundaries of the 
geographies of money and finance and conceptualisations of ÔmarketsÕ.  
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Chapter 3  
Conceptualising Global Financial Flows  
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION   
ÒConsider [É] how fantastical are futures contracts and Eurobond markets, and 
how we, as supposedly sophisticated individuals, have placed our faith first in gold 
and silver, then in paper monies, and now in electronic representations of these 
paper tokens of ÔrealÕ value. Yet we have no choice but to take (construct) money for 
granted in this way [É] Fantastic as our faith might be, it is a necessary faith. We 
must believe in the modern money form because money greases the wheels of 
industry; money makes the world go around. Money makes possible the complexity 
of modern life and the extended divisions of labour that are at its core. Without 
global money, there can be no global trade and industry; no modern forms of 
globalisation. While money is undoubtedly an abstraction, it is also concrete. Money 
shapes the lives of men and women almost everywhere.Ó Ð Stuart Corbridge and 
Nigel Thrift (1994: 21) 
 
Even as money has become an increasingly intangible commodity, freely exchanged 
within national boundaries and in internationally competitive markets, particular 
localities remain critical to the production and reproduction of global finance and the 
uneven geographies of finance have specific impacts on localities. More than an 
impersonal force, money is a social, cultural and political process that has inherently 
spatial qualities. Even as particular configurations of space and place enable its 
historical and contemporary workings, these financial flows, networks and nodes 
have spatial consequences. In conceptualising money and global financial flows in 
this chapter, I want to emphasise three points. Firstly, I want to highlight the 
contribution of the political economy approach in emphasising the 
interconnectedness of economics and politics across international as well as national 
scales. This approach seems to have fallen out of favour (or fashion) since its heyday 
in the 1980s and early 1990s, but I would argue that it is particularly useful for 
understanding specific local or national scale phenomena by embedding them within 
an international context that emphasise flows, interconnectivity and power. The 
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second point to bear in mind is the social and cultural embeddedness of finance 
capital and financial markets. Much of this draws inspiration from the works of 
economic sociologists and anthropologists, although geographers have increasingly 
made links between the economy of international money and the distribution and 
formation of social power (Thrift, 1994; Pryke and Lee, 1995; Leyshon, 1996; 
Reszat, 2002). The world of money is discursively constructed through particular 
social-cultural practices. Finally, the world of money and global finance has a 
distinctive geography, which operates at a number of different spatial frames or 
scales. Leyshon (1996) puts it most succinctly in arguing that Òmoney does not just 
have a geography; money is itself a geographyÓ (p. 3; original emphasis).  
A number of geographers have noted the neglect of money and finance 
within economic geography research (see Leyshon, 1995; Martin, 1999c; Leyshon, 
2000). Economic geography has been preoccupied with industrial landscapes since 
its inception and throughout the 1950s and 1960s the passions of economic 
geographers and regional economists remained focused on industrial development 
and agglomeration; there were little, if any, consideration of monetary issues. Since 
the late 1980s, however, there has been a growing wave of work on the spatial 
dimensions of money and increasing recognition and appreciation of the theoretical 
and empirical importance of finance and money for understanding the forces shaping 
economic landscapes. David Harvey (1982, 1985a, 1989), for instance, started to 
elaborate on the key role of finance in his evolving Marxist theorisation of the 
uneven development and crisis-prone tendencies of the capitalist economy. There 
was also a growing number of more specific studies that dealt with the spatial 
organisation and operation of financial institutions, services and markets (Leyshon 
and Thrift, 1992; Cerny, 1993a, 1993b; Corbridge et al., 1994; Roberts, 1994; Thrift 
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and Leyshon, 1994; Leyshon, 1996; Hudson, 1999), as well as the economic, 
political and social dynamics of international financial centres (Pryke, 1991; Zukin, 
1992; Thrift, 1994; Pryke and Lee, 1995; McDowell, 1997; Porteous, 1999). This 
period was also marked by the publication of influential texts on financial geography 
by Corbridge et al. (1994), Leyshon and Thrift (1997a) and Martin (1999a).  
This chapter does not seek to provide a comprehensive overview of all the 
work undertaken in geographical accounts of money and finance (see Leyshon, 1995, 
1997, 1998; Martin, 1999c). Rather, my objective is to focus upon four main areas of 
research which falls into two broad themes: (i) the regulation of the international 
financial system and (ii) the making of financial (market)places. The former follows 
a broadly political economy perspective and latter a social constructivist perspective 
(Table 3.1). The regulation of the international financial system takes place on a 
variety of scales. In examining research on geographies of money and finance under 
the broad umbrella of political economy (section 3.2), I proceed in two stages. First, I 
deal with research focusing on the role of money and finance within broader 
historical context of capitalist accumulation and transformation. Much of this work 
was conducted in the international political economy (IPE) tradition relying on 
concepts of regulation, hegemony and post-hegemony. Second, I focus on the 
complex and dynamic relationship between finance capital and nation-states. How do 
states regulate their own national economic spaces and financial flows? How do they 
frame finance capital and what are the implications for the rise of the competitive 
state? The second perspective has become more popular as geographers become 
dissatisfied with the limitations of a political economy interpretation. Under the 
umbrella of social constructivism, in section 3.3, I examine a more social and 
cultural interpretation of international financial centres and the centrality of 
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knowledge (its formation, interpretation and circulation). The conceptual treatment 
and framing of ÔmarketsÕ will be covered in the next chapter (Chapter 4).   
 
Table 3.1 Conceptualising global financial flows 
Political economy perspective Social constructivist perspective 
Money and the international financial system The making of international financial centres 
States and finance capital Framing markets 
 
In what follows I examine research in the above areas by outlining their 
position within the broad theoretical perspective and their contribution to the 
literature. After outlining each area of research, I discuss how these ideas and 
concepts informed my research on ÔmarketsÕ and ShanghaiÕs development, how they 
influenced the framing of my research questions and the theoretical contribution of 
my empirical research.  
 
3.2 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY PERSPECTIVE  
The political economy approach featured prominently in earlier studies on 
geographies of money and finance. The term Ôgeopolitical economyÕ can be traced to 
the works of David Harvey (1985b), John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge (Agnew and 
Corbridge, 1989; Corbridge and Agnew, 1991) and refers to geographical and 
structural shifts in power between states, between states and markets, and between 
groups of social and economic actors involved in the regulation and operation of 
markets (Leyshon, 1995) as the globalisation of capital and ideas disrupted 
traditional forms of sovereignty and international regulation. Many of these studies 
focused on understanding the dynamics of financial capital in terms of international 
relations and global political economy. Regulatory changes, technological 
innovations and the globalisation of markets and monetary flows are remapping the 
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financial landscape towards increasing deterritorialisation but states remain 
important arbiters in determining the shape and speed of such processes. They 
continue to exert significant influence within their national space economies as well 
as on the international arena. Research within the political economy perspective thus 
covers various spatial scales from global systemic analysis to national strategies to 
financial centres at the city-level.  
 
3.2.1 Money and the International Financial System 
This area of research is concerned with the broader transformation of space, of which 
the work of David Harvey is particularly important. In The Limits to Capital (1982), 
Harvey provides an incisive analysis of the dynamics of the financial system under 
capitalism. The role of money and finance, in particular, is given centre stage in 
examining the circulation and accumulation of capital and their spatial implications.  
He argues that the imperatives of the financial system have brought about a world 
characterised by time-space compression. This shrinking of the world occurs as 
capitalist producers are locked into a perpetual race to exploit new markets and to 
reduce the turnover time of capital, which brought about a major transformation in 
the nature of capitalism as a whole. Harvey thus connects with regulation theory in 
explaining why capitalism appears to be increasingly beset by crisis and volatility, 
such as how and why the relative stability of the ÒFordist-KeynesianÓ era had been 
dislocated by the rise of Òflexible accumulationÓ, brought about by an acceleration of 
time-space compression (Harvey, 1989). Harvey then goes on to connect with a 
broader IPE literature that examines the ways in which the international monetary 
and financial system constitute a kind of regulatory space, holding together broader 
processes of accumulation. This research draws attention to the changing scale of 
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financial activity that had become increasingly globalised, and its implications for 
state actors and the international financial system.   
There is no all-encompassing definition of the term ÔregulationÕ but 
Leyshon and Thrift (1997a: 60) offer two uses of the term that are prevalent in the 
literature. Firstly, regulation refers to the maintenance of a systemic equilibrium, in 
which an economic or social system is controlled by a Ôgoverning mechanismÕ. 
Second, it refers to a framework of legal and administrative rules. Both 
interpretations are often mutually constitutive. The form of systemic equilibrium in 
operation will influence the drafting of rules and guidelines, which are used to ensure 
that the system reproduces itself. Despite the restraining imposition of regulatory 
measures, crises remain a persistent feature within capitalist economies because all 
systems of regulation are fragile and temporal within a highly dynamic and spatially 
variegated capitalist system. As economic agents continually seek to surmount 
barriers to the generation of profits and value, the nature of activities being regulated 
often change in ways that render existing governing mechanisms redundant. 
Moreover, the spatially bounded nature of regulation (often organised according to 
political-territorial boundaries) makes it possible for economic agents to move 
between different Ôregulatory spacesÕ in order to circumvent constraints associated 
with particular regulatory regime. This form of Ôregulatory arbitrageÕ (Leyshon and 
Thrift, 1997a; Cerny, 1993a) has increased dramatically with improvements in 
information and communication technologies (ICT) (see Leyshon, 1996).  
An important influence in this area of research is the notion of hegemonic 
stability Ð the idea that one powerful state will impose order on the international 
financial system such that it provides a platform on which more general processes of 
capital accumulation follows. Studies on the making and breaking of earlier systems 
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of international regulation in the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries largely focus on British 
financial capitalism and the pivotal role of the City of London (Chapman, 1992; 
Michie, 1992; Rubinstein, 1993; Kynaston, 1994), and the rise and fall of U.S. 
financial hegemony during the post-war period (Corbridge and Agnew, 1991; 
Leyshon, 1992; Cerny, 1993b). In the late-19
th
 century, an international gold 
standard was constructed as an attempt at economic regulation at the international 
level. This rule of money consolidated the power of the City of London as adherence 
to principles of free trade was in line with the financial rationality and economic 
liberalism that governed development within Britain. This form of regulatory order 
was soon undermined by rising industrial powers such as the USA, Germany and 
Japan as their developmentalist orientation involved some degree of closure from the 
international economy, usually through protectionist barrier to trade and capital. The 
rise of nationally regulated capitalism eventually overrode the prevailing regulatory 
mechanisms of international order and facilitated the breaking away from the gold 
standard (Eichengreen, 1996; Rothbard, 1998; Yeager, 1998). In the immediate post-
war era, the Bretton Woods system was constructed as an attempt to build an 
international order that allows separate accumulation strategies to be pursued but 
prevent states from retreating into defensive blocs (Corbridge, 1994b). During the 
period of 1945 to 1971, the US dollar was linked directly to gold while all other 
currencies were linked indirectly through fixed exchange rates against the dollar. 
This system of fixed exchange rates was to bring stability to the currency markets 
and facilitate international trade. With post-war economic recovery in the core 
capitalist states, however, accumulation soon came up against the limits of the 
national market. As economic activity became increasingly internationalised, the 
geographical integrity of national economies was eroded and regulatory dislocation 
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began to unfold. The development of Euromarkets, for example, threatened the 
control that national governments exercised over national space-economies and 
symbolised the emerging power and mobility of private capital (see Corbridge, 
1994a). Eventually, various regulatory contradictions and pressures forced the 
system to collapse in 1973, which brought about a more volatile and spatially 
extensive global financial system that is less conducive to the regulatory strictures of 
national governments (Underhill, 1991; Gill, 1992; Gill, 1993; Cerny, 1993b; 
Helleiner, 1993b, 1994; Corbridge, 1994a; Leyshon and Tickell, 1994).  
Even though it seems to offer a progressive and contextualised 
interpretation of the international political economy, the concept of hegemonic 
stability has been criticised by a number of researchers (Cerny, 1993b; Corbridge, 
1994a; Leyshon and Tickell, 1994). Cerny (1993b), for example, points out that 
ÔBritish hegemonyÕ in the 19
th
 century was actually controlled not by the British state 
per se but by a structure of powerful financial market actors that might have been 
centred in London but which stretched around the financial world. This wider 
network was essentially a transnational one cutting across British, French and other 
financial systems and tying them into a set of international norms and practices, 
underpinned by the gold standard. Be that as it may, a more volatile financial system 
has significant implications for corporate behaviour and national and regional 
development. An important sub-theme within this area of research has been to 
consider regulatory changes and experiments in Europe that were introduced to inject 
some measure of monetary stability in response to the collapse of Bretton Woods and 
in pursuit of the European integration project (Swyngedouw, 1992; Leyshon and 
Thrift, 1992; Leyshon and Thrift, 1995). Furthermore, there is an increasing shift in 
power towards the transnational interests of social elites, particularly those associated 
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with global financial capital as documented in the works of Gill (1990, 1992), 
Leyshon and Tickell (1994) and Underhill (1994).  
These developments led researchers to consider the concept of post-
hegemony as the internationalisation of economic activity beyond and across the 
space-economies of individual states undermine the coherence of the old hegemonic 
order. Cerny (1993b), for example, argues that future national control would be 
limited, indirect and constrained to conform to the imperatives of the transnational 
financial markets. Governments, international regimes and regulatory authorities 
within governments will become increasingly squeezed between different sectors and 
forms in the financial services industry seeking the most ÔamenableÕ regulators and 
permissive rules. Different Ôstate actorsÕ linked into different policy communities 
will increasingly operate within transnational networks, with securities regulators 
establishing networks with counterparts abroad as well as with multinational 
securities firms, as they compete with similar networks among banking or insurance 
regulators and so on. In this sense:  
Hegemonic power no longer resides in one territorial state (if it ever did); it resides 
in a number of nodal points (and vectors or flows) that describe a decentred 
hegemonic core. (Corbridge, 1994a: 1849)  
This decentred hegemonic core is anchored by a variety of actors, including 
supranational organisations such as the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), large private capital and particular actors or communities (be they 
policy, finance or other interest groups) in the USA, European Union and Japan. 
Figure 3.1 shows how these major core-regions or institutions of capitalism and other 
ÔlesserÕ city-regions are held together by circuits of capital, pulling them ever 
inwards through changing configurations to prevent the international system from 
unravelling.  
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Figure 3.1 State of post-hegemony after Bretton Woods (Source: Corbridge, 1994a: 1850)  
 
Implications for Research  
How is the changing governance of ShanghaiÕs financial system typical (or not) of 
changes in the international financial system? London was the undisputed leader in 
international finance in the 19
th
 century as the City benefited from the imperial 
activities of Great Britain. The USA, however, took over this position in the mid-20
th
 
century as New York started to finance much of EuropeÕs debt following the Second 
World War (Budd, 1999; Hudson, 1999). Japan was predicted to take over as the 
leading international financial centre in the 1980s, as its banks became the largest 
and most powerful in the world and Tokyo controlled large flows of international 
finance capital. This vision, however, was never realised due to various geopolitical 
and economic factors (Helleiner, 1993a; Leyshon, 1994). In the 21
st
 century, there is 
increasing interest and concern regarding the rise of China (in the economic as well 
as geopolitical realm) and the possible dominance of Shanghai as an international 
financial centre (Ratliff and Gu, 2006; Kynge, 2007; D. Smith, 2007).  
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Following the concept of post-hegemony, we should discard any false 
expectation of hegemonic stability in the form of having one powerful state impose 
global regulatory order, but it is worth considering what impact a more powerful 
China might have on the global flows and configurations of capital. On 21 July 2005, 
China departed from a regime of fixed exchange rate by having the renminbi (RMB) 
weighted against a basket of currencies instead of pegged to the US dollar. This 
measure is still tightly controlled by the state, allowing only minimal currency 
fluctuation. However, there are also clear indications of international influence and 
cooperation as different Chinese state actors, such as regulators of banking and 
securities sectors, connect with their counterparts in the City of London, New York, 
Hong Kong and Singapore for expertise and knowledge transfer. The influence of 
global institutions such as the WTO is also clearly implicated in the deregulation of 
ChinaÕs financial services and economic strategies. The issue of power is foremost in 
this consideration and my empirical research highlights the complex nature of these 
processes and how they might be contested by a variety of actors and institutions 
within China and in the international community.  
 
3.2.2 The Relationship between States and Finance Capital  
Owners of finance capital, especially international financial institutions but also 
increasingly states themselves, began to switch money rapidly between national 
economies as they seek to avoid devaluation of money capital. With this practice of 
spatial-regulatory arbitrage, national economic policies became increasingly 
sensitive to the power of international money and orientated to the pursuit of low 
inflation and relative price stability in the constant bid to retain such Ôhot moneyÕ. 
This growing power of financial capital vis--vis the state at an international level 
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was paralleled by an inability of nation-states to control the creation and circulation 
of money within the national economy (Jessop et al., 1990). Advances in ICT 
accelerated the rate of product and process innovation within the financial sector that 
continually undermines the regulatory power of the state. The state attempts to 
enforce financial prudence and responsibility by constraining the behaviour of 
financial institutions, often through structural regulation; that is, a form of regulation 
that demarcates the financial system, and is designed to restrict financial institutions 
to prescribed areas of financial activity. But while the partitioning of the financial 
system is designed to constrain activities of financial institutions and offset the 
development of a systemic crisis, this mode of regulation tends to be undermined by 
the inherent tendency for these institutions to engage in financial innovation. This is 
a process by which financial institutions develop new financial instruments that 
enable them to move outside of existing regulatory frameworks and into new areas of 
financial activity as yet unconstrained by regulatory control (see Table 3.2). This 
tendency towards financial innovation ensures that the regulatory and supervisory 
authorities of the state are faced with the constant task of reappraising and 
restructuring the regulatory framework. Therefore, Òby nature [regulation] is reactive 
rather than proactiveÓ (Laulajainen, 2000: 228). As money capital became 
increasingly internationalised, it brought about a tendency for the power of 
international finance capital to wax and for the economic power of individual nation-
states to wane (Leyshon and Thrift, 1992).  
 
 
 
 
 53 
Table 3.2 Financial innovations in the United States, 1970-1982  
Types 
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A. Cash Management  
Money market mutual funds  
Cash management/sweep accounts  
Money market certificates  
Debit card  
NOW accounts  
ATS accounts  
Point of sale terminals  
Automated clearing houses  
CHIPS (same-day settlement)  
Automated teller machines  
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* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
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B. Investment contracts  
Primary market  
Floating rate notes  
Deep discount (zero coupon) bonds  
Stripped bonds  
Bonds with put options or warrants  
Floating prime rate loans  
Variable rate mortgages  
Commodity linked (silver) bonds  
Eurocurrency bonds  
Interest rate futures  
Foreign currency futures  
Cash settlement (stock index) futures  
Options on futures  
Pass-through securities  
 
Consumer type  
Universal life insurance  
Variable life policies  
IRA/Keogh accounts  
Municipal bonds funds  
All-saver certificates  
Equity access account  
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C. Market structures  
Exchange-traded options  
Direct public sale of securities  
Green Mountain Power Co.  
Shelf registration  
Electronic trading  
NASDAQ  
GARBAN  
Discount brokerage  
Interstate depository institutions  
    
 
 
* 
* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* 
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* 
 
 
 
 
* 
 
 
 
* 
* 
  
* 
D. Institutional organisation  
Investment bankers/Commodity dealers 
Salomon/Phibro, Goldman Sachs/J. Aron, 
DLJ/ACLI  
Brokers/general finance Shearson/Amex, 
Bache/Prudential Schwab/Bank of 
America  
Thrifts with commercial banks  
Financial centres (Sears Roebuck)  
 
* 
 
 
 
* 
    
* 
 
 
 
* 
  
 
 
 
 
* 
 
 
* 
 
 
 
* 
(Source: Leyshon and Thrift, 1997a: 131-132) 
 
Cerny (1993a) identifies a Ôfirst financial revolutionÕ in the late-18
th
 and 
early-19
th
 centuries and a Ôsecond financial revolutionÕ in the 1980s and 1990s. The 
first phase was driven by the imperatives of the nation-state and the state-based 
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international system. This involved the consolidation and expansion of the state 
apparatus itself, which required secure sources of capital, and the rise of economic 
competition between nation-states, which required the expansion of national wealth 
and development of new production and consumption processes. Finance was widely 
seen as a vital strategic industry, too important to be left to the market alone, which 
resulted in the incremental development of financial regulation. The main principle 
of regulation was compartmentalisation, which involved the separation of different 
financial ÔmarketsÕ to prevent failure in one from creating a chain reaction through 
the others (as had happened in 1929). This nationally based system became 
increasingly difficult to sustain with the rapidly expanding world of international 
integration of production and trade. The second financial revolution was a 
consequence of this structural contradiction and financial market deregulation was a 
response to the inadequacy of such nationally based regulatory systems to deal with 
the new internationalisation of finance.  
The term ÔderegulationÕ, however, masks a complex process of regulatory 
change. Regulations cannot merely be lifted as the very operation of market 
economies is dependent on the existence of a priori rules and mechanisms to deal 
with market failures. This so-called ÔderegulationÕ has not resulted in a reduction of 
regulation or overall state intervention but has generally led to a complex process of 
drafting new regulation Ð a process more usefully conceptualised as Ôre-regulationÕ 
(Cerny, 1993a). The major changes in financial market structures driving this process 
of re-regulation are a) decompartmentalisation, b) disintermediation and 
securitisation, c) financial innovation, d) marketisation of the state, and e) 
globalisation. These processes are briefly described in Table 3.3.  
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Table 3.3 Re-regulation and changes in financial market structures 
a) Decompartmentalisation ! Removing geographical or hierarchical limitations 
within particular financial sectors or between different 
functions.  
! E.g. the lifting of exchange controls and credit controls 
following the ÔBig BangÕ in the City of London 
b) Disintermediation and securitisation  ! Twin processes  
! Disintermediation concerns the slower growth or 
decline in supply of intermediated bank credit (i.e. 
loans)  
! Securitisation involves the growth of negotiable 
securities issues and trading  
c) Financial innovation  ! The development of new financial (mostly securities 
and Ôoff-balance-sheetÕ) instruments  
! Take advantage of regulatory loopholes or the lack of 
regulatory structures, in the continuous search for 
higher returns on capital  
d) Marketisation of the state ! Changing role of governments not merely as 
regulators but as participants in the markets 
themselves 
! Goals: ensuring their own solvency; manipulating 
monetary and fiscal levers; and promoting 
international competitiveness of home-based firms 
e) Globalisation ! The crystallisation of transnational linkages  
! Enabled and accelerated by ICT 
! Intertwined with all of the changes above  
(Based on: Cerny, 1993a: 56-69) 
 
These developments have changed relationships between states and finance 
capital especially with respect to the rise of the Ôcompetitive stateÕ. A fundamental 
reworking of the relations between capital and space underpins and reinforces the 
contraction of the Keynesian welfare state. According to Castells (2000), the 
Ônetwork societyÕ of contemporary capitalism has become dominated by a Ôspace of 
flowsÕ rather than a Ôspace of placesÕ as advances in ICT enabled capital to become 
not only mobile but hypermobile (Warf, 1999). This hypermobility of capital led to 
the emergence of a globalised, post-Fordist production regime that rode on a global 
wave of deregulation and privatisation, new trade regimes, and the integration of 
world financial markets. The emergence of the post-Keynesian state reflected the 
inability of the welfare state to adjust to the realities of late-20
th
 century capitalism. 
As the difficulty of ÔtrappingÕ capital led to heightened competition between 
localities, planning became more concerned with market rationality and local 
competitiveness rather than comprehensiveness and equity. Hypermobility thus 
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pressured national and local governments to accommodate global capital in ever 
more earnest ways, but other factors like pools of expertise, specialised information 
and institutional thickness concurrently increased in significance. The winners of this 
process have been particular global cities that have become attuned to the rhythms of 
the global economy and adept at pinning down hypermobile capital and offshore 
financial centres (OFCs). The wave of deregulation and liberalisation policies 
introduced in the leading industrial nations from the mid-1970s onwards was an on-
going attempt to embed their markets into specific territorial and regulatory spaces. 
Table 3.4 summarises the changing regimes of financial regulation during the post-
war period.  
 
Table 3.4 The changing regimes of financial regulation  
Period Regime of regulation  Characteristics  
Mid-1940s to 
early-1970s 
Embedded liberalism ! National regulatory system bound by fixed 
exchange and capital controls, underpinned by 
the international convertibility of the dollar 
Late-1950s to 
early-1960s  
Regulatory challenge of 
Euromarkets 
! Differences in national regulatory systems 
established concept of Ôregulatory asymmetryÕ 
between financial centres  
! International demand for dollar deposits outside 
the control of Federal Reserve led to Euro dollar 
market being established in London, which had 
the most liberal regulatory regime 
Mid-1970s to 
mid-1980s 
Successive international 
deregulation 
! Aftermath of the Bretton Woods system created 
the need for some international Ôthermostatic 
deviceÕ to recycle excess, in particular dollar 
liquidity  
! New technologies, financial innovation and the 
need for risk-managing financial instruments 
created the environment in which New York stock 
exchange was deregulated in 1975 
! The potential loss of LondonÕs international 
position led successive British governments to 
consider deregulation from 1978 onwards, 
culminating in ÔBig BangÕ in 1986 which increased 
LondonÕs international exposure  
! The other major centres in the European time 
zone quickly followed suit, albeit on a smaller 
scale  
! The locus of a few large financial centres embeds 
international flows in these few places  
Late-1980s 
onwards 
New re-regulation ! Increased systemic risk from increased exposure 
to derivatives and fall-out from associated 
scandals, as well as the East Asian crisis, leading 
to demands for global re-regulation  
! In the European Union, the single European 
Market Programme of 1992 extends Europe-wide 
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regulation to financial markets 
! Combination of electronic trading and moves 
toward regulatory Ôlevel playing fieldÕ threatens 
locational embeddedness of large centres though 
increase in placeless financial flows  
! Negotiation of real estate markets as strategy of 
re-regulating and re-embedding financial flows 
into specific financial locales 
(Source: Budd, 1999: 119) 
 
The privatisation of national economies was another trend that became 
ubiquitous alongside processes of deregulation and re-regulation. From a 
regulationist point of view, the large scale state-ownership of services and industries 
in the 20
th
 century formed a logical component of the Fordist regime of economic 
production and accumulation. But since the 1980s, this model has been unravelling 
under the pressures of transnational flows of trade and finance. The privatisation of 
public-sector activities was partly due to the collapse of the Keynesian welfare state 
model, but also partly a product of political-ideological motives to create a Ôpopular 
capitalismÕ by spreading individual share-ownership across society. ÔSelling off the 
stateÕ became a global phenomenon and accepted state economic policy, especially 
in the former socialist bloc (Martin, 1999b). In the case of Britain, for example, the 
privatisation of British Telecom and the flotation of other state assets were amongst 
the core policies of Thatcherism. MartinÕs (ibid.) study shows that the ambition to 
make Britain a nation of shareholders was, however, largely unfulfilled as there was 
a larger increase in institutional investors than individual investors. The size of large 
institutional shareholders was such that they could have considerable influence over 
equity markets and company stock valuations. The rise of this Ômoney manager 
capitalismÕ, in which large international financial institutions came to own significant 
portions of economic assets (through their control of finance capital) in various 
national economies around the world became a considerable economic force that 
state actors had to reckon with.  
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More recent work within this tradition has explored the transformation of 
financial space in more detail, such as the growth of ÔoffshoreÕ financial spaces, 
where more permissive regulatory environments served as havens from the 
restrictions that national governments placed on financial activities (Roberts, 1994, 
1995; Hudson, 1998, 1999; Cobb, 1998). Hudson (1999), for example, examines the 
links between onshore and offshore regulatory spaces in the development of 
international banking facilities in US and its relationship to offshore financial 
activities in the Bahamas and Cayman Islands. The development of OFCs was in part 
a response to increasing onshore restrictions. International banking facilities were 
then established in the US to attract monies back onshore although they failed to do 
so due to a variety of social and historical reasons.  
Leyshon and Thrift (1997a) speculated on the rise of a Ôphantom stateÕ in 
which governance is no longer based on individual nation-states but rather 
transnational linkages of overlapping actor-networks: the nation-state, the media, 
money capitalists and machine intelligence. During the Bretton Woods period, 
money capitalists were held in check by state regulation. Post-Bretton Woods, power 
shifted back to money capitalists who have gone global with advances in ICT. But 
even as power shifted from state-based institutions to transnational actors and 
increasingly disembedded flows, the pressures of multiple networks lead to the need 
for embodied, interpersonal and face to face interaction. Therefore there is both an 
invisible and visible hand Ð disembedded electronic spaces as well as re-embedded 
set of meeting places. Places such as the City of London, for example, became a 
centre for face to face communication, electronic information gathering and 
transmission, textual interpretation, cultural authority (ibid.: 318-319). The rise of a 
Ôphantom stateÕ is thus based on ICT and a few (g)localities, consisting of actor-
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networks that rely on money-power and communicative power rather than 
bureaucratic administrative power of the state form.  
Even as some scholars point to the shift in power from states to markets 
(Strange, 1994; Clark, 1999; Martin, 1999b; Warf, 1999), others have pointed to the 
continued relevance of the state in the international financial system through its 
regulatory role (Budd, 1999; Helleiner, 1995; Laulajainen, 2000). States remain 
important arbiters in determining the shape of finance and governments have 
continued to put considerable efforts at writing international rules in favour of either 
firms from their territories, such as the U.S. lobbying of the Bank for International 
Settlements and the WTO, or their territorial interests, evident in how the Bank of 
England promotes the interests of the City of London (Cohen, 1998). The role of the 
state is clearly vital in creating and maintaining the physical infrastructure that is 
necessary for a cityÕs high standing within the network of global cities, but national 
and local state agents are also highly implicated through their contributions to the 
institutional infrastructure of these cities. State regulation, in particular, is an 
important part of Ôinstitutional thicknessÕ (Amin and Thrift, 2000) Ð a product of the 
interaction and collective strategies of institutions of all kinds, including firms, 
financial institutions, trade associations, non- or inter-governmental organisations, 
economic development agencies as well as state and local governments Ð that seems 
to set successful places and regions apart from others in the global economy. The 
growing importance of supranational organisations and international forums of 
monetary and economic coordination, such as the Group of Seven (Gill, 1993) and 
Bank for International Settlements (Simmons, 1993) are also noted. All these 
development has a tendency towards ÔdeterritorialisationÕ such that conventional 
understandings of state power and economic boundaries are blurred and works on 
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geographies of money and finance become more concerned with flux, fluidity and 
the geography of flows (Thrift and Johnston, 1993).  
At this point, it is important to note that the end result of the above 
processes is not an evenly integrated, global 24-hour financial market-place or that 
the international financial system has brought about the Ôend of geographyÕ (O'Brien, 
1992). The development of transnational market structures has been very uneven and 
although the major trends are toward global integration, most markets can be found 
along a continuum from being highly globalised to being essentially national with 
some transnational linkages. The world, therefore, remains a patchwork of different 
financial spaces or systems; the patchwork that is the nation-state, to a certain extent, 
represents a geography of capitalisms (Agnew, 1994; Lash and Urry, 1994). What is 
clear is that such developments point to tensions emerging in the geography of 
money and finance, between processes of disembedding and homogenisation on the 
one hand and re-embedding and difference on the other (Leyshon, 1996).  
 
Implications for Research  
Within the long-term context of regulatory changes, different models of financial 
systems have fallen in and out of favour throughout history (Leyshon and Thrift, 
1997; Warf, 1999; Martin, 1999). A mode of structural regulation is prominent 
within the Marxist perspective that views the finance sector as being parasitic, as 
well as with the Keynesian model that emphasises control due to the fear of 
contagion. This was seen in the compartmentalisation of financial activities prevalent 
in the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries. With the crisis of the Keynesian state and Fordist 
regime of accumulation, this gave way to a different mode of regulation that tends to 
set broad guidelines and emphasise notions of accountability and transparency 
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instead of centralised control. The first model views the role of finance as being 
solely to lubricate the wheels of the economy, and the objective is therefore to be 
conservative so as to limit the risk of crisis and contagion. This is in contrast with the 
second model that has a very different self-image in which finance has a purpose in 
and of itself, with its own autonomy, authority and logic that operate in a brave new 
world of brash financiers and fluid rules (Budd, 1999). As such, it should not be 
constricted but allowed to flourish and innovate, albeit within certain guidelines and 
a fair regulatory environment.  
How is ChinaÕs financial system reforms and process of market formation 
reflective of the above trends? The first view seems to match ChinaÕs current 
experience as its regulators seek to enforce and maintain control over every aspect of 
the financial system as far as possible. Unlike commercial banks in the UK, US or 
Singapore, banks in China are much more limited in the types of financial activities 
they are allowed to conduct. For example, while a single bank in New York might 
offer bank deposits, asset management, financial leasing and consultancy, these 
activities are divided up among separate and specialised financial institutions. The 
rationale is that if one part of the financial market should fail, the crisis would be 
confined to one sector and not spread across the system as a whole, thereby limiting 
the economic and social impact (and political consequences, by implication). The 
priority of limiting risk and contagion is clear.  
The stock market listing process is another example. Every initial public 
offering (IPO) application has to be individually approved by the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) according to a rather opaque list of criteria that 
includes a quota for each province. If the quota for a particular province has been 
exceeded for that year, a company would not be able to list during that round. On the 
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other hand, a less competent and valuable company from another province that has 
not filled its quota would be able to list that year. In recent years, new IPOs have also 
been suspended due to fears that the market is not able to absorb new IPOs. Such 
decisions are thus taken out of the Ôinvisible handsÕ of the market and market 
participants and firmly held within the visible hands of the regulators. The fear of 
losing control (and the possibility of dire consequences) is clearly holding back the 
pace of financial reforms.  
Even as states remain important arbiters in determining the shape of finance 
within their national economies, they have to negotiate with a range of actors and 
institutions that operate on and across spatial scales: from international financial 
institutions and individual money capitalists to other state actors and interest groups. 
By engaging in a detailed enquiry into the process of market formation in Shanghai, 
my research findings could offer valuable insights into how state actors manage 
tensions between the desire to maintain regulatory control and the imperative of 
global financial capital.  
 
3.3 THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH: THE MAKING OF 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRES   
Within the literature on geographies of money and finance, an alternative approach to 
the relationship between money, space and place can be labelled broadly as social 
constructivist. This approach, which has proved particularly popular over the last 
decade, rejects smooth linear accounts of social change and favours instead 
disjunctive, interrupted and non-linear accounts. In contrast to the notion of progress 
and the value of rationality encapsulated by the political economy approach, social 
constructivism sees ÔtruthÕ and our understanding of the world as contingent and 
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contextual, varying across time and place. This breaks from the tradition of treating 
and defining money as purely economic as geographers seek inspiration from the 
work of sociologists who see money as a partial and anthropological phenomenon. 
This belies the idea of a single, centred model of money in favour of viewing money 
as being constituted in different networks of human practices and used and thought 
of in different ways. Monetary networks can thus be conceptualised according to 
different properties and practices, such as calculative practices, regulative practices, 
spatial practices, reflexive practices, and practices of sociability (Leyshon and Thrift, 
1997a: 189-190).  
How does a more social and cultural construction of money and finance 
improve our understanding of global financial space and places? The persistence, and 
indeed, increasing importance of international financial centres as strategic basing 
points for global capital in a world of fast-flowing and switching monies is a paradox 
that has particularly benefited from a social constructivist perspective. Its critical 
stance on the construction of ÔknowledgeÕ and ÔrealityÕ highlights the importance of 
problematising taken-for-granted categories such as money (Leyshon and Thrift, 
1997a; Leyshon, 1997), gender (Rose, 1993) and the economy (O'Neill and Gibson-
Graham, 1999).   
As opportunities arise due to regulatory gaps in different national systems 
(e.g. between New York and London, which led to the development of the 
Eurodollar market), international financial markets grew out of a combination of 
official policy and market responses. The increased globalisation of finance is due to 
the constant search for above average returns through financial innovation and risk 
management. This led to the rise of a Ôglobal neoclassicismÕ whereby financial 
globalisation is the agency through which national economies become subservient to 
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international markets (Budd, 1999). Although the internationalisation of financial 
markets may have promoted the conditions for global neoclassicism, the change in 
the nature of the relationship between money and space is complex and specific 
localities remain critical in the production and reproduction of global finance, as 
evident in studies done on the development and territorial embeddedness of financial 
centres (Roberts, 1994; Leyshon and Thrift, 1997b; Thrift, 1998; Budd, 1999; 
Hudson, 1999; Porteous, 1999) as well as their social and cultural constructions 
(Thrift, 1994, 1996, Clark and O'Conner, 1997; Leyshon, 1997; Reszat, 2002). The 
concept of monetary networks, for example, was particularly instructive in 
theoretical analyses that explored the mutual constitution of the global and the local 
(see Martin, 1994; Clark and OÕConner, 1997; Beaverstock, 2002), in which Òthere is 
not a global financial structure Ôout thereÕ, as a deus ex machina, but rather a 
spatially distributed network of money/social power which encompasses the globeÉ 
[The] local and the global intermesh, running into one another in all manner of waysÓ 
(Thrift, 1990: 81; quoted in Tickell, 2000: 235).  
Although the international importance of the City of London, for example, 
in the international financial system was vigorously promoted by a series of 
regulatory decisions made by the British authorities (such as those relating to the 
ÔBig BangÕ in the 1980s) (Pryke, 1991; Strange, 1994), financial centres also develop 
and are sustained by information, expertise and contacts (Porteous, 1999). Economic 
geographers have sought to unravel the apparent paradox of the durability and 
persistence of international financial centres in an age where ICT would appear to be 
shrinking the world in dimensions of both time and space (Marshall, 1988; Daniels, 
1987, 1993). Although not strictly in the social constructivist vein, the works of 
Saskia Sassen (1991, 1999, 2000, 2002a) have been instrumental in theorising the 
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role of centrality and concentration in the development of international financial 
centres. She argues that the transformation of the world economy over the last two 
decades has been accompanied by a shift towards services and finance, which have 
renewed the importance of major cities as sites for certain types of activities and 
functions. These global cities are centres of command in the organisation of the 
world economy, as key locations, marketplaces and major sites of production and 
innovation for finance and specialised services. But even as particular cities (such as 
London and New York) become dominant, global cities must inevitably engage one 
another in fulfilling their functions as this new form of growth seen in these cities are 
the results of these networks of cities Ð ÒThere is no such entity as a single global 
cityÓ (Sassen, 2000: 4, see also Knox and Taylor, 1995; Sassen, 2002b).  
The notion of centrality is extended by Nigel Thrift (1994, 1996) who 
focuses on the importance of culture and embodiment within the monetary networks 
that make up the modern financial centre. He explains why international financial 
centres have not simply melted into a generalised and electronic Ôspace of flowsÕ 
(Castells, 2000) by considering the influence of a wide range of social and cultural 
factors contributing to their success and survival. This departs from a more abstract 
political economy approach by conceptualising financial centres as active and 
dynamic ensembles of networks Ð of bodies, machines, concepts, interpretations and 
information. Information is particularly important as the role of a financial centre is 
to generate, capture and interpret the vast amounts of monetary information that 
flows through every day. Rather than merely physical locations of financial markets 
and institutions, international financial centres are centres of representation and chief 
points of surveillance for the global finance industry, centres of expertise where 
product innovation and marketing are conducted, and centres of social interaction 
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amongst finance workers (Thrift, 1994: 335-336). Successful monetary networks 
within the financial system are bound to particular places; to go beyond the network 
and localities means stepping outside the loop of information, knowledge and 
interpretation. Such a step could be extremely costly in a financial world that has 
become increasingly complex and speeded up. Focusing on the City of London, 
Thrift shows how the CityÕs role as a centre of knowledge, expertise and contacts, of 
narrativity, has persisted and even increased in importance with the increase in speed 
and volume of capital flows and human mobility.  
The issue of trust is another important feature of the literature, which 
explores how the business of finance still thrives on close inter-firm and inter-
personal relationships, such that physical proximity as being in an international 
financial centre is integral to the operation and reproduction of the financial system 
itself. Although formal institutions and mechanisms exist that underwrite trust in 
finance, such as credit rating agencies Standard & Poor and MoodyÕs (Sinclair, 1994, 
2000, 2001), informal and personal relationships continue to be vital lubricants in the 
wheels of international finance. As the financial system becomes increasingly 
complex, such trust relationships have also become central strategies to reduce risk 
through the development and maintenance of interpersonal relationships, often 
achieved through regular face-to-face contact (Zuker, 1986; Boden, 1994). This 
Òactive construction of trustÓ (Thrift, 1994: 335) is more easily performed in 
relatively spatially circumscribed spaces such as financial centres, although trust 
relationships are also vulnerable to abuse, as in the case of fraudulent activities that 
led to the fall of Barings Bank (Tickell, 1996; Clark, 1997).  
As geographers begin to pay greater attention to the significance of 
discourses and metaphors in shaping spatial formations (Barnes, 1992; Neil and 
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Katz, 1993; Schoenberger, 1998; OÕNeill and Gibson-Graham, 1999; OÕNeill, 2001; 
Bunnell, 2002), the importance of discursive representations, practices and 
narrativity is increasingly explored in research on financial centres. The term 
ÔdiscoursesÕ can be used to broadly describe various ways through which meanings 
are constructed and conveyed (un)intentionally to their recipients. These meanings 
are often embodied in representational devices such as metaphors and analogies and 
are transmitted through communicative materials such as texts, speeches, films, 
images and so on. As such, the acceptance and deployment of discourses are highly 
politicised acts because the process reflects the ideological stances of the actors and 
agencies involved and influences their responses and actions. The active branding 
exercise conducted by state actors and institutions has become critical to the imaging 
of particular global cities as having the right credentials and expertise to claim the 
status of Ôinternational financial centreÕ in a world of flux. The City of London, for 
example, increasingly markets itself as a centre of cultural authority for global 
financial services and as a place where people meet from around the world due to the 
knowledge, expertise and contacts concentrated there. To this end, there is a 
Ôrediscovery of traditionÕ as the City consciously plays to this role:  
The old gentlemanly discourse may have dissolved but the Ôtrappings of trustÕ still 
remains: quiet, wood-panelled dining rooms, crested china, discount round top hats, 
City police uniforms and so on are all used to ÔbrandÕ the City, to boost its image of 
solidarity and trustworthiness. (Thrift, 1994: 350)  
Such branding exercises are more than symbolic reconstruction; they have material 
consequences with the reconfiguration of city centres to meet the demands of capital. 
The development of the London Docklands and Battery Park City in New York are 
the material expressions of a shift from organising the city as an assortment of 
concrete production spaces towards visualising it as a coherent space of abstract 
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financial processes and consumption (Zukin, 1992). The building of Shanghai as an 
international financial centre draws from various discourses out of ideology at the 
national level, political aspirations at the municipal level, from narratives of 
historical success and eminence, and particular visions of Ôglobal cityÕ status and 
what that might entail (Olds, 1997). Yet, in developing capitalist spaces of finance, 
the landscape of power reflects the institutional interventions of the national and 
local states as well as the social and cultural reorganisation of business, political and 
artistic elites who wield varying levers of social power. The representations of 
specific visions or versions of reality embody particular agendas but the power to 
represent is also limited and countered by the power to resist those representations as 
other economic actors and institutions draw upon differing and distinctive 
experiences and counter-discourses (Kelly, 2001; Lai and Yeung, 2003).   
All these literature relate to a broader trend of problematising the 
ÔeconomicÕ in economic geography, reinforced by an increasing number of articles 
by geographers informed as much by cultural studies and feminism as by traditional 
economic theory or political economy (Barnes, 1996; Thrift, 1996; Rothbard, 1998). 
Studies in this vein range from the iconography of the CityÕs built environment 
(Jacobs, 1994), to analyses of media representations of financial crises (Tickell, 
1996; Kelly, 2001), to issues of gender relations and representations of the body and 
embodiment in understanding the spatialities of financial services and practices 
(McDowell, 1997; McDowell and Court, 1994a, 1994b; Leidner, 1991, 1993). 
Economic activities are social and cultural processes that are not merely shaped and 
directed by distinctive sets of social relations but actively constituted through social 
and cultural practices that cannot be reduced to stimulus-response models of rational 
economic actors or the socially-sterile operation of economic forces.  
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Implications for Research  
An approach that emphasises the social and cultural construction of financial centres 
is useful in examining ShanghaiÕs financial centre development with the recognition 
that it is driven by a range of actors who cannot be reduced to rational, economic 
entities. Economic actors are inherently social, cultural and political; they have 
different politics, agendas, interpretations and practices that operate at and across 
various spatial scales in monetary networks. Viewing money as being constituted in 
different networks of human practices brings to the fore the necessity of critically 
examining these contestations of meanings and the process of negotiation between 
owners of finance capital, state actors and other agents of power.  
In the case of Shanghai, its financial centre development in banking and 
securities is very much influenced by forces and actors operates from and across 
different spatial scales. The SMG and the Lujiazui Finance Commission pursue 
specific urbanisation projects and implement policies such as tax incentives geared 
towards the capture of international capital flows by attracting international financial 
institutions. However, this process is also strongly influenced and driven by actors 
elsewhere: on the one hand, the interest and politics of officials in Beijing who are 
attuned to national development strategies as a whole as well as BeijingÕs own 
financial centre aspirations; on the other hand, the international banks and financial 
institutions that have become crucial to the functioning and image of an international 
financial centre and how business activities in Shanghai might fit into the global 
investment strategies of their own corporations. A deep analysis of how development 
in Shanghai is driven and influenced by processes elsewhere and how this process is 
negotiated will improve our understanding of the international financial system, 
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relationship between state actors and global capital and how financial centres operate 
within international monetary networks. Sensitivity to the importance of scalar 
politics in such processes will also be a useful geographical contribution to the 
money and finance literature (see Swyngedouw, 1992; H. Yeung, 2000).  
The historical image and contemporary branding of Shanghai as a 
cosmopolitan world city and international financial centre play a significant role in 
its development strategies. This is prominent in official discourses and (state-
controlled) media representations as well as the expectations of foreign investors. 
How do these discursive representations and interpretations influence (and are 
constituted by) policy actions and investment strategies? A more socially inflected 
approach is necessary in teasing out such motivations and their rationale and 
practices, which are crucial to the development of Shanghai as a financial centre.  
 
3.4 CONCLUSION  
In the first part of this chapter I highlighted the political economy approach in 
emphasising the interconnectedness of economics and politics across international as 
well as national scales. I examined how various scholars have treated the concepts of 
hegemony and post-hegemony in the regulation of the international financial system 
and explored their relevance for ChinaÕs changing economic structure and the 
development of financial markets in Shanghai. The changing roles and relationships 
between states and finance capital in the on-going process of spatial-regulatory 
arbitrage is another important feature of the literature. Even as power appears to shift 
from states to markets, the state maintains a crucial role in the international financial 
system through its participation within supranational organisations such as the WTO 
and IMF, and maintaining the physical and institutional infrastructure of global 
 71 
cities. While states remain important arbiters in determining the shape of finance 
within their national economies, they also actively negotiate with a range of actors 
and institutions across spatial scales. This tension between the desire to maintain 
regulatory control and to meet the imperatives of global financial capital has to be 
constantly balanced and renegotiated.  
The second part of the chapter focused on the social and cultural 
embeddedness of money and finance and the social constructivist approach which 
belies the idea of a single, centred model of money in favour of viewing money as 
being constituted in different networks of human practices and used and thought of in 
different ways. This highlights the significance of place in the formation of 
international financial centres as specific localities remain critical in the 
(re)production of global finance. The centrality of knowledge, the importance of 
socio-cultural elements such as trust in economic transactions, and discursive 
constructions of space and place all have important bearings on the flows and 
structure of global finance. Viewing money as being constituted in different 
networks of human practices highlights the significance of contested meanings and 
processes of negotiation between owners of finance capital, state actors and other 
agents of power.  
One of the key objectives of this thesis is to critically engage with the 
concept of ÔmarketsÕ, to expose its multiple identities and conceptualisations and 
examine the contested nature of the ÔmarketisationÕ process. In the next chapter, I 
turn to research on the framing of financial markets and its role in the formation of a 
financial centre. Although this falls under the social constructive perspective in Table 
3.1, I have devoted Chapter 4 to examining and problematising its conceptualisation 
in various fields due to its significance to my arguments. The literature in economic 
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geography has been largely silent on the role of markets and the actual process and 
politics of market formation that is crucial to a modern financial centre. A theoretical 
engagement with markets and its conceptualisation in various fields could thus 
provide additional insights to studies of geographies of finance and processes that 
drive the international financial system.  
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Chapter 4   
Framing Markets  
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
ÒThe market, it turns out, is the hollow core at the heart of economicsÓ Ð John Lie 
(1997: 342)  
 
ÒThe market is no longer a safe place to theorise. Its longstanding neutrality is 
being increasingly violated by scholars from various disciplines who refuse to treat 
the market as a purely economic institution.Ó Ð Viviana Zelizer (1988: 614) 
 
Contemporary social sciences, including economic geography, have largely 
overlooked the conceptual and political status of markets and market formation. 
Whether as an idea(l), a system or as economic practice, markets lie at the heart of 
capitalist societies but they remain one of the most elusive concepts within social 
sciences and the challenge of engaging with contemporary capitalism though the 
theoretical lens of the market has gone largely unmet (Sayer, 2001). In line with the 
social constructivist perspective, I wish to highlight two points in the treatment of 
markets. First, markets, like other institutions involved in economic practices, are not 
ontologically stable, unified, straightforward or entirely predictable (see Gibson-
Graham, 1996; OÕNeill and Gibson-Graham, 1999; OÕNeill, 2001; Slater, 2002). 
They are riddled with contradictions, full of complexities and operate in changing 
contexts as various actors (be they states, firms, institutions or individuals) interact in 
the active production of markets (ideas, practices, regulations etc.). Second, in 
acknowledging that markets are the products of social relations that vary across time 
and space, empirical research needs to examine how financial markets are being 
constructed, regulated and reproduced. Who are the actors involved in the making 
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and maintenance of a market? What are the historical, social and cultural factors 
affecting these processes and in what ways?  
Although some geographers have examined the construction of various 
financial markets (see, for example, French, 2000, 2002; Hall, 2007), the literature 
on geographies of money and finance has been largely silent on the role of markets 
and the actual process and politics of market formation that is so crucial to a modern 
international financial centre. A theoretical engagement with markets can provide 
additional insights to studies of geographies of finance and processes that drive 
global cities. Even though much of contemporary social sciences have largely written 
over markets as social practices, disciplines such as heterodox economics, economic 
sociology and economic anthropology are well ahead of the game compared to 
economic geography in exploring the conceptual and political significance of the 
market. In this chapter, I examine the different ways of theorising the market in 
orthodox and heterodox economics (e.g. new institutional economics), economic 
sociology, anthropology and cultural studies and assess their contributions and 
implications for my conceptual understanding and empirical study of Shanghai.  
 
4.2 ORTHODOX ECONOMICS  
The classical period of economics is usually defined by the publication of Adam 
SmithÕs Wealth of Nations in 1776 and John Stuart MillÕs Principle of Political 
Economy in 1848. Classical economists place great emphasis on the concept of 
laissez faire to resolve conflicting self-interest in a manner that would benefit the 
community as a whole, via the Ôinvisible handÕ of market competition as depicted by 
Adam Smith. Orthodox economics, in both the classical and neoclassical traditions, 
has the tendency to treat market exchange as the base for all economics activities, 
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portraying other organising principles as second-rate or sub-optimal alternatives. 
This exchange system consists of individual actors, each acting rationally to 
maximise their individual utility. As such, it is in the individualÕs best interest to 
produce what they are most economically efficient at and exchange the surplus 
produced with other actors who have also produced what they are most economically 
efficient at producing. This Òmarket opticÓ (Sayer, 2003) not only privileges the 
market over other modes of economic and social organisation but also abstracts 
economic action from wider political, social and spatial contexts. Neoclassical 
economists abstract the market from concrete places and social relations to an 
isotropic space where all producers have equal access to transport, labour and raw 
materials (i.e. the ceteris paribus principle). The concern is thus with the abstract 
interplay of forces of demand and supply, concentrating on the circumstances in 
which these will tend towards equilibrium.  
A market exists when buyers wishing to exchange money for a good or service are 
in contact with sellers wishing to exchange goods or services for money. Thus a 
market is defined in terms of fundamental forces of demand and supply and is notÉ 
confined to any particular geographical location (Bannock, Bexter and Rees 1978: 
297, quoted in Lie, 1992: 509) 
As such, the neoclassical market is devoid of social relations, institutions, geography 
and sociological concerns such as power, norms and networks. There is a belief in 
the natural, evolutionary progress of the market as a succession of solutions Ð with 
perfect competition, information, mobility and the laissez faire government 
protecting property rights Ð that is continuous and consensual rather than 
discontinuous and conflictual.  
Sustained discussions of the market occur primarily among critics of the 
orthodoxy. Five common theoretical and epistemological stances can be identified in 
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heterodox economics such as institutional economics, economic sociology, and 
economic geography that are in many ways responses to the perceived limitations of 
orthodox economics. First, they tend to share broader socialised and plural 
conceptions of the economic, with particular interest in understanding the 
interdependencies between places and individuals, between economic, political, 
social and cultural processes (Sheppard, 2000). Second, space is conceptualised as 
heterogeneous instead of isotropic, places are different in site and situation which 
create different possibilities for economic action. This is evident from discussions in 
Chapter 3 on international financial centres and offshore centres that have played 
crucial roles in driving global financial services in particular ways (Thrift, 1994; 
Cobb, 1998; Hudson, 1999). The historical and institutional contexts of difference 
places are also emphasised instead of written off in the neoclassical tradition (North, 
1990; Hodgson, 2000). Third, they share a commitment to primary data collection 
and Ôdirty handsÕ in the pursuit of grounded theorising (Hirsch et al., 1987; Peck, 
2005). Apart from in-depth, semi-structured interviews, a wide range of qualitative 
methods is used such as participant observation and ethnographic studies (Abolafia, 
1998; Hertz, 1998) and corporate autobiographies (Schoenberger, 2001). Fourth, they 
do not believe that an ÔequilibriumÕ can exist as the economy is constantly being 
(re)constructed through everyday production, distribution and consumption that are 
steeped in processes of power and negotiation. More attention is thus paid to 
disequilibria and the dynamic unpredictability of much of economic life (Sheppard, 
2000). Fifth, there is a shared scepticism about the logical and normative superiority 
of markets, and a healthy disregard for disciplinary boundaries.  
Beyond these broad inter-disciplinary similarities, a significant difference 
can be identified in terms of the empirical object of study between economic 
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geography and other heterodox economics: the former has not taken the market 
seriously as an object of study in its own right to same extent. Research on 
geographies of finance has typically concentrated on money but has not seriously 
engaged in research on the market.
1
 This is potentially problematic since to be taken 
seriously in academic and policy circles outside of economic geography, it is 
erroneous not to make a theoretical and empirical claim on the market seeing as it 
lies at the heart of our market capitalist societies.  
 
4.3 ALTERNATIVES IN ECONOMICS  
4.3.1 Institutional and Evolutionary Economics 
While economic geography has been slow in engaging directly with debates about 
markets,
2
 other fields have developed different ways of conceptualising and engaging 
with market theories and practices. New institutional economics and evolutionary 
economics have sought to overcome the limitations of orthodox economics by 
attempting to infuse institutional and historical factors into their analysis. Hodgson 
(1999: 3) argues that Òformalism [as practiced in neoclassical economics] became a 
way to escape from reality rather than a tool to help itÓ. The abstraction of economic 
action from the wider social sphere and its analysis in isolation made the resultant 
explanations unrealistic. These critics argue for the need to study real economic 
processes, systems and institutions, instead of creating simplified models that do not 
apply to the real world.  
                                                
1
 Although this has started to change in recent years as more geographers are engaged in the new 
inter-disciplinary grouping called the Social Studies of Finance (see section 4.4).  
2
 It is worth noting, however, that much of recent economic geography research has drawn from 
heterodox approaches to markets, such as institutional approaches and conceptions of embeddedness 
in studying industrial districts, creative clusters and regional development (see, for example, Grabher, 
1993; Amin and Thrift, 1995; Amin, 1999; Asheim, 2000; Feldmand, 2000; Scott, 2000b)   
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Institutions are taken as the unit of analysis, defined as generally accepted 
and recognised systems or routines that organise human actions and activities (Mki 
and Gustafsson, 1993: 13). Institutions also define and limit the set of choices 
available to individuals through formal and informal rules that guide actions and 
behaviours (North, 1990). As conditions such as perfect information and mobility do 
not exist in the empirical world, transaction costs in the form of collecting 
information and enforcing rights are likely to be high. In this aspect, institutions help 
to provide regulatory frameworks and stability through the implementation and 
enforcement of acceptable forms of behaviour and procedures. Rather than being 
treated as isotropic, the environment of the decision-maker is accorded special 
significance in institutional analysis where there is significant distinction between the 
real world and the actorÕs perception of it, which is in turn affected by institutional 
contexts. This concept of bounded rationality is introduced in contrast to the neo-
classical concept of perfect rationality. The creation of knowledge is a socially-
embedded phenomenon and process. More than just the input of facts, learning also 
involves interpretation, development, reconstitution, creation and destruction, all of 
which are contingent upon institutional contexts, social norms and values (Hodgson, 
1999). Such institutional constraints in knowledge construction and adoption may 
lead to a situation of path dependency. Because of such path dependencies, history 
matters; there is a need to understand the past in order to explain present phenomena 
and processes. In terms of policy-making and recommendations, this also has 
implications for the transferability of solutions; the same rule or solution may not 
create the same type or magnitude of development in different places due to their 
specific historical experiences and institutional configurations. Therefore, 
institutional analysis highlights the awareness of such constraints in economic and 
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political models and their relevance in cross-applications. In contrast to models of 
stage-by-stage linear economic development with the input of the requisite economic 
factors, institutional economists caution that what may be the most effective and 
efficient policies in one instance are unlikely to be so in all environments.  
In their effort to bring knowledge, uncertainty, history and other 
institutional considerations (i.e. transaction costs) into the discourse of economics, 
institutional and evolutionary economists overcome some of the limitations of the 
neoclassical approach. However, their analysis remains politically thin. To the extent 
that they discuss power and institutions, the focus remains on the state and property 
rights and they share the neoclassical problem of neglecting power struggles among 
social groups. Although state actions are alluded to in the form of legislation and law 
enforcement, they fail to include the interventionist role of the state, as policy-maker 
and entrepreneur, who may be very active in the creation and adaptation of social and 
economic institutions. Governments thus assume a neo-liberal and non-
interventionist approach in their analyses, which exclude how developmental states, 
for example, may contribute very significantly to the institutional development, and 
economic performance and trajectories of their national economies. This lack of 
consideration given to the political economy, and the interventionist and 
entrepreneurial role played by state agencies present a conspicuous weakness in 
institutional analysis.  
 
4.3.2 Economic Sociology and Embeddedness 
ÒIf economic action is embedded in networks of relations, it is logical to begin our 
investigation by discussing the nature of those relations.Ó Ð Granovetter (1993: 3)  
 
 80 
In economic sociology, the rational, individualistic and utility-maximising homo 
economicus is rejected in favour of a wider and richer conception of the socially 
constructed actor whose actions are constrained and influenced by cultural norms 
group relations and other social and meaning structures. Instead of ÔfreezingÕ social 
relations while focusing on economic exchange, the market and the economy in the 
manner of neoclassical economic practices, the sociological conception of economy 
views market relations as being socially structured and constituted, and argues that 
the ÔeconomyÕ cannot be fully understood without examining the institutional and 
cultural parameters that constitutes its societal context.  
Most contemporary American economic sociologists work under the banner 
of the embeddedness approach in which network analysis is particularly important. 
In ÔThe Great TransformationÕ, Karl Polanyi argues that the increasingly market-
based nature of 19
th
-century Western society meant that Òinstead of the economy 
being embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded in the economic 
systemÓ (Polanyi, [1944] 2001: 60).
3
 As economic life is embedded in broader social, 
political and cultural settings, social and structural factors are crucial in examining 
economic relations and phenomena:  
The human society, then, is embedded and enmeshed in institutions, economic and 
noneconomic. The inclusion of the noneconomic is vital. For religion or government 
may be as important for the structure and functioning of the economy as monetary 
institutions or the availability of tolls and machines themselves that lighten the toil 
of labourÓ (Polanyi, [1957] 2001: 36).  
Therefore, there is nothing automatic or laissez faire about the growth of market 
society as it Òis never traceable to the mere desire of individuals to truck, barter and 
                                                
3
 Polanyi used the term ÔembeddednessÕ to refer to a particular moment in capitalismÕs historical 
development at a macroeconomic and social scale, but its usage has since been expanded by 
sociologists and geographers. 
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exchangeÓ (quoted in Lie, 1993: 277). It was new economic sociology, and the work 
of Mark Granovetter in particular, that moved the embeddedness concept from its 
initial societal scale analysis to a more institutional and actor-based account of 
economic life. His influential paper, ÔEconomic Action and Social Structures: the 
Problem of EmbeddednessÕ (1985), grew out of a conviction that in order to address 
the inadequate treatment of economic phenomena by economists, such as the neglect 
of social structures and reduction of individuals to isolated actors, sociologists should 
attempt to ÔembedÕ economic actions and activities in social structures conceived as 
interpersonal networks. More specifically, he was critical of what he called 
ÒoversocialisedÓ and ÒundersocialisedÓ conceptions of economic actions and actors 
in both economics and sociology as both views suffer from isolating actors from their 
immediate social contexts:  
Actors do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social context, nor do they adhere 
slavishly to a script written for them by the particular intersection of social 
categories that they happen to occupy. Their attempts at purposive action are instead 
embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations (Ibid., p. 487).  
The embeddedness approach is thus proposed as a Òmiddle groundÓ or 
Òthird wayÓ (Powell and Smith-Doerr, 1994: 368) between oversocialised and 
undersocialised views. Economic action takes place within the networks of social 
relations that make up the social structure, and the Òproblem [is thus about]É to 
what extent economic activity is mediated by Ð or shall I say, Ôembedded inÕ Ð 
networks of personal relationsÓ (Granovetter, 1990: 96). Others such as Zukin and 
DiMaggio (1990) have attempted to distinguish between different types of 
embeddedness, such as cognitive, cultural, structural and political. The fallacious 
separation of the economic from the social, typical of conventional economic 
analysis, is also rejected, with the view that market actions are constituted and 
 82 
shaped by the social relations, institutional norms, and interpersonal networks in 
which they are embedded.  
The disciplinary objective of new economic sociology is to reclaim ÔcoreÕ 
economic issues (such as the market) rather than focusing on the economic 
ÔleftoversÕ such as analysing ÔirrationalÕ behaviour and ÔsuboptimalÕ institutions 
because Òsocial relations are fundamental to Ômarket processesÕÓ (Granovetter, 1985: 
500; added emphasis). Take the concept of the market, for example. The neoclassical 
market is highly abstracted, stripped of social relations or institutions and devoid of 
sociological concerns like power, norms and networks. The embeddedness approach 
on the other hand argues that social networks Òbuilt on kinship or friendship, trust or 
goodwillÓ (Lie, 1997: 349) are necessary to build and sustain economic relations and 
institutions such as markets. Instead of simply examining markets in terms of price 
mechanisms, economic sociologists treat markets as social structures and in terms of 
exchange (i.e. networks) (Swedberg, 1994). In avoiding both the oversocialised and 
undersocialised approaches, the embeddedness approach seeks to strike a balance in 
analysing markets and other economic phenomena and institutions, while 
emphasising power and control struggles as constituent elements of markets by 
examining the state and legal systems, social relations of market actors and different 
types of markets, such as Ôflea marketsÕ, peasant economies and bazaars (White, 
1981; Granovetter, 1993; Lie, 1997). WhiteÕs (1993) analysis of production markets 
emphasises struggles for control and autonomy that generate the market as a social 
category. Mizruchi and Stearns (1994) highlight the contribution of a sociological 
approach to money, banking and financial markets in making explicit the cultural 
embeddedness of money and monetary institutions, examining the effects of social 
networks on economic decision-making and the ways in which social and political 
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power influence both economic action and the character of economic institutions. Lie 
(1991: 230) argues that:  
By taking the embeddedness thesis seriously, we can penetrate the ideological veil 
of the market to reveal the distinct social organisations of commodity exchange. É 
Rather than assuming the invisible hand, we should investigate the concrete social 
relations of those who buy and sell: the visible hand of the market. (Emphasis 
added) 
Despite its widespread currency in economic sociology and other social 
sciences, the concept of embeddedness and networks remain theoretically 
underspecified in many ways. Rather ironically, some works by economic 
sociologists suffer from the very abstraction and reification of categories which were 
found wanting in mainstream economics. For example, in defining the sociological 
approach to the economy, Granovetter asserts economic sociological research should 
be guided not by conventional disciplinary boundaries but the analytical aspect of 
networks of ongoing social relations. According to this conceptualisation, new 
economic sociology becomes an exercise in abstraction in which concrete objects are 
examined in a single aspect (i.e. networks) rather than in their complex multi-
dimensionality (Krippner, 2001).
4
 In taking up the challenge to treat market activity 
as a social phenomenon, a common approach has been the Ôadd-social-context-and-
stirÕ method, which involves correcting the economic model of a ÔfreeÕ market by 
uncovering non-economic constraints of economic. There is also a tendency to defer 
to an idealised market by placing the market at one end of a spectrum with more 
socialised versions of the economy along the opposite end, or to rely on the abstract 
market as an analytical foil. Paradoxically, this could contribute to the very 
                                                
4
 As such, GranovetterÕs concept of embeddedness departs from PolanyiÕs usage which calls for the 
analysis of concrete institutions in terms of multiple intersecting dimensions, and in their complex 
political, cultural and ideological contexts.  
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naturalisation of markets that it sets out to transcend by theorising context and 
embeddedness in such a way that it seems easy to siphon them off from a Ôpre-socialÕ 
market. This kind of conceptual slippage leads Peck (2005: 145) to question: Òare all 
economic phenomena socially constructed and embedded, or are some markets more 
embedded than others?Ó (Original emphasis) Krippner also criticised the ÔaddingÕ 
social consideration to market analysis and the concept of a continuum:  
[E]very transaction, no matter how instantaneous, is social in the broader sense of 
the term: congealed into every market exchange is a history of struggle and 
contestation that has produced actors with certain understandings of themselves and 
the world that predispose them to exchange under certain set of social rules and not 
another. In that sense, the state, culture, and politics are contained in every market 
act [É] (Krippner, 2001: 785; original emphasis)  
Sayer (2003) also criticises the tendency in theorising about embeddedness, 
networks and trust within economic sociology to idealise them, such that it 
inadvertently produces an overly benign view of economic relations and processes. 
Economic relations that were previously seen as governed by narrow self interest are 
embedded in relations of trust, in which there are shared norms and forms of 
reciprocity. But the social embedding of economy activity also often involves 
relations of domination, some of them based on gender, class or race. Relations 
within and across networks are seen to be more reciprocal and more egalitarian 
because of the emphasis on interaction, but not all networks are non-hierarchical or 
mutually beneficial. This idealistic and ÔsoftÕ conceptualisation of networks 
downplays issues of power and inequality. Stable forms of embedding such as 
networks or regulation are also not necessarily the product of free consensus, they 
may represent an uneasy compromise between interests that would realign 
themselves given the opportunity (such as in a crisis). Thus, networks do not 
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necessarily fuse the self-interest of different actors into a harmonious and egalitarian 
whole but may be characterised by inequalities of power, strategic coalitions, 
dissembling and opportunistic collaboration. However good the networking, or 
however strong the reliance on information and trust, economic survival for capitalist 
firms depends on costs and cash; although extraordinarily this literature says 
remarkably little about these factors, the bottom line remains the bottom line (Ibid., 
p. 50).   
The challenge of incorporating macroeconomic structures and issues of 
power and conflict has not gone unheeded. John Lie (1992, 1993), for example, has 
proposed the concept of Ômode of exchangeÕ as an alternative to the disembedded 
concept of the market offered by neoclassical economics. This mode of exchange 
refers to Òan ensemble of traders engaged in commodity exchange under historically 
specific technological and socioinstitutional constraintsÓ (Lie, 1992: 510). Rather 
than portraying the rise of market society as an evolutionary progress toward a 
homogenous market, Lie emphasises the variety of forms assumed by the Ômode of 
exchangeÕ and analyses commercial history as a product of power struggles among 
social groups attempting to shape exchange relations in their interest. The case of 
England is used to show how different modes of exchange waxed and waned from 
1550 to 1750 (Lie, 1993). In late medieval England, marketplaces proliferated under 
a market mode where simple commodity production was geared toward local 
consumption and recurrent face-to-face interaction among producers and consumers. 
These marketplaces were held together by sociological basis of trust in a region 
where traders knew each other and through formal regulations such as a local market 
court. In the 17
th
 century, an entrepreneurial mode emerged, constituted by a nexus 
of travelling merchants in tandem with provincial shopkeepers, which was largely 
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complementary to the continuing operation of the market mode. In the late-17
th
 
century, however, a mercantile mode was constructed by London-based middlemen 
merchants in which they sought direct deals with rural elites, bypassing the onerous 
regulations of the open market. This also led to a shift from intraregional to 
interregional trade and transformed the social relations of exchange. The struggle 
between the entrepreneurial and mercantile modes is highlighted by the royal grant 
of patents that gave London merchants the right to hire ÔagentsÕ to harass local 
manufacturers and peddlers who threatened their monopoly. LieÕs (1992) market 
revisionist account also reveals distinct social organisations involved in commodity 
exchange and points to discontinuities in the economic history of Japan from the 
Tokugawa to the Meiji period (1600 to 1900). Power struggles among different 
groups, advocating different social organisations of commodity exchange, thus 
determines which mode of exchange will predominate in a particular time and place. 
Rather than harmonious cooperation ensured by the invisible hand or the coercive 
power of the state, concrete social groups construct ÔmarketsÕ through power 
struggles against other groups and other possible forms of markets.  
A further example is the work of Neil Fligstein (2001) on the evolution of 
large industrial firms in the US. He conceives of markets at various stages of 
development as containing the firm and the state as actors rather than simply 
opposing an ill defined market concept to alternative institutional logics. Market 
institutions are emergent, forged through political contestation over shifting social 
and cultural beliefs. There is thus a recognition of the variety of actors and interests 
within a market setting and an emphasis on power and conflict and processes of 
negotiation and resolution. Fligstein conceives of markets as social arenas that exist 
for the production and sale of goods or services and are characterised by structured 
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exchange. This implies that actors expect repeated exchanges for such goods or 
services and therefore require rules and social structures to guide and organise 
exchange. These requisites are often facilitated by government structures and the 
state plays an important role in his conceptualisation of market.  
Theoretically, the market is examined in terms of fields, actors and rules. 
Using a political-cultural approach, Fligstein (2001) argues that social action takes 
place in arenas that might be termed fields (Bourdieu, 1977), which contain 
collective actors who try to produce a system of domination in that space. This 
requires the production of a local culture that defines local social relations between 
actors. Once in place, the social interaction in fields can be seen as ÔgamesÕ whereby 
groups in the field who have more power use the acceptable cultural rules to 
reproduce their power. As such, action in fields is continuously conflictual and 
inherently political. The theory of fields thus focuses on the opening of new social 
space, how it becomes and remains stable (i.e. becomes a field) and the forces that 
may transform them. Market orders are governed by a general set of rules, which 
consists of common understandings and laws that allow capitalist firms to exist. The 
dominance of different groups in society means that those rules tend to reflect one set 
of interests over others.
5
 Structured exchange within markets can thus be understood 
as a ÔfieldÕ because any social structure (including markets) are cultural constructions 
where actors are locked into a ÔgameÕ in which the dominant players try to reproduce 
their advantageous position while the dominated try to challenge the power of the 
former. The social order of the state is also seen as a set of fields of policy domains 
where actors claim the power to make and enforce rules for other actors in society. 
                                                
5
 Increasingly, these rules are also being established on a transnational level such as in the EU and 
WTO.  
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These orders are governed by formal and informal rules that create and limit social 
and political interaction within particular domains.  
Fligstein divides the actors within a market into incumbent and challenger 
firms. Incumbent firms dominate a particular market by creating stable relations with 
other producers, customers and the government and tend to set the agenda within a 
market. Challenger firms fit into the dominant logic of a stable market either by 
finding a niche or framing their action with reference to the dominant firms. The goal 
of action within markets is to create and maintain a stable balance of power and 
(re)produce social relationships across firms that enable them to survive. This 
production of social structures in markets is guided by four types of rules as shown in 
Table 4.1.  
 
Table 4.1 Four types of rules governing the production of social structures in markets.  
Property rights are rules that define who has claims on the profits of firms and includes issues of different 
legal forms, the relationship between shareholders, employees, communities, customers etc. and the role 
of the state in providing and maintaining a governance structure to ensure these rights. They define the 
social relationships between owners and everyone else, which stabilises the market by making clear who 
is risking what and who stands to reap the rewards. Stability is produced by defining the power relations 
between different actors and signalling to other firms who the dominant actors are.  
Governance structures are general rules within a society that define relations of competition and 
cooperation and the organisation of firms. They can take the form of formal laws or informal institutional 
practices embedded in existing organisations as routines and accepted practices.  
Rules of exchange define who can transact with whom and conditions under which transactions are 
carried out. They help reproduce conditions of stability by ensuring that exchanges occur under conditions 
that are applicable to all.  
Conceptions of control are forms of local knowledge that reflects market specific agreements between 
actors regarding internal organisation, tactics for competition and cooperation and the hierarchy of firms 
within a market. It is a worldview that enables actors to interpret the actions of others and a reflection of 
how the market is structured. They are historically specific and are cultural in that they form a set of 
understandings and practices about how things work in a particular market. In a stable market as a social 
field, a conception of control defines the social relations between incumbent and challenger firms such 
that those relations are reproduced over time. 
(Source: Fligstein, 2001: 32-35) 
 
 
The theory of fields also suggests how states as a set of fields interact with 
markets as a set of fields. Creating a general set of rules where stable markets can be 
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reproduced helps to structure exchange in particular fields. Fligstein argues that for 
countries in the process of establishing modern capitalist markets, creating stable 
conceptions of control is more difficult precisely because the other rules, i.e. property 
rights, governance structures and rules of exchange, which are necessary pre-
conditions, are not well specified. Creating these new institutions requires the 
interaction of firms, political parties, states and new, revised or borrowed 
conceptions of regulation. The policy domains of the state can be organised 
according to interventionist or regulatory principles. In an interventionist regime, 
governments can make substantive decisions for the markets directly by owning 
firms, controlling the financial sector, direct investment and exercise strong control 
over firmsÕ activities. In contrast, regulatory states put organisations in place that 
theoretically do not reflect the interest of any one group but use rules impartially to 
police the interaction of actors. However, it is possible for a particular group to 
capture the regulatory agency and get officials to accept their view of the industry 
and influence the rules of governance.  
This political-cultural approach implies that the historical problems of 
instability for market participants, the formation of institutions in response to these 
problems and the configuration of economic and political elites are crucial to the 
formation of stable markets. Once established, they tend to reproduce entrenched 
interests and structure the operation of markets in that society. FligsteinÕs approach 
also allocates a key role to states in market-building and explains the existence (and 
persistence) of many national capitalisms. If firms survive by stabilising their 
relationships with their competitors, then the social relations that are the outcome of 
this process are not necessarily maximising the efficient allocation of resources for 
society, contrary to the normative claims of neoclassical economics. ÒIf firms are 
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effective and not efficient [by operating within a very wide set of social relations] 
then the claim that one form of market organisation is always superior to other forms 
is probably falseÓ (Fligstein, 2001: 22).
6
  
 
4.4 ANTHROPOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL ALTERNATIVES  
In questioning the normative claims of neoclassical economics, other scholars have 
pointed to the discursive power of economics as a discipline and the need to 
distinguish between economics as theory and economics as practice. More 
importantly, research has shown how theories about markets have had an impact on 
those very markets. Callon (1998) and Miller (2002a) suggest that theories, 
especially from economics, have a tendency to create the world which they purport 
to describe, such that reality comes to mirror theory through the policies and 
practices of the powerful. Metcalfe and Warde (2003) remark at the unparalleled, if 
not entirely unprecedented, confidence expressed about markets at the end of the 20
th
 
century and how the spread of the market can be seen in ever more areas of society. 
This overt promotion of the market requires strong legitimisation from a discourse of 
Ômarket virtuesÕ (Table 4.2). The power of this discourse operates through political 
rhetoric, in business practice and through the ghostly role of markets in economic 
analysis. According to Sayer (2003), this tendency to treat market exchange as the 
atomic structure of all economic processes and as the default form of economic 
coordination is problematic as other forms of organisation thus become marginalised 
or treated as problematic exceptions. The market optic and its normative presumption 
in favour of markets both mystifies and promotes unfettered capitalist dynamics and 
social relations. He argues that these issues are especially significant given the 
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 This claim also places his argument and contribution within the Ôvarieties of capitalismÕ school (Hall 
and Soskice, 2001). 
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prevalence of neoliberal dogmatism and fatalism that are driving a particular model 
of economic development, which is being hailed as the only workable model (see 
also Peck and Tickell, 2002). Lie (1997) also observes that this approach has resulted 
in an assumed progression of market practices in socialist economies. The post-Cold 
War period saw an avalanche of proposals to privatise formerly communist 
economics and to effect a transition from planned economy to market. Empirical 
investigations, however, reveal the complexity of institutional legacies that differ 
across Eastern Europe and China. The assumption of market essentialism forecloses 
considerations of alternative forms of exchange relations and structures. ÒIf the only 
alternatives were plan and market, then market socialism, for example, would be an 
oxymoron (ibid., p. 353).  
 
Table 4.2 Propositions of the Ôvirtuous marketÕ  
¥ The market enshrines the principle of consumer sovereignty.  
¥ The market permits, sustains and delivers individual freedom of choice and action 
across the economic and social spheres.  
¥ The market is an ideal mechanism for exchange because its incentive structures are 
consistent with basic features of human nature  
¥ The market is applicable to many, if not all, forms of human activity, its principal mode of 
rational calculation being suitable to all spheres of life.  
¥ The market is the epitome of efficiency in the allocation of resources and is unfailingly 
superior to any other system of economic governance.  
¥ The market is the best guarantor of reliable quality in products and services.  
¥ The market guarantees sustained growth in standards of living in all countries, whatever 
their level of development.  
(Source: Metcalfe and Warde, 2003: 4) 
 
There is thus a need to unpack the ÔessentialistÕ and ÔvirtuousÕ market and to 
scrutinise its inner workings through its microstructures, institutions and constituent 
actors. Studies that employ an anthropological and cultural perspective have made 
use of ethnographic and intensive qualitative research methods to uncover the 
richness of market meanings and practices. Viviana Zelizer (1988), for example, 
presents a Ômultiple marketsÕ model as an alternative to the neoclassical paradigm of 
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the market, in which the market is analysed as one category of social relations 
involving consumption, production and exchange under a variety of cultural and 
structural settings. The theoretical and empirical task is thus to investigate the social 
and cultural variation of these Ômultiple marketsÕ. The objective, she argues, is to 
capture the complex interplay between economic, cultural and social structural 
factors in the production of multiple markets. She applies this multiple markets 
model in empirical research on life insurance, which stresses the cultural response to 
life insurance by examining changing attitudes to the monetary evaluation of human 
life and changing cultural definitions of risk (Zelizer, 1983). Another study examines 
the interaction between market or price (i.e. economic worth) and personal and moral 
values in tracing the social construction of the economically ÔuselessÕ but 
emotionally ÔpricelessÕ child in the US between 1870 and 1930 (Zelizer, 1987). It 
reveals how childrenÕs insurance policies, compensation awards and the market for 
the adoption and sale of children contribute to rethinking about markets as being 
regulated in part by non-economic criteria. In more recent studies, she adopts a 
historical-cultural approach in examining the institutional circuits through which the 
most reified product of the market Ð money Ð travels, and how it acquires distinct 
social meanings (Zelizer, 1989, 1993, 1994). Her bold thesis is that rather than 
money depersonalising social relations, social relations personalise money, which 
accounts for its multiple meanings and usage. Money is neither culturally neutral nor 
socially anonymous. There is no single, uniform, generalised money but multiple 
monies as people embed money in particular times, places and social relations by 
earmarking different currencies for various social interactions. Different currencies 
are created through social and cultural processes in the forms of domestic money, 
gifts of money, institutional money and moral money. Through these studies, Zelizer 
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demonstrates how a sociological and culturally inflected model of money offers an 
alternative approach to aspects of economic life, including the market. Economic 
processes of exchange and consumption are defined as a particular category of social 
relations, much like friendship, kinship or patron-client ties, and that economic 
phenomena are interdependent with historically variable systems of meanings and 
structures of social relations.  
One of the provocative claims made by Michel Callon (1998) in ÔThe Laws 
of the MarketsÕ is that sociologists should rethink their relation to economics. Rather 
than denounce orthodox economics for its impoverished account of society and 
culture, sociologists should examine the role of economics in the constitution of 
markets. Callon is less interested in the question of whether economics gives a good 
or bad representation of markets than in the part played by economics (in a broad 
sense) in performing markets. In this sense, economics has to be understood broadly 
to include not only academic economic theory but all related institutions, techniques 
and professional practices (e.g. accountancy and audit). Daniel Miller (2002b) also 
argues that we should stop thinking of economics as the study of economies but 
focus on the degree to which economics and other abstract models manage to accrue 
such power that they are able to transform actual economic practices to accord more 
with those same models. He introduces the concept of ÔvirtualismÕ as a way to 
understand the growth and power of abstraction in the contemporary economy, to 
examine the ability of economists and other agents such as audit and consultancy to 
transform the world into closer approximations of their theories and models (Carrier 
and Miller, 1998; Miller, 1998; Leyshon et al., 2005). Economics is not a set of 
falsifiable claims about the economy, or an ideological construction of the economy, 
but rather a participant in its construction (see Mackenzie et al., 2007). This makes 
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enormous sense when one considers, as noted earlier, the diffusion of neoliberalism 
through virtually every social institution over the last 20 years, with very real effects 
on marketisation and consequent abstraction of social relationships.  
The performativity of economics is explored by Donald MacKenzie in his 
research on arbitrage and option pricing theory (MacKenzie and Millo, 2003; 
MacKenzie, 2005a, 2006). Through the use of oral-history interviewing, archival 
research and non-participant observation, MacKenzie and Millo (2003) examine how 
the Nobel Prize winning theory of option pricing developed by Black, Scholes and 
Merton became integral to the success of the Chicago Board Option Exchange 
(CBOE). In the first instance, the option pricing theory conferred legitimacy to the 
CBOE. What used to be regarded with suspicion as gambling or speculation came to 
be understood as efficient pricing when framed within the option pricing theory, 
which later led to the subsequent legitimisation and acceptance of the derivatives 
market. When Black and Scholes tested their formula against prices in the pre-CBOE 
ad hoc options market in 1972, they found only approximate agreement; the basis of 
their work was theoretical rather than empirical. However, the fit began to improve 
over the course of the CBOEÕs history. Mackenzie and Millo argue that this 
empirical success was not due to the model describing a pre-existing reality but was 
the result of two interrelated processes. First, there were changes in market 
conditions over time that came closer to what were unrealistic assumptions made by 
Black, Scholes and Merton Ð various forms of regulation were later waived for bona 
fide hedging by options market makers, stock borrowing became easier, and with 
technological advances price dissemination and transaction processing was 
improved. The second process was the modelÕs growing use as a guide to trading 
itself; theoretical prices were printed on sheets of paper and carried on the floor. As 
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the options markets grew, options were traded on more stocks, including high 
volatility newcomers as well as Ôblue chipÕ companies. More expensive errors made 
pricing models seem indispensable:  
Seat-of-the-pants trading or simple heuristics could not suffice when implementing a 
position across several markets and carrying dozens or hundreds of such positions. 
Pricing models were necessary for risk management and, crucially, offered a way of 
communicating and coordinating activities, of talking about options. (Ibid., p. 125; 
original emphasis). 
Pricing models thus came to shape the very way participants thought and 
talked about options. The use of the Black-Scholes-Merton model in arbitrage had 
the effect of reducing discrepancies between empirical prices and the model. 
Gradually, the CBOE participants began to price options as economists suggest homo 
economicus should. The process thus concurs with CallonÕs formulation that: ÒYes, 
homo economicus does exist, but is not an a-historical reality; he does not describe 
the hidden nature of the human being. He is the result of a process of configuration. 
[É W]e should not forget the essential contribution of economics in the performing 
of the economyÓ (Callon, 1998: 22-23).  
Knorr Cetina and Bruegger (2002a, 2002b) employ an innovative 
combination of participant and non-participant observation on trading floors, 
interviews and trading transcripts drawn from inter-bank currency trading in global 
investment banks to explore the global microstructures of the foreign exchange 
market and theorise about a postsocial relationship between traders and financial 
markets. For traders, the most fascinating part of their environment is the market 
with which they appear to be obsessively engaged during their working and waking 
hours. The process and content of this intense engagement is the focus of their study 
(2002a). In the past, the foreign exchange market was nested in territorial space, 
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hidden in transnational banking networks of institutions that did not share the same 
information. The advent of the computer screen, however, brought a geographically 
dispersed and invisible market close to participants, rendering it interactionally 
present. After the introduction of the screens, they argue, the market became fully 
available and identified as a separate entity in its own right with prices, interests and 
actions of other participants all visually indicated on screen. Traders were then able 
to simultaneously position themselves inside the market in the sense of becoming 
players, and to relate to the market on screen as an exteriorised other, a Ômaster-
beingÕ that observes all transactions and includes their contextual conditions and 
motivations. ÒIn a sense, the screen is a building site on which a whole economic and 
epistemological world is erected. It is not simply a ÔmediumÕ for the transmission of 
other interactionsÓ (ibid., p. 167; original emphasis). They examine how traders 
consider the market as ÔeverythingÕ that cannot be reduced to just prices, news or 
known groups of players:  
[The market is] Everything. Everything. How loudly heÕs screaming, how excited he 
gets, whoÕs selling, whoÕs buying, where, which centre, what central banks are 
doing, what the large hedge funds are doing, what the press is saying, whatÕs 
happening to the CDU, what the Malaysian prime minister is saying, itÕs everything 
Ð everything all the time. (Quoted in Knorr Cetina and Bruegger, 2002b: 168)  
The market is also considered a Ôgreater beingÕ, an empirical object of on-
going activities and effects that changes all the time such that traders have to 
continually redefine their relationship to the market. As the traders take a position 
(open their accounts and start buying and selling currencies), they are also able to 
ÔenterÕ this life form cognitively and emotionally and become part of it. The inability 
to control the market is turned into a sophisticated game as Knorr Cetina and 
Bruegger reveal a trading room culture of star systems and how the market not only 
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provide the obvious goal of making money but also a secondary goal of excitement 
and mastery in the sheer joy of ÔwinningÕ. As markets are always in the process of 
being materially defined, they provide an unending series of new challenges. The 
term ÔpostsocialÕ thus refers to new kinds of bonds such as those constructed between 
humans and objects and calls for a rethinking of sociality along lines that include 
objects in the concept of social relations. They also suggest that fields in which 
geographically distant participants are oriented towards one another can be bound 
together by global microstructures Ð i.e. patterns of relatedness and coordination that 
are global in scope but microsocial in character and that assemble and link global 
domains, such as the global foreign exchange market. Their study (2002b) explores 
how the foreign exchange market as seen through the practices of traders is governed 
by institutional rules, informal codes of honours and structural use of interaction to 
manage and sustain social order, even as they are scattered among the financial hubs 
of major time zones such as in New York, London, Zurich, Singapore and Tokyo.  
Abolafia (1998) argues that when people are engaged in market exchange, 
they are socially embedded in a network of social relations and culturally embedded 
in a meaning system of norms, rules and cognitive scripts. In focusing on markets as 
cultures, he examines them as fields of repeated interaction and transaction in which 
they exhibit distinct sets of mutual understandings. These understandings, in turn, are 
both enabling and restraining in that market participants are able to use them both to 
pursue their interests as well as to limit the range of alternatives available to each 
other. But market culture is also not fixed or given and must be continually 
reproduced through exchange relations that is vulnerable to change through social or 
institutional power. Through the use of interview data and extended periods of 
observation on the floor, AbolafiaÕs ethnographic research on the stock, bond and 
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futures markets in New York focuses on the subjective experience of market makers 
as they enact their rules and roles, drawing attention to the fact that they are actively 
constructed and fluid. Market participants construct rich social identities that come to 
define behaviour and interaction as they employ a toolkit of strategies to reduce 
uncertainty and risk in their environment and to maximise survival. Constitutive 
rules and roles such as an ÔentrepreneurialÕ identity, emotional control, risk-taking 
and the strategic use of guile are actively employed by market participants to 
construct and interact with the market (Abolafia, 1996). By treating markets as 
cultures, rationality is treated as a community-based, context-dependent cultural 
form. He thus explores the market participantsÕ construction and understandings of 
the decision making process and the individual as well as social means of 
establishing value in the marketplace.  
The above studies fall under a new inter-disciplinary grouping called social 
studies of finance (SSF)
7
 which focuses on the creation, development and effects of 
financial markets. This approach combines perspectives from disciplines such as 
anthropology, geography, history, politics, sociology, social studies of science and 
legal studies. Rather than focusing on the theoretical category of the market per se, 
social studies of finance focus on empirical research on financial markets (Knorr 
Cetina and Preda, 2005). The literature can be summarised as a commitment to post-
disciplinary social science, including cultural and social anthropological accounts of 
trading floors (Abolafia, 1996; Zaloom, 2003; Hassoun, 2005), electronic capital 
markets (Sassen, 2005), the deployment of mathematical economics model in the 
making of an options market (MacKenzie and Millo, 2003), the sociology of 
interactions between humans and objects in markets (Knorr Cetina and Bruegger, 
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2002b), the importance of mundane management processes within multinational 
financial service firms in structuring dispersed knowledge and risk in global financial 
markets (Clark and Thrift, 2003), and how finance is ÔperformedÕ through the media 
and the regulatory implications of Ôfinance entertainmentÕ (Clark et al., 2004). These 
in-depth studies yield rich accounts of market practices, constructions, agencies and 
governance that are often overlooked and beyond the epistemological scope of 
orthodox economics and its myopic framing of markets.   
 
Implications for Research  
By precluding attention to non-rational elements of human behaviour, economists 
leave themselves no mechanism for learning about the crude and messy empirical 
world that so defies their models. Economists pay a heavy price for the very 
simplicity and elegance of their models: empirical ignorance, misunderstanding, 
and relatedly, unrealistic and bizarre policy recommendations. Ð Hirsch et al.  
(1987: 320; original emphasis) 
 
The challenge of learning about the Òcrude and messy empirical worldÓ in its 
complexity has been taken up by a variety of heterodox economics, anthropological 
and cultural approaches that have significantly enriched our understanding and 
appreciation of economic processes and the important concept of markets. Martin 
and Sunley (2001), however, observes that many ÔnewÕ (cultural) economic 
geographers have limited understanding of institutional and evolutionary economics, 
economic sociology and other heterodox fields of economics and suffer from a 
Ôcherry pickingÕ syndrome of jumping onto the latest theoretical bandwagon that is 
en vogue. In the preceding sections, I reviewed the theoretical approaches and 
empirical studies conducted in various fields to assess their strengths and 
contribution to understandings of the market. These provide a conceptual toolkit in 
framing markets, each with their strengths and limitations. There is no single tool 
suitable for all tasks and a project will often require a selection of tools appropriate to 
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the task at hand. My intention is to combine some of the key insights from these 
approaches to inform my empirical research into ShanghaiÕs financial markets and, 
in turn, to reflect on the implications for issues of power, states and market building.  
First, I want to highlight the importance of power and inequality in 
examining market structures and processes. Soft conceptualisation of networks, trust 
and embeddedness has to be reformulated if we are to avoid an overly benign view of 
how social relations operate in making markets (Sayer, 2003). Much of the network 
literature has tended to neutralise or obfuscate relations of power, domination, 
exploitation and inequality while demoting structural forces and contexts to the 
sidelines. LieÕs (1993) and FligsteinÕs (2001) studies demonstrate the importance of 
embedding concepts of power and governance into the theorisation of markets and 
how they not only enrich accounts of market formation and processes but are crucial 
to their explanations. Rather than harmonious cooperation ensured by the invisible 
hand or the coercive power of the state, concrete social groups construct ÔmarketsÕ 
through power struggles against other groups and other possible forms of markets. 
The recognition of the variety of actors and interests within a market setting and an 
emphasis on power and conflict and processes of negotiation and resolution is central 
to my research. The form, structure and pace of market formation taking place in 
Shanghai is a contested process that has to be negotiated amongst the different 
interests of incumbents and challengers, involving a variety of actors including local 
firms, foreign firms, national and local state bodies, foreign state institutions and 
transnational organisations. The dominant Ômode of exchangeÕ that emerges is the 
outcome of a conflictual process between multiple parties but is itself also constantly 
Ôunder threatÕ due to shifting agendas and contexts. This process of power, 
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negotiation and conflict resolution amongst actors in the field forms the main focus 
of my empirical enquiry in Shanghai.  
Second, I want to highlight the key role of states and state institutions in the 
process of market building. The distinction between states and market has proved 
unhelpful and unrealistic by considering the state and the market to be two 
analytically separate realities, placed at two ends of a continuum, while a particular 
form of economy can be defined as mixed, a combination of two types. This 
paradigm has proved to lack realism both historically and theoretically. The state 
does not intervene in the market, it participates in the constitution of the economy 
and its role is always essential. I concur with Callon (1998: 41) in questioning: 
ÒCould we say that the waffle exists independently of the waffle-iron? Of course not. 
Similarly, we cannot say of an organised market activity that exists without the 
state.Ó In theorising about conceptions of control, governance structures and rules of 
exchange, Fligstein (2001) demonstrates how issues of governance and regulation are 
central to market enquiries. The question should thus be: how and with what methods 
does the state contribute to the performance of calculative agencies and the 
organisation of their relations? This implies the existence of a wide range of possible 
configurations. The case of China (and other post-socialist economies) is valuable in 
demonstrating this. The term Ôtransitional economyÕ reflects the old paradigm; there 
is nothing of a transition in the developments observed or in the diversity between 
countries such as Poland, Ukraine or China. It is more useful to conceptualise them 
as reconfigurations, combinations and re-arrangements peculiar to their historical 
contexts. In these rearrangements, the state often plays a crucial role and the 
dynamics in place, in turn, impact on its own position and contribution to the 
economy. The case of Shanghai should therefore not be seen simply as a transition 
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Ôfrom plan to marketÕ but a process of reconfiguration specific to its historical and 
geographical context, of which the constitutive role of the state is crucial. The 
experience of market building in Shanghai can thus illuminate how different 
constructions of capitalism evolve, how they intersect, and how a geographic 
sensibility makes a difference to the form and function of variegated capitalist 
economies. In the face of neoliberal fatalism, the active construction of neoliberal 
(market) ideology needs to be exposed through theoretically informed empirical 
research (Gibson-Graham, 1996; Peck and Tickell, 2002; Peck, 2005).  
Third, I concur with Zelizer (1988) and Krippner (2001) that the Ôadd-
social-context-and-stirÕ approach common in earlier economic sociology tradition is 
an erroneous conceptualisation of economy and society relations which impoverish 
both arenas. We need to move beyond the notion that economic phenomena are 
abstract and disembodied and need culture to be added to them. By seeing economic 
goods as the outcome of what Callon (1998; see also Barry and Slater, 2002) calls a 
Òdouble process of dis-entanglement and entanglementÓ, they become richer and 
more meaningful. ZelizerÕs (1988, 1993) multiple markets approach is particularly 
instructive in this sense by capturing the complex interplay between economic, 
cultural and social structural factors in the production of multiple markets, without 
privileging any one aspect but demonstrating how they are mutually constitutive. The 
anthropological and cultural approaches to ÔmarketsÕ have shown how markets are 
understood and experienced by actors in a variety of ways, invested with different 
meanings and acted upon according to different interests and through contingent 
social relations. The discursive construction of markets has material consequences in 
affecting policies and practices and is implicated through the exercise of power 
structures in the interest of particular groups. The central Chinese government and 
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SMG have particular understandings and visions of the financial markets in 
Shanghai; the local and foreign financial institutions in Shanghai are also Ôframing 
marketsÕ according to their own interests, agendas, experience and interpretations of 
what a market should be. How are these different ÔframingsÕ of market played out in 
Shanghai?  
With in-depth empirical studies and rich accounts of market practices, 
agencies and governance, the SSF has become increasingly prominent in studies on 
financial markets. In this thesis, however, I focus on the political economy of 
ÔmarketsÕ, rather than adopt a SSF approach, in emphasising broader structural issues 
and the nature of regulation in Shanghai (and at wider national and transnational 
scales). There is no royal road to markets. Although SSF research has opened up the 
field by challenging myopic framings of ÔmarketsÕ with rich empirical data and 
innovative studies, it tends to focus on market practices and processes at the micro- 
or meso-level that neglects certain aspects of power (such as between state 
institutions and finance capital). In this thesis, I reiterate the contribution of a 
political economy approach (as highlighted at the beginning of Chapter 3) in 
understanding specific local or national scale phenomena, by embedding them within 
an international context that emphasise flows, interconnectivity and power in the 
case of ShanghaiÕs financial markets. 
 
4.5 CONCLUSION: OPENING THE BLACK BOX OF MARKETS  
In eschewing a Marxist political economy approach in favour of more discursive 
accounts, recent research has contributed to more nuanced understanding and richer 
accounts of the geographies of money and finance. By problematising the 
ÔeconomicÕ and rejecting the artificial distinction between the economic sphere and 
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Ôother spheresÕ (be they cultural, social or political), such arguments allow for a 
greater appreciation of their mutually constitutive relationships. However, I would 
concur with Tickell (2000: 242-243) that:   
analyses should remain sensitive to the fact that however much financial flows and 
geographies are socially embedded, culturally inflected, discursively mediated, and 
symbolically inscribed, financial geographies are also geographies of power.  
The social constructivist approaches have traditionally been criticised for 
being politically thin and having a soft conceptualisation of power and inequality. 
Recently, an increasing number of scholars have sought to transcend the divide 
between a macrostructural view and socially and culturally inflected approach. This 
is evident in FligsteinÕs (2001) political-cultural approach, more holistic 
conceptualisations of state and economies (Mizruchi and Stearns, 1994; Callon, 
1998; MacKenzie, 2005b) and assigning greater explanatory weight to the role of 
power and conflict in socially and culturally inflected accounts of the market (Lie, 
1992, 1993; Abolafia, 1996).  
Issues of power are addressed in both structural (political economy) 
approaches as well as social constructivist approaches, albeit in slightly different 
ways. I argue that combining insights from various conceptualisations and 
understandings of power structures and processes contribute to a more holistic 
picture of its workings and impacts. In this study, I investigate the production and 
maintenance of financial markets in Shanghai through the frames of the regulation of 
the international financial system and the making of financial (market)places. To this 
end, I employ a socially and culturally inflected approach in understanding the rich 
accounts and multiple conceptualisations of the markets through the experience of 
variegated actors in Shanghai (and elsewhere) while placing them within broader 
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structural contexts of the international financial system (traditionally associated with 
the political economy approach).  
Within economic geography, much of the recent theoretical discussion of 
networks has been pushing in a similar critical direction by making a case for more 
political-economic content within network analyses, taking asymmetrical power 
more seriously and locating networks within their macroeconomic and institutional 
contexts (Olds and Yeung, 1999; Dicken et al., 2001; Henderson et al., 2001; Gertler, 
2002; Yeung, 2003). I would argue that much of the above engagement with markets 
and economies that I have reviewed in this chapter lack an appreciation of the 
significance of geographic context and spatial embeddedness, with little attention to 
issues of uneven development, place making or scalar constitution. Much more can 
be done to explore the historical geographies of market making and state building, at 
a variety of scales and in a variety of spatial contexts and to examine the social 
(re)construction of economic institutions more generally (Peck, 2005). The 
development of Shanghai as an international financial centre can be seen as part of a 
global process servicing finance capital but this conceals the complex reasons behind 
why such processes are taking place in Shanghai and at a particular point in time and 
space. The process of market making in Shanghai and the actors involved are also 
spread across scales and much of what is happening within the city is determined by 
economic, social and political considerations elsewhere on the national, regional and 
global level.  
Through my empirical research, I demonstrate how ÔmarketsÕ in Shanghai 
are framed, understood and acted upon different by the SMG, the central government 
in Beijing, regulatory bodies, domestic financial institutions and foreign financial 
institutions in Shanghai within the wider context of their global operations and 
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strategies. Transnational interests and roles of organisations such as the WTO and 
other state agencies from the financial centres of London, New York, Singapore and 
Hong Kong are also considered. The construction of a financial centre in Shanghai is 
thus the outcome of not only its own historical context, economic advantages and 
development trajectory (important as they are) but is also intrinsically bound up with 
the interests and decision of other agencies acting across spatial scales and negotiated 
amidst conflicts of interests and power struggles.  
Deconstructing markets, market relations and market ideologies means 
confronting the messy reality of economic behaviour and economic structures instead 
of assuming them away in the tradition of orthodox economics or impoverished 
accounts of the economy. According to MacKenzie (2005b), the concept of Ôblack 
boxÕ is originally an engineerÕs phrase, describing a device whose internal structure 
can be disregarded; as long as the device transforms given inputs into predictable 
outputs, how it does this can be ignored. It can thus be treated as opaque as if its 
content cannot be seen. Treating artefacts (computers, watches, car engines), 
organisations (banks, retailers) and expertise (surgeons, pilots) as black boxes may 
be an inescapable part of societies in high modernity but what may be unavoidable as 
a practical matter should not be satisfactory on an intellectual level: ÒNot to examine 
the contents of black boxes is to miss a critical part of how societies are constructedÓ 
(ibid., p. 557).  Power is exercised through the ability to sit on top of black boxes. 
According to Callon and Latour (1981), macro actors of social life (i.e. those who 
wield power) are micro actors grown large through their capacities to mobilise and 
command black boxes. The contents of black boxes are therefore not mere details; if 
a black box ceases to function as such, then the power of a macro actor can be 
disturbed and undermined. By opening the black box of ÔmarketsÕ in the context of 
 107 
ShanghaiÕs experience, and examining the underlying processes taking place in the 
city as well as across spatial scales, we can better understand the complex processes 
of market making and undermine the power of a seemingly unified (neoliberal) 
market discourse.  
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Chapter 5 
Doing ÔMarketÕ Research  
Methods and Practice   
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
Economic geography has grappled with a range of epistemological and 
methodological approaches over time. These range from quantitative economic 
geography, to Marxian political-economy, to the more recent culturally inflected 
economic geographies (Scott, 2000a; Barnes, 2001). The resulting methodological 
pluralism that has come to characterise the sub-discipline in recent years has been a 
response to, as well as a driver of, debates about where economic geography situates 
itself within the discipline and wider social sciences (Thrift, 2003; Amin and Thrift, 
2000; Peck, 2003)
1
. Over the past decade, in particular, the concept of the 
ÔeconomicÕ has been refigured as scholars have rejected conventional dualisms 
between Ôthe economicÕ and Ôthe culturalÕ in favour of a range of more fluid and 
hybrid conceptions that emphasises the mutual constitution and fundamental 
inseparability of these two spheres. Several progress reports and review articles have 
documented these exciting developments, known collectively as Ônew economic 
geographiesÕ (Barnes, 1996; Thrift, 2003; Lee and Wills, 1997; Lee, 2000; Sheppard 
and Barnes, 2000), which have influenced empirical research in geographies of firms 
(H. Yeung, 1994; McDowell, 1998; Schoenberger, 1997; Lai and Yeung, 2003), 
political economy (Barnes, 1995, 1998; Scott, 2000b), geographies of money and 
finance (Hudson, 1998; Jacobs, 1994; Leyshon, 1998; Leyshon and Thrift, 1997) and 
geographies of consumption (Crewe, 2000; Jackson, 2002). This Ôcultural turnÕ is a 
                                                
1
 See also the responses to Amin and ThriftÕs (2000) article in a 2001 special issue of ÔAntipodeÕ 33 
(2).  
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direct response to the new economic realities that have accompanied the shift to a 
post-industrial, knowledge-based, global capitalist economy as well as wider 
epistemological developments within human geography. New economic geographers 
have advanced the frontiers of geographical research to incorporate substantive 
issues traditionally considered to be outside mainstream economic geography. The 
discipline has benefited considerably as scholars drew attention to new subject 
matters and scales of analysis, accorded roles to previously ignored and subordinated 
players, and encouraged a diversity of analytical frameworks. At the same time, new 
economic geographers have also invoked new metaphors, strategies of writing and 
authorship, and research methods.  
Despite these advances, however, many commentators have questioned the 
rigour and relevance of much of these Ôcultural economic geographiesÕ (James, 
2006). Martin and Sunley (2001) criticise Òthe new (cultural) economic geographyÓ 
for its Òvague theory and thin empiricsÓ (p. 153), which privilege an oversocialised 
epistemology and a less-than-rigorous methodological framework. Markusen (1999) 
similarly highlights what she considers to be the waning quality of in-depth empirical 
work that results in Òfuzzy concepts, scanty evidence [and]  policy distanceÓ (p. 869).  
There is now increasing recognition that the methodological component of new 
economic geographies continues to lag behind their ontological and epistemological 
counterparts (see Jackson, 2002; H. Yeung, 2003; James, 2006). James (2006), for 
example, calls for greater reflections on effective methodologies in terms of the 
broader sets of standards and guidelines (rather than rigid mandatory rules that are at 
odds with the epistemology of new economic geographies research) used in 
formulating whole research strategies, Òfrom the derivation of research questions, to 
data collection, empirical analysis, theory-building and write-upÓ (p. 291).  As such, 
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our research methodologies should go beyond simply the choice of research 
instruments per se to include the entire process of practicing research itself (H. 
Yeung, 2003). Research practice includes aspects of research activity that are often 
left out of conventional accounts of method and methodology, such as how the topic 
evolves, its ongoing and dialogic character, and the way the project changes in the 
process (Raghuram and Strange, 2001).  
In this chapter, I document and reflect on how the research themes and 
empirical work of this thesis were derived and conducted in a circular rather than 
linear fashion (moving straightforwardly from theory through to epistemology to 
methods), as is often assumed to be the case. This study did not start with 
preconceived notions such as the success of market-building in Shanghai, systems of 
governance and regulatory goals of the Chinese state bodies, and strategies of foreign 
and domestic financial institutions, at the stage of literature review or the stage of 
data collection. While iterative abstractions were constantly underway from an 
immanent critique to data analysis, the notion and significance of ÔmarketsÕ did not 
fully emerge until empirical data were triangulated and theories on ÔmarketsÕ were 
grounded in these data. Following H. Yeung (2003), I employ a process-based 
methodological framework, whereby the configuration of different methodological 
practices is driven by the research process itself rather than some preordained 
philosophical positions. This inductive approach is particularly relevant since my 
objective is to expose and critically engage with the multiple identities, 
conceptualisations and contested nature of ÔmarketsÕ and the ÔmarketisationÕ 
process,. In doing so, I allow field observations and the experience and perspectives 
of market participants to Ôspeak outÕ as I analyse the empirical data to discern 
patterns and regularities (as well as irregularities). Some tentative hypotheses are 
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formed which are then progressively modified, refined and reaffirmed through the 
course of further empirical research.  
The research methods employed in this study took a multi-pronged and 
complementary approach, comprising archival/library research, analysis of secondary 
data (e.g. press releases, news articles, government/official reports, bank reports and 
other industrial publications) and in-depth semi-structured interviews. In the next 
section, I elaborate on the specific research methods employed with regards to my 
research themes and the types of data collected. As personal interviews form a 
prominent component of my empirical research, a separate section (5.2.2) documents 
its use in this study and highlights issues that emerged in the course of fieldwork. In 
section 5.3, I take a reflexive approach in examining issues of research practice 
(Raghuram and Strange, 2001) and positionality (Rose, 1997; Cormode and Hughes, 
1999; Ward and Jones, 1999) that emerged in the course of my field research, paying 
particular attention to how my complex ethnic identities have influenced the 
fieldwork process. Rather than self-indulgent navel-gazing, I argue that this 
reflexivity is important as our fluid positionalities and hybrid identities invariably 
influence which doors are opened or closed to us as researchers and the content and 
dynamics of the interview process and, as such, have important implications for the 
resultant analysis and claims of our research.  
 
5.2 RESEARCH METHODS  
5.2.1 Research Agenda  
The objective of my thesis is to open up the Ôblack boxÕ of markets and critically 
examine the process of market formation by studying ShanghaiÕs experience. 
Statistics on public listings on the SSE and the types of policies and regulations at 
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different points are useful in providing a timeline and broad picture of events but are 
not particularly informative in revealing the motivations and rationale underlying 
specific decisions and actions, which I argue is vital to a deeper understanding of the 
market-formation process. The initial plan was to conduct an intensive and in-depth 
study of a particular financial market in Shanghai, i.e. the Shanghai stock market. 
However, problems of access became a serious obstacle as it became clear that I was 
unable to obtain any interviews with employees of the stock exchange. The China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) was in the process of implementing 
reforms to the stock markets and share structures in 2006, during which the bulk of 
my fieldwork was conducted. Officials and workers were particularly sensitive about 
questions relating to the history, performance and structure of the stock market and 
were not keen to entertain interview requests from a foreigner.
2
  
In the course of fieldwork in Shanghai and through conversation with 
people in the industry, it emerged that in spite of the hyperbole and international 
media attention surrounding the SSE, the securities market is only a very small part 
of the story in developing ÔmarketsÕ in Shanghai and its aspiration towards being an 
international financial centre. I had almost fallen into the trap of pigeon-holing 
Ômarket formationÕ as pertaining to only capital markets (e.g. stock market, futures 
market, commodities market). This reflects with Carrier and MillerÕs (1998) 
argument regarding the growth and power of abstraction in the contemporary 
economy such that our lives are made to conform to the virtual reality of economic 
thought Ð the trap of ÔvirtualismÕ. Much of the financial sector reforms underway in 
China are in the banking sector; this is unsurprising given its traditionally prominent 
role in ChinaÕs finance sector. However, the development of capital markets is also 
                                                
2
 The intersection of politics and time has a significant impact on research access and the interview 
process as a game of positionalities. Ward and Jones (1999) highlight this political-temporal 
contingency in research access during their studies of UK local government bodies.  
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integral to the success (or lack thereof) of these banking reforms along with the 
relaxation of rules regarding the roles and activities of foreign banks in Shanghai. 
The development of financial markets from a banking perspective is more important 
than I initially expected and I became interested in how different actors in this sector 
(foreign banks, local Chinese banks, Chinese regulatory authorities) position 
themselves in Shanghai and how different visions of ÔmarketsÕ might be framed, 
understood and acted upon differently. There is also an element of serendipity in this 
as the interviews I had the most success obtaining were with senior managers and 
country representatives in the banking sector (a point to which I will return to later). 
Financial markets in Shanghai are being developed through conflicts and 
negotiations between competing agendas and visions and power play as foreign 
banks, local Chinese banks and local government and regulatory authorities are 
actively involved in the process (Figure 5.1). These processes are also spread across 
scales as much of what is happening within the city is determined by economic, 
social and political considerations elsewhere on the national, regional and global 
level. These include directives from head offices of foreign banks, influence of the 
national government, transnational interests and roles of organisations such as the 
WTO and other financial centres such as London and Hong Kong.  
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Figure 5.1 Negotiating different visions of ÔmarketsÕ: the main players    
 
To begin with, I collected background information on the historical context 
of ShanghaiÕs economic development, focusing on the finance sector, and the 
structure of the banking sector and stock market, in order to understand the empirical 
context of my study. Background information on the political economy and financial 
centre of Shanghai was mainly obtained through archival research (library and 
internet searches) of books, journal articles and newspaper reports and websites. 
These include research conducted by Chinese scholars on ChinaÕs financial system, 
financial markets and regulatory changes, as well as secondary data and statistics 
from yearbooks and government reports, in a mix of Chinese and English language 
material. Whilst in the field, I collected news articles from local newspapers (such as 
the China Daily and Shanghai Daily) and business magazines (e.g. BizShanghai), 
tracked relevant announcements from banks and regulators, and collected reports 
produced by local analysts in financial institutions and regulatory bodies. 
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Approximately half of these materials were in Chinese. I also kept a field journal to 
record experiences as well as events as they were occurring in local and national 
politics and reported in the media, particularly those relating to changes in the 
finance industry or being circulated in the industry grapevine. More detailed 
accounts were obtained through interviews with official sources and independent 
bodies such as the SMG, the Shanghai Lujiazui Development (Group) Co. Ltd, the 
China-Britain Business Council, British Chamber of Commerce and EU Chamber of 
Commerce.  
I also needed to access in-depth and interpretative views and experience of 
individuals and institutions involved in the development of financial centre 
capacities, specifically the changing structure and activities of the banking sector and 
capitalisation of the stock market, both of which are part of the ÔmarketisationÕ 
strategy implemented by the Chinese regulatory authorities. What were their 
expectations of financial reforms in Shanghai (or China more broadly)? What 
particular challenges or difficulties did they experience? What were their plans 
(corporate strategies or institutional policies) for these markets? How were they 
being implemented? What skills or knowledges were needed to ÔcreateÕ or ÔreformÕ a 
financial market (especially with regards to developing regulatory frameworks and 
the legal environment) and how were they obtained or transferred? What 
opportunities and prospects did they perceive in the future for the banking sector, the 
capital markets, the region and for Shanghai as a financial centre? What were the 
most vital issues to be resolved?  
Reading literature on capital markets and finance provided a general 
background on the structures and functions of the stock market and the banking 
sector, but sterile data on the number of IPOs and other market trends are not 
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particularly helpful in examining the landscapes of power and actors involved in the 
complexities of market formation. Quantitative techniques such as questionnaire 
surveys to securities firms and banks are also inadequate means of understanding 
peopleÕs views and experience; they may capture the material effects but not the 
underlying rationale of actors engaged in complex and on-going processes 
(Schoenberger, 1991). Qualitative and interpretative techniques are more appropriate 
in this respect as their flexibility allow for a greater variety and richness of data to be 
captured. To access the views and experience of those involved in the process of 
market formation, personal interviews were conducted with senior managers, 
directors or country representatives of foreign and Chinese financial institutions 
(banks and securities firms), and government and regulatory authorities in Shanghai 
with some interviews in the UK. Semi-structured interviewing was employed so that 
not only specific research questions could be answered, but new and interesting 
points could also be raised during the course of a more fluid interaction (Hughes, 
1999). This allows existing theories of the economy and its geographies to be 
continually reworked in the light of conversations with people who actively engaged 
with and in the ÔmarketÕ. As this thesis draws largely from interview data, I will 
elaborate on this aspect in the next section.  
 
5.2.2 Corporate Interviews  
As one of the main objectives of this thesis is to understand the perspectives, 
meanings and relationships in the process of market-making, as well as individual 
interpretations of changing events, the research methodology invariably lends itself 
to an interpretative approach. The economic phenomena of capital flows, information 
exchange and development of financial centres are not defined or examined in purely 
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ÔobjectiveÕ or economistic terms as the world is organised in a subjective manner that 
is open to a multiplicity of different interpretations or ÔreadingsÕ. If Òthe world can 
only be known indirectly through ideasÓ (Johnston, 1997: 187), the process and 
politics of economic phenomena have to be understood by taking into account 
individual motivations, ideologies, personal experiences, unique resources and 
(sometimes conflicting) objectives. I adopted a method of semi-structured interviews 
consisting of a checklist of topics to be covered while allowing the direction and 
content of interviews to also be guided by the specific knowledge of the interviewees 
and the dynamics of our conversations. In exploring the views and experiences of 
institutional and individual actors, I argue that each interpretation is equally valid and 
accurate insofar as they reflect the worldviews of the actors concerned. In other 
words, what matters most is not what is but what people believe is, as these beliefs 
have their consequences (Jackson, 1988). In this vein, this research is anchored in the 
subjective understanding of the meanings, motivations and relationships amongst 
government bodies, institutions, firms and individuals and the ways in which 
financial knowledge, government policies and specific events are experienced, 
understood and acted upon. Rather than focusing on quantitative, large-scale 
samples, the field research concentrated on smaller numbers but more intensive and 
in-depth analyses of particular institutions. The idea is not to extrapolate 
representations to a larger population, but to use these cases to demonstrate the 
conceptual underpinnings of this study. Such an approach emphasises Òinformation 
rich casesÓ rather than statistical representativeness (Baxter and Eyles, 1997: 513).  
The task of studying and interviewing business elites, high-level corporate 
executives and other professionals can often be a frustrating experience. It has been 
variously argued that ÔeliteÕ groups (those who are socially, economically or 
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politically powerful, for example, celebrities, the aristocracy, high-ranking lawyers 
and investment bankers, and senior politicians and diplomats) are more difficult to 
penetrate than other groups as they are better equipped to protect themselves and 
better positioned to manipulate research results and even dissemination (Hertz and 
Imber, 1995; Cochrane, 1998; Hughes and Cormodes, 1998; McDowell, 1998; Parry, 
1998; Sabot, 1999). Obtaining an interview can be extremely difficult when access to 
powerful business people is constrained not only by their elite status but also by their 
demanding schedules. However, other scholars have also cautioned against a 
distinction between ÔeliteÕ interviewees and other types of interviewees that is based 
on inadequate conceptions of power and dualistic identities. Alternative suggestions 
include employing a poststructural understanding of power (K. Smith, 2006) in order 
to transcend the dualistic categories of ÔeliteÕ and Ônon-eliteÕ (or ÔpowerfulÕ and 
ÔvulnerableÕ) or using the concept of the Ôhybrid eliteÕ (Parry, 1998) to better reflect 
the fluid and complex relationships between the researcher and the researched.   
In the context of my research, gaining access to the initial few respondents 
had been crucial. Other researchers have pointed out that the use of social 
connections and institutional affiliations are often valuable starting points in 
establishing rapport with elite interviewees. McDowell (1998), for example, 
described how she used her college connections in Cambridge University to contact 
members on the boards of banks in setting up interviews with high-status merchant 
bank workers in the City. Through personal and university contacts, I conducted four 
pilot interviews in 2005 (one in Nottingham, two in the City of London and one in 
Shanghai). These interviews helped to verify the relevance and industry interest of 
the research themes in this thesis and establish rapport and contacts for later 
fieldwork in Shanghai. Conducting the initial interviews in London also had the 
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advantage of providing a view from the ÔoutsideÕ in the triangulation of field data. 
Given the historical connection and contemporary business interests between the UK 
and Shanghai, the views and experience of counterparts in the City provided 
additional insights into trends and prospects of developments in Shanghai. These 
respondents also helped to connect me with their overseas operations in Shanghai for 
further interviews. In Shanghai, the British Chamber of Commerce and UK Trade & 
Investment department of the British Consulate-General also recommended some 
potential interviewees in their network or database. Subsequent interviews were then 
largely based on a snowballing or Òreputational methodÓ (Fainstein, 1994: 17) in 
which researchers rely on informants to supply names of people who are prominent 
actors or other well-informed/connected people in their respective professional 
networks. Previous research experience has shown this method to work better than a 
purposeful selection of samples from a list given the difficulty of obtaining up-to-
date and comprehensive listings in most industry sectors in China. More importantly, 
experience has also shown it is extremely difficult to solicit favourable response 
from Ôcold-calling/emailingÕ potential respondents; the personal nature of a face-to-
face interview, the elite status of professionals in the finance industry and their busy 
schedules made it difficult to obtain interviews without a recommendation or 
introduction from another contact.  
A total of 51 interviews were conducted, the majority of which were carried 
out in Shanghai between February to November 2006. Respondents were mainly 
from foreign and local Chinese financial institutions (mostly banks and a few 
securities companies), and Chinese regulators and officials (e.g. CBRC, Shanghai 
Office for Finance, Lujiazui Financial Zone). I also interviewed two foreign 
companies in China with manufacturing or service operations in Shanghai to 
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document their experience and perspectives as service clients and spoke to 
representatives from the British Chamber of Commerce and EU Chamber of 
Commerce Banking Group. Interviews with foreign entities were conducted in 
English (except for one) and those with Chinese organisations were conducted in 
Mandarin or a mixture of English and Mandarin. All the interviews were taped with 
permission (with the exception of one interview in the UK, two interviews in 
Shanghai and one email interview from Hong Kong). They lasted between 45 to 90 
minutes and were all transcribed and translated by myself. Details of the respondents 
are listed in Appendix A.  
Apart from problems of access, other issues had to be considered in the 
interpretation and analysis of interview data. Lim (1998) warns that elite 
interviewees may exaggerate or distort their roles and experience in past events, 
intentionally or otherwise. Some of my interviewees have relatively high public 
profiles in the local and international media. Given their experience in presenting 
their views to the public, to what extent were their comments during interviews be 
ÔrehearsedÕ? This can be a rather slippery problem to negotiate and highlights the 
importance of data triangulation by corroborating intervieweesÕ comments against 
other interviews and field data. I collected information from a wide range of sources, 
including field observations, interview data, the media, published reports from 
different agencies and so on. In this way, triangulation helps to reduce 
methodological problems associated with eclecticism as different practices are 
brought together with a common purpose of cross-checking research results and 
interpretations, thus improving the validity and reliability of findings (H. Yeung, 
2003).  Some critics have urged a move away from what they see as Òunwarranted 
selectivity in the choice of respondentsÓ (Markusen, 1999: 872, see also Martin and 
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Sunley, 2001) when utilising the ÔsnowballingÕ or case-study method. Most 
researchers probably start with an ÔidealÕ sample of research participants but as 
James (2006) points out, the selectivity of the respondent sample that we achieve in 
practice ultimately rests on our ability to gain access, something that can be 
particularly problematic as junior researchers with limited resources.
3
 Rather than 
simply disclaiming responsibility, triangulation can help to improve the integrity of 
empirical findings and subsequent interpretations.  
Analysing data from these interviews was a critical step in the development 
of theoretically valid claims about the nature, politics and process of ÔmarketsÕ 
formation (as presented in Chapters 6, 7 and 8). My strategy for analysing the 
interview transcripts was to employ a systematic set of coding and recoding 
processes, informed by some of the techniques of grounded theory (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990), which guide the researcher through the building rather than ÔtestingÕ 
of theories through iterative abstraction (Crang, 1997). I first sifted through the data 
through a process of open coding, annotating and making notes. This involved 
analysing transcripts, noting particular observations, sentences and paragraphs and 
giving each discrete incident, idea or event particular themes or codes. At the same 
time, I also examined the data in terms of the actors involved, their motives and 
positionalities and events that were happening at the time of interviews (e.g. in 
policy, politics and industry) that could have bearing on the issues that were 
discussed. As ideas emerged they were jotted down as theoretical memos. Similar 
phenomena identified by open coding were then brought together into common 
                                                
3
 My own sampling strategy, for example, started with an ÔidealÕ set of interviews with foreign 
financial institutions, local financial institutions and regulatory and government officials in Shanghai, 
with an equal number of interviews conducted with each group. In the end, foreign financial 
institutions came to occupy a much more significant portion of my final sample and I had much fewer 
interviews with Chinese regulatory and government officials. Various factors that contributed to this 
final distribution are discussed in section 5.3.  
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categories and given conceptual labels, sometimes borrowing words and phrases 
used by the participants themselves. The themes were then re-analysed and refined in 
relation to my theoretical analysis of extant literature and as new empirical material 
was collected. Contradictions in interview responses were not conceptualised as 
problems but as the source of potentially fruitful new lines of enquiry in subsequent 
interviews. Moreover, they highlight the complexities and contradictions of 
ÔmarketisationÕ in Shanghai.  
Finally, all interviewees were offered anonymity, which can be important 
given the nature of possibly sensitive information and ÔstoriesÕ that are shared and 
the highly regulated context of China. Brief profiles of respondents are listed in 
Appendix A, which provides important information in interpreting the interview data 
but identifying traits such as individual and names of institutions have been 
excluded. Having said that, I am aware that for small organisations such as certain 
business or governmental institutions, true anonymity may not be possible since it 
will not difficult to deduce whom I had spoken to if one is familiar with the financial 
sector and events in China and do a search on the internet. In any case, I have 
endeavoured to provide as much contextual information as possible to be useful for 
interpretation and analysis without revealing too much specificities that could 
identify individuals.  
 
5.3  RESEARCH PRACTICE: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIELDWORK 
PROCESS 
5.3.1 The Contingencies of ÔSnowballingÕ  
All too often, only Ôsuccess storiesÕ (of say X number of interviews conducted) are 
presented in research findings without revealing the process of actually obtaining 
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interview data or whether other interview requests were rejected, as if discussion of 
the latter would somehow undermine the integrity of methods and findings. The 
written presentation of research findings is clearly important but what does not 
appear (and why) can also be useful and revealing of the empirical context. Crang 
(2005) points out that silences can point to significant moments of resistance, both in 
society and the process of research. Hostility to interviews or refusals due to fear, 
mistrust or other reasons are not just barriers to overcome but also an instructive part 
of the research process. In my field research, the snowballing technique for obtaining 
interviews proved largely successful with foreign respondents but was surprisingly 
limited with the Chinese. While the foreign respondents were often happy to literally 
dig through their business cards collection and offer contact details of friends or 
professional contacts, the Chinese respondents were mostly reticent. This might be 
explained by the different ways in which interpersonal networks seem to operate 
within these two communities (if one could label them as separate and cohesive 
groups, at least in juxtaposition to each other).  
My experience with foreign interviewees in Shanghai seems to concur with 
work conducted on the expatriate community elsewhere (e.g. Beaverstock, 2002, 
2004, 2005), in which the international experience and personal circumstances of 
expatriates produce a certain openness to engagement with new ideas and people, 
and thereby a willingness to recommend ÔstrangersÕ to friends in professional circles 
and to talk to said ÔstrangersÕ as well. All this is done in the spirit of helping out a 
ÔnewcomerÕ to the city, just as they would have benefited from similar practices 
when they first arrived. The snowballing technique thus works well when there are 
already complementary social practices and networks present within the group of 
target respondents. My experience was quite different with the Chinese respondents. 
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Relational networks appear to operate on a more trust-based and personal basis 
amongst the Chinese, such that while the initial respondent might suggest one or two 
further contacts, the ÔobligationÕ of the latter (who were otherwise generally helpful 
and generous with their time and knowledge) would seldom extend to suggesting 
further contacts as I would then be at least twice removed down a hierarchy of 
relationship.  
Therefore, while snowballing operates in the form of A1 recommends A2 
recommends A3 recommends A4 and so on for foreign interviewees, the situation 
with Chinese respondents tend to be B1 recommends B2 (and possibly B3), and stop 
at that point as I do not have sufficient social capital with B2 and B3 (they do not 
know me well enough) for them to grant further contacts (Figures 5.2 and 5.3). This 
suggests that interpersonal networks seem to operate more like a chain for the 
expatriate community while they tend to form a hierarchy based on closeness of 
association for the Chinese community. Interviewees in the B1 category were mostly 
family relations or university contacts and their friends or colleagues. They were 
very willing to put me in touch with their contacts, often in a very personal manner 
such as driving me to the interview venue or calling me after the interview to inquire 
about how it went. B2 interviewees, on the other hand, were further removed in the 
relational hierarchy and were hesitant to ÔrecommendÕ me to someone else as they 
could not personally vouch for my credentials or status or whatever criteria was 
deemed important. Another point worth noting is how the contact lists of local 
Chinese and foreign respondents appeared to be distinct and separate, i.e. local 
respondents would recommend another local contact and foreign interviewees would 
suggest foreign ones. This alludes to the rather rigid separation between local 
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Chinese and foreign participants in the Shanghai financial sector and is very much a 
product of the regulatory environment, a point that I will pick up in later chapters.   
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Snowballing ÔforeignÕ style 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Snowballing ÔChineseÕ style 
 
The socio-cultural dimension in ShanghaiÕs finance community has thus 
proved more complicated than expected in utilising the snowballing method. While 
the foreign banks and contacts were relatively easy to get hold of, it took a lot more 
time than I anticipated to obtain information and contact local Chinese respondents. 
While the former were happy to arrange meetings on emails, which was very 
efficient and helpful for advanced planning, the latter were often only contactable 
through telephone calls as I often received no response through emails. This could 
partly be due to technical difficulties in rendering Chinese characters on email 
programmes and internet browsers on different computer systems (one often gets 
nonsensical squares or symbols in place of characters within an email). The 
University of NottinghamÕs web-based email system could not handle Chinese 
A1 A2 A3 A4 
 
B1 B2 B3 
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characters which meant I could only exchange very brief emails with Chinese 
respondents who could write in English or had to write Chinese emails in a separate 
word document and email that as an attachment. Apart from the tedium of the above 
procedure, the relative success of telephone requests could also be due to its more 
personal nature and is preferable given the more trust-based nature of relational 
networks amongst the Chinese respondents. The process of obtaining interviews thus 
took longer and proved more complicated than expected. The situation improved 
during subsequent trips when I was able to gather more local contacts but the 
difference in styles of communication between the two groups did affect my final 
sample.  
 
5.3.2 Not Chinese Enough? Positionalities and Hybrid Identities 
Some scholars have suggested that ÔinsidersÕ Ð researchers who study a group to 
whom they belong Ð have an advantage because they are able to obtain greater 
insights through intrinsic knowledge or traits (Hill-Collins, 1991; Lughod, 1988). By 
contrast, ÔoutsidersÕ argue that by not ÔbelongingÕ they are more likely to be 
perceived as neutral and provided with information that might not be accessible to an 
insider (Fonow and Cook, 1991). They also claim to have greater degree of 
objectivity and ability to observe behaviour and phenomena without distorting their 
meanings.  In examining the issue of positionality in the field, some geographers 
have problematised this insider/outsider binary which assumes that being an ÔinsiderÕ 
or ÔoutsiderÕ is a fixed attribute. This binary is in reality a boundary that is highly 
unstable and ignores the dynamism of positionalities in time and through space 
(Herod, 1999; Mullings, 1999; Sabot, 1999; K. Smith, 2006). The research process is 
a social one in which both interviewer and interviewee are active participants in 
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knowledge creation and therefore although the ÔinsiderÕ and ÔoutsiderÕ may shape 
this process in different ways, it is erroneous to assume that one version is 
necessarily more ÔtrueÕ in some absolute and ÔobjectiveÕ sense (Herod, 1999). 
Mullings (1999), for example, speak of Ôpositional spacesÕ as areas where the 
situated knowledges of both parties in the interview encounter engender a level of 
trust and cooperation. When academics have attempted to problematise the research 
process, positionality is often taken to refer to the physical or socio-cultural 
characteristics of the interviewer (race, gender, class, age, nationality etc.) but such 
categories are themselves problematic and not necessarily obvious to the interviewer 
or interviewee. One could consciously manipulate ones positionality; how others 
view oneÕs positionality could be different from oneÕs own perspective; and a 
researcherÕs positionality could also change over time (Herod, 1999).   
At the beginning of the research project, I thought that my identity as an 
ethnic Chinese who can speak, read and write English and Mandarin would help me 
build trust and rapport with the local Chinese and ease communication. On the one 
hand, these were probably nave assumptions on my part, but, on the other hand, it 
points to complex issues about positionality that I have highlighted above. Contrary 
to initial expectations, I had far greater interview success with the foreign 
respondents compared to the Chinese. To the foreign interviewees, I am an ethnic-
Chinese scholar from Singapore, based in the UK, who speaks fluent English and 
have (presumably) ÔwesternisedÕ perspectives and experience.
4
 I thus stand out from 
most other Chinese people that they come into contact with and am, to them, rather 
interesting as a person. Hertz (1995) and Green (2004) also spoke of similar 
experiences as ÔWesternersÕ whom their Chinese respondents found rather 
                                                
4
 Almost every foreign interviewee commented on my English and asked why I speak the language so 
well. Few people are aware that English is taught as the first language and language of instruction in 
Singapore schools.   
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fascinating as they spoke Mandarin and even some Shanghainese (in the case of 
Hertz). This went a long way toward facilitating access and the process of field 
interaction. To the local Chinese, on the other hand, it would seem that I appeared to 
be a bit of a conundrum. I am a competent Mandarin speaker but not as fluent 
compared to a native speaker. This was especially apparent when I had to deal with 
technical and business terminology. I prepared (and was constantly adding to) a list 
of corresponding Mandarin and English phrases, terminology and names of 
institutions to help me in Mandarin interviews (see Appendix B) but it was still 
difficult at times because I just did not have the same finesse with Mandarin as I do 
with English when, for example, trying to ask a question in different ways to tease 
out particular details and corroborate the validity of claims. I also do not speak 
Shanghainese, which, although not problematic in communication, might have given 
me additional cultural capital. Although I am, technically speaking, a ÔforeignerÕ who 
speaks Mandarin as a second language, I had a rather different experience compared 
to Hertz and Green because I am ethnically Chinese. Thus, I seem to occupy a 
liminal space in the field of not being foreign enough to make me ÔinterestingÕ to the 
Chinese respondents and yet not being local enough to ease access and 
communication with the locals.  
Out of the 51 interviews, I only managed to obtain three with local 
regulatory and government officials (with another four Chinese interviewees having 
previously worked for regulatory bodies and were asked to reflect on their 
experience and official stances there). Apart from the problem associated with 
accessing local respondents in general (as explained earlier), I was also told by a 
number of local respondents and one of the three officials that the official policy was 
not to give interviews to scholars or journalists without prior approval (which is very 
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difficult to obtain). Even when I was successful in getting a meeting through specific 
recommendations, the interview process often proved to be more difficult than prior 
experience. I found myself having to press and prod more than I ever had to (while 
worrying about whether I was being rude!) for further elaboration and examples to be 
given. This made it very difficult to obtain their views and experience of the 
regulatory environment in Shanghai and China, changes in the system and potential 
problems and progress. I also came to question the usefulness of such interviews. 
Advice from local contacts (personal contacts as well as local Chinese postgraduate 
and faculty researchers) revealed that my experience is common and that Chinese 
government officials and regulators tend to be very taciturn in interviews. They 
pointed out that there might be little value-added information in what I obtain from 
such interviews compared to information publicly available from official websites, 
official reports and press release due to the closely-regulated nature of information 
management in China. My experience thus echoes that of SabotÕs (1999) in her 
interviews with local French officials where the institutional context is such that 
mistrust and minimal disclosure of information are the rule:  
The right behaviour to adopt is: first, if possible, try to postpone the appointment, 
hoping that (s)he will lose patience. Secondly, if the stubborn researcher insists on 
having an interview, receive him/her very politely, with all regard due to his/her 
position, but avoid giving any written documents [É] which could be used in a 
distorted way [É]. Thirdly, be careful about what one says by adopting a 
stereotypical formal language; avoiding all the sensitive current events; cultivating 
ambiguity in order to confuse [É] and never complaining about anything or anyone, 
because every word spoken can boomerang back and cause serious damage (p. 332).  
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And indeed, I was never given any documentation at those meetings and vague 
language permeated the course of our conversations.
5
 As a result, the main sources 
that I used for local government and regulatory authoritiesÕ vision of market 
formation were from official websites, official reports, press release and news 
articles, which can still be very informative if one knows how to read between the 
lines. When speaking to interviewees from local and foreign financial institutions, I 
also actively sought their views on local regulatory processes and frameworks and 
their encounters and interaction with local officials and regulators to get a sense of 
the (changing) regulatory environment. This helped me to corroborate what I read 
from official or publicly available reports with a spoken discourse, which I could 
triangulate with the interview data from those three ÔofficialÕ respondents and other 
Chinese interviewees with regulatory experience.  
Herod (1999) and Sabot (1999) note that in their experience being foreign 
Western academic researchers afforded a warmer reception than being local 
researchers, i.e. being an ÔoutsiderÕ was important in conducting the research. My 
field experience seems to mirror those observations particularly in my interaction 
with the Chinese interviewees. A number of them were quite careful in enquiring 
about my affiliation and nationality at the beginning of the interview, as if assessing 
how much of a ÔthreatÕ I might be and how much information would be safe to 
reveal. Although it would be hard to prove conclusively, Ôplaying upÕ my identity as 
a Singaporean Ð i.e. emphasising my status as a foreigner and ÔoutsiderÕ with little 
understanding of the Shanghai context Ð allowed me to ask questions without being 
perceived as too inquisitive or intrusive and might have given me some advantage in 
                                                
5
 Conversations with local academic researchers in Shanghai reveal that the majority of research 
projects in universities are funded or commissioned by government or other official bodies and the 
conspicuous use of letters from those authorities are vital to the research process in obtaining 
interviews and documents.  
 131 
that interviewees perhaps perceive me as a harmless ÔforeignÕ academic rather than, 
say, a threatening ÔlocalÕ investigator. By lowering the (perceived) risk of reprisals, 
they might have been more open and candid in sharing their views and experience. 
Certainly there were various points during which I felt very strongly that I would 
have been told even less if I had been a local researcher, such as when I was 
specifically asked about my affiliation and nationality to establish my ÔforeignÕ status 
before the interview progressed.  
 
5.4 CONCLUSION  
Somehow you have to get in there, and although we often, in writing up our results, 
talk blandly of our samples or our case studies, letting the reader assume that the 
particular industry, location, site, and respondents were the optimal or ideal for 
investigating the particular issue in which we were interested, we all know that the 
ÔrealityÕ Ð if I can use that old modernist term Ð is a lot messier. A great deal 
depends on luck and chance, connections and networks, and the particular 
circumstances at the time (McDowell, 1998: 2135)  
 
McDowell (1998), Parry (1998) and Hughes (1999) firmly acknowledge the role of 
chance in accessing corporate elites and eliciting information from them. My 
research journey was also guided, at least in part, by an element of luck and 
circumstances which I could not have anticipated.  Such is the rich yet ambiguous 
and messy world of doing qualitative research. Thrift (2003: 106) notes that Òmore 
often it is a curious mix of humiliations and intimidations mixed with moments of 
insight and even enjoyment.Ó Some of the taken-for-grantedness about fieldwork has 
indeed been replaced, as evident from the critical and reflexive engagements from 
the geographers mentioned in this chapter. But others scholars have continued to 
push the boundaries of qualitative research (see, for example, Schoenberger, 2001; 
Latham, 2003; Crang, 2005; Wiles et al., 2005; James, 2006). Interviews have tended 
to form the ÔbedrockÕ of qualitative research methods with some attempts made to 
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reach beyond the limitations of this through focus groups and, to some extent, 
ethnographic research (usually in the form of participant-observation). Valentine 
(1999), for example, incorporates methods such as food and photographic and video 
diaries in addition to in-depth interviews and focus groups and Latham (2003) uses 
photographs, text and time diaries produced by respondents to convey a sense of 
practising places.  
For this research, I have found it very useful to keep a research diary (or 
field journal) to record field experience as well as events that were happening in the 
media and local and national politics, especially those relating to changes in the 
finance industry, and news or rumours circulating in the industry grapevine that 
emerge in the course of conversations (Table 5.1). Such records helped me to put 
interview data in context of events that were happening during that time as well as to 
capture fresh thoughts, ideas and observations that emerge not only in the course of 
conducting the interviews themselves but also when obtaining contacts, requesting 
for meetings, walking around the LFTZ, going in and out of office buildings, having 
lunches with interviewees and local academics, and so on. Field data should not be 
seen as only consisting of interview transcripts but needs to include the more holistic 
experience of being Ôout thereÕ in the field and the observations, interaction and 
insights obtained in that process. I certainly would not have been able to write much 
of this chapter without having kept a research diary to record my thoughts and 
experience as they happened and I would argue that this has added richness and 
additional insights into my analysis. As researchers of ÔeliteÕ geographies, it is 
perhaps more difficult for us to employ methods such as participant-diaries or 
ethnography but we do need to think of creative ways of collecting and incorporating 
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empirical material that begins to unpeg the corporate interview from its currently 
privileged position in the economic geographerÕs research toolkit.  
Table 5.1 Excerpts from research diary  
ÒOver the past 10 days, the local news was filled with reports on the NPC (National PeopleÕs Congress) & 
CPPCC (Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference). Focus was on building a ÔSocialist countrysideÕ 
and a Ôharmonious societyÕ, Also on technology and innovation in science and technology sectors. Not much 
on finance itself. That seems to have taken a back seat after being in the limelight for the past decade. 
Income and regional inequalities are high on the agenda with development targets for the western inner 
regions of China.Ó (14 March 2006)  
ÒI was rather hopeful about this one because it was important. The Shanghai Municipal Council Office of 
Financial Services. I hoped to get some good stuff. But it was rather disappointing.  
That guy was very taciturn and just didnÕt seem very interested in general. Of all the interviews that IÕve done, 
I have never had to push as hard as for this one. I kept pushing for more details, asking for elaboration, 
specific examples and so on but he just wasnÕt keen on giving too much detail. I was feeling rather 
discouraged and embarrassed actually. I knew on a professional level this was my job and I was supposed to 
just keep pushing and seeking, to be bold and thick-skinned. But on a personal level I felt really awkward and 
impertinent. I felt really bad about it. It felt like he just wanted to get me out of his office as quickly as 
possible.  
A day later, when I was having dinner with QY (a PhD student from East China Normal University), she 
related similar experiences when she interviewed officials. I was quite relieved that it wasnÕt just me. She also 
confirmed other peopleÕs opinions that I might not find it all that useful to interview officials because they are 
not always very cooperative in interviews and are unlikely to offer any extra info that one could not obtain 
from published sources. Definitely something to keep in mindÉÓ (22 April 2006) 
ÒThe interview was difficult in that he was unwilling to talk about operations of [the securities company] itself. 
He was quite firm in only wanting to talk about very general or macro issues and refused to go into specifics. I 
found it interesting how he asked whether I was local or Singaporean or from the UK. It was as if he would 
have told me even less if I was Chinese!  
When I asked for his views, he kept saying how we should leave the government to do the right thing and not 
criticise what they are doing. We can put forward suggestions or recommendations but not say what they are 
doing is right or wrong. Basically refused to comment from personal experience or perspective unless he has 
actually done a report or project on that specific topic. ItÕs incredulous. I found it incredible, the very tangible 
fear of saying something ÔwrongÕ and of getting into trouble for that. Absolutely incredible.Ó (17 October 2006)  
 
In this chapter, I have considered the multiple identities and roles that I took 
on in the field (positioning myself as sometimes foreign, sometimes Chinese, 
sometimes knowledgeable and sometimes an enquiring student), as well as roles 
accorded to me that I did not anticipate or had little control over. A researcherÕs 
(fluid and shifting) positionalities influence the kinds of ÔdataÕ collected and thus the 
information that becomes coded as ÔknowledgeÕ. ÔPositionÕ indicates the kind of 
power that enabled a certain kind of knowledge and knowledge thus positioned, or 
situated, can no longer claim universality:  
In contrast to the god-trick of claiming to see the whole world while remaining 
distanced from it, subjugated and critical knowledges work from their situatedness 
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to produce partial perspectives on the world. They see the world from specific 
locations, embodied and particular, and never innocent; siting is intimately involved 
in sighting. (Rose, 1997: 308) 
This reflexivity and transparency in presenting the methods and results of empirical 
research is particularly important in establishing ÔrigourÕ in qualitative research. The 
quality of intensive and case-study methods should be judged on the veracity of the 
claims made rather than on the grounds of representativeness, replicability, and 
generalisability. In his response to Markusen (1999), Peck (2003) disputes the claim 
that the shift towards qualitative methods in regional studies and economic 
geography has led to declining standards of evidence, ÔfuzzyÕ theorising and policy 
irrelevance. He argues that qualitative and case-study methodologies need not be any 
less rigorous (than, say, quantitative methods) if appropriate steps are taken towards 
setting high standards of research design, better corroboration and triangulation of 
data to improve their validity of claims; nor should they be less relevant as intensive 
methods have an important role to play in the spirit of methodological pluralism. 
ÒThere is no royal road here, only different methodological pathsÓ (Peck, 2003: 732) 
and the shift towards qualitative methods Òdoes not [necessarily] imply lower 
Ôstandards of evidenceÕ; it entails different standards of evidenceÓ (p. 738).  
The situatedness of my knowledge and the knowledge that I derive from an 
extensive reading of the work of others shape my own interpretations and 
presentation of the research. Establishing certainty in the claims that I make required 
the use of a number of techniques ranging from the triangulation of information from 
multiple sources, methods and theories to the unveiling of the constructs that guided 
the research and the limits posed by the sample used. Reflexivity is an important 
process for making clear the landscapes of power within which our research practices 
are invariably bound up with. In this chapter, I have sought to make visible my 
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position within the written research by revealing the circumstances that surrounded 
my field research and how that process has shaped the data collected and subsequent 
analysis. Gaining access to a range of respondents and being able to corroborate their 
views and identify inconsistencies can go some way towards validating findings 
based on corporate interviews, but recognising that the information we as researchers 
receive will always be partial makes our claims more circumspect and our stance 
more reflexive. This is a consideration that is particularly important for producing 
valid accounts of economic landscapes and processes based on qualitative 
methodologies.  
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Chapter 6  
Walking the Chinese Road to ÔMarketisationÕ 
State Institutions and Re-regulation   
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION  
ÒShanghaiÕs goal is to develop an international finance and trade centre. [É] If 
China doesnÕt have a financial centre, it will not have much standing in this world. 
A financial centre, there are only a few financial centres in the world. There is New 
York, London, we can feel that they are truly global financial centres. [É] No 
matter where it is [sic], if there are some changes to the financial markets in these 
places, there will be changes globally as well. Global markets will be affected, so 
they have global impacts.Ó (Planning official for LFTZ: #19, 10 April 2006)  
  
The desire for China to have a role on the world stage through developing a financial 
centre in Shanghai is expressed above by a government official from the 
Administration of Pudong New Area in Shanghai. The Shanghai stock market might 
have achieved some global influence, as seen in the knock-on effects it had on the 
US and world stock markets when the Shanghai stock index dropped 8.8 per cent on 
27 February 2007 (Time Magazine, 18 February 2007), but this on-going process of 
instituting market-led practices into the Chinese economy is complex and contested. 
Regulatory changes, technological innovations and the globalisation of markets and 
monetary flows are remapping the financial landscape towards deterritorialisation but 
states remain important arbiters in determining the shape and speed of such 
processes. The state and state institutions continue to exert significant influence 
within their national space economy as well as on the international arena through the 
channels of supranational organisations (such as the IMF, the EU and WTO). The 
case of ChinaÕs journey towards ÔmarketisationÕ in its financial sector reform 
demonstrates this complex and fluid relationship between state and finance capital.  
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In this chapter, I examine how the state, through government institutions 
and regulatory bodies, manage tensions between the desire to maintain regulatory 
control and the imperative of global finance capital. To do this, I examine the process 
of Ôre-regulationÕ through the experience of government and regulatory authorities, 
and foreign financial institutions in Shanghai. In the next section (6.2), I examine 
how knowledge networks are constructed to build up the necessary expertise and 
skills in developing the legal and regulatory frameworks needed by Shanghai in 
building its financial markets. Who are the actors involved in such flows and how 
and why are different concepts and principles adopted or rejected by the Chinese 
officials and regulators? The pace and style of reforms have been tightly controlled 
by the state. In section 6.3, I analyse the reactions and views of foreign and Chinese 
interviewees from financial institutions in Shanghai and their assessment of how 
much control the government exerts over the ÔmarketisationÕ process. Is this pace 
deemed too quick, too slow or appropriate by financial institutions and participants in 
Shanghai? In section 6.4, I discuss some of the problems associated with current 
regulatory structures and procedures, which have been pointed out as problematic by 
interview respondents. In section 6.5, I use the case of ChinaÕs WTO commitments 
to illustrate the tension between the imperatives of the state and international 
pressures. Finally, in section 6.6, I examine how specific regulations and Ôsoft 
powerÕ are used to control the activities of foreign banks in Shanghai, to solicit 
ÔappropriateÕ behaviour and cooperation, and thereby control the pace of 
ÔmarketisationÕ.  
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6.2 ADOPTING BEST PRACTICE? KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER AND 
ACQUISITION   
As ChinaÕs central bank, the PBOC is in charge of more than the countryÕs monetary 
policies; for most of its existence it has served as the cashier for the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF) under Soviet-style planning. In addition to handing out working 
capital loans to SOEs, its attractiveness to all levels of the state was enhanced by its 
control of ChinaÕs mints. Until the passing of the Central Bank Law in 1994, the 
PBOC was the banker of last resort for the national, as well as many local, budgets. 
Although it was called the Ôcentral bankÕ, the PBOC was in fact a very decentralised 
entity with principal staffing and functions at the provincial level and a small staff of 
only a few hundred in Beijing. Local branches, although reporting on a direct line to 
Beijing, had strong links to local governments such that the local party had the right 
to nominate senior branch staff. With this background, there were doubts as to 
whether the PBOC would be an appropriate candidate to act as the national regulator 
of a rapidly evolving market-based experiment (Walter and Howie, 2003).  
Creating effective institutions, the rules that govern economic transactions 
that are monitored and enforced by regulatory agencies (as well as other institutions 
like the courts, accountants, media and industry participants) lies at the heart of a 
successful market-based economy. To ensure that the use and trading of property 
rights is fair and transparent, and that abuses are punished appropriately, a complex 
set of regulatory institutions must be created, including an architecture of rules and 
organisations to monitor and enforce compliance with those rules (Hutton, 2007). To 
achieve these objectives, three regulatory bodies were created as spin-offs from the 
PBOC. The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) was established in 
1992 as China experimented with stock markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen; the 
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China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) was established in 1998 to regulate 
the insurance industry; and the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was 
the latest to be set up in 2003 to implement banking reforms and open up the banking 
sector to foreign competition under WTO commitments. This allowed the central 
bank to focus on monetary policy and financial system stability while the three 
regulatory bodies focus on securities, insurance and banking regulation and 
restructuring (see Figure 6.1). The establishment of these regulatory bodies, with 
their specific areas of responsibility and mandates, were widely seen as indicative of 
ChinaÕs commitment to reforming its financial sector along market principles and 
opening up to foreign investors and competition (PeopleÕs Daily Online, 24 April 
2003).  
At the launch of the CBRC, its Chairman, Liu Mingkang, pledged the 
regulatorÕs commitment to Òfurther deepening financial reform, improving financial 
supervision and mitigating financial risks, so as to maintain a safe, sound and 
efficient financial system in ChinaÓ. He also declared that the establishment of the 
CBRC Òdemonstrates that ChinaÕs financial sector has been opened up further to the 
outside world, while the financial supervisory regime has been brought closer to the 
international best practicesÓ (quoted in EuroBiz Magazine, July 2003). How are 
clearly capitalist market principles being implemented in an economy where such 
structures do not exist (or are in their infancy) and in a society that is still broadly 
ÔsocialistÕ in official rhetoric? How are Òinternational best practicesÓ being accessed 
and adopted by regulatory bodies such as the CBRC? These are done through 
networks of knowledge transfer and skills acquisition (i) at the regulatory level with 
counterparts in other financial centres, (ii) at the industrial level through consultation 
and lobbying and (iii) at the individual level through recruitment strategies.  
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Figure 6.1 ChinaÕs financial eco-system (Source: Chatham House material from interview #4) 
 
Specific channels of knowledge and skills transfer were set up by the 
regulators to connect with sources of expertise both within and outside of China. On 
the regulatory level, the CBRC has a Regulatory Cooperation Memorandum 
(冴鯨糊崘ψ漫誠; jianguan hezuo beiwanglu) with counterparts from about 20 other 
countries and financial centres, ranging from London, New York and Russia to New 
Zealand, Hong Kong and Singapore. The idea was to Òstand on the shoulders of 
giantsÓ (planning official for LFTZ: #19, 10 April 2006), to learn from their 
regulatory models and methods and then assess how best to implement particular 
aspects of those in China or specific areas like Shanghai:  
I think you have to learn from real world cases and experience. But you must have 
contextual knowledge. Like you know how the Americans do it, how it is done in 
Singapore, how it is done in Hong Kong, then you think about how you should do 
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this here. That is the best method. And that is how we are doing it. [É] We use a 
global view to examine our own problem, to see how we should develop. (Ibid.)  
Memorandums of understanding (MOUs) (for example, between the CBRC 
and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority,1 and between the CSRC and the HM 
Treasury of the UK2) provided frameworks for cooperation, including channels for 
communication, increased mutual understanding and the exchange of regulatory and 
technical information. Through these international channels, the Chinese regulators 
were able to acquire technical support and access different conceptual 
understandings of banking and finance restructuring and management, learning from 
different regulatory methods and experience. These were done through specially 
organised conferences and workshops held in China or other countries, fact-finding 
trips to different financial centres, and training and internship programmes. The 
Monetary Authority of Singapore, the Federal Reserve of the USA, the IMF, World 
Bank and Asian Development Bank, for example, regularly hosted officials from the 
CBRC, CSRC, and PBOC on training workshops or attachment programmes in their 
respective country offices and also sent their representatives over to China every year 
on training visits and exchange programmes (economist for foreign bank: #7, 22 
February 2006; CBRC official: #25, 16 April 2006).  
Within these networks of knowledge transfer, some regulatory models or 
practices were deemed more attractive or suitable than others with respect to ChinaÕs 
political and economic context. While Hong KongÕs proximity and success as an 
international financial centre and close economic ties with China might render it a 
natural role model for mainland ChinaÕs financial sector reforms (according to some 
interviewees), its specific economic history and governance system made it 
                                                
1 http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/press/2003/ 20030825e3.htm 
2http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/documents/financial_services/securities_and_investments/fin_sec_ 
china.cfm 
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problematic to transfer regulatory principles and frameworks. In examining the 
experience of other developing economies, SingaporeÕs more conservative regulatory 
style (vis--vis Hong Kong) and success based on a managed market-economy was 
deemed closer to ChinaÕs experience and had been highlighted as a valuable learning 
partner (government official from Office of Financial Services: #28, 20 April 2006). 
Amongst developed economies, the UK appeared to be a preferred learning partner. 
Special committees consisting of industry experts, economists and regulators from 
the UK (particularly the City of London) have advised the Chinese on aspects such 
as interest rates deregulation and bankruptcy laws. Rather than being one amongst 
many countries, the UK was often consulted in isolation and asked to advise on 
specific issues on financial sector reforms. This could partly be due to the UK being 
seen as having a more prudent approach to financial services regulation compared to, 
for example, the US (economist from an international bank in London: #4, 11 
January 2006), but such consideration could also be down to personal ties. Liu 
Mingkang, the chairman of the CBRC obtained his postgraduate degree in the UK. 
He was reputedly very good friends with Howard Davies, former chairman of the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) and had mentioned the possibility of modelling 
the Chinese financial regulatory system on the FSA. There were working groups 
from the CBRC that visited the FSA on a regular basis, as well as interns who 
worked within the FSA not only to absorb ideas and techniques but also to establish 
contacts that are maintained when they return to China (country representative of 
foreign bank: #16, 9 March 2006; chief representative of foreign bank, #29, 12 
October 2006). The development of regulatory expertise and structures in China 
were clearly influenced by models, experience and actors elsewhere in the global 
financial space.    
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Apart from regulatory counterparts overseas, industry participants within 
China were also tapped upon for specific skills and knowledge of the banking and 
finance industry. The CBRC in Shanghai and Office for Financial Services of the 
SMG would consult the financial institutions in Shanghai to understand their 
perspectives on particular issues, problems that they were facing and suggestions for 
improvement. Rather than on a regular basis, industry participants tend to be 
consulted on a particular topic or just before the drafting of new policies or reforms 
and both foreign and local banks in Shanghai would be consulted depending on the 
issues at hand. The CBRC in Shanghai also had an international banking committee 
which held regular meetings to keep in touch with the concerns of the international 
banking community in Shanghai (head of department of foreign bank: #49, 3 
November 2006). One such example was how the CBRC worked on encouraging 
more business lending to small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), a business 
sector that had been largely neglected by the Chinese state-owned banks. The CBRC 
went directly to specific foreign banks that had been successful in this loan sector to 
learn from their experience and seek advice:  
They [the CBRC] definitely consulted Standard Chartered Bank because [they] were 
so successful in SME banking. At that time the government was really wanting to do 
something for the SMEs [É] State owned banks are very reluctant to extend loans 
because there is no credit, credibility, you know, no financial report that sort of 
thing. [É] They asked [for] a report saying Ôhow are you doing, what is your 
business with SMEs like, what are your views on SME banking and what are your 
success storiesÕ. All sorts of things. ÔWhat are your concerns?Õ So they are very 
willing to learn. And I believe that they consult other foreign banks as well. HSBC 
definitely. AndÉ within a month after that, produce a regulation just toÉ guiding 
the state owned banks to be more willing to extend loans to SME sector. (Deputy 
representative of foreign bank: #30, 12 October 2006) 
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Through these consultative channels, industry participants were able to 
influence aspects of banking reforms, albeit only by invitation from the regulators.  
Professional bodies within the industry such as the Securities Association of China3 
and Shanghai Banking Association4 were also involved in the building of expertise 
and raising professional standards of its members by inviting overseas experts into 
China for training seminars and collaborating with other professional bodies in 
places like Hong Kong for joint programmes and training. The International 
Advisory Services department of Lloyds TSB5 in London, for example, conducted 
training programmes on corporate credit assessment, international trade finance and 
bank analysis that had been attended by representatives from regulatory bodies as 
well as state-owned banks from China (international bank in London: #49, 12 March 
2007).    
Apart from being partners in consultative meetings and offering training 
programmes, foreign financial institutions in China were also key actors in the 
ÔmarketisationÕ process through institutional affiliations with foreign chambers of 
commerce. The EU Chamber of Commerce (EUCC) in China, for example, 
published an annual Position Paper representing an overall view of European 
companies doing business in China.6 It detailed the key concerns and 
recommendations from each of its 30 Working Groups regarding issues such as 
WTO implementation, trade, regulatory issues and broader policy-related issues. 
Each Working Group highlighted the five most important issues relevant to its sector 
or industry, explained the problems, and offered advice and solutions. The Position 
Papers were presented to the Chinese government each year with the aim of 
                                                
3 http://www.sac.net.cn/en/homepage/index_en.jsp 
4 http://www.sbacn.org/introduction/default.asp?LanguageID=2 
5 http://www3.lloydstsbcorporatemarkets.com/internationalservices/ias.asp 
6 http://www.europeanchamber.com.cn/show/details.php?type=3 
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improving the investment climate in China and were often used as a basis for 
negotiations between the EU and China. They were also given to EU authorities and 
visiting delegates as a basis for lobbying on specific areas of trade and foreign 
investment concern. The American Chamber of Commerce7 also have similar groups 
and publications as basis for negotiations with the Chinese regulators and other state 
institutions.  
The EUCC Banking Working Group in Shanghai met once a month to share 
problems that individual members/banks were facing and discuss issues of concern, 
which were then forwarded to the CBRC and PBOC for their consideration. Before 
the launch or approval of each financial products the PBOC, CBRC or CSRC would 
hold rounds of consultation with banks and individual specialists within financial 
institutions to troubleshoot and identify potential problems. Before the 
announcement of new regulations, draft copies would be sent out to individual banks 
to assess market reaction and garner responses. Very often, those banks would bring 
the draft regulations to their respective banking groups or associations and the groups 
would send in an official response if necessary. An interviewee related this process 
of how:  
[b]efore [the] launch of each products, normally like PBOC or CBRC or other 
regulators they will consult rounds of times with banks, specialists, saying what is 
the impact of this new product launch, what is the technical issue, what is the other 
issue that needs to be considered before we launch it. So after rounds of discussions, 
they will have introduction of this product in the end and then we will have several 
rounds of education to pass information to banks. [É] Also before the launch of 
each product, we as well as other foreign banks and local banks have been invited to 
Beijing to Shanghai or other places to discuss about these markets, to give your 
                                                
7 http://www.amcham-shanghai.org/AmChamPortal/MCMS/Presentation/Publication/WhitePaper/ 
Default.aspx?HLLink= Sl_Pub_2&tb_Name=Publications 
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views, concerns, difficulties, benefits, everything, to shareÉ for them to make the 
last decision. (Deputy head of department of foreign bank: #15, 7 March 2006)  
There was thus a clear channel of dialogue between these market 
participants and regulators. However, some interviewees expressed their reservations 
regarding the influence of these Position Papers and consultation on real market and 
regulatory environments:  
The problem is of course with these [draft] regulations they have a lot of funny 
things in there. You can tell them this is all rubbish, what you wrote there, butÉ 
they will never totally change this. They wonÕt take it back and write something 
totally different. What you can do is you can try to fix certain issues in the draft, but 
the general thing usually stays the same. And then you just have to live with it. 
(Chief representative of foreign bank: #45, 1 November 2006). 
In terms of the EUCC Banking Working Group Position Paper, for example, the top 
five issues highlighted in the report had remained the same in the past five years with 
only very minor improvements (ibid.). The regulators often knew very well the 
concerns of the foreign banks and the desired regulatory changes but reforms were 
not always carried through due to other political and economic considerations. The 
regulators had to be careful about giving the impression that they might be giving 
away too many incentives to foreign financial institutions instead of helping the local 
Chinese banks. The pace and structure of reforms seen as appropriate and desirable 
by the foreign banks were also not always deemed appropriate for the current 
Chinese context (more on this in section 5.3). Even though the power of foreign 
financial institutions was limited in these channels, such networks of influence was 
still valued by both the industry actors and regulators as a basis for knowledge 
transfer and negotiation and did have significant bearing on the content and structure 
of reforms and longer term trend of ÔmarketisationÕ.  
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At the individual level, another strategy had been to attract overseas Chinese 
to return to China where they could contribute their knowledge and experience in 
regulatory bodies. Many of them were educated in the US, Europe and Australia and 
most had experience working on Wall Street, the City of London or Hong Kong. 
Amongst the most prominent of the Ôhai gui paiÕ,8 or faction of returnees, at the 
CSRC were Gao Xiqing and Laura Cha (more generally known as Shi Meilun on the 
mainland), both of whom were vice-chairman of the CSRC. Laura Cha held a US 
law degree and was formerly vice-chairman of the Hong Kong Securities and Futures 
Commission. Her CSRC appointment in 2003 was part of an initiative by Zhu Rongji 
to hire world class talent into China. Although these returnees wielded considerable 
influence, they were sometimes criticised for promoting policies that are perceived to 
be ill-suited to China, such as the pace and style of reform being too quick or 
inappropriate for the local financial and regulatory system. Gao, for example, had 
been a consistent advocate of a mandatory disclosure system similar to that of the 
US. He had been critical of the Chinese governmentÕs insistence on approving all 
listed stocks as it gave an apparent signal to investors that the investment was a good 
one. The number of listed companies had grown dramatically as a result but in his 
opinion only less than 10 percent of those companies were really worth investing in. 
The Chinese government, on the other hand, was more concerned about bolstering 
investor confidence when they embarked on the stock market experiment and was 
more comfortable with the familiar governmentÕs-stamp-of-approval method, 
regardless of the market signals that it conveyed. It was not difficult to see why many 
of these returnees did not stay for long9 (analysts for local securities firms: #22, 12 
                                                
8 Returnees are often referred to as Ôsea turtlesÕ (研訣) in a joking or in a slightly derogatory manner. 
It is a pun (homonym) on the word Ôhai guiÕ which sounds the same as ÔreturneesÕ or Ôsea turtlesÕ.  
9 Laura Cha was at the CSRC from 2001 to 2004. She is now is a member of the executive council of 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) and non-executive chairman of HSBC 
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April 2006; #34, 17 October 2006; general manager of foreign bank: #41, 27 October 
2006). 
 
6.3 ÔDI FANG HUAÕ AND THE PACE OF REFORMS   
All (current and former) Chinese regulators and officials whom I interviewed were 
keen to emphasise a contextualised approach in learning from the regulatory models 
and experience of other countries, to adapt such knowledge and expertise to the 
historical context and economic needs of China. While Òthe original idea is from 
abroad, learning from those overseas [É] as it comes into China, it has to change its 
flavour, to Ôdi fang huaÕ (額祇慌; localise)Ó (Planning official for Lujiazui Finance 
Zone: #19, 10 April 2006) to suit economic and political conditions in China. Gao 
Xiqing, the former Vice-Chairman of the CBRC noted that:   
While we tried to copy [the American securities system] in many ways, we also 
borrowed rules from the British, Taiwanese, Japanese, and German systems, because 
the American rules of laissez faire sometimes just wouldn't work in China. [The 
Chinese] people wouldn't agree to it. Even after all these years, we have a system 
that looks on the surface like others, but when you talk about the enforcement level, 
and the actual details of the laws, it's very different.10 
This emphasis that Ôforeign conceptsÕ would not work in China were also 
particularly prominent amongst most of the ethnic-Chinese respondents from 
financial institutions (both foreign and local) that I interviewed. Their argument was 
that due to different political and economic histories, different philosophies of 
market development and approaches, level of maturity and economic structures, the 
                                                                                                                                     
Investment Asia Holdings Limited. Gao Xiqing served from 1999 to 2003 before moving on the 
position of vice chairman of the National Council for Social Security Fund in China.  
10 http://www.law.duke.edu/magazine/2005fall/profiles/prcgaoxiqing.html 
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ÔmarketsÕ being developed in China must necessarily be different from that of other 
countries. A local respondent, for example, pointed out that:  
Of course we would like the market to grow as quickly as possible, as a business. 
We can only work for a few decades and I hope that things can develop quickly 
during my working life, that we can attain the same standards as Wall Street. But I 
think that is not practical. I think it will be up to the next generation and I am willing 
to push things up to the right level for them to take over. [É T]hese things are 
determined by background. We cannot go according to a western, mature market, do 
you understand my meaning? Our backgrounds are also different; we have a more 
planned economy approach. We donÕt have the same experience of market 
development as in other countries. (Local manager of Chinese securities firm: #35, 
18 October 2006; translated from Mandarin) 
Another Chinese interviewee emphasised ChinaÕs Òunique characteristicsÓ that must 
be taken into account in its ÔmarketisationÕ strategy:  
China does have its own unique characteristics. So if you rely completely on foreign 
concepts and methods, maybe it seems very advanced and attractive theoretically, 
but in practice it may not be possible in China. Cannot be done. (Local analyst of 
Chinese securities firm: #22, 12 April 2006; translated from Mandarin) 
This Ôdi fang huaÕ or localised approach to ÔmarketisationÕ relates to the 
actual content or structure of regulatory frameworks as they are developed as well as 
the pace of reforms. Instead of making sweeping changes to existing regulatory 
frameworks or opening up the financial service sectors to foreign competition with 
bold liberalisation policies, the approach taken by the Chinese authorities had been a 
very measured and cautious one, to take things step by step, examine the implications 
and results, make further adjustments and then take another small step. Once again, 
this was related to a ÔChinese styleÕ of implementing reforms, which had to be taken 
in a slow and cautious manner to avoid political and social unrest. The word, 
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ÔjinshenÕ (字爆), meaning prudent or cautious, was often used by interviewees to 
describe the Chinese style of reform. Looking at the experience of Soviet Russia and 
Eastern Europe, the Chinese state had drawn the conclusion that the so-called Ôbig 
bangÕ liberalisation of sudden and comprehensive price reforms combined with 
wholesale privatisation had led to the sale of national assets to foreign powers and 
economic, political and social instability (Green, 2004; Nolan, 2004). This 
experience was contrasted with China where an incremental reform process had been 
preferred and relatively successful (if problematic in other ways):   
Firstly, you have to identify the problems, what are the main problems and what do 
you need to do? In this aspect they know what is needed but to implement sweeping 
reforms, that is impossible. And it is not in line with the Chinese style of reforms. 
The Chinese style of reforms has always been very cautious (字爆; jinshen) and 
gradual. Not like in Russia or like perestroika, basically it is not possible to happen 
here. (Local analyst of Chinese securities firm: interview: #22, 12 April 2006; 
translated from Mandarin) 
In terms of launching new financial products and approval new business areas for 
banks and financial institutions, the regulators had been very conservative and 
moving very slowly due to the fear of instability in the financial markets, the 
economy and thereby political and social instability. The ability to control the pace 
and structure of re-regulation and ÔmarketisationÕ was a top priority in order to avoid 
market chaos and social unrest.  
In terms of reaction from the industry, opinions differ somewhat between 
the Chinese and foreign respondents. Many of the Chinese interviewees viewed the 
current pace of ÔmarketisationÕ as being either appropriate for China or a little too 
quick, and expressed concerns about the abilities of Chinese banks, finance workers 
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and the common people (small investors) to Ôcatch upÕ with the new concepts and 
practices as well as broader issues of economic and social inequality in China:  
The thing is that the market is too big and difficult to manage. [É] It was a centrally 
planned economy [É] and now to deal with more market economyÉ So there are 
many contradictions. I just feel that Chinese people like to Ôjuan xiao kong ziÕ 
(孥里舜孱; poke small holes). MeaningÉ looking for loopholes in the laws or 
regulationsÉ the Chinese love doing that. If the regulators are not strict, I think 
there will be problems too. The RMB exchange rate, for example, I think it is a good 
thing that they donÕt let go all of a sudden. Too quick. The big problem in China is 
that there are too many peasants, if they cannot adapt they may revolt! (Local 
manager of foreign bank: #44, 27 October 2006; translated from Mandarin) 
The foreign interviewees, on the other hand, tended to view the speed of 
development as being too slow for their liking, particularly from their business 
perspective, but almost all of them conceded that the pace of change is appropriate in 
the China context:  
For China, [the pace is] appropriate. Again, itÕs like a decision making process. 
There are so many single-interest, pressure groups, involved that they have to find a 
way through this to balance things. And again when you consider where China is 
standing from and where it is standing today, you could run this country into chaos. 
Yeah, so itÕs amazing to see what they do. And again, for foreigners, itÕs always 
easy to say that, ÔHey youÕve got to do thisÕ, the US says Ôyou have to appreciate 
[the RMB] right awayÕÉ but hey, itÕs not their country, and these people who run it 
are very clever, very smart, they know what theyÕre doing. So, step by step, take it 
easy, they have 5000 years of history; doesnÕt matter if it takes another 5000. I think 
for China itÕs just right. (Foreign manager of foreign bank: #41, 27 October 2006)  
A Chinese respondent who worked for a foreign bank expressed the exact 
dilemma faced by the regulators in instituting reforms and opening up the finance 
sector to foreign competition:  
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Of course you want Shanghai to be, to establish our financial centre, to be able to 
compete especially for the banks, to be able to compete with the foreign banks 
worldwide. On the other hand, you fully realise the problems with the state-owned 
banks, so you have mixed feelings because the time is not enough for themÉ So 
being a Chinese, [I] always have very mixed feelings. First of all, working in an 
international bank, I can see the potential of this competition, all these sort of things 
going on. But on the other hand, I think about the mass population andÉ the state-
owned banks who employ so many people. So if the country do [sic] fully open up, 
what about the problems that will be caused? I am fully in support of the open up 
policy, that sort of thing, in support of what the regulators are doing, but in some 
ways, I think maybe we need a little bit more time for the state-owned banks. They 
are doing pretty well. Three of the four state-owned banks are going public. 
Especially like ICBC, going public in November. But probably I think they need a 
little bit more time. (Local deputy representative of foreign bank: #30, 12 October 
2006) 
The process of change, therefore, had more to do with the ability of the 
Chinese industry and society to adapt rather than the capabilities and knowledge of 
the regulators themselves. Almost all Chinese and foreign respondents that I met 
with expressed their high opinion and confidence in the knowledge and skills of the 
Chinese regulators and officials that they have met, and approved of their avoidance 
of Ôshock therapyÕ in reforms. The regulators had to balance the demands of the 
finance industry, of foreign financial institutions, state-owned banks and private 
Chinese institutions, with pressure from institutional and small investors, lobbying 
by other governments and supranational organisations, and political considerations of 
central administrators in Beijing. They might know the problems that needed to be 
tackled but were not always free to act on them due to other constraints. A foreign 
interviewee from a foreign bank (#40, 25 October 2006) revealed her assessment 
through dealings with the Chinese regulators:  
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[I] went to Beijing to try to meet some CSRC people, really quite impressed because 
these guys they know the reality and when you are talking to them they are very 
direct. ÔOk, you are right, we need to improve the regulation like that. But wait a 
little bitÉÕ But they know, they know perfectly. They know perfectly well whatÕs 
the problem.  
The philosophy behind the ÔmarketisationÕ process, of the banking industry, 
securities market and other areas of the finance sector, had always been that of 
experimentation, with an eye on an Ôexit routeÕ such that if things should go wrong 
they could be shut down and restarted again when underlying conditions and 
problems were corrected. This concept was spearheaded by Deng Xiaoping back in 
1992 when he pushed for the development of stock markets in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen:  
As for securities and the stock market, are they finally good or bad? Are they 
dangerous? Are they things that only capitalism has or can socialism also make use 
of them? To decide whether they can be used, we must experiment first. If we think 
they work, if after a year or two we think they are good, then we can expand them. If 
problems arise, we can close them down, immediately and completely. And even if 
we close them down, we can do so quickly or slowly, or we could even leave a little 
tail. (Quoted in: Green, 2004: 138-139)  
However, many of my respondents expressed their reservations and doubts 
as to whether Ôshutting downÕ was still an option now when the process of re-
regulation and ÔmarketisationÕ had gone so far. With the involvement of foreign 
participants such as foreign financial institutions and global capital, relationships 
established with foreign governments and regulatory bodies, and commitments made 
to organisations such as the WTO, China might no longer be able to pull the plug as 
easily as it might wish to. As one respondent put it Òthe genie is out of the bottle, itÕs 
so far out you cannot push it back anymore [É] youÕre so far [along that] the only 
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way is to continueÓ (Foreign manager of foreign bank: #46, 2 November 2006). The 
ÔmarketisationÕ of the finance sector was seen as part of an irreversible trend towards 
the loosening of the governmentÕs grip on economy and society. This view was also 
echoed by a CBRC official who agreed that ÒAfter taking the first step, you cannot 
go back, right? [É] ThatÕs the way it is, you cannot turn back. You cannot go backÓ 
(#25, 16 April 2006; translated from Mandarin).  Such sentiments could explain why 
foreign financial institutions in Shanghai were willing to put up with the slow pace of 
change and limited business opportunities thus far because they had confidence in 
the long term liberalisation of financial services and were also keenly aware of the 
importance of stability in a large emerging economy like China.  
 
6.4 REGULATORY CONFUSION? SOME ISSUES AND PROBLEMS 
WITH REGULATORY STRUCTURES AND PROCECURES  
The Chinese style of ÔmarketisationÕ and regulatory reforms had drawn criticism 
from international commentators as well as industry participants. Although they 
acknowledged the appropriateness of the pace and structure of reforms with regards 
to the China context, and expressed confidence in the knowledge and abilities of the 
regulators to varying extents, both local and foreign financial institutions in Shanghai 
had their complaints about the ÔstyleÕ of such re-regulation on their business 
activities and environment. As discussed in the above section, the Chinese regulators 
did not implement bold reforms but would test the market in small ways before 
issuing new regulations. The new regulation would generally be very vague to allow 
for further adjustments and refinement after gathering information and advice from 
financial institutions, professional bodies and other organisation (such as the foreign 
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chambers of commerce and banking groups). These steps were described by a 
foreign manager of a foreign bank in Shanghai:   
When they issue a new law, in all processes concerning banking, they will let a 
rumour go in the market. They will let a rumour go and they will see how the market 
reacts, see whether it will be a complete catastrophe or will they revolt or whatever. 
And if they donÕt hear that much they will issue a law and the law will be very 
vague. It will be general blah-blah-blah, and then all these questions will come up 
and then they will issue an implementation after that to explain what they meant. 
(#36, 18 October 2006; original emphasis) 
By developing and implementing new regulations in the above manner, rumours, 
vague rules, amendments and clarifications were constantly circulating in the market, 
and changes were always being implemented in small but frequent steps. With new 
policies being announced almost every month, the business and regulatory 
environments were constantly shifting and market participants often found it difficult 
to keep on top of these changes. This problem was compounded by the lack of 
transparency in regulatory procedures and stilted information dissemination. Even as 
regulatory frameworks, such as those governing the public listing process on the SSE 
and the launch of new derivatives products, were being implemented, the precise 
criteria to be met and application process to obtain regulatory approval were not 
always made explicit and public. This led to one of the most frequently cited 
criticisms amongst respondents, that of disorientation and confusion due to the lack 
of transparency and clear structures. A Chinese interviewee likened the regulatory 
environment to a pot of soup in which different ingredients were just thrown into a 
pot and mixed together in an ad hoc manner:  
For the market to work, regulation is very important, the structure is very important. 
Everyone must follow the same rule to work, that will make things much better. 
Otherwise it all gets very messy and this market just cannot get off the ground. Even 
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if you have good companies, they canÕt do anything. In the end you just get the 
feeling of everything being yi guo tang (倡憲蔽; one pot of soup, meaning all mixed 
together) and you canÕt differentiate, canÕt make head or tail of things. (Local 
consultant for Chinese financial institution: #24, 15 April 2006; translated from 
Mandarin). 
The application process for a public listing on the SSE was highlighted by a 
number of interviewees as a prime example of the rules being fuzzy and the lack of 
transparency in dealings with regulators. The procedure of listing, documents 
required and other related information were publicly available on the SSE website11 
(see Table 6.1) but even if one had ticked all the boxes and fulfilled the requirements 
following the checklist, there was still no guarantee of success due to other 
undisclosed criteria. For example, the first step in the listing procedure was to obtain 
CSRC approval, after which the company could then submit the various required 
documents. But how one would go about obtaining CSRC approval was not 
specified12 and that was clearly a hurdle that could stop potential IPOs in their tracks 
from the onset. A Chinese investment analyst (#48, 3 November 2006) spoke of the 
use of personal leverage and ÔguanxiÕ to push through such applications and that the 
undisclosed criteria were usually understood by potential companies (through 
rumours, informal chats with others in the industry) such that they would know 
whether they would be successful even before they submitted an application:   
Analyst: ItÕs about 70-80 percent [of the requirements that are disclosed]. Under the 
circumstances, you cannot say for sure [whether your application will be 
successful]. For large state-owned enterprises or private companies, it is largely 
done through guanxi or maybe the brokers have some special access and they can 
                                                
11 http://www.sse.com.cn/sseportal/en_us/ps/lc/lst_req.shtml 
12 One could contact the Shanghai CSRC office for formal enquiries but there is no indication of what 
exactly it takes to obtain the go-ahead to proceed with documents submission and the rest of the 
listing procedure.  
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help you do things. But purely market-style operation is not possible, it doesnÕt 
happen. [É] There are two systems: one says that you just have to fulfil certain 
requirements, like Hong Kong and USA, [if you fulfil the criteria] they have no 
reason to disallow your IPO; the other system is whereby you have to fulfil certain 
criteria as well as be approved.  
KL: So this process of approval is rather fuzzyÉ? You cannot be 100 percent 
certain what it is they are looking for?  
Analyst: ThatÕs right. Although you also know in your heart what they look for! 
Like what IÕve saidÉ they will not write it down but you also know yourself and 
you donÕt even have to try, there is no need to even try [laughs]. (Translated from 
Mandarin)  
 
Table 6.1 Listing procedure for the Shanghai Stock Exchange and documents required 
 
Listing Procedure 
 
1. CSRC approval. The applications of companies for the listing of their shares are subject to the 
approval of the China Securities Regulatory Commission approval; 
2. Submission of listing application documents. Only after gaining the approval of the CSRC, can 
the company make an application for listing to the SSE and submit the listing application 
documents required by the SSE. 
3. Share custody. Before a companyÕs shares can be listed and trading commenced, it must 
entrust its full register of shareholders to the Shanghai Branch of the China Securities 
Registration and Clearing Co., Ltd. 
4. Determination of the date of listing; 
5. Publish a listing notice. Following examination and verification of the SSE, the company must 
publish a listing notice 5 days prior to the listing and trading of its shares. 
6. Listing and trading. 
 
 
List of Documents 
 
According to the provisions of the ÒSecurities Law of the PeopleÕs Republic of ChinaÓ, limited liability 
companies must submit the following documents when making an application for the listing of their shares 
to the Securities Supervisory Institutions of the State Council:  
1. Listing Announcement; 
2. General meeting of shareholders resolution to apply for listing; 
3. Company Ordinance; 
4. Company business license; 
5. Financial accounting materials for the last three years or since the founding of the company 
following verification by legal verification organization; 
6. Legal opinions in writing and a letter of recommendation from a securities company; 
7. The most recent share prospectus. 
 
In addition, companies must submit the following related documents according to the provisions of the 
ExchangeÕs rules for the listing of shares: 
1. Listing Application; 
2. Documents from the CSRC approving its share issue and issue and listing declarations 
approved by the CSRC; 
3. Newly added financial materials as required following issue of the share; 
4. Photocopy of its business license; 
5. Personal particulars of the secretary of the board of directors and contact details of the 
secretary of the board of directors, securities representative and legal representative; 
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6. Report regarding the shareholdings of the company directors, supervisors and senior 
management of the company; 
7. Circular determining the listing abbreviation of the companyÕs stock; 
8. Documentation showing the full custody of the companyÕs stock; 
9. A written pledge of the companyÕs largest shareholder pledging not to sell or repurchase its 
shareholding for a period of twelve months.  
10. Other documents required by the Exchange. 
 
(Source: Shanghai Stock Exchange Website, http://www.sse.com.cn/sseportal/en_us/ps/lc/lst_req.shtml) 
 
This lack of transparency in regulatory procedures also extended to 
application for various branch and business licenses which was applicable to all 
foreign financial institutions when they set up or expanded their operation in 
Shanghai and other parts of China. A foreign manager of a foreign bank contrasted 
her experience with the regulatory environment in developed economies in Europe 
where  
Òyou just go to the internet and dadadaÉ you know in UK or France, you know 
whatever, how to get your information and then, ok, maybe you go to a law firm. 
But here things are just not that clear. They are spread out, you need your advisors, a 
lot of things are based on trust, on connections, onÉ things are not always clearly 
spelled out. Not like one, two, three, four, fiveÉ and then you get the license. Nuh-
uh. ThatÕs not how it works and that makes it fuzzy for many peopleÓ (foreign 
manager of foreign bank: #46, 2 November 2006).  
This ÔfuzzinessÕ was particularly problematic for foreign banks as they try to 
negotiate the local regulatory environment in developing their financial operations in 
China. The types of activities permitted for a representative office was one such 
example. In legal terms, a representative office may only engage in non-profit 
making activities, such as conducting research; providing data and promotional 
materials to potential clients and partners; conducting research and surveying for its 
parent company in the local market; liaising with local and foreign contacts in China 
on behalf of its parent company; acting as a coordinator for the parent companyÕs 
activities in China; making travel arrangements for parent company representatives 
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and potential Chinese clients; and other non-profit making business activities.13 The 
line that must not be crossed was that of business-taking and profit making activities, 
but certain activities, such as operating as a post-box for local customers, forwarding 
documents and letters of applications to the bankÕs head offices and branches in 
Hong Kong, could be interpreted as profit-making activities or being outside of its 
research and consultancy mandate depending on which legal counsel and regulators 
one consulted. Therefore even approved licenses came with significant grey areas 
that could be frustrating for foreign financial institutions used to having clear rules of 
operation. Knowledge about the scope of activities for a representative office was 
therefore acquired slowly through more experiential and sociological means of 
personal interaction and information exchange with other banks in Shanghai, 
meetings with CBRC officials and becoming increasingly in touch with the ÔspiritÕ of 
the rules over time. This notion of understanding a loosely-defined and illusive 
ÔspiritÕ of the legal meanings was highlighted by a foreign representative of a foreign 
bank office in Shanghai and whom I interviewed from the beginning of its operations 
and then again 10 months later. He described the process through which he learned 
about the activities a representative office should and should not engage in:  
Foreign banks represent less than two percent [É] of the total banking community 
in China. To have a banking presence here is a long term strategic view for any 
foreign bank and the regulator, the CBRC would say, youÕve got to do your time, 
youÕve got to sit there and youÕve got toÉ see what you want to do. DonÕt jump in 
and have the activities and I think thatÕs the spirit of it. So, therefore, they would say 
you can consider that, you can do that, you can research the marketplace, build good 
relationships with regulators and government for your future. ItÕs very much a long 
term view, and I think thatÕs probably the spirit of it. [É] A lot of it is understanding 
what people can do in the other banks, CBRC, talking to people, understanding what 
                                                
13 www.export.gov/china/exporting_to_china/RepOffice.pdf 
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sort of activities are permissible and what would be frowned upon. [É] You mustnÕt 
do any transactions. You mustnÕt be seen to be actually transacting and certainly the 
CBRC came to do our field audit and they inspected our computer system. They 
opened them up to see whether we have any programmes or any ability to do 
transactions, which we donÕt do. We simply facilitate. We market the name and we 
help, creating business activities for our overseas branches, which is our 
interpretation of what we can do, and I think thatÕs acceptable. And I think that sits 
within the grey area but itÕs on the right side of grey. (Foreign chief representative of 
foreign bank: #29, 12 October 2006; emphasis added)  
Apart from the problem of administration transparency, Chinese rules were 
normally expressed in generalities and did not usually provide sufficient details for 
practical resolution. Implementation and enforcement were often subject to the 
interpretation and articulation of local administrative authorities and could vary from 
case to case. If formally published policy information could not be interpreted 
ÔcorrectlyÕ by information users, tacit information became more important for 
conducting business in China in order to stay on Òthe right side of greyÓ. The 
regulators used this ÔfuzzinessÕ and grey areas as extra room for policy manoeuvre, 
to refine aspects of the framework after monitoring market reaction and the 
behaviour and actions of participants. Some of my Chinese respondents explained 
that Chinese laws were deliberately vague because of the ways in which Chinese 
regulatory bodies were structured across spatial scales. Regulators at the national, 
provincial and local levels were faced with different problems and demands and the 
very vagueness of the laws allowed them to be adapted according to local contexts 
and requirements. As a local analyst for a joint-venture fund management company 
explained:  
If you issue a regulation or a new law, maybe this new law is suitable for places like 
Shanghai, Guangzhou and Beijing but the problem is when this law reaches Wuhan, 
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Sichuan, you may find that this regulation does not quite work because the method 
of governance is looser and there are more loopholes. If you issue a regulation that is 
very tight, you may find that it controls risk in those places very well but inhibits 
business in other places. (#48, 3 November 2006).  
Banking regulations in China can be divided into Ôpublished lawsÕ and ÔregulationsÕ; 
Beijing publishes the law, but the regulations are interpreted and implemented by 
local entities. ÒChinese laws are [thus] inspirational statementsÓ (Foreign Chamber of 
Commerce in Shanghai: #2, 17 August 2005) that are open to interpretation by local 
bureaucrats. Although this was a particular strategy used by the Chinese state and 
regulators to manage the political economy that had developed out of specific 
contexts, it created uncertainty, inhibited business decisions and raised transaction 
costs particularly for foreign investors who arguably had greater difficulty accessing 
such non-policy information compared to their local counterparts (Yusuf and Wu, 
2002: 1222). Another example was the legally binding nature of contracts. What was 
deemed a basic part of the legal framework was not always understood in the same 
way by foreign and Chinese partners, as a legacy of allowing for multiple 
interpretations of one law. A foreign interviewee had come to see the Chinese laws 
as more like guidelines. Using the spatial metaphor of a journey, he explained that:  
The contract is more aÉ descriptionÉ of the path you want to walk together. [É] 
The problem with the path is it goes up and down the hill, and then after the hill you 
donÕt see if there is a fork in the road. For the Chinese person, if there is a fork in the 
road, the contract is no longer valid. We have this style of, ÔHey, here is the contract, 
this is the deal!Õ ÔYes, soÉ that was the deal, that moment in time when we walked 
the path. And we walked for two years very happily together, and now we fork. Now 
we negotiate how to part.Õ The one thing that the lawyer keeps on saying is contracts 
are a different concept. ItÕsÉ itÕs just a start of a journey. If the journey goes 
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different ways, then you part. ItÕs not like in Europe. (Foreign director of foreign 
company: #6, 21 February 2006) 
Therefore, many respondents pointed out it is a misconception that there are 
insufficient laws in China to govern property rights and rules of exchange; the real 
problem lies with their execution and enforcement. Their characteristic vagueness 
allows for more specific treatment and interpretations by local authorities according 
to local contexts, but the lack of clarity proved highly confusing and frustrating for 
foreign investors who might not understand their rationale and mode of operation. 
Through consultations, working groups, position papers and training programmes, 
foreign financial institutions and regulatory bodies had contributed to greater clarity 
of new and existing regulations with some success as seen from the on-going drafting 
and re-drafting of laws and policies to govern new and existing products and 
markets. However, the Chinese regulators clearly value the ability to control market 
activities through an opaque system that allowed them the power and flexibility to 
quicken, interrupt or slow the process of ÔmarketisationÕ. It also allows for adaptation 
to local needs by local branches in the context of a huge country with widely varied 
regional and local political economies. As such, the ÔfuzzyÕ characteristic of Chinese 
laws and regulations is likely to continue while particular areas within are refined in 
response to changing local, national and international considerations.  
Apart from the lack of administrative transparency and the ÔfuzzinessÕ of the 
laws and regulations, regulatory confusion also extended to having what was seen as 
too many regulatory bodies. When the CBRC, CSRC and CIRC were set up as 
separate institutions from the PBOC, the move was seen as a sign of ChinaÕs 
commitment to strengthening regulatory frameworks, introducing international 
standards and improving supervision of the respective financial sectors (Lyons, 
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2005). However, having three individual regulatory bodies instead of one (like the 
FSA, for example) created confusion for financial institutions whose products and 
services sometimes span across banking, securities and insurance. The QFII and 
QDII schemes, for example, were banking as well as securities products. Financial 
futures are regulated by the CSRC but they are mostly done through banks. These 
overlapping jurisdiction means industry participants could get caught between two 
regulators and figuring out which set of rules and procedures to follow takes time 
and raises transaction costs. Many banks have to deal with up to six regulatory 
bodies (CBRC, CSRC, CIRC, PBOC, SAFE and the local tax office) on a regular 
basis and significant amounts of time and effort has to be invested into maintaining 
the good relationships essential to business in China. A Chinese respondent from a 
local credit rating agency described the regulatory confusion that they faced when 
they had to figure out which regulator to liaise with depending on the specific 
project:  
They always talk about the regulatory body Ð [but] who is actually the regulator? 
LetÕs say we want to do some corporate rating exercise in Shanghai; the PBOC in 
Shanghai will regulate us. If we want to do another kind of rating, maybe it could be 
CSRC. If we want to do some rating for credit guarantee organisations or insurance 
companies, then we get regulated by the CIRC. ThenÉ so itÕs very messy and we 
canÕt even make sense of it ourselves! Now we are all asking, so who is regulating 
us? If you are talking about this area, maybe they are the regulators; if you are 
talking about another area, maybe someone else is the regulator (#24, 15 April 
2006).   
Shuttling between regulators might be inconvenient, but being given 
contradictory instructions and interpretations of rules was even more problematic. As 
mentioned earlier, new laws and regulations are announced in Beijing with the 
implementation carried out by local regulatory offices. This allows for a wide 
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interpretation and implementation of rules which could result in the regulators 
contradicting one another depending on where they are and who they talk to:  
All of them, they have made regulations that affect our business and many times 
[they] contradict. [É] We call SAFE in Shanghai; we call SAFE in Beijing. You can 
get different answers on the same policy. So even clarification doesnÕt help, this 
cannot exist. The only reason it is the way it is right now is because regulations 
change so quickly that even the regulators cannot keep up with itself [sic]. [É] it 
needs to be the point where if you call the regulators they can explain their own 
regulation! [chuckles] And if you call two regulators in different cities you [need to 
be able to] get the same answer. ThatÕs the minimum requirement that is not fulfilled 
at the moment. (Foreign manager of foreign bank: #43, 27 October 2006) 
Because of the constant amendments and re-drafting of existing regulations, and the 
announcement of new ones, some interviewees even expressed doubts that the 
regulation were even read by the local offices. This tended to be less of a problem in 
larger and more ÔinternationalÕ and business-oriented cities like Shanghai, Tianjin or 
Shenzhen, but in smaller centres some interviewees said they had to convince the 
local regulators that particular regulations even existed or they had to negotiate past 
the Ôstrange interpretationsÕ of local officials:  
Shanghai SAFE, totally fine, but the further you go inland or away from the main 
centres, the more strict they interpret, or the [more strangely] they interpret the rules. 
So you have answers like, ÔOh, the contract should have been written within 10 days 
after itÕs signed, we canÕt accept itÕ, orÉ all kinds of weird things, ÔOh, it should be 
written in Chinese andÉ it should be under laws of ChinaÕ, and we say, ÔYou can 
actually use the law under Hong KongÕ. And they [would] say, ÔWe obviously donÕt 
understand the law there so we want you to write in Chinese lawÕ. And all these 
ÔfunÕ requests. So what I do not like is the fact that you are left to all these various 
interpretations. (Foreign manager of foreign bank: #36, 18 October 2006) 
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These problems had been highlighted to the regulators and they had 
demonstrated some efforts at better communication across the regulatory bodies. A 
MOU was signed between the CBRC, CSRC and CIRC Òaimed at clarifying 
respective responsibilities in financial supervision and regulation, coordinating the 
actions of three commissions to avoid absence and overlaps of supervision and 
regulation, enhancing efficiency and encouraging financial innovation so as to ensure 
that all financial institutions and their financial businesses are under continuous and 
effective supervisionÓ (CBRC website)14. Ensuring better communication and 
cooperation across regulatory bodies would clearly be an on-going process and was 
an encouraging sign. However, the existence of separate regulators for banking, 
securities and insurance is likely to continue as long as the overall governance 
structure of ChinaÕs finance sector remains divided according to industry.  
Financial institutions in China are governed based on the principles of 
separate business sectors (休倔; fenye), i.e. they cannot engaged in mixed-business 
(刻倔; hunye). Unlike financial institutions in the UK, USA or Singapore, those in 
China are much more limited in the types of financial activities they are permitted to 
conduct. For example, while a bank in New York might offer bank deposits, asset 
management, financial leasing, consultancy and derivative products Ð likened to 
Òfinancial [products] supermarketsÓ (local analyst from Chinese securities company: 
#22, 12 April 2006; translated from Mandarin) Ð these would not allowed to be 
offered by a singular bank or financial institution in China and have to be conducted 
by separate financial institutions. The rationale for this is so that if one aspect of the 
business should fail, there would be limited economic and social impact (and 
                                                
14 http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/english/home/jsp/docView.jsp?docID=718 
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political consequences) compared to the collapse of a large financial conglomerate. 
The importance of limiting risk and contagion is clearly paramount:  
Currently, the Chinese government feels that separate-sectors isÉ regulatory 
standards cannot catch up. A mixed-sectors approach brings too much risk. Too 
much risk, without the means to control them. This is why it is still separate-sectors. 
In terms of securities, there is the CSRC to regulate them. Insurance has the CIRC, 
banking has CBRC, so itÕs all separate. They feel that it is easier to control risk by 
regulating them separately. [É] But from separate to mixed sectors approach, how 
do we make this change? The regulators are also thinking about this now. This is the 
trend. (Local analyst from Chinese securities company: #22, 12 April 2006; 
translated from Mandarin)  
The absence of big financial conglomerates that are able to offer a range of 
products and services across business sectors is seen as holding back the 
development of an international financial centre in Shanghai. The separate-sectors 
structure places a limit to growth and innovation on financial institutions in 
Shanghai, which would be detrimental to its future growth and development as 
financial institutions if financial institutions such as banks and securities companies 
could only conduct designated businesses. Securities companies in China, for 
example, are still primarily dependent on commission from trading business on the 
secondary markets. This is in contrast to other countries where the income of similar 
financial institutions also comes from financing, consultancy, intermediary business 
and other information sourcing business. This makes them less reliant on the 
securities markets and trading volumes compared to the Chinese counterparts and 
they are better able to spread their business risks.  
Respondents who had been in Shanghai over the past decade indicated that 
they had seen a clear improvement in regulatory expertise over time and the on-going 
reforms and negotiations were testament to their efforts. However, the regulators still 
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tended to err on the side of caution as a guiding principle which tended to stifle 
business activities and financial innovation.  
[B]anks have the possibility of applying for a derivatives license but still there is still 
a very small range of products allowed to do. Usually I always felt that the 
regulators, if there is a product they donÕt understand, they wonÕt allow it. They 
understand more and more so they allow more and more. But still there is a lot to do. 
[É]of course you have to be careful, but you can also be too careful sometimes. 
(Foreign representative of foreign bank: #45, 1 November 2006)   
This (some would say overly) cautious attitude could result in very long 
approval process while the regulators deliberated over the appropriateness of new 
products for the Chinese market. Depending on the type of products, it could take up 
to three months to obtain approval. For a fast-moving business in commercial 
banking, this limits quick market turnaround and when Òyou have to wait three 
months, and then you do the sales for two weeks and then you have to start doing a 
new product, [É] this is very ma fan (専偽; troublesome), very difficult É very 
restrictiveÓ (ibid.) This conservative attitude of regulators can be described as a ÔNo 
U-Turn SyndromeÕ15, whereby drivers in one country are not allowed to make a U-
turn unless a sign specifically allows them to do so. This is in contrast to other 
countries where drivers may make U-turns freely so long as the ÔNo U-turnÕ sign is 
not present. This mirrors the experience that foreign banks have with the Chinese 
regulators. For example, from the perspective of the local regulators, industry actors 
                                                
15 ÔNo U-Turn SyndromeÕ is a term coined by a Singapore entrepreneur, Wong Hoo Sim, to describe 
the social behaviour of Singaporeans as having a mindset of compliance to higher authorities before 
proceeding with any action. In his book Chaotic Thoughts from the Old Millennium (1999), he uses a 
comparison of traffic rules in Singapore to those found overseas, to describe the phenomenon: In 
Singapore, drivers are not allowed to make a U-turn unless a sign specifically allows them to do so, 
while in some other countries drivers may make U-turns freely so long as the 'No U-turn' sign is not 
present. This analogy is used to explain the red tape he has encountered with hard-nosed bureaucrats, 
which in turn stifles the very creativity that the Singaporean government has been trying to promote in 
the recent years.  
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could only conduct particular transactions or venture into another business area if 
permission has been granted; if permission is not granted they cannot do so. For 
foreign banks, their experience overseas has been the case of if the regulators did not 
specify that they cannot do a particular business, it means they can. This problem 
was highlighted by a number of local and foreign interviewees as another instance of 
regulatory confusion (due to different expectations and regulatory experience) as 
well as a limit to financial innovation and business activities:  
In foreign countries, if it is not mentioned, you can do it. If the law did not specify 
[that it is not allowed], you can do it. But here in China, if we say that you can do it, 
then you can do it. If it is not specified, you cannot do it. IsnÕt that confusing? Ok, in 
other countries, [É] if you did not say that this is not allowed, I can do it and the 
courts will not say that I am guilty, that I have broken the law. But here in China this 
is not the case. What you are doing, the law did not say that you can do this. If you 
do it, there will be problems. (Local manager of Chinese financial institution: 
interview no. 9, 27 February 2006; translated from Mandarin)    
This is a legacy of ex-ante planning (see Sayer, 1995) that runs through the CCP 
planning system and the above experience marks a clear continuity with that system 
in spite of stated commitments to Ômarket-styleÕ reforms.   
 
6.5 CHINAÕS WTO COMMITMENTS: OPENING ONE DOOR AND 
CLOSING OTHERS?  
In December 2001, China joined the WTO as its 143rd member. In exchange for 
WTO membership, China made a series of concessions and commitments to further 
open up its domestic industries to foreign imports and investment. The WTO 
agreement was expected to fundamentally transform the existing socialist market 
system in China into a ÔrealÕ market system, and to establish Chinese global trade 
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and production systems that comply with the global Ôrules of the gameÕ (Zhao et al., 
2002). Accession to the WTO is seen as ChinaÕs public recognition of marketisation 
and internationalisation as the primary sources of its rapid growth since the 1980s 
(Lughod, 1988).  
As part of ChinaÕs WTO commitments, it had to open up its banking sector 
to foreign banks with regards to 1) the types of business they can engage with 
(foreign or local currency business), 2) the types of customers (corporate or retail) 
and 3) by geography (cities and regions where such business is permitted). For 
foreign currency business, foreign financial institutions should be permitted to 
provide services in China without restriction as to clients or geographical areas upon 
accession. Geographical restrictions on foreign banks on Chinese currency 
businesses were to be phased out by opening up four cities (Shanghai, Shenzhen, 
Tianjin, and Dalian) upon accession and a few more cities every subsequent year. All 
geographical restrictions were to be removed within the fifth year after accession. 
For local currency business, foreign financial institutions should be permitted to 
provide services to Chinese enterprises within two years after accession (before the 
end of 2003). Within five years after accession (before the end of 2006), foreign 
financial institutions should be permitted to provide services to all Chinese clients. 
Within five years after accession (before end of 2006), any existing non-prudential 
measures restricting ownership, operation, and juridical form of foreign financial 
institutions, including on internal branching and licenses, should be eliminated. In 
other words, by the end of 2006, foreign banks in China were to receive Ônational 
treatmentÕ, i.e. be treated the same as domestic Chinese banks, in banking regulation 
(PeopleÕs Daily, 12 June 2001; World Trade Organisation, 2001). The timetable for 
lifting these restrictions is shown in Tables 6.2 and 6.3.  
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Table 6.2 WTO phases by business and customer groups 
Business Customer  
Corporate Banking Foreign corporations Chinese Corporations 
Deposits and lending RMB Immediate  WTO + 2 years 
Deposits and lending 
FOREX  
Immediate Immediate  
Settlements and 
remittances 
Immediate  WTO + 2 years  
Foreign exchange 
transactions  
Immediate Immediate 
Foreign currency 
guarantees 
Immediate WTO + 2 years 
Interbank Ð deposits and 
lending  
Immediate  
Interbank Ð discounting  Immediate  
Retail Banking Foreign citizens Chinese citizens 
Deposits and lending RMB  Immediate  WTO + 5 years 
Deposits and lending 
foreign currency  
Immediate Immediate 
(Sources: People Daily, 12 June 2001; Low, 2003: 1-2) 
 
Table6.3 WTO phases by geography  
Foreign Currency 
Time Region 
Immediate  No geographic restrictions  
RMB 
Time Region 
Immediate  Shanghai, Shenzhen, Tianjin, Dalian  
WTO + 1 Guangzhou, Qingdao, Nanjing, Wuhan  
WTO + 2 Jinan, Fuzhou, Chengdu, Chongqing 
WTO + 3 Kunming, Beijing, Xiamen, Zhuhai 
WTO + 4 Shantou, Ningbo, Shenyang, Xian  
WTO + 5 No geographic restrictions  
(Sources: People Daily, 12 June 2001; Low, 2003: 3) 
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The opening up process proceeded according to schedule. By the end of 
October 2005, there were 138 foreign banks approved for conducting yuan-related 
businesses in China. Their assets amounted to US$84.5 billion, equivalent to two 
percent of total assets in ChinaÕs domestic banking sector. Their share of ChinaÕs 
foreign exchange loan market rose to more than 20 percent. In Shanghai, foreign 
banks achieved a share of total banking assets as high as 12.4 percent and a share of 
the foreign exchange loan market of 54.5 percent (CBRC, 2005). Almost all 
interviewees agreed that ChinaÕs WTO commitments have helped quicken the pace 
and strengthened the direction of reforms. External pressures and international 
expectations for China to meet the deadlines and fulfil its commitments had played a 
significant role in regulatory reforms and the ÔmarketisationÕ process. However, this 
should not be seen simply as a decline of state power vis--vis the demands of global 
capital, supranational organisations and pressure from foreign states. Even within the 
terms of WTO ascensions, there was plenty of scope for the Chinese state and 
regulatory bodies to act according to their interests and agendas, even as they had to 
negotiate with the agendas and considerations of other interest groups. An official 
from the CBRC admitted that it was a delicate task having to juggle WTO 
commitments with local consideration and national politics and agendas:  
Regulations have to keep up with that, develop in tandem. If we go deeper into 
thisÉ With so many foreigners coming in here, what do the local enterprises do? 
What if theyÉ get eaten up? They [foreign firms] can, through M&A [merger and 
acquisition], swallow up all the local enterprises, right? So for ChinaÕs economyÉ it 
definitely has to consider the locals. But you still have to fulfil your WTO 
commitment, your promise, so this will require a lot of skillÉ itÕs a ratherÉ 
complex relationship. (#25, 16 April 2006; translated from Mandarin)  
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Another official from the SMG pointed out rather candidly that the WTO 
commitments did not come with very specific stipulations so there was room to 
manoeuvre within those areas, so long as the broad principles were adhered to. ÒYes, 
there is that commitment, but it could work out differently on the ground. The WTO 
regulations are not very specific. So they [the regulators] can work through other 
ways and means to impose some restrictionsÓ (#28, 20 April 2006; translated from 
Mandarin and emphasis added). A few other interviewees whom I spoke to in early- 
to mid-2006 also expressed their scepticism and the expectation that non-tariff 
barriers would be imposed to allow the Chinese regulators to maintain control over 
the pace of reforms and extent of foreign competition while still honouring their 
WTO commitments. When I raised the question of WTO during interviews, a 
number of respondents would interrupt saying Òin theoryÉ in theoryÓ, stressing the 
difference between theory and practice with regards to WTO compliance and 
expressing their doubts that a truly level-playing field would be instituted.  
When I returned to Shanghai again in late-2006, close to the final WTO 
deadline of fully opening up its banking sector to foreign banks regardless of 
business activities, customers and geographical regions, those doubts were revealed 
to be justified with the announcement of a new law that effectively restricted the 
expansion and activities of foreign banks in China. The lifting of restrictions had 
been largely in keeping with WTO commitments but the reality was that high 
capitalisation requirements and other conditions such as onerous reporting 
requirements (see Chapter 7) often made it commercially unviable or difficult for 
foreign banks to expand their range of businesses and customers. These conditions 
operated on a tier basis: each tier had a minimum capitalisation requirement Ð the 
higher the tier, the broader the permitted scope of business and access to customers 
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but also the higher the capitalisation requirement. An example of this was the new 
rules regarding foreign banks wanting to engage in RMB retail banking. Since 2001, 
foreign banks had been able to conduct foreign currency business with both 
corporate and retail customers and they had been able to conduct RMB business with 
corporate clients since 2003. But the Ôbig fishÕ that foreign banks had been angling 
for was RMB retail business with what was expected to be a large and growing 
Chinese middle-class population. A draft amendment on Regulations on 
Administration of Foreign Banks was circulated by the CBRC amongst the foreign 
banks in September 2006 for comments, as per usual practice, relating to the opening 
up of RMB retail banking to foreign banks. Despite the Òmoans and disagreementsÓ 
(foreign representative of foreign bank: #29, 12 October 2006) from the international 
banking community, the amendment was subsequently passed with little changes to 
the draft just before the WTO deadline of December 2006.  
The amended regulation stated that foreign banks that had prior approval to 
conduct RMB corporate business with Chinese enterprises would not be 
automatically permitted to conduct RMB retail business; instead, they would have to 
reapply and fulfil specific conditions. Apart from having to meet existing condition 
of Òprofit-making for two consecutive years during the first three years since its 
openingÓ (while having its business activities restricted) (State Council, 2006), the 
banks would also be required to commit unprecedented amounts of money as 
registered capital. The operating capital for foreign bank branches to conduct foreign 
currency business (with both corporate and retail clients) would stay the same at 
RMB 200 million. The requirement for foreign currency and RMB business with 
corporate customers would also remain at RMB 300 million. However, banks that 
wanted to engage in RMB retail banking would have to acquire Ôlegal personÕ status, 
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which involved being locally incorporated (in China) and a registered capital of 
RMB 1 billion yuan. If the foreign banks were not locally incorporated, they would 
only be allowed to accept deposits of over RMB 1 million yuan from Chinese 
individual residents and would not be able to issue bank cards. This move had been 
criticised as China giving with one hand and taking with the other (Areddy, 2006; 
Shao and Lou, 2006). Some described the capitalisation requirements as an example 
of China perverting its WTO commitments as the bar for foreign banks had been set 
much higher than many have anticipated (Low, 2003).  
Many interviewees viewed the new amendment as a means of controlling 
the activities of foreign banks in China and maintaining a grip on the pace and nature 
of ÔcompetitionÕ in the banking sector. There was a sense that the Chinese 
government might have Ôgiven awayÕ too much in opening up the banking markets to 
foreign competition over the past five years under WTO agreements and that the 
local banks were in danger of being left behind. Although there was never much 
doubt that the Chinese government would adhere to their WTO commitments, my 
interviewees were also not entirely surprised that Òthey [the government] will find all 
kinds of ways to make life very difficult for foreign banks because they feel that right 
now foreign banks are getting too aggressive and too effective in competing with 
local banks. ThatÕs why you have new regulation on incorporation, foreign banks can 
only effectively compete with local banks if you incorporate locally. That is a very 
painful, expensive process. It has a lot of disadvantages for foreign banks. SoÉ it is 
not easy, not many banks will go that routeÓ (foreign head of department of foreign 
bank: #42, 27 October 2006). By imposing more stringent rules and raising the 
barrier to entry on foreign banks, a ÔlevelÕ playing field was offered to foreign 
participants (as stipulated under its Ônational treatmentÕ WTO agreement) but the 
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conditions attached to that imposed financial costs which not every bank that entered 
China with the goal of RMB retail banking could afford to meet:  
You might say, well, fair enough, to be on a level playing field with the Chinese 
banks, they incorporated here in China then you should incorporate here in China, 
thatÕs fair enough. But then of course it implies a massive financial commitment 
because in order to incorporate a bank, [É] So itÕsÉ ItÕs a way ofÉ not penalising 
but itÕs a cost involved [É] ItÕs just a control mechanism. So what IÕm saying is that 
whatever you do and however they do it, itÕs a sort of level playing field but itÕs a 
conditional one. (Foreign manager of foreign bank: #37, 19 October 2006; original 
emphasis) 
This suspicion expressed by the foreign finance community, that the 
Chinese government was seen as having conceded too much to foreign investors, was 
confirmed by other Chinese respondents. Some local interviewees expressed their 
concerns about the abilities of the local Chinese banks to raise themselves to 
international standards of management, risk control, compliance, reporting and many 
other areas that required a period of time for new concepts and methods to be learned 
and instituted, and that the five-year deadline under WTO was too short. Other 
interviewees were more candid and blunt in their assessment and viewed foreign 
players as treating the Chinese market like a mine, digging up what was valuable and 
depriving the locals of opportunities and wealth:  
Take for example, the securities sector, [which] is currently closed to foreign 
investors. I am in complete agreement with that, personally, that is. From the 
companyÕs point of view, of course opening up is good for business but I have found 
that when they cooperate with us, at this stage, it is mostly a case of taking away, it 
is like mining, I can tell you! [É] They have brought some things, such as 
management, personnel, but their ultimate goal is to buy up companies. They want 
to take hold of a certain company, to enter the market. They donÕt really have much 
contribution, not much. This is like mining, do you understand my meaning? Like a 
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coal mine, if you dig down, you get coal. They have come here to dig into the 
mainland mine. (Local analyst of Chinese securities company: #34, 18 October 
2006; translated from Mandarin) 
The concept of ÔcompetitionÕ was thus viewed differently amongst local and 
foreign respondents. The foreigners saw such non-tariff barriers as giving unfair 
advantages to the local financial institutions while the Chinese saw it as unfair if 
foreign investors were given free rein in business activities and to enter all segments 
of the financial industry before local financial institutions were fully prepared and 
mature:    
Why donÕt we build up our own strengths and our own people? [É] Our securities 
companies have not adapted to the international market, they have not done any 
international business or transactions. [É] When they have not been properly 
trained [Éi]f you let the foreign institutions in now, isnÕt that courting your own 
death? It will be very easy for them to pull your good employees over, and it will be 
even easier for them to pull your clients over. [É] Under these conditions, how can 
you compete? So I think it is right that the doors are closed to foreign investors at 
this point. [É] there needs to be a process for healing and recovery before allowing 
the foreign investors in. It is just a matter of time. (ibid.; emphasis added)  
Therefore, although ChinaÕs WTO accession was taken as a indication of its 
commitment to further liberalisation and reforms and adherence to international 
standards and agreements, the actual implementation on the ground revealed the 
complex balance of interests between the Chinese government, regulatory bodies, 
foreign and local financial institutions and negotiating their different concepts of 
what constitutes Ôfair competitionÕ.  
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6.6 GOVERNANCE AND CONTROL: THE USE OF WRITTEN RULES 
AND SOCIOLOGICAL POWER  
As discussed above, specific regulatory measures were used to control the business 
activities of foreign banks in China so as to control the pace of ÔmarketisationÕ and 
soften the impact of foreign ÔcompetitionÕ on local financial institutions. In this 
section, I present accounts of how such control is exercised through published rules 
as well as through the use of Ôsociological powerÕ to influence the behaviour and 
ÔcooperationÕ of foreign financial institutions. While the Chinese government might 
have been accused of subverting the terms of its WTO commitment to fully open up 
the banking sector by the end of 2006 through new conditions, foreign banks in 
Shanghai were also actively seeking loopholes to get around the various regulatory 
restrictions placed on their business activities. It was a constant game of Ôcatch me if 
you canÕ as foreign banks employed creative means of routing money from abroad 
and obtaining the necessary documents from alternative sources to get around 
existing rules even as the Chinese regulators were catching on to the trends and 
issuing amendments to plug loopholes and foreign banks seeking other avenues 
again. The following examples illustrate how specific rules and regulatory 
requirements were used to restrict the business activities of foreign banks. However, 
the relationship was always contested and unstable as the latter sought to circumvent 
foreign and local currency restrictions in order to expand their business scope which 
necessitates further regulatory response.  
Foreign and domestic banks were on an uneven playing field especially with 
regards to building an RMB deposit base. Factors that handicap foreign banks 
include the high level of capitalisation (mentioned in section 6.5) which locked up 
significant sums of money as registered capital; a one branch per year rule which 
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inhibited their ability to expand customer bases; and customer types being restricted 
depending on the WTO timetable and licensing. In terms of RMB business, most 
foreign banks were limited to corporate customers and foreign retail clients who had 
limited RMB deposits. This is in contrast to the local Chinese banks that held huge 
amounts of RMB deposits from their large client base. The significance of being 
handicapped in building an RMB deposit base was that foreign banks were 
effectively forced to rely on interbank borrowing to fund their own RMB business. 
The margins were thus lowered by the narrow difference between interbank 
borrowing and the regulated interest earnings on customer loans.16 Foreign banks 
were thus at a serious commercial disadvantage compared to their domestic 
counterparts. Due to their reliance on interbank loans, any restriction on accessing 
this source of funding would strain their capacity to do RMB business. Such a 
restriction was passed in 2006, which applied to both foreign and local banks, stating 
that a bankÕs total RMB interbank borrowings could not exceed 40 percent of its total 
RMB liabilities. Theoretically, the purpose of the regulation was to put overseas 
banks in line with domestic banks that were already subject to the 40 percent rule. 
However, the practical effect of the regulation had a disproportionately negative 
impact on foreign banks because they were restricted in expanding their RMB 
deposit base:  
ThatÕs the Ôlevel playing fieldÕ, because thatÕs how the Chinese banks fund 
themselves, through deposits. But when you extend that Ôlevel playing fieldÕ to the 
foreign banks, without deposits, things get screwed entirely! Because they donÕt 
have deposits, itÕs like a reversal playing field. ItÕs a wonderful way of controlling 
the foreign banks. (Foreign president of foreign bank: #32, 13 October 2006)  
                                                
16 Interest rates in China are fixed and regulated. Banks therefore have very limited scope for offering 
more ÔcompetitiveÕ rates to attract new customers.  
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Foreign banks in China were limited in terms of the types and amount of 
business they could do due to licensing restrictions (having to apply for separate 
license for foreign currency or RMB business). They also had to contend with 
specific quotas on the amount of lending business they can conduct. All foreign 
banks in China were subject to a foreign currency lending quota which they could 
not exceed for that year. Although the foreign banks only had a small presence in 
China and restricted scope for RMB business, they could theoretically mobilise a 
significant amount of funds from their head offices or bank branches elsewhere in the 
region (such as Hong Kong or Singapore). However, regulations controlling how 
much banks could borrow from abroad (which includes interbank loans from abroad) 
effectively restricted their lending business and was a way of slowing down the 
foreign banks in terms of their business expansion in China. The Beijing regulators 
gave the local regulators (to the local SAFE office for short-term lending and the 
local CBRC for medium-term loans) a quota every year to be allocated amongst the 
banks in Shanghai. The local regulators would examine the balance sheets of the 
banks, inspect the banksÕ applications based on their expected level of business, 
assess their needs and grant them a figure for the amount of foreign currency lending 
they were allowed to conduct for that year. The banks could apply for an increase to 
that limit but only on a case-by-case basis. Having the government specify the 
amount of business that could be done was certainly a strange concept for most 
foreign banks and did not make commercial sense. From the Chinese government 
and regulatorsÕ point of view, however, it was an effective tool to control the pace of 
foreign competition. A foreign manager of a foreign bank expressed the frustration of 
having to turn down business opportunities due to quota restrictions:  
So if we get a short terms deal, [person X] comes to me and say Ôoh weÕve got a 
brilliant deal, weÕll like you to fund us for $10 million for 3 monthsÕ, and he did it 
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today, I canÕt do it because IÕve got about $25 million of space left. $20 million 
already spoken for, and the other bits and pieces. So youÕre limited in terms of the 
amount of business you can do. [É] And thatÕs it, thatÕs the limit. A fantastic, huge 
deal comes along and you canÕt do it. (#33, 13 October 2006)  
Not only did this penalise foreign banks vis--vis their local counterparts, the quota 
system practically dictated the nature of competition amongst the foreign banks since 
the regulators determined the amount of lending business each bank could do. A 
more established foreign bank with a larger loan portfolio was more likely to be 
given a higher quota for foreign currency lending compared to a smaller and newer 
entrant into the Chinese banking market:  
[T]he general way to calculate your quota is your business portfolio. How much loan 
you have is how much quota you will get. Then of course if you [are] a new bank 
here, itÕs very difficult to borrow. If youÕve set up for a long time and you have a 
large loan portfolio then your quota will also be much bigger so your position is 
much better. This is not them [just] treating the foreign banks compared to local 
banks unfair[ly] but also treating the foreign banks among each other unfair[ly]. 
(Foreign representative of foreign bank: interview no. 45, 1 November 2006)  
A foreign manager of a foreign bank in Shanghai gave me an extended 
account of how foreign banks and regulators were constantly trying to keep a step 
ahead of one another to further their commercial or regulatory agendas. For banks 
that did not have the appropriate license for RMB business, they could lend a 
corporate customer US dollars which they could then convert to local currency at a 
local bank to pay their bills, overheads and so on. However, this was halted in June 
2004 when the government passed a law whereby a foreign currency loan made to a 
customer had to be utilised in that currency and could not be converted to RMB.17 In 
order for the corporate customer to convert the loan into local currency, 
                                                
17 Theoretically, this is to prevent speculation on the appreciation of the RMB. 
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documentation was required to demonstrate the reasons for the conversion (such as 
import or export documents). In response, some foreign banks employed creative 
means of regulatory arbitrage: 
The banks might stretch the rules a little bit by saying that this company wants RMB 
financing; we canÕt do the financing because we havenÕt got a RMB license and if 
we lend you dollars you canÕt convert it. And he might say that a year ago I bought 
some machinery from so-and-so company and provided he can produce the right 
documentation, weÕre allowed to make loans on that basis and he can repayÉ he 
can demonstrate that he has importedÉ (Foreign manager of foreign bank, #37, 19 
October 2006)   
Another tactic used by foreign banks that did not have a RMB license was 
to sign a corporation agreement with a Chinese bank which stated that they would 
offer a guarantee if the local bank lent local currency to their clients. This allowed 
the foreign banks to still participate in RMB lending in some form even if they could 
not provide the loans directly. However, the regulators soon caught up with this and 
issued a new law stating that foreign banks in China were not allowed to issue 
guarantees or standby letters of credit (LC) to support local companies wanting to 
borrow RMB. ÒBut what they forgot is that we can issue a standby LC from abroad. 
So what we do now is issue a standby LC from Italy directly to the Chinese bank. 
We just rang the customer with their requirement, send into ICBC, issue a standby 
letter of credit from Italy to ICBC and they lend them the money, which is fineÓ 
(ibid.). But even this loophole was closed later by another regulation concerning the 
borrowing gap, even though it governed corporations instead of banks. The 
borrowing gap was defined as the financial gap between the registered capital and the 
total investment. If a company had a registered capital of US$3 million and total 
investment of US$9 million, its maximum borrowing (the borrowing gap) would be 
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US$6 million. When the regulators tightened up the rules on domestic standby LC 
and the foreign banks issued them from abroad instead, they tightened the rules on 
the borrowing gap such that if a company had local currency borrowing supported by 
a foreign currency guarantee of any type, that would count as debt. So if the 
company that had US$6 million of borrowing would still like to borrow another 20 
million RMB supported by a US$2 million foreign currency guarantee, it would find 
that it has reached its permitted amount of borrowing because the US$2 million was 
outside the borrowing gap. The company was responsible for managing the 
borrowing gap, but when a bank granted the loan it had to demonstrate that it made 
the appropriate enquiries and that the company was operating within the limits. In 
this instance, the tightened regulatory measures not only restricted the business scope 
of the foreign banks but also their corporate clients, who would either have to limit 
their business activities or expansion in China or turn to the Chinese banks for their 
borrowing needs even if the rates or level of service were less favourable.  
It was not only published rules that are used by the Chinese regulators to 
control the pace of ÔmarketisationÕ and govern the behaviour of foreign financial 
institutions; other less tangible and more sociological means of influence are also at 
work. In international relations, the term Ôsoft powerÕ was coined by Nye (1990) to 
describe the growing importance of non-traditional ways, such as culture and values, 
a country could wield to influence others. According to Nye, soft power lies in the 
ability to co-opt, rather than coerce, other countries, so that a country Òmay obtain 
the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries Ð admiring its values, 
emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness Ð want to 
follow itÕ (Nye, 2004: 15). In contemporary international politics the term Ôsoft 
powerÕ is used to supplement or conceal the exercise of military and economic 
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power. The goal underlying the use of this concept is for a country, particularly one 
with global influence, to convince the world or particular groups of the correctness of 
its principles and ideas. Culture is thus seen as a means of public relations and a 
method of strengthening a countryÕs influence. Although operating on different 
scales and originating from different political contexts, this concept echoes 
GramsciÕs (1971) notion of hegemony, which refers to a process of moral and 
intellectual leadership through which the subordinate classes of post-1870 industrial 
Western European nations ÔconsentÕ to their own domination by the ruling classes, as 
opposed to being simply forced or coerced into accepting inferior positions. This is 
accomplished by states through the use of the popular culture, mass media, 
education, and religion to reinforce an ideology which supports the position of 
dominant classes.  Buried in everyday life, hegemonic processes thus become taken-
for-granted and ÔnaturalÕ. In the case of my empirical study, power was used not 
necessarily to convince financial actors about the ÔrightnessÕ of regulatory actions or 
principles but more in the form of indirect coercion and influence through cultural 
and sociological means (rather than specific regulatory rules) in order to solicit the 
desired response or actions. As such, the use of specific rules and regulations to limit 
the behaviour and activities of foreign banks could be conceptualised as Ôhard powerÕ 
while indirect methods of governance and control could be conceptualised as 
Ôsociological powerÕ18, although one could argue that the latter is more effective 
when it is backed up by the implicit threat of Ôhard powerÕ. The examples below 
illustrate the workings of sociological power in the finance community in China. 
A number of interviewees emphasised the importance of establishing good 
working relationships with the regulators so that they were more likely to be Ôon your 
                                                
18 I use the term Ôsociological powerÕ in order to differentiate my usage and conceptualisation of the 
term from NyeÕs (1990) notion of Ôsoft powerÕ.  
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sideÕ when certain decisions had to be made that might be favourable to you or 
another party. In their experience, regulatory and commercial decisions especially in 
smaller centres outside of Shanghai tended to be structured by ÔguanxiÕ (へ系; 
directly translated as ÔconnectionsÕ and ÔrelationshipsÕ),19 which meant establishing 
and cultivating relationships with the local regulatory bodies (who interpreted the 
laws passed from Beijing and oversaw the local implementation) who could have 
significant impact on business activities. Part of this was due to the tiered structure of 
government in China where local government officials and regulatory bodies had 
considerable autonomy to make decision based on the broad guidelines issued by the 
central government. Local officials were usually keen to protect the interests of local 
institutions whom they had regular contact and good guanxi with. Most foreign bank 
branches were located in Shanghai as it was the first city to be opened up. However, 
the rising cost of labour, land and other resources within Shanghai meant that most 
industrial activities took place in the surrounding provinces of Zhejiang and Jiangsu, 
which had also become the preferred location of many foreign manufacturing 
companies. If a foreign company in China wanted to open a bank account outside of 
the province it was located in, it required permission from the local SAFE or PBOC 
office (depending on the type of account and transactions). The foreign company 
might wish to open a bank account with a foreign bank located in Shanghai due to 
existing client relationships in other parts of the world, reputation or particular 
banking services, but permission could be denied by the local SAFE or PBOC office 
who would rather the bank account be opened with a domestic Chinese bank within 
that province. The decisions made by the local regulators were thus not only based 
                                                
19 ÔGuanxiÕ refers to a basic dynamic in personalised networks of influence associated with Chinese 
societies (even outside of China) and is treated as a form of social capital. 
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on interpretation of published rules but also heavily influenced by a strong localised 
social network between government, banks and enterprises:  
So a new Italian company says ÔIÕm setting up a new company in Suzhou industrial 
park. My initial capital is going to be a million dollars. I would like to open a capital 
account with [your bank because] youÕre our bank [back in the home country]. And 
we say, ÔGreat!Õ He needs to get the permission of his local SAFE in Suzhou and 
also SAFE Shanghai. SAFE Shanghai is no problem because theyÕre here, we know 
them and thatÕs fine. But the local SAFE in Suzhou, the guy who runs it there, you 
know, goes out every week with the guys from the Bank of China and ABC 
[Agricultural Bank of China]; he will not give permission to the Italian company to 
open a capital account with us. He would say, ÔNo, no, open it locallyÕ. They just 
have a way of doing thingsÉ because you need to have these people on board and 
you need to have a good relationship as a company with your local SAFE office, and 
your local this office and that office. (Foreign manager of foreign bank: #37, 19 
October 2006; original emphasis)  
It was difficult to overcome local guanxi networks especially when the local 
regulators were already predisposed to protecting their local institutions. Foreign 
banks could thus find themselves facing additional barriers in attracting new clients 
or even retaining existing international corporate customers. 
Foreign banks could also find themselves under pressure from the regulators 
to Ôtoe the lineÕ and display the ÔappropriateÕ behaviour even outside of the 
application process for licenses. There was a fear that if one should annoy the 
regulators, through misfiling of forms, not turning up at certain official functions or 
stepping on their toes in one way or another, the regulators could withhold 
permission for certain requests or delay the application process of various licenses. 
The foreign banks thus felt additional pressure to be especially diplomatic in their 
dealings with the regulators; ÒYouÕve got to play nice-nice and be nice-niceÉ and 
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make sure you get it right. And almost, itÕs kind of pathetic to see all these lao wai20 
paying court and homage to the CRBCÓ (president of foreign bank: #20, 11 April 
2006). The above respondent related an event that occurred the day before our 
interview where there was a presentation by the Spanish central bank at the Shangri-
La hotel, under the auspices of the CBRC. There was a large guest list which 
includes Liu Mingkang, the chairman of the CBRC from Beijing. For official events 
like these, some of the banking figures invited would either miss the event due to 
other demands on their schedule or they would turn up to sign in, collect printed 
material and then leave after a short period. For that particular event, however, due to 
its high profile nature and attendance by the CBRC head from Beijing, all the invited 
guests were called up individually and their attendance were firmly requested, with 
the unspoken but understood pressure of knowing that the regulators have the power 
to quicken or slow down (or even halt) their business progress in Shanghai:  
At this one, I was called, everybody was called, and if you didnÕt go and your name 
was on the list they called you. And they called, the compliance office, and said, 
ÔGet there. Get there, be thereÕ. And so there was an instant fear that if you didnÕt 
turn up, youÕre in the black book. I trotted down there for lunch, and the [É] little 
ladies behind the desk, sort of, ÔWhere have you been? Why werenÕt you here?Õ 
ÔCan I have a badge?Õ ÔNo, you canÕt have a badge.Õ They werenÕt going to register 
me as being there unless IÕve stayed all afternoon. Fortunately, my friend at the 
central bank came in with a little bag of goodies with my badge, so I shot off for the 
afternoon. But I know the Japanese were all in, and lots of people were called, you 
know, ÔYou come. YouÕve been invited, you be here.Õ And every time, everyone is 
at a different stage of development, every bank. With licenses, with the renminbi 
licenses or with branch licenses, so everybody has this to fear. And there is a fear 
here; if I piss off the central bank, you know, what will they do? Will they hold me 
up? And then of course if itÕs a multinational bank, there is a fear that if you screw 
                                                
20 紹妹, a Mandarin slang for ÔforeignersÕ, more specifically referring to ÔWesternersÕ or ÔCaucasiansÕ. 
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up, then head office gets to hear about it, then youÕre double-damned! [É] ItÕs a 
very powerful beast in terms of keeping control, you knowÉ itÕs the general run-of-
the-mill bureaucracy and then thereÕs the sort of blackmail of be-good-or-else! 
(Ibid.; original emphasis) 
This use of Ôsociological powerÕ by the regulators to control the behaviour 
of foreign banks was mentioned by a few other interviewees but the above account is 
the clearest example of how the regulators use official powers to solicit the desired 
forms of behaviour from foreign banks. Therefore, while soft power or Gramscian 
notions of hegemony operate by having actors confirm willingly, the foreign finance 
community in Shanghai found themselves complying grudgingly rather than 
willingly due to the fear of undesirable consequences, even if such threats were never 
made explicit. Due to the degree of control that the regulatory bodies had over the 
business activities of foreign banks in China, the latter had to constantly work at 
staying in their good graces and cultivate good relationships outside of the formal 
application procedures.  
 
6.7 CONCLUSION  
The regulation of a financial market requires the maintenance of some form of 
systemic equilibrium and a framework of legal and administrative rules (Leyshon 
and Thrift, 1997: 60). All systems of regulation, however, are fragile and temporal 
within a highly dynamic and spatially variegated capitalist system especially in an 
age of post-hegemony where governments, international regimes and regulatory 
authorities are increasingly squeezed between various sectors and firms in the 
finance industry pushing for more permissive rules. The concept of post-hegemony, 
highlighted in Chapter 3, captures how the internationalisation of economic activity 
beyond and across the space-economies of individual states is undermining the 
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coherence of the old hegemonic order such that Òhegemonic power no longer resides 
in one territorial state (if it ever did) [but] resides in a number of nodal points (and 
vectors and flows) that describe a decentred hegemonic coreÓ (Corbridge, 1994: 
1849). This idea of a decentred core of actors is useful in conceptualising how power 
in influencing regulatory regimes and capital flows is distributed amongst a variety 
of actors, including state institutions, supranational organisations, large private 
capital and particular actors or communities (e.g. policy, finance or other interest 
groups) across the global space economy. ChinaÕs approach to the ÔmarketisationÕ of 
its finance sector had been fairly conservative and remained tightly controlled by the 
state with regards to the specific nature of foreign competition, information 
disclosure and levels of transparency and pace of reforms. However, there were also 
clear indications of international influence and cooperation as regulatory counterparts 
in the places such as the City of London, New York, Hong Kong and Singapore were 
actively involved in the development of regulatory capacities in the financial sector 
in China. The influence of global institutions such as the WTO was also clearly 
implicated in the deregulation of ChinaÕs financial services and economic strategies. 
In addition, foreign financial institutions in Shanghai were actively engaged in 
pushing for reforms in specific areas important to their business operations in 
Shanghai, in their search for ever higher returns on capital investment. As discussed 
above, they also sought to exploit loopholes and employ creative means of routing 
money from abroad and obtaining the necessary documents from alternative sources 
to get around existing rules that restricted their business activities. The process of 
ÔmarketisationÕ was thus highly contested and influenced by a variety of actors and 
institutions both within Shanghai, the larger context of China and the international 
community.  
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As the finance sector in Shanghai (and elsewhere in China at different 
stages and pace) is opened up to foreign participants and regulatory and legal 
frameworks are being developed, the concept of Ôre-regulationÕ is useful in capturing 
the complex process of regulatory change (Cerny, 1993). Regulations are not simply 
lifted as the very operation of market economies is dependent on the existence of a 
priori rules and mechanisms, many of which were actually lacking in China. This 
process of Ôre-regulationÕ, in the drafting of new regulations, the adaptation of 
existing rules and better policing of how these rules are implemented, is not purely 
for the purpose of attracting foreign capital. In the case of Shanghai, the pace and 
nature of re-regulation is also used as a means of controlling the speed of financial 
reforms and to achieve particular objectives set by the Chinese government. The 
Chinese state clearly maintains a key role in determining the shape of finance within 
the national space-economy but they do still have to negotiate with a range of other 
actors and institutions that operate on and across spatial scales.  
In this chapter, I began by examining the ways in which knowledge and 
expertise regarding the implementation of ÔmarketÕ practices and structures were 
acquired, interpreted and adapted by the Chinese regulatory institutions through 
MOUs with counterparts in other countries, channels of consultation and dialogue 
with industry participants and attracting overseas ÔreturneesÕ with the relevant skills 
and experience to change and implement economic practices from within the 
organisations. The importance of a Ôdifang huaÕ approach, highlighting the 
specificities of the Chinese historical, economic and political context, was shown to 
be the guiding principle in determining the structure and pace of reforms. There were 
different views regarding whether the pace of financial reforms and liberalisation had 
been too quick, too slow or appropriate, as well as different conceptualisation of 
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ÔcompetitionÕ between foreign and local market participants. By combining different 
concepts, philosophies and methods, financial reforms in China were borne out of a 
complex balance of interests amongst market participants in Shanghai, regulatory 
bodies and state institutions in different parts of China (who had different 
interpretations, views and agendas), and other financial, regulatory and institutional 
actors in the global space economy. The case of ChinaÕs WTO accession 
demonstrated the role of supranational organisations in establishing market order and 
governing terms of exchange and competition through specific sets of rules. It had 
arguably quickened the pace of reforms and boosted international confidence in 
ChinaÕs commitment to fairer terms of competition and opening up its markets to 
foreign players. However, non-tariff barriers that had a disproportionately negative 
impact on foreign banks vis--vis domestic banks were seen as a means of 
ÔsubvertingÕ their commitments. In addition to specific regulations that were used to 
control the activities of foreign banks and pace of ÔmarketisationÕ, the use of 
Ôsociological powerÕ was also important in disciplining foreign financial institutions.  
In the next chapter, I focus on the building of specific capital markets 
development in Shanghai and how contesting visions of markets were negotiated in 
the process of instituting market reforms. The reasons why such processes were 
taking place in Shanghai at a specific moment will also be explored with regards to 
its historical context and forces and actors operating across global, national and local 
scales.  
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Chapter 7  
Contesting Visions of Financial Markets in Shanghai 
 
 
7.1  INTRODUCTION  
Of the numerous financial reforms that took centre-stage in the national development 
agenda since the early 1990s, the most conspicuous was the establishment of capital 
markets in Shanghai where none existed before or were closed for many decades. 
The financial markets in Shanghai include securities, inter-bank offerings, bonds, 
futures, foreign currency and gold amongst other. In terms of recent changes in 
financial markets, the public listing of the big Chinese banks, especially the state-
owned banks, is an important trend and one that is likely to continue. Table 7.1 lists 
some of the publicly listed Chinese banks over the past five years. Although there 
has been some criticism levelled at the process and objectives of such listings, it has 
at least opened up the banks to some public scrutiny and improved systems of 
corporate governance to some extent (Lyons, 2005). The push towards international 
public listings is also important in aligning Chinese firms, financial institutions and 
individuals with international practices and conventions of corporate governance, 
regulatory process and accounting and legal standards. In late-July 2006, China 
ended its decade-old peg of the RMB to the US dollar and introduced a managed 
float, weighted against a basket of four major currencies. The US dollar, the Euro, 
the Japanese yen and the Korean won were chosen as they represent the economies 
of ChinaÕs four largest trading partners. This was seen as a small but important step 
towards the internationalisation of the RMB in the longer term. Stock market reforms 
had been especially prominent in the past five years as the CSRC work at dissolving 
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the artificial divisions within the segmented Chinese stock market, allowing greater 
foreign participation in the domestic market as well as allowing domestic investors to 
invest in overseas markets. 
 
Table 7.1 Recent public listings of Chinese banks 
Bank Date of IPO Listed in Capital raised 
(US$ billion)  
Shanghai Pudong Development 
Bank
1
 
November 1999 Shanghai  0.48 
China Construction Bank
2
 21 October 2005  Hong Kong 8.0 
Bank of China
3
 24 May 2006 Hong Kong 9.7  
China Merchants Bank
4
 22 September 2006 
(Hong Kong) 
Shanghai & Hong 
Kong 
2.4 (Hong Kong) 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China
5
 
27 October 2006  Shanghai & Hong 
Kong 
19.1 
China CITIC Bank
6
 16 April 2007 Shanghai & Hong 
Kong 
5.4 
(Sources: 
1. http://www.gbcc.org.uk/iss18_1.htm 
2. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-10/21/content_486689.htm  
3. http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/05/24/business/boc.php 
4. http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2006/09/22/china_merchants_bank_ipo_makes_debut/ 
5. http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/10/28/business/AS_FIN_China_ICBC_IPO.php  
6. http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/04/29/news/bxcitic.php)  
 
The actors involved in the recent trends described above are many and 
varied in terms of their institutional capacities, financial clout, regulatory power and 
geographical location. The recognition of the variety of actors and interests within a 
market setting and an emphasis on power, conflict and negotiation is central to my 
analysis. The form, structure and pace of market formation taking place in Shanghai 
is a contested process that has to be negotiated amongst the different interests of 
ÔincumbentsÕ and ÔchallengersÕ (Fligstein, 2001), involving a variety of actors such 
as local firms, foreign firms, national and local state bodies, foreign state institutions 
and transnational practices. The dominant Ômode of exchangeÕ (Lie, 1992, 1993) that 
emerges in Shanghai is the outcome of a conflictual process between multiple parties 
but is also itself constantly Ôunder threatÕ due to shifting agendas and contexts. In this 
vein, anthropological and cultural approaches to an understanding of markets (see, 
for example, Zelizer, 1988, 1993, 1994) are particularly instructive in demonstrating 
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how markets are understood and experienced by actors in a variety of ways, invested 
with different meanings and acted upon according to different interests and 
contingent social relations. This discursive construction of markets has material 
consequences in affecting policies and practices. The central Chinese state and 
Shanghai government have particular understandings and visions of financial 
markets in Shanghai; the local and foreign financial institutions in Shanghai are also 
framing markets according to their own interests, agendas, experience and 
interpretations of what a market should be. How are these different ÔframingsÕ of 
market played out in Shanghai?  
In this chapter, I focus on the development of the Shanghai stock market 
and the strategies and experience of foreign banks in Shanghai to examine how 
contesting visions of markets are negotiated in the process of instituting market 
reforms. Section 7.2 presents a close examination of the structure and characteristics 
of the Shanghai stock market as I tease out some of the contradictions and 
complexities in the process of ChinaÕs ÔmarketisationÕ in its capital markets 
formation. The particular structure of the Shanghai stock market is a product of 
historical and economic contexts that it is embedded in as well as specific objectives 
set by the Chinese state, but it has also constantly evolved in response to broader 
national economic development, international pressure from foreign investors, 
financial institutions and supranational organisations and increasing maturity of local 
financial institutions and investors. My objective is therefore not to point out its 
ÔpeculiaritiesÕ or simply to present a Ôstock-market-with-Chinese-characteristicsÕ but 
to highlight the process of market reforms in which the structure and meaning of 
ÔmarketÕ in the context of the Shanghai stock market evolves through contingent 
social relations amongst market participants.   
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The SMG is keen to promote the city as an international financial centre to 
attract foreign capital and has been largely successful as evident from the large 
foreign bank presence in Shanghai. However, much of what is happening in 
Shanghai is arguably the outcome of political and economic processes elsewhere. On 
the one hand, institutional forces in Beijing still determine the pace and process of 
ÔmarketisationÕ in Shanghai; on the other hand, developments in Shanghai are also 
determined by the business needs of the international community and how Shanghai 
(or China as a whole) fits into their globalisation strategies. In section 7.3, I examine 
how scalar politics is implicated in the development of ShanghaiÕs financial markets 
by examining the extent to which central government policies, regulatory forces and 
economic development at the national and regional levels influence the development 
of financial markets in Shanghai. In section 7.4, I use the experience of foreign banks 
in Shanghai, the history and strategies of their involvement, relationships with their 
global headquarters and other (local and foreign) banks in Shanghai as a lens through 
which to gain insights into the process of instituting market reforms in ChinaÕs 
banking sector. Through this, I reveal the often conflicting, sometimes cooperative 
and always fluid relationships amongst the domestic and foreign banks and 
regulatory authorities as they pursue their contesting visions of ÔmarketsÕ.  
 
7.2 THE SHANGHAI STOCK MARKET: ONE MARKET, TWO 
SYSTEMS?   
ÒWhy do you want to visit the trading floor?Ó smiles Fang Xinghai, deputy chief 
executive of the Shanghai Stock Exchange. ÒThere is nothing to see.Ó He is right. 
But this has little to do with the switch from open-outcry to electronic share-trading 
to which he refers, because the exchange simply replaced tradersÕ paper slips with 
computers and kept everyone on the floor. The desks are mostly unmanned, 
however, or given over to card games. An elegant gong greet new listings, the 
equivalent of New YorkÕs famous bell, gathered dust for months until a ban on IPOs 
was lifted in January. The only movement is on electronic wall charts tracking 
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prices and volumes Ð and that is resolutely downwards. (The Economist, 24 
February 2005)   
 
In 1990, China became the first communist country in the world to have stock 
exchanges and the only socialist country to initiate building a Ômarket styleÕ 
enterprise system through a corporatisation and shareholding framework without 
privatising its SOEs. The Chinese political-economic concepts of Ôsocialism with 
Chinese characteristicsÕ and Ôsocialist market economyÕ1 were reflected in its 
practices of a quota system for the primary equity market, segmented share structure 
and restrictions on the trading of shares held by the state (and its affiliates) in the 
secondary market. The conversion of state enterprises into stock corporations, 
flotation and listing of shares, and the pricing of firms in the primary and secondary 
markets did not operate according to common understandings of ÔcapitalistÕ 
principles and ÔmarketÕ-determined criteria (such as price-to-earning (P/E) ratio, 
book value, cash flow forecasts, historical performance, quality management and 
product niches), but were subject to central control and national planning.  
Implementation of the shareholding system was set out in the 1992 Trial 
Measures on Shareholding System, which stated that it was to observe the principle 
of preserving Ôpublic ownershipÕ (by the state) and Ôcooperative ownershipÕ (based 
on contractual arrangement among the employees, enterprise, and the state) as the 
mainstay of ChinaÕs economic system. The framework for this shareholding system 
is set out in Table 7.2. In capitalist economies, a shareholding system is used to 
maintain the fundamental structure of private ownership of the means of production. 
In a socialist economy like China, the shareholding system was utilised to preserve 
public ownership of the means of production as the mainstay of the national 
                                                
1 As stated in the 1992 Fourteenth Party Congress report (Yao, 1998) 
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economy, through distribution of shares such that it resulted in the dominance of 
state ownership amidst private ownership. In other words, the system dilutes, but did 
not completely undermine, state ownership. Shares issued by stock corporations were 
thus classified and segregated into different types of shares to fit an investor-specific 
share structure (e.g. state shares, state-owned legal person shares, Chinese individual 
shares, and foreign person shares), each type being subject to unique sets of laws 
which aimed to preserve the dominance of the socialist public ownership in the 
overall share structure.  
Table 7.2 Guidelines for implementing the shareholding system in China  
! It shall be prohibited to those lines of business related to national security, 
national defence technology, rare metals mining, or any lines of business 
that call for state monopoly.  
! It may be adopted, subject to the state holding controlling interests, for 
those lines of business that are among the key development industries 
listed in national industrial policies, such as energy, transportation, and 
communication industries.  
! It shall be encouraged for those lines of business that are developed in 
accordance with the national industrial policies and where competition is 
intense, particularly for those industries that are capital intensive or 
technology intensive, or that are large scale in terms of economic size.  
(Source: Yao, 1998: 5) 
  
7.2.1 The Alphabet-soup of Share Structure 
Some of the contradictions and complexities in the process of ChinaÕs financial 
ÔmarketisationÕ are most clearly revealed in its stock markets and share structures. 
Ideally, regulators and exchanges should create conditions in which information 
affecting the price of a company is equitably available to all buyers and sellers on the 
stock markets. With a sufficient degree of transparency, investors have a (more or 
less) level playing field on which to base their investment decisions, whether for the 
purchase of a just a handful of shares or millions to secure the control of an entire 
company. These decisions, in aggregate, determine the market value, or market 
capitalisation, of listed companies. For Chinese companies, stock markets do not 
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particularly fulfil this function for the simple reason that the different categories of 
stock trade in different and functionally independent markets.  
The stock shares in the PRC are classified into Chinese public shares (also 
known as A shares), domestically listed foreign person shares (B shares), state 
shares, state-owned legal person shares (C shares), and overseas floated and listed 
foreign person shares (e.g. H and N shares). Table 7.3 lists the legal definitions of 
these categories. Under the popular classification in use on the stock markets, shares 
are divided into A, B, C, H and N shares. A shares are shares denominated and 
payable in RMB and held by individual Chinese citizens; B shares are denominated 
in RMB and payable in a foreign currency, listed within China, and held by foreign 
individual or institutional investors; C shares are denominated and payable in RMB 
and held by state-owned legal persons; H shares are shares floated and listed on the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange; and N shares are shares floated and listed in New York 
(on the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ). This classification of stocks into 
different types of shares based on the identities of investors, and which attach 
different sets of rights, interests and obligations to each, is problematic for many 
reasons. Creating a hierarchy of investors goes against the principle of share equality 
Ð a share is a share. This practice of attaching different sets of legal rights and market 
characteristics to each type of share based solely on investorÕs identity, and not on 
any economic differentials in terms of capital contribution or investment risk, 
produces different market prices for the same stock, increased levels of uncertainty 
and hence greater investment risk (which I will elaborate upon later).  
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Table 7.3 Types of shares in the PRC stock market and their legal definitions and characteristics  
Individual A shares ! Domestically listed shares denominated in local currency 
! Owned by individuals and legal persons.  
! Make up about one-third of a typical companyÕs equity.  
! Foreign investors were not allowed to own these shares prior to the 
QFII scheme. 
Individual B shares ! Domestically listed shares of China-incorporated companies, 
denominated in US$ in Shanghai and HK$ in Shenzhen.  
! Owned by individuals and legal persons.  
! Initially reserved for foreign investors, domestic institutions and 
individuals now account for most trading  
Legal person C shares ! About one-third of every listed firmÕs equity is transferred to domestic 
institutions (stock companies, non-bank financial institutions and 
SOEs with at least one non-state owner) at the time of restructuring 
and cannot be traded on the stock market.  
! Since 1997 an active market in one-to-one deals in legal person 
shares have evolved, usually involving state legal person 
shareholders selling out to private companies but only in state 
approved deals. 
State shares ! About one-third of equity is transferred to the state (central and local 
government bureaux and SOEs wholly owned by the state).  
! The ultimate owner of these state shares is the State Council but the 
shares are managed by the Ministry of Finance or state asset 
management bureaux.  
! State shares are not tradable.   
H shares ! Individual shares of PRC registered companies listed in Hong Kong.  
Red Chips ! Shares of companies registered overseas and listed abroad 
(principally in Hong Kong), having substantial Mainland interests and 
controlled by affiliates or agencies of the PRC government.  
(Source: Yao, 1998: 8-19, Green, 2004: 29) 
 
The conversion of SOEs into stock corporations was to comply with the 
policies outlined above to ensure the necessary dominant position for state shares and 
the secondary position for state-owned legal person shares, with Chinese public 
shares occupying the third, non-controlling and minority position. As a result, the 
trading of state shares was banned, the trading of state-owned legal person shares 
was confined within the scope of state-owned legal persons (i.e. they could only 
trade with one another), and likewise the Chinese public could only trade Chinese 
public shares among themselves. Fixing this hierarchy in the primary market and the 
insulation and fragmentation in the secondary market was intended to achieve the 
Constitutional mandate of preserving the predominance of the stateÕs share interests 
(Yao, 1998). However, this resulted in poor liquidity and produced differentiated 
prices for various types of shares of the same stock in the fragmented markets.  
Within the Shanghai stock market, for example, traded A shares and B 
shares, for the same companyÕs stock, had different prices, while H shares (in Hong 
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Kong) of the same companyÕs stock were also traded at another price. This begged 
the question of which price was an accurate reflection of issuer value and created 
confusion for investors as well as corporate financing as the firm would need to 
consider the pricing of each share compartment to make project investment 
decisions. Due to tight currency controls, the A share investors (i.e. the Chinese 
public) had few investment alternatives. They could invest in A shares, B shares (if 
they had foreign currency) or put their money in the bank. Even if they had foreign 
currencies and overseas bank or securities accounts, they were restricted as to how 
much they could send abroad. ChinaÕs investors were thus faced with very limited 
investment options and this created a situation of too much money chasing too 
limited a supply of (A) shares. This was in contrast with overseas investors who 
could freely convert their currencies and have much greater choice in markets and 
types of securities. Table 7.4 shows that A shares were generally traded at a P/E ratio 
much higher than B shares or H shares, compared to the average P/E ratios in the 
United States in the range of 15 to 22 and to any given issuer having only one P/E 
(Yao, 1998: 22). Such wide differences in P/Es for the same issuer in different 
markets could not be accounted for by exchange rate differentials alone. So if A 
shares, B shares and H shares for the same company had different prices and 
different trade volumes, which was more indicative of the companyÕs actual 
performance and value? The concept of using the trading price of a companyÕs shares 
on the secondary market to value its performance is still relatively new in China 
where valuation is still largely based on financial reports. Risk is indicated only if a 
companyÕs financial reports show a loss over a period of three consecutive years. 
The biggest problem with this method is that it provides incentive for company 
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owners to Ôcook the booksÕ, as pointed out by a local analyst for a Chinese securities 
company (#22, 12 April 2006; translated from Mandarin):  
The first problem is that the company could move its finances around, create false 
accounts to avoid this. Another thing is it is over 3 years. So if it was making a loss 
in the first 2 years but make a profit in the third year, then itÕs ok! So as long as it 
does well for that one year, it has bought itself another 3-years time! There are many 
problems in this. This is very different from overseasÉ But this is already changing 
now, but it still does not really follow stock price from the secondary markets.  
 
Table 7.4 The P/E ratios of Chinese stock markets 
Year Shanghai 
A-shares 
Shanghai 
B-shares 
Shenzhen 
A-shares 
Shenzhen 
B-shares 
H shares Red Chips 
1990 28.05 - - - - - 
1991 81.83 - 26.71 - - - 
1992 72.65 17.40 57.52 35.56 - - 
1993 42.48 - 44.21 20.11 - - 
1994 29.67 9.94 10.67 7.02 11.61 - 
1995 16.32 8.00 9.80 6.01 10.05 - 
1996 32.65 14.04 38.88 14.07 10.85 - 
1997 43.43 11.99 42.66 10.67 14.84 - 
1998 34.38 6.04 32.31 5.71 7.11 10.44 
1999 38.14 10.05 37.56 10.38 - - 
2000 59.14 25.23 58.75 13.06 - - 
2001 37.59 43.39 40.76 25.30 6.41 18.72 
2002 34.50 30.61 38.22 17.51 9.52 13.17 
(Source: Walter and Howie, 2003: 181) 
 
Normally, only one liquid market should exist, the A share market. Legal 
person shares and state shares are not tradable on the open market but could be 
transferred within each class. However, this is only done with specific transaction 
approval by the state. Then there are the B shares market and overseas listings. Over 
time, at least four parallel markets have developed, with each market being restricted 
in terms of types of investors and trading (Figure 7.1). The intersection of the A-
share and legal person share market in Area I and with the state share market in Area 
II are open only to legal person entities on a negotiated basis; the typical A-share 
investor is excluded. Areas III, IV and V are growing in significance with stock 
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market reforms undertaken in the past five years to allow greater foreign investor 
participation and improve market liquidity. State shares that are released and sold in 
public offerings are found in Area III. Areas IV and V indicate participation by 
foreign investors through the QFII scheme, which I will elaborate upon later. Such a 
compartmentalised share structure in the Chinese capital market has been 
humorously dubbed Ôone market, two systemsÕ.2 Without a capital market that is 
truly open, where every share of the same stock has the same rights, the same 
interests and the same obligations as every other share of the stock, the Chinese stock 
markets continue to confuse and frustrate both local and foreign investors and suffer 
from poor liquidity.  
 
Figure 7.1 Parallel markets (Source: Walter and Howie, 2003: 177) 
 
                                                
2 Named after the PRCÕs policy of Ôone country, two systemsÕ of socialism for mainland China and of 
capitalism for Hong Kong, under the aegis of one China.  
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Moreover, the amount of tradable stocks is only a very small portion of the 
actual issued stocks of the company. The markets, or a single companyÕs capital 
structure, can be seen as a series of concentric rings or wheels (Figure 7.2). At its 
heart lies the state with absolute control via state shares; next come the state-
affiliated institutions holding legal person shares; then come the ÔalphabetÕ share 
holders. Over time, the wheels themselves have grown in size due to new listings and 
other financing. In general, however, the non-tradable share of this system has 
remained at around 70 percent (see Appendix C for the equity structure of Chinese 
listed companies on the SSE and Shenzhen Stock Exchange). The majority of shares 
are held by the state, state entities or company employees and are non-tradable on the 
open market for three to five years, after which they are often bought back by the 
company and then re-issued to employees again. However, there is plenty of activity 
at the boundaries of each wheel as they grind against each other. The further out 
from the centre, the greater the number and diversity of the investors, and further one 
is away from the state itself. There is a big difference between holders of state-owned 
legal person shares and foreign investors at the outer reaches of the circles. As this 
system spins, friction and centrifugal force gradually push the shares located in the 
centre (the state shares) into the next layer (legal person shares), into the next (A 
shares) and so on. This process, driven by the unending quest for capital by the state, 
companies and investors, is happening now with reforms underway in ChinaÕs stock 
markets.  
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Figure 7.2 Circles of ownership (Source: Walter and Howie, 2003: 201) 
 
Over the past few years, the Chinese government had begun to try to unify 
ChinaÕs stock markets. This was largely due to the practical need for more capital 
and involved selling at least part of the stateÕs holdings into the A-share market. 
Other factors driving the effort included a political willingness on the part of the state 
to divest itself from non-essential industries (孑廻吉里; zhuada fangxiao Ð keep hold 
of the big and let go of the small) (Green, 2004). Finally, a number of my 
respondents also pointed out that there had been growing realisation among policy 
makers that the current share system would have an increasingly negative impact on 
the future growth of the market and economy at large if the inconsistencies and 
contradictions persisted (Chinese regulatory official: #24, 16 April 2006; local 
official from Office for Financial Services: #28, 20 April 2006; local analyst from 
joint-venture company: #48, 3 November 2006).  
One of the key reforms was in the B share market, which had been 
problematic for the past decade. The market bloomed during its inception in the early 
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1990s but then quickly stagnated with the beginning of overseas listings in 1992. In 
general, lack of interest, a dearth of quality companies and shallow trading volumes 
had plagued the market. There were other better Chinese investment opportunities 
such as H shares, Red Chips and other listings, which had all trumped the role that 
the B share market was supposed to play. The exclusion of domestic investors, 
coupled with the lack of foreign interest, meant that B shares had historically traded 
at an 80 to 90 percent discount to their A share counterparts (Walter and Howie, 
2003). To address the B share market problem, the CSRC announced the opening of 
the market to domestic investors with foreign currency accounts in March 2001. This 
had some limited success as the B share price discount fell rapidly within a few 
months from around 75 percent to 30 percent and then levelled out at around 45 to 50 
percent after 18 months of trading (Walter and Howie, 2003: 180). 
Since late-1999, the CSRC and State Council had initiated a number of 
regulations, with limited success, to reduce the stateÕs holdings. On 29 November 
1999, the CSRC announced the selection of 10 listed companies chosen to auction 
off a portion of their state shares to the A share market. Pricing was set at around 20 
percent that of tradable shares. The response, however, was surprisingly cool and 
many of the newly released shares were undersubscribed (Walter and Howie, 2003: 
196-199). The failure of the experiment reflected peopleÕs expectations of much 
lower pricing with the knowledge that there were more state shares to come. A 
second effort was launched in June 2001, which was arguably instrumental in 
bringing to an end the two-year-old bull run in the Chinese stock markets as the 
prospects of that many low-priced shares ÔfloodingÕ the market had an adverse effect 
on stock prices. The conclusion was that the domestic equity market was still not 
broad enough or deep enough to absorb even a part of the huge state sector, which 
 205 
explains the continued reliance on overseas offerings for major listings. The way out 
required time and the development of an investor base beyond the retail sector and 
market punters.  
There was a constant call in the state share sale debate that the value of 
existing A share holdings must not be diminished but this was impossible as no 
market could maintain its current prices against a big influx of new supply unless 
there was fresh capital entering and in this case, the fresh capital had to come from 
foreign sources. The introduction of a Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) 
scheme was particularly welcomed in this regard, the objective of which was to 
attract long term investment into the domestic market. On 5 November 2002, the 
CSRC and PBOC introduced the QFII programme as a provision for foreign capital 
to access ChinaÕs RMB-denominated equity and bond markets. Foreign entities with 
QFII status were thus allowed to participate in the previously locals-only A share 
market, although some restrictions still apply. Investors, such as overseas invested 
China funds, were required to keep their money in China for a minimum period of 
three years. Shares could be bought and sold freely within that period but funds could 
not be repatriated during that time. Since then, revisions to the rule have lowered the 
threshold of capital lock-up first to one year and then down to as little as three 
months (People's Daily Online, 2006). As of 14 October 2004, a total of 25 foreign 
institutions have received QFII licenses with quotas ranging from US$50 million to 
US$800 million, amounting to more than US$2.8 billion authorised for investment in 
the Chinese markets (China Daily, 2005). Table 7.5 shows the latest list of QFIIs in 
China.  
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Table 7.5 List of QFIIs (as of December 2006) 
  
No. Names of QFII Date authorised 
1 UBS AG 23/05/2003 
2 Nomura Securities co, Ltd. 23/05/2003 
3 Morgan Stanley & Co. International Limited 05/06/2003 
4 Citigroup Global Markets Limited 05/06/2003 
5 Goldman, Sachs &Co 04/07/2003 
6 Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft 30/07/2003 
7 The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited 04/08/2003 
8 ING Bank N. V.  10/09/2003 
9 JPMORGAN CHASE BANK 30/09/2003 
10 Credit Suisse  ( Hong Kong ) Limited  24/10/2003 
11 Standard Chartered Bank(Hong Kong) limited 11/12/2003 
12 Nikko Asset Management Co. Ltd.  11/12/2003 
13 Merrill Lynch International 30/04/2004 
14 Hang Seng Bank 10/05/2004 
15 Daiwa Securities SMBC CO.Ltd.  10/05/2004 
16 Lehman Brothers International(Europe)  06/07/2004 
17 Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation 19/07/2004 
18 INVESCO Asset Management Limited 04/08/2004 
19 ABN AMRO Bank N.V.  02/09/2004 
20 Socit Gnrale 02/09/2004 
21 Templeton Asset Management Ltd 14/09/2004 
22 Barclays bank PLC 15/09/2004 
23 Dresdner Bank Aktiengesellschaft 27/09/2004 
24 Fortis Bank SA/NV 29/09/2004 
25 BNP Paribas 29/09/2004 
26 Power Corporation of Canada 15/10/2004 
27 CALYONS.A. 15/10/2004 
28 Goldman Sachs Asset Management International.  09/05/2005 
29 Martin Currie Investment Management Ltd 25/10/2005 
30 Government of Singapore Investment Corporation Pte Ltd 25/10/2005 
31 AIG Global Investment Corp 14/11/2005 
32 Temasek Fullerton Alpha Investments Pte Ltd 15/11/2005 
33 JF Asset Management Limited 28/12/2005 
34 The Dai-ichi Mutual Life Insurance Company 28/12/2005 
35 DBS Bank Ltd. 13/02/2006 
36 AMP Capital Investors Limited 10/04/2006 
37 The Bank of Nova Scotia 10/04/2006 
38 KBC Financial Products UK Limited 10/04/2006 
39 La Compagnie Financierr Edmond de Rothschild Banque 10/04/2006 
40 Yale University 14/04/2006 
41 Morgan Stanley Investment Management Inc. 07/07/2006 
42 Prudential Asset Management(Hong Kong)Limited 07/07/2006 
43 Stanford University  05/08/2006 
44 GE Asset Management Incorporated   05/08/2006 
45 United Overseas Bank Limited 05/08/2006 
46 Schroder investment Management Limited 29/08/2006 
47 HSBC Investments (Hong Kong) Limited 05/09/2006 
48 Shinko Securities Co .Ltd 05/09/2006 
49 UBS Global Asset Management(Singapore) Ltd 25/09/2006 
50 Sumitomo Mitsui Asset Management Company, Limited 25/09/2006 
51 Norges Bank 24/10/2006 
52 Pictet Asset Management Limited 25/10/2006 
(Source: CSRC website)  
 
Faced with the increasing demands of domestic individuals and institutions 
for asset management in the context of limited opportunities within the mainland 
capital markets, the Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor (QDII) scheme was 
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announced by the PBOC on 13 April 2006. This provided a much needed investment 
option for individuals and institutions, through entities with QDII status, to invest in 
overseas markets. When combined with the QFII scheme, which allowed foreign 
capital to invest in the mainlandÕs A shares and bonds, the scheme established a two-
way channel for capital to flow in and out of China via institutional investors. By 
reducing net capital-inflow, the QDII scheme was also expected to ease appreciation 
pressure on the RMB. So far, investments had been mainly in the market for US$ 
bonds, the global bond market, the stock market in Hong Kong and the stock market 
in the USA (Liang, 2007). Table 7.6 shows the list of approved QDII and their 
foreign exchange limits.  
 
Table 7.6 List of QDIIs 
Qualified institutions Foreign exchange conversion  
limits (US£ million) 
Bank of China 2500 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 2000 
China Construction Bank 2000 
Bank of Communications 1500 
China Merchants Bank 1000 
HSBC 500  
Hua An Asset Management  500 
China CITIC Bank 500 
Bank of East Asia 300 
Industrial Bank* - 
China Everbright Bank* - 
China Minsheng Bank* - 
Hang Seng Bank* - 
Citibank*  - 
Standard Chartered Bank*  - 
(Source: Hang Seng Bank, 2006) 
 
The Ôsplit share reformÕ was a more recent effort to reform ChinaÕs stock 
market. The split share structure refers to the existence of both tradable shares and 
non-tradable shares owned by the state and legal persons. Non-tradable shares 
account for about two-thirds of the shares of the firms listed on the two markets in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen (see Appendix C). The system, with major shareholders 
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indifferent to price fluctuations, greatly hindered stock transactions and capital 
allocation and was seen as the key culprit for ChinaÕs stagnant stock market. On 2 
February 2004, the Nine Provisions of the State Council declared that Òthe issue of 
split-share structure must be settled in a positive and reliable manner. In solving the 
problem, we should respect the rule of the market and exercise diligence in 
protecting the lawful rights and interests of investors, especially public investorsÓ 
(quoted in China Daily, 10 August 2005). According to the guidelines, more than 
1,400 listed companies could ÒgraduallyÓ convert their non-tradable shares. From 
May 2006, a total of 46 listed companies in two groups took part in the trial reform.3 
According to the reform proposal, the companies or major shareholders should 
compensate about three shares per 10 shares tradable to shareholders. However, 
investors in ChinaÕs B-share and H-share markets would not take part in the A-share 
market reform and therefore would not get compensation. This ÔgradualistÕ approach 
to the split share reform mirrored wider trends in the re-regulation of the financial 
sector in China. Although it is too early to tell, optimistic responses from my 
interviewees indicated that they saw this as a very positive trend and expected these 
reforms to be very helpful in creating a better market environment with more 
transparent pricing that would reflect value and risk more accurately. 
It is not only the share structure of the stock markets but also the listing 
process that is problematic. Every IPO has to be individually approved by the CSRC. 
Table 6.1 in the previous chapter shows the listing procedure for the SSE as 
published on its website. The first step in the listing procedure is to obtain CSRC 
approval, after which the company then submit the various required documents; but 
how one goes about obtaining CSRC approval is not specified. Part of this 
                                                
3 Of which only one of the firms was vetoed by public stock holders at a plenary session of the 
shareholders of the company as they were not satisfied with the compensation offer. 
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undisclosed criterion is a quota set for every province; only a certain number of 
companies from each province are allowed to issue IPOs each year. If the quota for a 
particular province has been reached for that year, a company would not be able to 
list during that round and have to wait in a queue. On the other hand, a weaker 
company (in terms of performance and valuation) from another province that has not 
fulfilled its quota would be able to list that year, ahead of better-performing 
companies (local analyst from Chinese financial institution: #24, 15 April 2006). In 
recent years, new IPOs had been suspended due to fears that the market was not able 
to absorb new IPOs. Such decisions were taken out of the Ôinvisible handsÕ of the 
market and market participants and firmly held within the visible hands of the 
regulators. A former employee of the SSE, now an official at a SMG bureau, 
recounted how companies were frustrated in their attempts to discern the undisclosed 
criteria for public listing:  
There would be other criteria or requirements that are not publicly stated. It is like a 
case by case consideration, so the process was not transparent. This is very 
frustrating for the corporation. It may want to issue an IPO but the regulator may 
say, ÔNo, you cannot do so due to this and that reasonÕ Ð reasons that were never 
stated initially. The corporation may not be able to bear the transaction cost of that 
going through the application and then have it rejected. For example, if the stock 
market is not performing very well at the moment, there might be considerations 
about the effect of a new listing on the market, whether the market can accept that. 
But these things should not be the concern of the regulatory bodies; the market 
should decide whether or not it can accept a new listing. (#28, 20 April 2006; 
translated from Mandarin)  
What was also left out of the published listing procedure and requirement 
was the discriminatory practice by the CSRC and other state institutions in their 
treatment of SOEs and private companies. This resulted in unequal treatment and 
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SOEs were given more favourable treatment and special consideration, be it in terms 
of obtaining bank financing or CSRC approval for public listing:  
On the one hand you have economic intervention, and sometimes that does not 
happen according to market principles, itÕs according to government principles. The 
other thing is that the government is often more mindful of state owned enterprises. 
So [É] when there is a problem they always support the SOEs first. That means 
SOEs, compared to other companies, they are not treated in an equal manner in the 
marketplace. In terms of banking finance, in terms of entering new markets, in terms 
of obtaining approval and so on, they are treated differently. (Local manager of 
Chinese financial institution: #9, 27 February 2006; translated from Mandarin)   
Due to large numbers of companies that were seeking public listing on the 
Mainland, and the quotas imposed on the number of listings each year (amongst 
other criteria), there was always a long queue of companies waiting to be approved 
by the CSRC for IPOs. Some local respondents remarked that it was common for 
SOEs to Ôjump the queueÕ and had their applications fast-tracked and be publicly 
listed ahead of smaller, private companies:  
The CSRC put them in a queue and there may be about 200 of them. In reality you 
can only wait for the market conditions to change, or some of them can jump the 
queue [laughs], like some SOEs. So if you are a small company you are stuck 
waiting. [É] This is not just a matter of companies wanting to get listed; there are 
too many other issues to consider. The state has done so much to get rid of the bad 
loans in the company so if you donÕt let it be publicly listed now and wait for 
another six months, maybe by then it will have another lot of bad loans. So you can 
only let it jump the queue and get listed. This is an IPO problem that must be 
resolved. (Chinese analyst for joint-venture company: #47, 3 November 2006; 
translated from Mandarin) 
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Therefore, it is not only the share structure of the stock market that needs to be 
reformed, but also the application procedure and regulatory system for approving 
public listings as this affects the very role and function of the stock market.  
 
7.2.2 ÔThis Little Pig Goes to MarketÕÉ But Which Market?  
Issuers competing in the stock market for capital and investment decisions rely on 
the information available in a fair and efficient capital market. In order for issuers to 
compete on the basis of their fundamentals, investors must be able to determine the 
investment value of a project, the firmÕs cost of capital, its risk and value Ð all of 
which should ideally be reflected in the market price of the company stock. The 
practice of government determined listings in the primary market and government 
controlled liquidity in the secondary market disables accurate determination of the 
investment value of projects and distorts fair pricing of firms4, both of which are two 
crucial functions of an efficient capital market. This view, however, misses the point 
in that the very functions of a capital market are viewed differently depending on the 
desired outcomes from the point of view of different actors. If Ôa rose is a rose is a 
roseÕ, a financial market should be unproblematic in its role and function in the 
circulation of capital (i.e. there is only a particular model to follow). But in reality, 
financial markets present different possibilities and serve different purposes for 
different groups. The central Chinese state and Shanghai government had particular 
understandings and visions of the financial markets in Shanghai; the local and 
foreign financial institutions in Shanghai were also Ôframing marketsÕ according to 
their own interests, agendas, experience and interpretations of what a market should 
be.  
                                                
4 At least according to neoliberal concepts of markets. 
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Table 7.7 presents a summary of the contesting visions held by the Chinese 
state and regulators on the one hand and foreign investors and international business 
on the other. In the case of Shanghai, finance capitalists and international business 
want financial markets that would allow them to raise capital quickly and efficiently, 
the ability to participate in markets that they deemed profitable or strategic, the 
ability to move capital in and out of the country easily, listing procedures that would 
improve the efficiency and corporate governance of listed companies, and clear and 
transparent laws and regulations that were compatible with international standards 
and systems. The Chinese regulators want financial markets that would finance cash-
strapped SOEs, reduce long-standing reliance on domestic banks for financing, the 
prestige that an international financial centre with vibrant financial markets would 
bring, and also to control the pace and degree of change so as to manage systemic 
risk in the economic as well as social dimensions. Not all of these are necessarily 
conflicting aims, but the different visions of what the Shanghai financial markets 
should look like, what roles and functions they should perform, and more 
importantly, how it should go about developing the necessary capacities and 
infrastructures and how quickly it should do so, are sources of contestations.  
 
Table 7.7 Different views on the functions of the Chinese stock markets  
Chinese state & regulators Investors 
! Raise capital for SOEs  
! Reduce reliance on bank loans for 
corporate financing  
! Prestige  
! Manage pace and degree of 
ÔmarketisationÕ reforms 
! Improve returns on capital quickly and 
efficiently  
! Freedom in market participation  
! Choice of investment options  
! Movement of capital in and out  
! Improved corporate governance  
! Clear and transparent laws and 
regulatory frameworks  
! Ability to assess companies and 
investment 
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At the moment, although foreign investors are able to participate in the B 
share market and increasingly in the A share market through the QFII scheme, 
opportunities are still limited due to the lack of quality listings on the mainland (with 
many of ChinaÕs top companies listing H shares and Red Chips in Hong Kong and N 
shares in New York) and restrictions on foreign exchange and capital repatriation. 
Chinese listed companies have been sliced and diced in the process of changing 
ownership of its constituent parts and to raise capital, but separate share markets for 
different share classes fail to promote fundamental changes in performance. This can 
only come about if the stock markets, through valuing all the companyÕs shares, 
directly influence management decision-making, and this will only happen with 
greater shareholder interest in the company rather than in its short-term stock price 
performance. However, shareholder interest and power is constrained by the limited 
amount of tradable shares and, thereby, limited influence on the listed companies. 
The importance of accurately valuing companies should be, but has only 
superficially been, a crucial part of ChinaÕs SOE reform programme. The stock 
marketÕs current inability to clearly value listed companies is a consequence of the 
stateÕs perpetuation of illiquid markets. The Chinese company, viewed through the 
prism of the various stock markets, is a fragmented entity that is hard to discern, 
difficult to value and unattractive to invest in.  
A Chinese respondent who formerly worked at the SSE candidly admitted 
that financing SOEs and changing their ownership structures were the primary 
objectives in setting up the stock market. The result was that it emphasised financing 
but neglected other aspects of corporate and financial reforms that could have been 
pushed forward with the formation of capital markets:  
Of course that was the case when the SSE started. There was a problemÉ When we 
want to actually develop the stock market, we need to look into the objectives of 
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development. Why do we want a stock market? One of [the reasons] is to serve the 
purpose of SOE reforms, provide finance capital for SOEs, so that they donÕt have to 
depend on bank loans but can also go to the capital markets. Another aspect is to 
change some operation and structure of SOEs. This is a good thing but the result was 
that it emphasised financing but neglected other aspects of reform. (Local SMG 
official: #27, 20 April 2006; translated from Mandarin) 
Because raising capital for cash-strapped SOEs was the main objective, the 
approval process did not focus on a companyÕs fundamentals but rather whether it 
needed capital. This resulted in a severe neglect of investorsÕ interest and created 
lingering problems within the stock market that resulted in its lacklustre performance 
due to the perception of lack of quality companies, illiquid markets and problems of 
transparency:  
[The state] wanted to raise capital for companies; that was the objective. They were 
doing it for the companies, not for the investors. That kind of concept can create a 
lot of problems. In planning for a company listing, they were not looking at whether 
the company was doing well, but they were looking at whether the company needed 
money. If there were two companies, one company was doing very well with good 
plans for future development and required more capital for international expansion, 
and another company was not doing very well but it had many workers and if there 
was no cash injection it might go bankrupt, the preference would actually lean 
towards the one that is less efficient. Of course, that goes against economic sense. 
[É] The regulators are aware of this problem and are beginning to cater more to 
investors. There are plans to revise the system, to change non-tradable shares into 
tradable share. We can see a clear general direction towards an international 
standard of stock market development. (Local manager for foreign bank: #11, 6 
March 2006; translated from Mandarin) 
From the Chinese central governmentÕs perspective, however, the stock 
market did fulfil its function (albeit with associated problems) of raising cash for 
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SOEs, diversifying the financial markets away from bank loans, and measures 
controlling the participation of foreign capital in the domestic capital market, and the 
release of non-tradable state shares and legal person shares onto the open market 
allowed regulators to control the pace of reforms, thereby controlling the fear of 
widespread social and economic (and thereby political) instability. A number of my 
Chinese respondents were careful to point out that social stability in China was of 
paramount importance and that financial stability was very much part of that process:  
The regulators are part of the government, and the government needs to ensure 
social stability, financial stability. Financial stability is part of social stability; if 
there is no financial stability, there is no social stability. If people lose money on 
some corporate bonds that are not capital-guaranteed, they will create trouble. They 
will bring it up with the government, because they have been approved by the 
government. [É] So the people can complain that, ÔYou have approved this. We 
donÕt understand this but since you have approved it you must have the 
responsibility to protect our investment. If we canÕt get our money backÉÕ then they 
will create trouble. So it is a matter of social stability. (Local vice-director of 
Chinese asset management company: #26, 18 April 2006; translated from Mandarin)   
Corporate ownership reforms and capital market reforms thus had to be 
done at a particular pace and through specific structures that would minimise the risk 
of market instability, especially when this was an area that was still largely 
experimental. The goal of prestige, as identified in the opening quote of Chapter 6, 
might have been achieved to some small extent (as seen by the surge of interest and 
capital inflow into the A and B share markets in the early 1990s) but that had 
arguably been overshadowed by persistent problems with the ShanghaiÕs segmented 
stock market and poor performance. By maintaining the divisions between state 
shares, domestic and foreign share structures, China was able to continue with its 
ÔmarketisationÕ reforms without eroding its constitutional command of the basic 
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structure socialism with public ownership as the mainstay of the national economy. 
Moreover, a blending of domestic and foreign shares would increase demand on the 
full convertibility of the RMB on the capital account, which China was not ready to 
proceed with.5 The concept of Ôpublic ownershipÕ remains the raison dÕetre for the 
Chinese economic and political system and must be maintained, at least in some 
form. Capital market reforms thus have to address political concerns about Ôselling 
offÕ Chinese ÔpublicÕ companies (i.e. SOEs) to foreigners through public listings if 
shares are to be fully tradable. This argument was commonly used by my Chinese 
respondents (both in regulatory and financial business capacities) to defend the 
apparent shortcomings and failures of the Chinese stock markets and to emphasis the 
need for more time to put in place the appropriate measures and reforms:  
When the stock markets were first set up we were not in the WTO. You cannot say 
that [it] was wrong because perhaps the market did not allow for that. The market 
did not allow for a fully tradable structure, because that would mean selling 
everything! All the companies would get sold off! So you can buy and sell your 
shares, not the state owned shares, thatÕs ok, that is not wrong. So itÕs political issues 
again. Now, if you talk about a stock market in North Korea, you donÕt have a stock 
market. Vietnam didnÕt have a stock market either and now they do. So this is a 
process, and you should not be too hasty. (Local manager of Chinese securities 
company: #35, 18 October 2006; original emphasis and translated from Mandarin) 
So far, the Chinese regulators seemed to be ÔwinningÕ as they continued to 
hold the reins of financial reforms firmly in hand and even international business and 
finance capitalists had been remarkably patient. Much of that patience (or some 
might say tolerance) had to do with ChinaÕs enormous market potential that nobody 
wanted to miss out on, such that China could afford to remain largely unmoved in the 
                                                
5 Other than with the ÔgradualistÕ approach that it has taken as with reforms in all other sectors. The 
unpegging of the RMB from the US dollar to being weighted against a basket of four currencies on 21 
July 2005 was seen as a small step towards RMB convertibility.  
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face of international pressure because it possessed a very good hand of cards. A 
foreign interviewee summed this up perfectly when he made the point that for all the 
problems and slow pace of reform, the Chinese market was so big and the 
opportunities were potentially so huge that firms and financial institutions could not 
afford to miss out on the action, even if there were better investment opportunities 
elsewhere. For all the restrictions, prohibitive capital requirements, onerous reporting 
requirements, confusing application process and opaque regulatory systems, China is 
China:  
I think Shanghai will be important in global terms but itÕs going to be a long time 
before it could really compete. Because markets like London or Singapore, which 
are regulated, but in a sort of free market way, are able to offer products, you know, 
sophisticated products and financial services without all the control, and I think itÕs 
just difficult. But having said that, you know, China is China. (Foreign manager of 
foreign bank: #37, 19 October 2006; emphasis added) 
To sum up, the aim of raising capital from stock issues was clear, but other 
functions of a classic stock market Ð to improve transparency and corporate 
governance through the IPO process, to provide additional avenues of investment for 
the public, to diversify the financial system and spread risk Ð had been less evident.  
 
7.3 WHOSE VISION: BEIJINGÕS OR SHANGHAIÕS?  
I mean, for a financial centre to form you need decision makers. And there are noÉ 
Look at all these buildings (gesturing out the window at the skyscrapers in Pudong) 
and there wonÕt be a single Ð with the exception of a few foreign banks Ð there wonÕt 
be a single CEO in any of them. I mean, with the regulator, exactly the same thing Ð 
there wonÕt be a single decision maker here, they are all in Beijing. [É] Of course 
the stock market, the stock exchange is here but it might as well be in Chongqing 
because so much of whatÕs happening in Shanghai is controlled from Beijing, in 
terms of regulation. (Foreign analyst from foreign bank: #7, 22 February 2006)  
 
The above quote captured a general concern expressed by a number of (particularly 
foreign) respondents that I spoke to in Shanghai. We were sitting in the middle of the 
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LFTZ, next to a floor-to-ceiling window with an impressive view of an array of 
skyscrapers plastered with bank logos all around us (Figure 7.3). His observation, 
however, raised the question of how much one could see in Shanghai was the product 
of ShanghaiÕs intrinsic qualities and policy actions of the SMG or were the reins of 
ShanghaiÕs development tightly held by the central government in Beijing, and what 
difference did that make.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3 Bank logos at Lujiazui (Source: AuthorÕs own photograph) 
 
Politics and policies at the national level clearly played a vital role in 
affecting ShanghaiÕs growth, development and policies pursued. A number of local 
respondents pointed out how the philosophy of regional development for the country 
as a whole had changed from Deng Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao, and how 
that in turn had influenced the rise of different regional economies in China. When 
Deng Xiaoping announced the Open Door Policy of China in December 1978, 
Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen were earmarked as SEZs to take advantage 
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of their geographic proximity to the overseas Chinese communities in Hong Kong, 
Taiwan and Macau and connections to other overseas Chinese (Cai and Sit, 2003, 
Yao, 1998, Crawford, 2000). Foreign investment was encouraged and new factories 
were established in these SEZs by offering tax privileges such as reduced import 
tariffs on raw materials and tax exemption for importation of certain capital goods. 
Shenzhen was the first SEZ in 1980 and it became the focus of BeijingÕs efforts to 
demonstrate the efficacy of its new international economic policies. It was partly 
because of its proximity to Hong Kong and partly because of special assistance from 
the central government that it grew from a small rural town of 20,000 inhabitants to 
an industrial city with a population of 10 million in 2005. Its economy was anchored 
by light industry, especially the production of arts and crafts, textiles, footwear, 
clothing, medicines and building material. The focus shifted to Shanghai and the 
Yangtze River Delta in the early 1990s when it was designated as the ÔdragonheadÕ 
of the Chinese economy to connect a modern, industrial China to the global economy 
(F. Wu, 2000a, 2003). Unlike the earlier phase of development which focused on 
industrial production, Shanghai was to specifically develop its tertiary sector and its 
financial services industry in particular.  
Regional development policies are not uncommon as economic 
development strategies but what is particularly interesting in the case of China is how 
much those regional policies are associated with particular leaders of the central 
government. The personality cult has significant influence on politics and policies in 
China which has to be considered when examining economic development strategies 
and outcomes. Echoing the sentiments of a number of local respondents that I spoke 
to, a Chinese manager of a foreign bank associated the development of each region 
with the visions of individual leaders during particular periods:  
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Back then, Deng Xiaoping drew a circle on [the Pearl River Delta], and then Jiang 
Zemin drew a circle on Shanghai here. So now it seems that Hu Jintao has drawn a 
circle there [in Bohai]. Of courseÉ it is difficult to say but, not that Shanghai will 
stop growing but I think it is possible that it will not be double-digit growth like in 
the past. Maybe things will slow down a bit. (#44, 27 October 2006; translated from 
Mandarin)  
The Bohai Bay area in northeast China was earmarked in the early-2000s as the latest 
development zone, centered on the cities of Beijing and Tianjin. Its focus would be 
on developing trade and manufacturing capacities in areas such as pharmaceuticals, 
communications, iron and steel, machinery and agribusiness, and capitalising on its 
proximity to trading partners such as Korea and Japan.6 Some interviewees saw this 
as a shift in attention (and resources) away from the south and Shanghai and towards 
the north. The northwestern parts of China, which had been relatively neglected in 
earlier economic policies (that focused on the coastal regions), had become 
increasingly important in national economic agendas since Hu Jintao assumed 
leadership. Such shifts had not gone unnoticed by business leaders and observers:  
During the 13 years of Jiang ZeminÕs leadership, that was when Shanghai grew most 
rapidly. Now, under the era of Hu [Jintao], Shanghai cannot be said to be growing 
slowly, but compared to previous years, it has slowed down. [É] But this has to do 
with the philosophy of development for the country as a whole. Under Hu Jintao, the 
problem that he is most concerned about is rural development, development of 
western parts of China, sustaining ChinaÕs economic development. He needs to 
consider all these things. So for coastal areas, you just have to maintain growth, no 
need to be as spectacular as before. So there is a big change in policy. (Local 
manager of Chinese financial institution: #9, 27 February 2006; translated from 
Mandarin)  
                                                
6 http://www2.tjftz.gov.cn/system/2006/10/05/010001281.shtml 
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The fact that Shanghai had always enjoyed strong political representation in 
the CPC and state hierarchy since 1949 had always been seen as a significant factor 
in ShanghaiÕs economic success. Former president Jiang Zemin, President Zhu 
Rongji, former Vice Premier Wu Bangguo and current Vice Premier Huang Ju were 
all leaders of Shanghai (see Table 2.2). The connection was widely seen as useful, if 
not instrumental, to ShanghaiÕs aspirations and development as a financial hub (Han, 
2000, Yatsko, 2001). The situation, however, is uncertain now that the ÔShanghai 
gangÕ is no longer in power and Hu Jintao appears to have a different priority in 
focusing development in the northeast and northwestern parts of the country:  
Jiang Zemin was Shanghainese, so if you wanted to do something it was easier; now 
itÕs not that certain. So now if Shanghai is to go to the National State Council, the 
premier is Wen Jiabao, it is not certain whether Huang Ju can always do what he 
wants. And now the general secretary is Hu Jintao. So for many things, my feeling is 
thatÉ itÕs not as smooth as before. In the past even if things have to go through 
PBOC, there is Jiang Zemin so when Shanghai wanted to get things done it was 
pretty quick. (Local manager of Chinese financial institution: #9, 27 February 2006; 
translated from Mandarin)  
As mentioned in Chapter 6, the laws are passed from the central authorities 
in Beijing, be it the PBOC, SAFE, CBRC or CSRC. However, the regulations are 
implemented and interpreted by the local branch offices. This regulatory autonomy is 
an important consideration in understanding Chinese administration and policies. 
While the very generalised statements of the law from Beijing might be accused of 
being too vague and ÔfuzzyÕ, its lack of specificities allows for adaptation to local 
needs by local branches in the context of a huge country with widely varied regional 
and local political economies. As such, the local regulatory bodies have considerable 
power to interpret and implement policies to control the structure and pace of 
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economic growth and development and this applies to the case of Shanghai. 
Therefore, while it is true that the ultimate decision-making as to what laws are 
passed are restricted to policy-making circles in Beijing, the authorities in Shanghai 
are given a lot of leeway in which to implement them and the fact that the 
headquarters of the regulatory bodies are housed in Beijing need not be seen as an 
impediment to ShanghaiÕs aspirations. The branch offices in CSRC and CBRC 
offices in Shanghai have been given increasing levels of authority in their operations. 
New applications for products and branch licenses are also submitted to the local 
offices which are then forwarded to the Beijing regulators where the final decision is 
made. However, most of the communication process and liaising will be with 
officials in Shanghai rather than Beijing. According to a regulatory official who 
recently moved from Shanghai to Beijing, this is a trend that is set to continue as the 
regulatory bodies seek to improve their efficiency and service quality:  
[To] increase regulatory efficiency, and to be close to the market, the regulatory 
bodies have also delegated more authority to these [CSRC and CBRC] branch 
offices. Some former headquarter functions have moved here so the branches can 
just make their own decisions here. This is to increase the efficiency of supervision 
and approval process, and decrease the transaction costs of banks. For some things 
that have been delegated to the branch offices, regarding productsÉ and reports, 
they just have to submit to the local branch office and thatÕs fine. For other things 
like application for new business areas, status of the bank director and so on, that 
still has to be done in Beijing. (#25, 16 April 2006; translated from Mandarin)  
On 10 August 2005, the second headquarters of the PBOC was inaugurated 
in Shanghai. Zhou Xiaochuan, a governor of the PBOC said that due to ShanghaiÕs 
importance as a financial hub, the existing Shanghai Branch of PBOC often assumed 
a role of greater importance than a mere regional branch and this was a key 
consideration in establishing a headquarter in the city (Shandong Business Net, 
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2005). The Beijing headquarters will continue to run policy-oriented operations 
related to monetary policy, financial research, note issuance, statistical data and anti-
money laundering while the Shanghai headquarters will focus on market-oriented 
and international activities such as regulating the financial market, conducting 
financial supervision, making financial and trust analysis, and coordinating regional 
financial cooperation. To further improve the central bankÕs management, it will also 
transfer some of its bureaus for payment and liquidation and national credit profiling 
to Shanghai headquarters over the next three years (China Daily, 10 August 2005). 
While the policies are still made in Beijing, the Shanghai headquarters will not only 
operationalise them but also play an important role in consolidating feedback from 
market participants in Shanghai and affecting subsequent policy changes. A local 
SMG official pointed out that the two headquarters will thus play complementary 
roles (#19, 10 April 2006). The establishment of the second headquarters is thus a 
highly symbolic act but also one with operational impact in highlighting ShanghaiÕs 
mandate from Beijing:  
The central bank is still there [in Beijing], the main decision making unit has to stay 
in Beijing because it is the capital. That is normal. Moving a second headquarter 
here is indicative of ShanghaiÕs development. A whole range of departments and 
services have been moved here. [É] When you are operating in an environment 
where your business activities are restricted, you will have a poor impressionÉ 
Because he thinks that what he can do depends on the policies from Beijing, and 
there is a problem with that simplistic understanding. Beijing has its policies which 
then allow Shanghai to pursue its own local policies. That is very normal. You have 
to understand it that way. It is not that Shanghai is not doing anything or it is 
powerless. The central governmentÕs objective for Shanghai to be a financial centre 
is confirmed, it cannot be changed, thatÕs why [the second headquarter of PBOC] is 
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placed here. (Local manager of Chinese securities company: #35, 18 October 2006; 
translated from Mandarin)  
During my time in the field, there were also rumours circulating in the grapevine that 
the foreign reserves of the central bank might be moved to Shanghai; as the central 
bank had become the largest in the world its reserves required more effective 
management and investment, which was best done in Shanghai. This would further 
consolidate ShanghaiÕs position as the national financial hub and boost the 
development of its financial markets and services.  
As part of a tertiary industry that relies on the growth of and demand for 
financial and advanced producer services, the development of a financial centre in 
Shanghai is very much dependent on the economic growth of its hinterland. The 
Yangtze River Delta has been the fastest growing economic region in China for the 
last decade and this increase in production and trade activities has played a 
significant role in developing a market for financial services in Shanghai. Therefore, 
other than considering politics and economic development strategies at the national 
level, Shanghai needs to harness the growth potential of the regional economy in the 
neighbouring provinces of Jiangsu and Zhejiang, in order to build on and sustain its 
own growth and further develop the financial services sector and capital markets. A 
Chinese respondent spoke of the concept of Greater Shanghai:  
That means linking up Jiangsu and Zhejiang with Shanghai, to develop a regional 
economy. Finance has to be backed up by production. Without the support of 
production, finance is empty. So in order to develop Shanghai, you have to consider 
the development of Jiangsu and Zhejiang together as well. In the past, Shanghai 
tended to consider only its own economy but now you should think about how to 
harness the development of Jiangsu and Zhejiang, how to attract investment to this 
region. Financial services and flows may be in Shanghai but the production facilities 
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are over there. (Local analyst of joint-venture financial institution: #48, 3 November 
2006; translated from Mandarin) 
On 10 December 2005, the Yangshan Deepwater Port in Hangzhou Bay, 
south of Shanghai, was officially opened. Expected to be fully completed in 2012, 
the new port will eventually have a container handling capacity of 15 million TEUs 
(20-foot equivalent units) with more than 30 berths. The Shanghai port had been fast 
approaching maximum capacity and its shallow waters prevented the docking of 
third and fourth generation containers. Since the 1980s, the SMG had been 
concerned about managing the ever rising trading volumes at the Shanghai port and 
Yangshan was conceived as part of ShanghaiÕs ambition of becoming a shipping hub 
in Northeast Asia and to enable it to compete against other ports in the region such as 
Kao-hsiung in Taiwan, Busan in South Korea and Yokohama in Japan (People's 
Daily Online, 12 December 2005). The Yangshan Deepwater Port was expected to 
open up new opportunities for the logistics business in Shanghai and the Yangtze 
River Delta and was accorded a key role in promoting regional economic 
development of the Yangtze River into a so-called ÒGolden WaterwayÓ (People's 
Daily Online, 15 June 2006). This growth in trading activities could only be 
beneficial to ShanghaiÕs aspirations in developing its financial markets and services.  
At the local level, the SMG was instrumental in developing the 
infrastructural capacities of Shanghai and Lujiazui (as detailed in Chapter 2) and in 
offering tax and other incentives to attract foreign financial institutions into the city. 
The SMG Office for Financial Services was tasked with specifically promoting 
ShanghaiÕs financial centre to foreign investors and was also in charge of managing 
financial institutions owned by the SMG (such as the Shanghai Pudong Development 
Bank and Pacific Insurance Company). Officials from the bureau played an active 
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role in attracting foreign financial institutions and would target specific companies to 
convince them to locate in Shanghai (rather than elsewhere in China). When LloydÕs 
of London was considering setting up an office in China, the bureau sent a team to 
London to offer advice and services, convincing them to locate in Shanghai (rather 
than Beijing) (local SMG official: #28, 20 April 2006). LloydÕs of London 
subsequently set up an office in Lujiazui, which was officially opened on 16 April 
2007, specialising in reinsurance (International Herald Tribune, 2 March 2007, The 
Independent, 15 April 2007).  
  
7.4 ÔMARKETISATIONÕ THROUGH THE EXPERIENCE OF FOREIGN 
BANKS IN SHANGHAI  
As prominent participants in the making of financial markets of Shanghai, the 
experience of foreign financial institutions as they set up and develop their business 
activities in Shanghai reveal the complexities of processes and relationships involved 
in instituting market practices, infrastructure and frameworks. In the rest of this 
chapter, I focus on the experience and perspective of foreign banks in Shanghai and 
how they make sense of and capitalise on the ÔmarketisationÕ process in China while 
being sandwiched between the demands of their head offices and the challenging 
regulatory and business environment in Shanghai. In section 7.4.1, I examine how 
foreign banks in Shanghai negotiate different visions of the Chinese market 
environment with their head offices before, during, and after their Shanghai 
operations were established. Section 7.4.2 deals with the roles and functions of 
foreign banks in Shanghai, as seen from the perspectives and agendas of foreign and 
domestic banks and the Chinese regulatory authorities. In section 7.4.3, I examine 
the business strategies of foreign banks in Shanghai, focusing on how they target 
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different market niches and different clients depending on their firm-specific 
characteristics as well as how different expectations of foreign and local clients 
affect their business strategies and operation in Shanghai.  
 
7.4.1 Between a Rock and a Hard Place? Contesting Visions of ÔMarketÕ Within 
the Organisation  
Different visions of ÔmarketsÕ are not only negotiated between different groups of 
market participants (such as between the Chinese state institutions and foreign 
investors) but also within an organisation spread across global economic space (see, 
for example, Schoenberger, 1997). The demands and visions of the head office, for 
example, can differ significantly from those held by representatives in Shanghai, who 
are often ÔstuckÕ between the regulatory demands in Shanghai and having to 
convince their head offices back in Europe or elsewhere of the realities of the 
business environment in China. According to a foreign respondent from the London 
head office of a bank, one of the biggest issues faced by many foreign banks in 
setting up in Shanghai was convincing their head offices in the first instance, having 
to put together strategy papers and convincing the board of directors to approve a 
China branch or representative office. In spite of the market potential of the Chinese 
banking sector, in terms of the corporate banking market as well as the growing retail 
banking sector, there were substantial costs involved in terms of large capital 
commitment, fuzzy legal and regulatory environment and restricted business 
activities due to licensing rules:    
I guess if youÕve got a CEO who is very much Asia-focused and sees the potential in 
China, then itÕs an easy sell. We always say that sometimes selling internally is more 
difficult than selling externally, and sometimes that can be the case. So once the 
CEO has decided that he wants to move into Asia, he wants to move into China, 
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then it becomes a lot easier. [É] Building the business case can beÉ convincing 
people there is a justification for having a branch, because there are fairly substantial 
costs involved, that can be a difficult thing, having to convince the board. For a bank 
our size there are quite a number of levels to go through as well. (Head of 
department of a bank in London: #3, 12 December 2005)  
Even before the banks encountered the minefield of Chinese regulatory 
requirements and the restricted business environment in Shanghai, those who were 
keen on pushing for a vision of the banksÕ presence in Shanghai had to get through 
the Ôinternal sellÕ, after which they then face the difficult process of obtaining all the 
necessary regulatory approval with the Chinese authorities. A foreign interviewee in 
Shanghai, who set up a representative office there less than a year ago, spoke of the 
Òhideous processÓ of getting into China due to the long list of requirements and the 
specific nature of those documents (#16, 9 March 2006) (see Table 7.8). A 
representative office had to be established for two years before a foreign bank could 
convert that to a branch office that could actually conduct business transactions. This 
required committing large amounts of capital into the country with a different 
amount for foreign currency or RMB lending, and for retail or corporate banking. 
Moreover, fresh sums of capital had to be committed for every single branch and 
new business licenses which increased the costs of building up a branch network in 
China to often prohibitive levels (foreign manager of foreign bank: #36, 19 October 
2006). When talking about this process of setting up their overseas branches and 
representative offices in Shanghai and elsewhere in China, my respondents 
highlighted the significance of internal organisational politics within their 
corporations. They described the long, complex and sometimes frustrating process 
that they had to go through to make the business case for Shanghai to their head 
offices. In spite of its almost unquestioned potential, the China market still occupied 
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a relatively small percentage of global business to these TNCs. As such, their 
requests to the lawyers, accountants, board of directors and chief executive officers 
in their global headquarters were not always met with the most prompt or favourable 
responses and they had to be very persistent:  
To try to collect a board resolution from a FTSE100 company, where the CBRC 
actually want to see these documents, they actually want to get a letter from the 
group of chief executives, to get notarised copies of the documents that you would 
require to submitÉ itÕs incredibly difficult to actually bring that together. Because 
also, whilst it is important because weÕve never had a presence in China, in terms of 
economic reasons, for a company that makes just under £4 billion in profit, this is a 
drop in the ocean. So getting the attention of our group legal people, to say, ÔOk, I 
need this and thatÕ is very difficult. So it was quite a challenge actually. That was 
probably one of the biggest challenges, actually submitting the application. [É] 
There isnÕt much room for manoeuvre. [É ] ItÕs interesting when youÕre negotiating 
with your group legal people and you say that the CBRC require a letter from our 
regulators, a reference letter essentially from the FSA. And then they would come 
back and say, ÔOh they donÕt want all that. They want this, this and this, that will do 
the jobÕ. And I would goÉ ÔNo. The CBRC has asked for this letter and that is what 
they wantÕ. [É] Yeah, donÕt try to be clever, donÕt try to deviate from that. Just give 
them exactly what youÕve got. (Foreign representative of foreign bank: #16, 9 March 
2006; original emphasis).  
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Table 7.8 List of documents required to apply for a bank representative office in China  
1. Application form for Establishment of Representative Offices of Foreign-Funded 
Financial Institutions in the PeopleÕs Republic of China  
2. Notarised business license  
3. Articles of association  
4. Name list of Board members  
5. Shareholder list of the Bank  
6. Annual reports for the last three years  
7. Opinion issued by Financial Services Authority in connection with establishment of 
Representative Office in Shanghai, China by the Bank  
8. The identification, academic certificates and resume of proposed chief representative  
9. A statement of a clear record signed by proposed chief representative  
10. Notarised Power of Attorney for the appointment of the chief representative  
11. Anti-money laundering policy of the Bank  
(Source: From interview respondent #16, 9 March 2006) 
 
Even after the foreign bank had set up in Shanghai, the representatives had 
to constantly explain the peculiarities of the Chinese system to those back in the head 
offices when it came to dealing with cross-border payment and other business 
activities when they ran up against Chinese regulatory restrictions that were 
unfamiliar to those in other regulatory environment. The non-convertibility of the 
RMB was one of the most common issues that had to be explained as what would 
have been a very simple transaction could become problematic due to currency 
controls:  
[C]oming from Europe and especially from the Netherlands, seeing all these 
regulations really feels like, ÔHuh? Is it possible that the government interferes in 
these kind of things?Õ ItÕs so unnaturalÉ It doesnÕt make sense, it completely does 
not make sense for Europeans that RMB is not freely convertible. I have to explain 
that every time because people say, ÔWell, you [can] just send some moneyÉÕ. 
ÔNoÉ ItÕs not possible!Õ [É] For me, itÕs very important in my normal working life, 
I explain it at least once a day. Because people just donÕt understand. (Foreign 
manager of foreign bank: #46, 2 November 2006) 
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Other respondents also talked about the onerous compliance Ð reporting and 
documentation Ð process that was endemic to the Chinese administration. A 
significant cost of business for foreign banks in Shanghai was reporting, having to 
comply with both Chinese as well as home country reporting obligations. This 
required two or more languages and applying two countriesÕ accounting rules and 
was very time-consuming and costly. In comparison, domestic Chinese banks only 
had to comply with one language and one set of accounting rules. They also had to 
comply with the multiple steps of documentation that would not exist elsewhere due 
to the preference for paper-copies in China and the importance of maintaining 
control through administrative procedures. A foreign respondent elaborated on how 
simple transactions that are conducted electronically or ÔinvisiblyÕ in Europe would 
be split up into multiple steps and complicated with multiple signatories and copies:  
The payment form thatÕs signed by the customer is quadruplicate, because one copy 
has to be for the bank, one goes to the customer, one probably goes to SAFE and the 
other probably goes to someone else. You canÕt do electronic banking here the same 
way as you do in Europe in terms of payment and things like that because you canÕt 
get the documents signed if youÕre using [an] electronic payment system. [É] First 
the request is signed off by the company, then the signature is verified, then itÕs 
signed by the assistant who checks the balance of available funds and so on, then itÕs 
signed by the compliance officer who makes sure that theyÕve got the appropriate 
documentation, and then itÕs signed by the manager who authorises the payment on 
basis that all the checks have been done. Whereas abroad, the payment would just go 
in and out without even being seen by anyone because, you know, the computer will 
tell you if thereÕs a balance on the account or whatever. So in that sense itÕs a lot 
more onerous and paper-based. (Foreign manager of foreign bank: #37, 19 October 
2006)  
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A number of my respondents revealed how they were often at pains to 
explain the business situation on the ground to Òheadquarter touristsÓ who often flew 
in for a few days and judge the business opportunities from the impressive exterior of 
ShanghaiÕs urban development and went away with erroneous assumptions of the 
business environment in China. Judging by the numerous skyscrapers plastered with 
logos of TNCs and financial institutions, the developed transportation network and 
array of upmarket restaurants and hotels, these Òheadquarter touristsÓ would conceive 
of very different visions of ÔmarketÕ in Shanghai (and projecting that to the rest of 
China) compared to their counterparts based in Shanghai who had to wrestle through 
regulatory Ôgrey areasÕ and various restrictions placed onto their business operations:   
They came here to Shanghai to a conference by business class, was shuttled from the 
airport directly to five-star hotel, have a wonderful conference with decent foodÉ 
[É] Have a wonderful party at night at one of these really posh places, and then 
they go back by the shuttle to airport and then they think, ÔOk, I know China, must 
be quite easy doing business thereÕ. And thatÕs not what is happening. (Head of 
department in foreign bank: #42, 27 October 2006)  
 
People come here, they come to Jin Mao [Tower], they fly to Pudong, they take a 
car to Jin Mao, they go to the Hyatt, leave their suitcases and come down to the 
office and say, ÔOh, I see a sea of opportunities! ItÕs got to be great! Why donÕt you 
sell more?Õ ItÕs like, ÔErm, this is not China at all!Õ (Foreign manager of foreign 
bank: #46, 2 November 2006; original emphasis) 
One respondent was careful to point out, however, that it was important to 
have these visitors from the head office because he was keen to make them 
understand the kind of environment he is working in. But such visits took up a lot of 
time and did not particularly add to his day to day operation in Shanghai (foreign 
chief executive of foreign TNC: #31, 13 October 2006). Another interviewee gave an 
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account of how she was anxious to prepare a presentation to the CEO of her bank, ÒI 
was really thinking how I could use that time to get [across] the message ÔThis. Is. 
Not. China.Õ This is basically my message, give us time, things are slower here, 
things are different, but this is not ChinaÓ (foreign manager of foreign bank: #46, 2 
November 2006). Circumstances were such that the CEO was stranded at an airport 
in Guangzhou due to a storm and his Blackberry device had stopped working. He 
tried to get himself booked onto a different flight but nobody could understand him 
due to the language barrier. In the end, he resorted to drawing two airplanes on a 
piece of paper and drawing arrows to get his point across. He eventually arrived in 
Shanghai too late for a presentation but his personal experience was enough to 
impress upon him the difficulties of day to day operation in China, not to mention 
specificities of the business and regulatory environment:  
So he came here very late so we couldnÕt do the presentation anymore. But in the 
end he was here and we had dinner and he said, ÔIÕm only here for a few hours now 
but I think I saw a good piece of China. I do understand that itÕs not that easy for 
you.Õ So I thought, [that] saved me, well, [a] one-hour explanation on the differences 
and things like that. ItÕs really good. (Ibid.) 
 
7.4.2 ÔKickingÕ Local Banks into Shape: The Roles of Foreign Banks in the 
Shanghai Banking Market 
There are 60 foreign banks, I think, in Shanghai, branches and rep offices and stuff 
like that. Sixty branches, I think, yeah. And why are they all here? I mean, they are 
not all here because they can do business, they are not all here because they can 
make profits; they are here because itÕs China. Because someone somewhere says 
they have to be here. I think, the China Dream as such, everybody is chasing the end 
of the China rainbow and the pot of gold is not there for a lot of these guys. 
(Foreign president of foreign bank: #20, 11 April 2006)  
  
With the numerous business restrictions and difficulties of setting up in Shanghai, 
foreign banks were clearly there for strategic reasons and with a long-term view. 
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Many of them were not making profits and the representative offices (that had not 
fulfilled their 2-year term before being allowed to apply for a branch license or those 
who preferred to maintain that representative status) were definitely not making 
business transactions. The ÔChina DreamÕ, however, was compelling and foreign 
banks were keen to get a slice of the growing financial markets, whether that was in 
corporate banking, retail banking or structured financial products.  
A number of foreign respondents pointed out that it was still an elementary 
market in Shanghai in terms of banking and especially in terms of capital markets. 
The range of products on offer was limited due to foreign exchange and other 
restrictions and, as mentioned in Chapter 6, banks were limited as to the types and 
amount of business that they could do due to licensing restrictions and quotas set by 
regulatory bodies like SAFE. With such limited business opportunities (at least thus 
far), a number of foreign banks had entered into strategic partnerships with local 
Chinese banks by buying minority stakes. Table 7.9 shows a list of foreign banks and 
their percentage shares in Chinese banks.  
 
Table 7.9 Foreign banks buying into Chinese banks 
Chinese Bank Foreign banks/institutional investors 
(headquarters) and their equity stake  
Bank of Beijing ING Group (Netherlands) 19.9% 
Bank of China  RBS (UK) 5.16%; Merrill Lynch (US) & Li Ka-
shing (Hong Kong) 5% 
Bank of Communications HSBC 19.9% 
Bank of Shanghai HSBC (UK) 8% 
Bohai Bank Standard Chartered (UK) 19.99% 
China Construction Bank Temasek Holdings (Singapore) 5.1%; Bank of 
America (US) 9.1% 
China Industrial Bank Hang Seng Bank (Hong Kong) 15.98% 
Hangzhou City Commercial Bank Commonwealth Bank of Australia 19.9% 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Goldman Sachs 10% 
Jinan City Commercial Bank Commonwealth Bank of Australia 11% 
Minsheng Bank Temasek Holdings 4.55% 
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank Citigroup (US) 19.9% 
Shenzhen Development Bank Newbridge Capital (US) 17.89% 
Tianjin City Commercial Bank ANZ (New Zealand) 19.9% 
XiÕan City Commercial Bank Bank of Nova Scotia (Canada) 2.5%  
Sources: (Time, 2005, Times Online, 2005) 
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The bad publicity that had dogged Chinese banks for decades regarding bad 
loans, and senior managers imprisoned for embezzlement and fraud was indicative of 
management and financial problems in Chinese banks and having the input of 
foreign partners was hoped to help turn things around (International Herald Tribune, 
2007). Foreign investors brought capital, management skills, modern lending 
practices, new products and internationally accepted standards of corporate 
governance. For foreign banks, having an established local partner could cut down 
on the time, effort and money needed to build a network of branches and attract 
customers. Their interest was in using the partner bank in China to distribute 
financial products and services that would be very difficult for them to do on their 
own; they could make use of the enormous local branch networks of the Chinese 
banks and client base to break into the (previously closed) consumer markets such as 
in insurance, credit cards and mutual funds (Figure 7.4). These investments also 
allowed foreign banks to learn about the market and gain experience that could be 
applied to building their own brand in China.  
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Figure 7.4 An advertisement in Shanghai featuring credit cards issued by HSBC and Bank of 
Communications (Source: AuthorÕs own photograph) 
 
For the Chinese banks, they benefited primarily from the large capital 
injection brought in by foreign banks through the purchase of equity stakes of up to 
19.99 percent (the current legal limit in domestic banks). This much-needed capital 
helped to settle outstanding non-performing loans and get the Chinese banks up to a 
better footing for public listings and developing other financial products and 
services.  Apart from capital injection, the transfer of skills and management styles, 
exposure to different corporate cultures, philosophies, and international standards 
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were also highlighted by my respondents as valuable benefits. A number of my 
Chinese respondents also pointed out that having a well-established international 
bank as a partner or stakeholder helped to boost the reputation and brand recognition 
of the local bank, which was particularly useful for its public listing and 
internationalization strategies. Two interviewees used the example of how Bank of 
Shanghai, a relatively small Chinese bank compared to the Big Four state-owned 
banks, benefited from its partnership with HSBC, and this was true even for a large 
bank like Bank of Communications (BOCOM):  
The main customers of Bank of Shanghai used to be small savings account holders 
and small businesses in the city. And then it entered into talks with HSBC a few 
years ago. [É] So after selling 20 percent to HSBC, they can say to customers that, 
ÔWe are together with HSBCÕ. It is the same with BOCOM. That will increase the 
value of its brand name as a bank. [É] So if a foreign bank invests in you, what it 
says is that, they [the foreign bank] decided that my company is valuable and 
attractive and worth investing in, based on fair and advanced valuation techniques. 
So, HSBC decides to invest in me because my company is worth investing in, it has 
good value and is a brand that can be trusted. (Local manager of foreign TNC: #12, 
6 March 2006; translated from Mandarin)  
 
You see, for BOCOM, only people in China know about BOCOM. But HSBC is 
known internationally. [É] So when they (BOCOM) go to the US, they can say that 
our shareholder is HSBC. (Local manager of foreign bank: #11, 6 March 2006; 
translated from Mandarin)  
Foreign banks therefore played an important in the ÔmarketisationÕ process 
by accelerating the pace of change, and bringing in skills, knowledge and best 
practice, for example, in compliance, pricing systems and risk management (as 
detailed in Chapter 6). Their very presence in the market changed the terms of 
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competition and also increased the pressure on local Chinese banks to speed up their 
financial and management reforms in order to not lose their customers to foreign 
competitors. The fact that foreign banks were still very much restricted in terms of 
the products and services they could offer gave local banks some breathing space to 
bring themselves up to par without the dangers of having domestic banks collapse in 
the face of foreign competition (an outcome that was politically and socially 
unacceptable in a Socialist-market Chinese economy). A local interviewee also 
concurred with the value of foreign competition in terms of skills and knowledge 
transfer as well as in fostering creativity and product innovation:  
When the foreign banks come here, they bring with them their concepts, capital, 
management, and that will be a good thing for the development of the capital 
markets here in the long term. Otherwise [the service of domestic banks] is too sub-
standard! There are many things they cannot do. There was no pressure from 
competition. Now with foreigners in here, there is the element of competition and 
they have to survive, that will naturally create the desire for creativity and 
innovation and so on. [É] that should be the way to go. If you donÕt know what the 
international trends are, how can you interact with other people and how can you 
innovate? (Local analyst from Chinese securities company: #34, 17 October 2006; 
translated from Mandarin) 
A couple of my foreign respondents were, however, more blunt in their 
assessment that foreign banks were being used by the Chinese regulators to Ôkick the 
local banksÕ into shape and to force reforms. One of them put it as such:  
The bottom line is actually very simple: China wants to open up the banking 
industry, at the same time they have to protect the local banks. The only reason they 
want to open up the banking industry is not because they like foreign banks Ð it is to 
use the foreign banks to kick the local banks to reform. Because the regulatorsÕ only 
interest, the key objective they have, is to have a strong banking system in China 
that is controlled by local banks. ThatÕs the objective. The way to make it happen is, 
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unfortunately, to allow foreign banks to come in to kick the local banks, because 
they will not reform by themselves. ThatÕs what they tried to do last 30 years, 
doesnÕt happen. Reform only happens when thereÕs pressure from outside. (Foreign 
country head of foreign bank: #43, 27 October 2006) 
There continued to be some simmering resentment or grumbles amongst foreign 
banks about the numerous restrictions placed on them while recognising that the 
Chinese state and regulatory bodies were clearly operating in the interest of domestic 
banks. By allowing foreign banks to purchase small stakes in domestic banks, 
foreign investors were offered a small channel through which to enter the Chinese 
market (since their organic expansion was severely constrained by capital 
requirements and licensing restrictions) and many Chinese banks had been snapped 
up. The foreign banks might have been able to gain a foothold on the Chinese market 
through this route but a number of respondents questioned the wisdom of buying into 
local banks, whether having a minority stake with little power on the board of 
directors and management was worth the risk of taking on bad debts and a corporate 
culture that they knew little about. The benefits to such partnerships were clearly 
geared towards long-term interests of developing further banking relationships and 
brand recognition in China. For the Chinese banks, on the other hand, the benefits 
were more immediately evident in the form of capital injection and transfer of skills 
and expertise in management styles, systems improvement and product design. The 
plan was to bring the Chinese banks up to par as quickly as possible so that by the 
WTO deadline at the end of 2006, when the banking industry was to be fully opened 
to foreign banks, local banks would be able to at least survive even if they could not 
compete effectively as yet.7  Therefore, while the foreign banks were welcomed to 
                                                
7 Although as noted in Chapter 6, non-tariff barriers had been put in place to so the ÔtheoreticalÕ level 
playing field had not worked out as such in practical terms for foreign banks even after the WTO 
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improve standards and practices and allowed to place competitive pressure on the 
local banks, they could not be given too much freedom to compete in the market in 
case local banks collapse under the pressure:  
We are allowed to kick [the local banks] but we cannot kick them too hard because 
they will fall over! So that is the balance, you have to allow foreign banks to kick 
the local banks by giving them products and making them competitive and allowing 
them to enter into the market but not too competitive because the [local] banks will 
fall over. (Ibid.) 
The Chinese regulators could not force the local banks to undergo reforms 
on their own and needed the help of foreign banks to kick the local banks into shape 
through competition. This should also mean that they would be careful not to drive 
the foreign banks away through too much regulatory bias. Therefore, while the 
regulators needed to maintain a balance of allowing foreign banks to pressure local 
banks without the latter being crushed, they also had to maintain a balance of 
restricting the activities and limiting the success of foreign banks in the Chinese 
market without driving them away through the lack of business prospect. Therefore, 
with reference to position papers written by a banking group to press the CBRC and 
PBOC for further liberalisation of the banking sector to foreign financial institutions, 
a foreign representative of a foreign bank commented that there would be greater 
political will to grant concessions to foreign pressure if foreign banks were on the 
verge of abandoning the Chinese market:    
The overriding principle is to what extent are foreign banks allowed to compete with 
local banks. Basically we are too effective so everything that we say will not be 
honoured. If foreign banks are dyingÉ at the moment of leaving China [É], which 
was the case maybe 5 years ago because we didnÕt see any hope, at that momentÉ 
                                                                                                                                     
deadline. Such barriers in varying forms are expected to persist for the next few years, or as long as it 
takes for the domestic Chinese banks to complete their reforms.  
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[É If the] foreign banks will leave the country then theyÕll think, well, thereÕs no 
one to reform the local banks. Then they will look at the position paper and make 
some changes. But at the moment there is no political will to help us because they 
have helped us too much already, itÕs the politics. (#45, 1 November 2006; original 
emphasis) 
On the other hand, the regulators could not be seen to be giving too many incentives 
to foreign financial institutions as that would rouse the ire of locals who felt that 
Chinese interests should be prioritised. This sentiment was echoed by one of my 
Chinese interviewees who felt that perhaps too much concession had been given to 
foreign investors that local institutions should be more entitled to:  
You have to give many incentives to attract foreign investors in here, give them 
many things. Actually, looking at our development to date, there is no reason why 
we should give so many things to other people. We have so many people who 
needÉ we should be giving to our own citizens. If anything, we should favour our 
own citizens instead of foreigners. So even if we do give [special treatment], it 
should be given slowly, slowly. ThatÕs how I feel. (Local analyst from Chinese 
securities company: #34, 17 October 2006; translated from Mandarin) 
Therefore, the roles accorded to foreign banks in Shanghai, as permitted by 
regulatory and licensing rules, had to be carefully balanced to address the desire of 
the foreign banks to exploit the business opportunities in China, the need of the 
domestic banks to implement practices and obtain the necessary skills and 
knowledge to compete effectively in the Chinese and international financial markets, 
and the interests of the regulators to use the foreign banks to force local banks to 
reform without seeming to favour or neglect either sets of market players. This 
balance was constantly shifting in response to the pace of change within the 
organisations themselves as well as to external events such as the WTO 
commitments, regulatory changes and general economic and capital market 
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environments which affected the performance, strategies and outlook of local and 
foreign financial institutions. If greater access was given to foreign banks to enter 
previously closed markets (such as being allowed to offer financial services in RMB 
and to retail customers instead of being restricted to foreign currency business and 
corporate customers), another restriction might be imposed (such as SAFE 
restrictions on borrowing money from abroad) to slow down the business expansion 
of foreign banks, in order to protect the local banks. If the pace of reforms and 
ÔmarketisationÕ was too slow and regulators were getting feedback from foreign 
financial institutions that they were no longer optimistic about their future 
development in the Chinese market, some concessions might be made to allow more 
products or services to be offered, or reduce some other regulatory requirement to 
placate foreign investors and convince them that it was worth their while to stay on 
in China in spite of currently unfavourable circumstances. This balance thus had to 
be constantly (re)negotiated with changing circumstances and with an eye on the 
long term goal of developing Shanghai as a financial centre with developed banking 
and capital markets supported by a strong base of domestic financial institutions as 
well as a wide range of foreign financial institutions.  
 
7.4.3 Making the Most of Market Niches: The Strategies of Foreign Banks in 
Shanghai 
There are currently around 65 to 70 foreign banks in Shanghai (figures vary 
according to the banksÕ status of application and registration) and Table 7.10 shows a 
list of those registered with the CBRC in 2005. While this does not seem like many 
compared to Tokyo, London or Hong Kong, it borders on overcrowding when one 
considers that business operations of foreign banks are still very much limited even 
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in Shanghai (still the most open city in China). Many large foreign banks had been 
given RMB licenses that would allow them to conduct RMB business with local 
corporate clients, but they still could not issue credit cards, invest directly in capital 
markets or offer risk management products without going through a local bank or 
financial institution (through joint-ventures or using the latter as agent banks). Local 
and foreign financial institutions were still subject to regulatory bias in spite of the 
WTO-level-playing-field rhetoric, so much so that some market participants had 
described the system as Ôone country, two banking systemsÕ. An interviewee from a 
UK bank confided that:  
[Foreign banks in Shanghai] say that most of the branches arenÕt making any money. 
I guess they probably just break even or something like that [É] So when WTO 
kicks in [É] there should be some relaxation, which would then allow foreign banks 
to do RMB lending. Which at the moment is quite restricted. And that's the market 
that everybody is eyeing. Everybody s going in the market now thinking, ÔWell, OK, 
IÕve got potentially a short-term loss here, I have to run some operational losses with 
a long-term future.Õ So everybody is looking at it, ÔRight, 2006, WTO...Õ In practice 
whether that actually happens or not remains to be seen. (Head of research at a 
London bank: #3, 12 December 2005; original emphasis).   
 
Table 7.10 List of foreign banks in Shanghai and their country of origin (as of 2005) 
ABN Amro (Netherlands) 
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group (Australia) 
Banca Di Roma (Italy) 
Banca Intesa (Italy) 
Bangkok Bank (Thailand) 
Bank of America (USA) 
Bank of East Asia (Hong Kong) 
Bank of Montreal (Canada) 
Bank of New York (USA) 
Bank of Nova Scotia (Canada) 
Barclays Bank PLC (UK) 
Bayerische Landesbank (Germany) 
BNP Paribas S.A. (France) 
Business Development Bank (Germany/Thailand)** 
Calyon (France) 
Chai Tai Finance* 
Citibank (USA) 
CITIC Ka Wah Bank (Hong Kong)  
Credit Suisse First Boston (UK) 
Dah Sing Bank (Hong Kong) 
Intesa Bci (Italy) 
JP Morgan Chase (USA) 
KBC Bank (Belgium) 
Korea Development Bank (Korea) 
Korea Exchange (Korea) 
Maybank (Malaysia) 
Metropolitan Bank (USA) 
Mizuho Corporate Bank (Japan) 
Natexis Banques (France) 
Ningbo International**  
Nord/LB (Germany) 
United Overseas Bank (Singapore) 
Norddeutsche Landesbank (Germany) 
Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation (Singapore) 
Pinan SH*  
RaboBank (Netherlands)  
Raiffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich AG (Austria) 
Royal Bank of Scotland (UK) 
Sanpaolo IMI S.p.A. (Italy) 
SEB (Sweden) 
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Development Bank of Singapore (Singapore) 
Commerzbank (Germany) 
Deutsche Bank (Germany) 
Dresdner Bank (Germany) 
First Sino Bank (Taiwan/Hong Kong/China) 
Fortis Bank (Netherlands) 
GE Finance (UK) 
Hana Bank (Korea) 
Hang Seng Bank (Hong Kong) 
HSBC (UK) 
IBPS Alliance Bank (UK) 
Industrial Bank of Korea (Korea) 
ING Bank (Belgium) 
Shinhan Bank (Korea)  
Socit Gnrale (France) 
Standard Chartered (UK) 
Sumitomo Mitsui (Japan) 
Sumitomo Trust (Japan) 
Svenska Handlsbanken  
Tokyo-Mitsubishi (Japan) 
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ (Japan) 
Wachovia Bank (USA) 
Westdeutsche Landesbank (Germany) 
Woori Bank (Korea) 
Wing Heng Bank (Hong Kong) 
Wing Lung Bank (Hong Kong) 
Xiaman International (Hong Kong/China/Japan/USA)** 
* Information not available 
** China-incorporated foreign bank 
Note: This list does not include representative offices 
Based on: (Metcalfe, 2005), CBRC data from interview respondent  
 
 
However the attractiveness of the Chinese market was such that foreign 
banks had not simply packed up and left; in fact, more were entering every year. In 
the current regulatory environment, possible strategies include: i) to sit and wait 
(either maintaining a representative office or keeping to current levels of business 
activities permitted) until China further opens up its financial markets, ii) move into 
niche markets and iii) expand by way of merger or co-operation with a domestic 
bank. Most banks employed a combination of the above strategies, such as 
concentrating on specific market or product niches or enter into joint agreements 
with domestic banks, while waiting for regulatory and market changes.  
A number of foreign banks had opted to expand their business opportunities 
through cooperative agreements and joint-ventures with domestic banks, often by 
taking minority stakes (see Table 7.9). This trend had been particularly prominent 
over the last 3 years. For most foreign banks, however, their key strategy was to 
focus their limited capital and human resources on specific market niches based on 
their country of origin, product expertise and/or existing client base. This 
specialisation in market niches could be seen in terms of a) products, b) sectors, and 
c) client base. Only a few very large foreign banks (such as HSBC, Standard 
Chartered and Citibank) were keen on being active in all sectors of the banking 
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market to offer a comprehensive range of banking services; most other foreign banks 
that I spoke to preferred to focus on specific product areas such as corporate or 
wholesale banking, trade financing or SME financing as their specialty. Many 
foreign banks went into China as a result of following up on client relationships 
elsewhere. In the 1980s and 1990s, many companies from the developed economies 
were moving production facilities and opening new branches in China due to new 
market opportunities and their banks followed in order to maintain those client 
relationships and as business opportunities began to develop for them as well within 
China. An interviewee based in London pointed out the simple fact that, ÒWeÕve got 
a global customer base; the customers are going to China. [É] If [the companies] are 
there in China and we are not there as well to support them, opportunities are going 
to go elsewhereÓ (Head of department in London bank: #3, 12 December 2005). In 
following these corporate customers, the foreign banks therefore tended to focus on 
banking products that they were most familiar with in wholesale/correspondent 
banking such as trade finance, loans syndication, structured lending, and mergers & 
acquisitions. Other than specialising in particular financial products and services, 
many foreign banks also capitalised on sector-specialisation due to their expertise 
and experience on finance and market research in particular sectors elsewhere in the 
global economy. This sector approach enabled banks to provide clients with in-house 
sector expertise and to combine that with extensive product knowledge available 
across their organization network worldwide. Some of the foreign banks that I spoke 
to specialised in areas such as the aerospace industry, agriculture and agribusiness, 
food and beverage industry, construction and building materials, transport and 
logistics and SME financing.  
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The third area of specialisation was in terms of client base. Many of these 
foreign banks (particularly the smaller ones) moved into the Chinese market with the 
expressed mandate of servicing their existing clients from their home countries. An 
Italian bank that I interviewed, for example, focused on servicing its Italian clients in 
Shanghai and the surrounding provinces of Suzhou and Zhejiang. Some smaller 
German banks that I spoke to also focused on their clients from Germany who had 
already entered or were considering entry into the Chinese market. One of the 
German banks, for example, had a specific German desk to concentrate on attracting 
and retaining German clients. This country-specific focus tended to be particularly 
prominent for the non-English-speaking client base. For corporate customers who 
were not fluent in English (or Mandarin), they faced additional difficulties apart from 
the normal hurdles already faced by counterparts from the US, UK and other 
English-speaking countries. These banks therefore sought to provide a value-added 
service in consultancy and business services by capitalising on their country and 
linguistic advantage:  
ThatÕs the reason why [the new head of German desk] is on board. In all countries of 
this world, despite the globalised world, people, customers who are not as fluent in a 
foreign language just tend to like to speak in their mother tongue. (Foreign manager 
of foreign bank: #41; 27 October 2006) 
Even with the above strategies of market specialisation in terms of products, 
sectors and client base, some foreign banks still found it difficult to sustain their 
business operations in China. Due to currency and licensing restrictions, there was a 
mismatch in terms of the types of financial services that corporate customers 
required and what the foreign banks could provide. An Italian bank, for example, 
could not offer RMB lending services to its potential clients as it was still in the 
three-year waiting period of applying for the requisite license. This reduced its 
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business opportunities while at the same time increased the pressure of having to be 
profit-making for two out of those three years in order to meet the criteria for a RMB 
license:  
Since I came here IÕve visited maybe 30 or 40 large foreign corporate that have 
business in China. WeÕve done very, very little in terms of business with them 
because essentially what they do in China is they need local currency [É] because 
they need to pay their local suppliers, pay their salaries and pay their rent and things. 
[F]or a lot of the foreign corporates who are our target, whether it be Carrefour or 
Decathon or MichelinÉ They only want local currency. (Foreign manager of 
foreign bank: #37; 19 October 2006).  
Due to the various business restrictions, high capital requirements for banking 
licenses, and onerous application process, some foreign banks opted to maintain a 
purely research and consultative role (for existing home customers), or to service 
Chinese banks and enterprises going abroad (capitalising on their global network) 
without actually conducting business in the monetary sense. This enabled them to 
adopt a wait-and-see attitude, monitor market and regulatory changes as they planned 
their next move, while maintaining linkages with existing clients moving into China.  
For foreign banks that had started breaking into the local market, they also 
had particular strategies for targeting certain types of Chinese corporate clients. 
Traditionally, most Chinese banks would only extend loans to large SOEs and SMEs 
in China would find it very difficult to secure business loans as domestic banks were 
unwilling to take the risk without government backing. One of the foreign banks that 
I interviewed spotted this neglected sector and established itself in Shanghai to 
provide corporate banking services to this niche market. This was, however, a rather 
unique case and most foreign banks that just started to move into the Chinese 
corporate banking market still prefer large SOE clients due to perceptions of risk and 
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the difficulties of assessing Chinese companies. Most interviewees claimed that the 
foreign clients that they worked with tend to have more transparent accounting 
practices and records and since they often already had existing client relationships 
elsewhere in their global network, the banks would already have some knowledge of 
their group financial data and status. These established relationships and history of 
engagement enabled the banks to have greater confidence in their foreign corporate 
clients while they often felt a great deal more uncertain about local companies. A 
respondent from a foreign bank that had established itself in Shanghai a few years 
ago explained that:  
Initially when you go into a market, you probably look at foreign companies as a 
base. Either joint-ventures or multinational corporates would be where foreign banks 
would go to. Mainly because in China we probably canÕt get comfortable with the 
credit, because the annual report and accounts, we donÕt know how accurate they 
are. So until we get to a stage where the country produce internationallyÉ you 
know, accounts to an internationally accepted standard, [unless] something like 
PWC [PricewaterhouseCoopers] or whoever is auditing the accounts [otherwise] itÕs 
probably difficult for a bank like ours to get comfortable with that. You might find 
that some of the Hong Kong banks that are based in China or HSBC who has been 
there a long time, or Standard Chartered, will have a slightly more relaxed view than 
ourselves. But I know that even they are quite cautious in terms of the sort of local 
corporate exposure that they will take on their books. (Director from a bank in 
London: #3, 12 December 2005) 
The lack of standardised accounting practices within China was another 
issue of concern for foreign banks in dealing with Chinese corporate clients. 
Compared to foreign corporates who applied international accounting standards 
(IAS) and were often audited by international accounting firms (which was seen to 
increase confidence and reliability of the numbers reported), Chinese companies 
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often had rather ad hoc approaches to accounting practices that were not easily 
comparable and rendered the process of assessing risk and rather opaque, at least 
from the perspective of foreign banks. A respondent who worked in corporate 
relations explains that for foreign companies:  
[a]ll their financials are veryÉ transparent, and audited by international audit firms. 
For local firms the situation varies. Some of them apply international accounting 
standards or this kind of standard, but for many others they do not have a very long 
financial history for you to track, their credit risks, their performancesÉ [É] And if 
they are not listed companies, their accounting, their accounts may not be audited by 
a national audit firm, soÉ we can say that the reliability and the transparency is 
lower. (Local vice-president of foreign bank: #14; 7 March 2006).  
Another respondent compared the accounting standards between established foreign 
client and potential Chinese clients:  
For the German companies you have your long lasting established relationship, you 
have the respective laws in place where you can rely on guarantees, collaterals etc. If 
you have a new Chinese client, you cannot rely on the financial, you know, there 
two or three statements they produce, one for the tax, one for the auditors, one for 
the company itself, for the investors, and maybe one for the shareholdersÉ itÕs very, 
very tough. ItÕs Chinese accounting standards, they have Chinese characteristics. 
(Foreign manager of foreign bank: #41, 27 October 2006) 
Due to what is deemed their incompatibility (or incomparability) with accepted 
ÔinternationalÕ standards, these unique ÒChinese characteristicsÓ were seen as 
problematic in hindering accurate assessment of accounts and valuation of 
companies on the part of foreign banks who were unfamiliar with the local 
environment and frameworks.  
Other than the questionable reliability of accounts and statements, the 
documentary process with Chinese corporates was another issue. A Chinese 
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respondent who had corporate dealings with both foreign and local banks in 
Shanghai pointed out that many Chinese clients were not used to what they saw as 
overly strict interpretation of laws. This was perhaps related to the regulatory style in 
China whereby broad laws and guidelines were established by central authorities 
which were then interpreted and enforced by local authorities with a great degree of 
flexibility to local contexts as well as on a case-by-case basis. Chinese clients of 
foreign banks often had the impression that foreign banks were too strict in enforcing 
all the rules with little ÔflexibilityÕ and interpreted that as poor customer service or 
bureaucracy:  
There is also a difference in culture between local and foreign banks, different 
concepts of service and operation. For foreign banks, their valuation of corporates 
and requirementsÉ internal management methods, they are more strict. Some 
[local] customers may not be able to accept this, thinking that they are too strict and 
should be more relaxed or flexible. [É] For foreign banks, they operate and adhere 
very strictly to the rule of law as laid down by the regulators. But for local banksÉ 
Foreign banks are very, very careful, but the local banks are different. [É] For 
foreign banks, white is white and black is black. But for local banks there are more 
grey areas. (Local manager for foreign TNC: #12; 6 March 2007; translated from 
Mandarin) 
He went on to give an example of how a local bank might bend the rules for 
a Chinese client in requiring only three documents instead of five, while the foreign 
banks, who were anxious to keep on the good side of the Chinese regulators, would 
stick by the rules and insist on five documents, or even request for additional 
documents as a safeguard in an unfamiliar business environment. This would 
frustrate potential Chinese clients whose expectations of superior customer service 
with a foreign bank were then dashed by what they see as unnecessary and 
complicated requirements:  
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[For certain transactions, banks] have to fulfil some legal requirements, have to 
submit various forms and accounts. But for local banks, they may only require you 
to submit three documents, even though the legal requirement is to submit five. But 
for HSBC or Citibank or Standard Chartered, they will stick with the five documents 
requirement, or they may even ask for five, including a letter of guarantee or 
something. [The customer may then complain] ÔHey, why is it that when I was 
dealing with ICBC in the past I only needed to give 3 documents? Why is it so much 
more troublesome with you?Õ Trust is another issue. If you borrow money from 
HSBC as a client [É] they may ask your company for more documents and letters 
of guarantee. They need to understand your business well and build up knowledge 
and trust that way. But if I am at ICBC, I may say, ÔHey, Karen, we have a good 
relationship and I know you very well,Õ so when I require documents from you, it 
makes things a lot simpler. (Ibid.) 
Due to complications like these in dealing with Chinese corporates, foreign 
banks that were just slowly moving into the Chinese corporate sector tended to target 
only SOEs due to the perception that they were too big and too strategically 
important to the Chinese economy and state to be allowed to fail. Government 
backing of these SOEs thus acted as a form of guarantee even if the financial status 
of these firms were poor:  
For Chinese clients, we look at the credit base, which is big operation in China so 
thereÕs actually something to bank on, you have actual cash flows, right? And we 
look at the fact that they are state owned and too big to fail. That applies to all 
companies, [like] Sinopec, Sinochem, COSCO [China Ocean Shipping Company] 
[É] these big names, thereÕs a list of 200 state owned enterprises, all these 
enterprises are targeted to be in the Global Fortune 500 one day, they are considered 
too big to fail. So even if the cash flows doesnÕt [sic] actually add up itÕs still 
bankable. (Foreign country head of foreign bank: #43, 27 October 2006; emphasis 
added)  
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Another foreign interviewee elaborated on the policy of his bank in dealing with 
Chinese corporate clients. Apart from examining individual cases to obtain an 
internal rating and pricing guide, an important criteria was that they were SOEs as 
they found the small Chinese companies difficult to understand and too risky without 
the assurance of government backing:  
If we do Chinese large corporateÉ because our bank is very conservative and very 
cautious, we aim to deal with investment grade companies. Also the high end of 
investment grade, really triple-B and above. Our policy is that if a company has a 
public rating or it doesnÕt, we still go through an analysis for assessment and give an 
internal rating by looking for numbers, macroeconomic, bits and pieces, all that 
stuff, [and] give an internal rating which allows us to price it to make sure we get 
our required return on capital. The Chinese companies would tend to be state owned 
companies, you know, like Sinopec, the big players. We donÕt do the little ones 
because we donÕt trust them. (Foreign manager of foreign bank: #37, 19 October 
2006) 
Therefore, with the exception of only one foreign bank that focused 
particularly on the Chinese SMEs niche market as a specialist, all the foreign banks 
that I spoke to limit their exposure to Chinese corporations by targeting SOEs. The 
approach was a very cautious and prudent one in which the banks stuck with the 
market sectors that they were most familiar with (international clients from their 
home country or existing global network) and moved slowly into the local Chinese 
corporate market by only engaging with the SOEs deemed too large and politically 
significant to fail or publicly listed companies (also mainly SOEs) who had at least 
gone through the listing procedure and had their accounts and documents scrutinised 
by reputable auditing firms. The business strategy of the following foreign bank 
summed up the view of most foreign banks in Shanghai:  
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[For] our bank we stay very, very close to our core strategy. We donÕt try and do all 
things for all people. The Italian business, we know and understand and thatÕs fine. 
Trade finance, we know and understand and thatÕs fine. And the corporate business 
itÕs just the SOEs, whom we feel wouldnÕt fail because of the state involvement. 
(Ibid.)  
However, given that almost all the foreign banks in Shanghai were chasing crumbs 
from that same SOE-pie, competition was stiff and margins were very slim as banks 
tried to undercut each other. Foreign banks would thus have to seek new markets in 
terms of sectors and products in order to maintain and expand their operations in 
China. While some banks were eyeing the RMB retail sector, others were focusing 
on securities and derivative products as the capital markets continue to mature and 
open up to foreign players.  
 
7.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I examined the characteristics and objectives of the SSE and the 
contesting visions of this market according to the Chinese state and state institutions 
and to foreign financial institutions and investors. The particular structure of the 
Shanghai stock market was a product of historical and economic contexts that it was 
embedded in as well as specific objectives set by the Chinese state, but it has also 
constantly evolved in response to broader national economic development, 
international pressure from foreign investors, financial institutions and supranational 
organisations and increasing maturity of local financial institutions and investors. My 
objective was not only to point out its ÔpeculiaritiesÕ or simply to present a Ôstock-
market-with-Chinese-characteristicsÕ but to highlight the process of market reforms 
in which the structure and meaning of ÔmarketÕ in the context of the Shanghai stock 
market evolved through contingent social relations amongst market participants.   
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The SMG was keen to promote the city as an international financial centre 
to attract foreign capital and had been largely successful as evident from the large 
foreign bank presence in Shanghai. However, much of what was happening in 
Shanghai was arguably the outcome of political and economic processes elsewhere. 
On the one hand, institutional forces in Beijing still determined the pace and process 
of ÔmarketisationÕ in Shanghai; on the other hand, developments in Shanghai were 
also determined by the business needs of the international community and how 
Shanghai (or China as a whole) fitted into their globalisation strategies. Foreign 
financial institutions were eager to tap into the huge market potential of the Chinese 
banking sector. However, perspectives and expectations of their roles and strategies 
in China varied amongst actors in the financial markets. Foreign banks, local banks 
and regulatory institutions had their own interpretations of ÔcompetitionÕ and agendas 
for cooperation. The terms of these relationships had to be constantly renegotiated 
according to changing circumstances in order to maintain a balance of interest 
amongst the different stake holders, for example, whether to support local banks in 
the face of foreign competition or to relax restrictions on foreign financial 
institutions so as not to Ôchase them awayÕ.  
In the face of regulatory bias, foreign banks had persisted in pursuing their 
ÔChina DreamsÕ through various business strategies, focusing on particular market 
niches according to products, sectors and client base. Given the difficulties of 
negotiating the regulatory environment in China as well as the accounting systems 
with ÔChinese characteristicsÕ which most foreign banks found difficult to negotiate, 
many banks chose to focus only on SOEs. One option was to finance these SOEs in 
RMB from within China but an emerging trend had been to capitalise on the global 
networks and expertise of foreign banks in international banking to assist Chinese 
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financial institutions and companies as they invest overseas (Financial Times, 26 
July 2007). China National Offshore Oil CorporationÕs (CNOOC) bid to buy Unocal, 
the ninth largest oil company in the world (Time Magazine, 23 May 2005), and the 
investment of the China Development Bank into Barclays Bank in partnership with 
the latterÕs bid for the Dutch bank ABN Amro (BBC News, 23 July 2007, The 
Guardian, 24 July 2007) were some prominent examples of such overseas forays by 
Chinese banks and companies in recent years. As Chinese banks and companies 
continue to expand their operations globally, there will be more opportunities for 
foreign banks in China to offer their financial services as part of their global 
networks.  
In the next chapter, I turn my analysis towards locational and policy 
considerations in assessing the place-based nature of market processes, examine 
factors influencing the development of Shanghai into a financial centre, its 
relationship with other competing centres such as Beijing and Hong Kong, and 
highlight some future challenges for the city.  
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Chapter 8  
The Making of (Market)places in Shanghai and Its 
Future as an International Financial Centre 
 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION  
The financial landscape in China has changed dramatically over the past 10-15 years 
and the impact has been most clearly felt in Shanghai where reforms and regulatory 
changes were the first to be implemented. The first key step was the liberalisation 
and opening up of ShanghaiÕs financial sector to foreign financial institutions. Most 
of the impact has been in the banking market
1
 as foreign banks were allowed to offer 
more products and services and compete with domestic banks in sectors that were 
previously closed to them (even though the terms of competition have not been 
entirely favourable, as discussed in Chapters 6 and 7). Within the process of 
liberalisation, the opening up of the RMB corporate business sector to foreign banks 
was particularly significant as it allows the latter to tap into the Chinese corporate 
market. ChinaÕs accession to the WTO was also important as it verified its 
commitments to financial reforms and liberalisation in an international setting. One 
of the biggest changes was the foreign exchange reforms which started from 21 July 
2005 when China abandoned its decades old RMB peg to the US dollar and allowed 
it to ÔfloatÕ against a basket of currencies. This introduction of some (albeit very 
small) flexibility to the RMB enabled the launch of derivative products such as RMB 
forward, RMB spot and RMB FX swap, which were not possible before. In turn, this 
                                                
1
  The impact of foreign financial institutions is also increasingly felt in insurance and capital markets 
as those sectors are slowly opening up for foreign investment and participation. 
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boosted the development of the derivatives market and helped to broaden ShanghaiÕs 
capital markets.     
Shanghai was selected by the central government as the Ôdragon headÕ to 
drive the growth of the Yangtze River Delta region and to connect China to the 
global economy through its financial services sector. However, the success of 
Shanghai was also dependent on other key actors such as the foreign and local 
financial institutions located in Shanghai as well as international players outside of 
China. The internationalisation of financial markets has not brought about the simple 
end of geography; financial centres remain crucial to global financial architecture 
and flows. Various studies done on the development and territorial embeddedness of 
financial centres have demonstrated this enduring trend (see, for example, Roberts, 
1994; Leyshon and Thrift, 1997; Thrift, 1998; Budd, 1999; Hudson, 1999; Porteous, 
1999). The social and cultural constructions of financial centres are particularly 
important in this process (Thrift, 1994, 1996; Clark and O'Conner, 1997; Leyshon, 
1997; Reszat, 2002). Although the importance of financial centres are often 
vigorously promoted by regulatory decisions made by state institutions (such as those 
relating to the City of LondonÕs ÔBig BangÕ in the 1980s) (Pryke, 1991; Strange, 
1994), financial centres also develop through, and are sustained, by socio-cultural 
factors such as information, expertise, contacts and even historical legacy (Porteous, 
1999). 
Why did local and foreign financial institutions choose to locate in Shanghai 
(rather than, for example, Beijing, Shenzhen or Hong Kong)? Why were particular 
markets being experimented with and taking place in Shanghai? What particular 
advantages did Shanghai enjoy such that processes of regulatory changes, financial 
liberalisation and innovation and various actors associated with them were 
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ÔgroundedÕ in this city? These are some of the issues I will address in this chapter, 
focusing on factors influencing the development of Shanghai in its financial centre 
aspiration to date and future challenges. The insights and experience of key actors 
involved in this process, namely regulatory authorities, local government and foreign 
and local financial institutions, provide the basis for analysis. In the next section, I 
examine the factors that have contributed to ShanghaiÕs relative success over the past 
two decades. In section 8.3, I assess ShanghaiÕs aspiration and achievement vis--vis 
other regional centres that might be seen as competing for the title of international 
financial centre for China, namely Beijing and Hong Kong. What are their 
comparative advantages and place-based characteristics and how might they affect 
ShanghaiÕs role in national and global financial services and flows? Finally, in 
section 8.4, I present the most pressing issues faced by Shanghai that, from the 
perspective of interview respondents, should be addressed in the next five to 10 years 
in order for Shanghai to capitalise on its advantages and develop its capacities as an 
international financial centre.   
 
8.2 THE SHANGHAI ADVANTAGE  
We have to consider whether a place has the right conditions, culture, standards; if 
you donÕt have the right factors, you wonÕt succeed. Shanghai has the right 
background, the people skills, the requirements. (Local manager for Chinese 
securities firm: #35, 18 October 2006; translated from Mandarin)  
 
While there were debates as to exactly when it might be achieved, there was almost 
unanimous agreement amongst my interviewees on the eventual success of Shanghai 
as an international financial centre. The initial euphoria and gushing enthusiasm that 
permeated local and foreign media and investor sentiments in the early-1990s might 
have dissipated; however, there was still firm belief in ShanghaiÕs long-term success 
amongst both the local and foreign respondents that I spoke to.  
 259 
Factors ranging from the historical, political, economic, and cultural, 
contributed to ShanghaiÕs current success as well as continued optimism for its future 
in spite of setbacks and difficulties encountered. Firstly, the historical image and 
contemporary branding of Shanghai as a cosmopolitan world city and international 
financial centre played an important role in its development strategies. The 
significance of discourses and metaphors in shaping spatial formations have been 
studied by various scholars (Barnes, 1992; Neil and Katz, 1993; O'Neill, 2001, 
Bunnell, 2002); the use of discursive representations, practices and narratives are just 
as important in the development of financial centres such as Shanghai. Many of my 
interviewees drew upon ShanghaiÕs historical success in the early-20
th
 century as a 
financial centre (see chapter 2) to account for its contemporary cosmopolitanism and 
receptiveness to foreign investment, ideas and practices. Most local Shanghainese 
saw it as perfectly ÔnaturalÕ that Shanghai should become the most cosmopolitan and 
commercially successful city in China (and becoming a financial centre was the 
epitome of that achievement) due to its cultural propensity to be open to outside 
influence and investors and an ethic for commerce, built up over generations:  
There is a history here, it did not happened only now, [it has developed] over 
generations. For example, my father, mother, grandfather, they might be doing this 
back then: working in trade, working in Western companies, there were many of 
them. So from this angle, Shanghai has a naturalÉ background as an international, 
cosmopolitan city. So it was easy for it to become a big city. This is from the 
historical angle. Also from the cultural perspectiveÉ have you been to the Bund? 
The Bund, the different foreign settlements, the French Settlement, the English 
settlements, Japanese and so on. All these cultures were there. So the impression at 
that time was that there were many foreigners. This has been passed down and is 
something natural to Shanghai, cultural. (Local manager of private Chinese financial 
institution: #9, 27 February 2006; translated from Mandarin) 
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With its colonial-style trading houses, old bank buildings and opulent 
hotels, ShanghaiÕs Bund was once the wealthiest, most decadent district in China and 
the entire Far East when it was one of the major financial centres of the world in the 
1930s and 1930s, with lively music filling the night clubs, jazz clubs and hotels at 
night (Figure 8.1). In the 1990s, ShanghaiÕs renaissance left the Bund behind as 
urban development swept across Shanghai. Shopping malls sprouted up on Nanjing 
Road and Huaihai Road west of the Bund and international banks returned to 
Shanghai but headed east of the river for Pudong. This could be due to the BundÕs 
symbolism as it represented a district built by foreigners who profited from 
concessions forced upon a weaker China. Following a renewed mandate by the 
central government for Shanghai to reclaim its commercial status, the Bund was 
rebranded and celebrated as a site of international commerce and cosmopolitan 
exchange rather than colonial humiliation (Olds, 1997; F. Wu, 2000a, 2003) (Figure 
8.2). Although the stately buildings along the historic promenade are now occupied 
less by banks than by Michelin-star restaurants, luxury hotels, glitzy bars and art 
galleries, its symbolism of historical success and reputation is no less potent. The 
past has become a source of confidence for the future, as well as the basis for a set of 
discourses about Shanghai that is frequently drawn upon in official promotions and 
to justify business presence on the part of foreign financial institutions. The ÔbuzzÕ 
that Shanghai had continues to reverberate particularly with the expatriate 
community and that energy translates into a vibrant commercial environment where 
reforms, experiments with new markets and new products are possible in a city that 
is ÔdaringÕ:   
Shanghai is a sexy place, because it has the history and at one time it was naughty. 
There was the French Concession and there is a sort of romanticism about what it 
was. (Foreign president of a foreign bank: #20, 11 April 2006)  
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Figure 8.1 The Bund in the early-20
th
 century (Source: http://www.earnshaw.com/shanghai-ed-
india/tales/t-buil01.htm) 
 
Figure 8.2 The contemporary Bund. Many of the old bank buildings (such as the former HSBC 
building with the dome) are now occupied by Chinese financial institutions. (Source: AuthorÕs own 
photograph) 
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Secondly, the preferential policies implemented in the early-1990s helped to 
boost ShanghaiÕs status especially amongst foreign investors, although one could say 
that the latter had little choice as Shanghai was the only Chinese city opened to them 
in those early years. As detailed in Chapter 2, the Pudong New Area (and the LFTZ 
in particular) was specifically designed for the city to resume its former role as 
ChinaÕs leading international financial, trade and economic centre. It also signified 
the commitment of the central government to continue its reform and open door 
policy, and this government backing was widely taken to be a strong indicator for 
success by both local and foreign investors:  
Because the government has decided to put the financial centre here, the leadership 
has set out their ideas very clearly, that is why things have grown so quickly. This 
gave foreign investors very strong confidence. The trend is very clear now but it 
remains to be seen what is to be done in the future. (Local manager of Chinese 
securities firm: #35, 18 October 2006; translated from Mandarin) 
Certain preferential treatment was approved by the central government including tax 
breaks to both foreign and local investors located in Pudong, greater foreign 
participation permitted in sectors that were closed to foreign investors elsewhere in 
China and the retention of financial income by Pudong for further development. 
More than just a symbolic model of ChinaÕs global aspirations and urban 
transformation, Shanghai was also the site where much of ChinaÕs financial reforms 
were tested. As China continues to experiment with and developed capital markets, 
the largest stock exchange in the country and the only futures and derivatives 
exchange in China are all established in Shanghai, which further boosts the latterÕs 
status as the pre-eminent financial centre in China.   
Thirdly, Shanghai benefits from access to ChinaÕs huge domestic market 
(the affluent eastern seaboard in particular) as an economic hinterland. Whether the 
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domestic market will be realised can be problematic but the allure of this potential is 
undeniably prominent in the minds of local and foreign investors alike. The Yangtze 
River Delta is currently the most vibrant economic region in China with a booming 
manufacturing sector and the recent opening of the Yangshan deepwater port in 2006 
is also expected to increase trade volumes and the demand for related financial and 
other producer services (see section 7.3). The growth potential of neighbouring 
provinces of Jiangsu and Zhejiang has a spillover effect on Shanghai as financial 
institutions located in Shanghai seek to harness growth in the region to further 
develop financial products and services and capital markets.   
Fourthly, the dramatic changes that have already taken place in the finance 
sector in Shanghai constitute a trend towards marketisation that is expected to 
continue as respondents pointed out that it would be unthinkable to turn back. 
Although there is still strong government influence in the decision-making processes, 
regulatory procedures, and business decisions, there is general consensus amongst 
my respondents that market consideration is definitely on the rise with a clear trend 
towards marketisation (飯韻慌; shichang hua). A local interviewee from a Chinese 
state-owned bank explained that:  
In the past in China, we rely on the regulators and administrators saying we have to 
do this in this way, so there wasnÕt much consideration about market response. Now 
there is more incorporation of market factors, in terms of price fixing, transaction 
volume, financing and so on. (#26, 19 April 2006; translated from Mandarin) 
A number of respondents were convinced that developments in the financial markets 
of Shanghai are so far along that there is now no turning back, in spite of the rhetoric 
of experimentation with the option of shutting down markets and businesses if they 
should threaten the stability of the economy and capacity of regulatory 
infrastructures. China wanted to gain international recognition and influence through 
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ShanghaiÕs financial centre development and the price of that accomplishment (to 
whatever extent) was that it now has to honour international commitments and 
adhere to international standards and protocols of behaviour, instead of having the 
freedom to shut down particular markets, interrupt capital flows and shut out foreign 
investors as and when they were deemed undesirable. This point was emphasised by 
a CBRC official (#25, 16 April 2006) who clearly believed that the current reforms 
towards marketisation and scaling back of government influence in the financial 
sector will continue. Another interviewee likened it to having released a genie 
whereby when Òthe ghost is out of the bottle, by then itÕs so far out you cannot push 
it back anymore [É such that] youÕre so far the only way is to continueÓ (foreign 
manager of foreign bank: #46, 2 November 2006). As the first locality in China 
where such reforms were carried out and new financial products and markets tested, 
these trends were much more prominent and established in Shanghai compared to 
other more recently ÔopenedÕ cities.  
Fifthly, the living environment is also an important factor in attracting 
foreigners to move to Shanghai compared to other cities in China. The high standards 
of living with good international schools, quality housing, growing arts and cultural 
scene, developed retail sector and the urbanised and cosmopolitan environment set 
Shanghai apart from almost all other cities in China, even compared to other big 
cities the likes of Beijing, Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Tianjin and Dalian. Many foreign 
respondents indicated that it would be easier to entice an expatriate staff to move to 
Shanghai compared to Beijing, for example, due to the more ÔwesternisedÕ and 
cosmopolitan urban environment and relatively lower levels of pollution.  
Finally, the geographical location of Shanghai is a key asset. Related to the 
latter point on living environment, Shanghai benefits from relatively mild weather 
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(other than the hot and humid summer months) compared to, for example, the very 
harsh winters and very hot and dry summers of Beijing. Its location in the middle of 
the eastern seaboard makes it an ideal base for travelling to other parts of the 
country, only two hours flight time to either Beijing in the north or Guangzhou or 
Hong Kong in the south. It is also a major transportation hub for rail, air and sea 
travel and transport and benefits from the huge flows of people and goods.  
Although there was general optimism and belief in the eventual success of 
Shanghai as an international financial centre, most interviewees agreed that it would 
be a long-term process and unlikely to happen before the next 20 to 30 years due to 
numerous issues still outstanding and regulatory frameworks, skilled labour and 
market infrastructures to be developed over time (see section 8.4). The building of 
Shanghai as an international financial centre drew upon ideology at the national 
level, from political aspirations at the municipal level, from narratives of historical 
success and eminence, and particular visions of Ôglobal cityÕ status and what that 
might entail. The cultural capital that Shanghai possesses due to its historical success 
clearly influences the perception and practices of both locals and foreigners in their 
evaluation of ShanghaiÕs potential. According to Thrift (Amin and Thrift, 1992; 
Thrift, 1994, 1996) the importance of financial centres lies not only in their role as 
centres of financial products and business services but as places where information 
about the global economy, companies and financial flows is exchanged and 
interpreted. Their success is thus sustained by acting as centres of representation and 
interpretation; as centres of expertise and innovation due to the concentration of 
expertise, contacts and liquidity; and as centres of contacts and social interaction. In 
the case of Shanghai, its success thus far can be attributed to its Ôcultural capitalÕ of 
having been the ÔParis of the EastÕ, its cosmopolitan environment and openness to 
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ideas and influence outside of China, as a centre of experimentation for new financial 
products and the location of choice for the China headquarters of foreign banks and, 
increasingly, domestic banks. Yet, in developing capitalist spaces of finance in 
Shanghai, the landscapes of power not only reflect the institutional interventions of 
the national and local states but also the social and cultural reorganisation of business 
and political and artistic elites
2
 who wield varying levers of social power. The 
representations of particular visions or versions of reality embody particular agendas 
but the power to represent is also limited and countered by the power to resist those 
representations as other economic actors and institutions draw upon differing and 
distinctive experiences and counter-discourses.  
 
8.3 COMPETITION OR COMPLEMENTARITIES? SHANGHAI VERSUS 
BEIJING AND HONG KONG  
8.3.1 Shanghai and Beijing: Dual Headquarter Strategy? 
ShanghaiÕs development trajectory towards national financial centre status has been 
questioned by some, primarily due to its relationship with Beijing (Zhao, 2003; Zhao 
et al., 2004). As seen in Table 8.1, Shanghai and Beijing are the largest and most 
developed cities in mainland China. Although Shanghai is at the top of the Chinese 
urban hierarchy, with the largest population and GDP contribution, Beijing handles 
more foreign trade and has a more developed tertiary sector. BeijingÕs most 
significant competitive advantage lies in its role as the capital of socialist China for 
almost half a century, being the primary location for institutions and organisations 
responsible for managing and determining the economic and political life of the 
                                                
2
 The opening of establishments such as M on the Bund and Three on the Bund by celebrity chefs and 
restaurateurs like Michelle Garnaut and Jean-Georges Vongeritchten, famed architects like Michael 
Graves and hotel chain Mandarin Oriental over the five years have been key to a cultural renaissance 
of the iconic Bund  (Gluckman, 2001, 2004) 
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country. It is the location of the countryÕs central bank, headquarters of the main 
financial regulatory institutions such as the CBRC, CSRC, CIRC, and SAFE, along 
with the head offices of the many of the largest domestic banks and SOEs. When a 
political decision was made to develop Shanghai as a financial centre, with the 
development of Pudong and Lujiazui in the 1990s and the location of the countryÕs 
main stock exchange in Shanghai towards the end of 2000, the cityÕs future as the 
national financial centre for China seemed assured. However, some recent studies 
(Yatsko, 2001; Shi and Hamnett, 2002; Cai and Sit, 2003; Zhao, 2003; Zhao et al., 
2004) have cast doubts on ShanghaiÕs position and influence.   
Table 8.1 Economic indicators for ChinaÕs largest cities (population > 2.5 million), 1997 
City Population 
(million) 
GDP  
(RMB 
million) 
Primary 
industry  
(% of GDP) 
Secondary 
industry  
(% of GDP) 
Tertiary 
industry  
(% of GDP) 
Total value 
of foreign 
trade (US$ 
billion) 
Shanghai   9.61 290.2 2.5 54.5 43.0 52.9 
Beijing  8.27 136.3 5.2 42.3 52.5 53.9 
Tianjing  5.93 85.8 6.4 53.0 40.6 21.7 
Chongqing  5.46 41.9 10.0 56.6 33.4 1.0* 
Wuhan  5.12 78.2 9.2 46.8 44.0 2.0* 
Shengyan 4.76 77.2 8.0 42.7 49.3 1.5* 
Guangzhou  3.90 95.0 5.6 46.7 47.7 43.3 
Chengdu  3.08 35.4 6.9 37.8 55.3 1.4* 
XiÕan  3.03 32.3 3.3 40.9 55.8 1.3* 
Harbin  2.95 33.9 4.9 36.5 58.6 1.8* 
Changchu  2.70 31.3 5.5 52.2 42.3 0.8* 
Nanjing  2.69 51.1 1.3 51.0 47.7 2.5* 
Dalian  2.54 51.4 5.9 43.3 50.8 12.2* 
* 1994 data  
(Source: Shi and Hamnett, 2002: 129) 
 
In their empirical studies on the agglomeration tendencies and locational 
preferences of global TNC head offices, Zhao (2003) and Zhao et al. (2004) found 
that although Shanghai has been heavily publicised and promoted as ChinaÕs number 
one financial centre, more foreign companies choose to locate their head offices in 
Beijing. If the presence of head offices of TNCs and financial institutions provide a 
good indicator for overall assessment and ranking of international financial centres 
and, by association, global city status (see Porteous, 1995; Dickens, 1998), the 
premiere position of Shanghai appears to be threatened by Beijing. Hong Kong has 
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the largest cluster of local/regional offices of Fortune 500 companies; it is also the 
preferred location for Asia-Pacific headquarters, with 94 per cent of them setting up 
in Hong Kong (Table 8.2). But in terms of the Chinese market, more Fortune 500 
companies choose Beijing as a base over Hong Kong, with Shanghai ranking third, 
followed by Guangzhou and Shenzhen. Zhao (2003) and Zhao et al. (2004) attribute 
the preference for Beijing over Shanghai to the problem of information asymmetry. 
In financial markets, there is an asymmetry of regulatory information when 
administrative agents know more than participating agents in the market. Firms and 
their agents, particularly foreign ones, do not know local market regulations as well 
as the government or appointed agents. This is particularly so in the Chinese case as 
the government relies heavily on ÔrulesÕ Ð laws, orders, regulations, directives Ð to 
manage the economy. Apart from the problem of administration transparency, 
Chinese rules are normally expressed in generalities and do not usually provide 
sufficient details for practical resolution. As such, implementation and enforcement 
are often subject to the interpretation and articulation of administrative authorities 
and can vary from case to case. If formally published policy information cannot be 
interpreted ÔcorrectlyÕ by information users, non-standardised policy information 
becomes crucial for conducting business in China. However, such information is 
difficult to gather or access without intensive policy contact with specific 
information providers, which is often facilitated by geographical proximity. In a 
questionnaire survey, Ôproximity to central government departmentsÕ was cited by 
respondents across several industries as the most important factor in influencing 
location choice of TNC regional headquarters in China (Zhao, 2003: 556; Zhao et al., 
2004: 585). According to Zhao, major financial firms and global TNCs prefer to 
locate their head offices as close as possible to the functional departments of the 
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central government in Beijing in order to access as efficiently as possible non-
standardised policy information. Therefore, although Shanghai may have a 
prominent (and officially sanctioned) role in developing various kinds of financial 
markets and services, he concludes that its claim to being the national financial 
centre may not be as strong as Beijing due to the effect of information asymmetry.  
Table 8.2 Headquarters or first-level subsidiaries of Fortune 500 companies in China (2000) 
City Regional/local 
office 
China regional 
headquarters  
Asia-Pacific 
headquarters 
Total 
No. % No.  % No.  % 
Hong Kong 57 40 28 30 17 94 102 
Beijing 25 17 34 37 0 0 59 
Shanghai  25 17 19 21 1 6 45 
Guangzhou 11 8 5 5 0 0 16 
Shenzhen 8 6 0 0 0 0 8 
Others  17 12 6 7 0 0 23 
Total 143 100 92 100 18 100 253 
(Source: Zhao, 2003: 554) 
 
BeijingÕs advantage is also seen in other areas. Its position as the seat of the 
central government makes it the source of political and economic information. It is 
host to many domestic and joint-ventured financial institutions on its Jinrong Jie 
(Financial Street), such as SAFE, CSRC, CIRC, all ChinaÕs major banks, China 
International Capital Corporation (ChinaÕs first and largest investment bank joint-
ventured by ChinaÕs Construction Bank and Morgan Stanley Dean Witter), 
Everbright Securities (one of the largest stock brokerage firms in China), and 
headquarters of the PBOC (Zhao, 2003: 564-565; Yatsko, 2001: 86-87). Shanghai is 
most important in terms of retail finance in China as suggested in Table 8.3, but in 
terms of representative offices of foreign institutions, Beijing has the largest share 
(44 percent) while Shanghai accounts for only 25 percent. Although Shanghai is the 
site of ChinaÕs major financial markets, real power arguably rests with the Beijing-
based institutions that make key decisions:  
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If Shanghai wants to issue a Yankee bond, it needs BeijingÕs permission. If 
Shanghai Industrial, the Shanghai governmentÕs flagship firm, wants to do a 
backdoor listing, it needs BeijingÕs permission. If a foreign securities firm based in 
Shanghai wants to change the English name of its company, it again needs BeijingÕs 
permission. The Shanghai branch of the PeopleÕs Bank of China does not have 
approval authority over even that small a matterÉ As Richard Graham, the former 
Shanghai-based chief representative for ING Barings, cleverly put it: ÒShanghai 
proposes, Beijing disposesÓ (Yatsko, 2001: 88).  
The above concern was echoed by a few of my respondents who questioned 
whether the fact that decision-making abilities were held in Beijing and not in 
Shanghai would be an obstacle to ShanghaiÕs aspirations (see section 7.3). One of 
them was of the opinion that, ÒOf course the stock market, the stock exchange is here 
but it might as well be in Chongqing because so much of whatÕs happening in 
Shanghai is controlled from Beijing, in terms of regulationÓ (Foreign economist of 
foreign bank: #7, 22 February 2006).   
 
Table 8.3 Distribution of bank branches
a
 and representative
b
 offices of foreign institutions in China 
(1998) 
 Foreign-owned bank branch (%) Representative offices (%) 
Beijing 16 (11) 122 (44) 
Shanghai 45 (30) 68 (25) 
Guangzhou  15 (10) 23 (8) 
Shenzhen  23 (15) 10 (4) 
Other Chinese regions  53 (35) 54 (19) 
Total  152 (100) 277 (100) 
a
 Solely foreign-owned  
b
 Foreign-owned or foreign-China joint venture 
(Source: Zhao et al., 2004: 588) 
 
Although ZhaoÕs argument and data are persuasive, I would disagree with 
his assessment that Beijing is necessarily outmanoeuvring Shanghai in developing 
financial centre capacities. Based on my field research (particularly from interview 
data, research diary records of casual conversations and tracking the local media), the 
situation is more complex than revealed from the quantitative data of which city has 
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more financial services offices or corporate headquarters. The qualitative functions 
of these two cities are clearly different from the perspectives of most of my 
interviewees and their operational structures and business strategies reflect that 
division of labour.  Most of my respondents (both local and foreign) saw a clear 
division between the roles of Beijing and Shanghai with the former being 
predominantly a political centre and the latter a predominantly business and 
commercial hub. A Chinese interviewee, for example, was insistent that:    
In building a financial centre, financial services, knowledge and skills in this aspect, 
Beijing cannot catch up with Shanghai because Beijing is better at other aspects.  It 
is better in terms of relationships, guanxi, policies; Shanghai is more business. That 
is a very clear division of labour. (Local manager of Chinese securities firm: #35, 18 
October 2006; translated from Mandarin)  
Another local respondent described how the general political atmosphere is 
reflected in the everyday topics of conversation on the street in what he calls Ôguan 
huaÕ (鶏抗; literally, official speak/talk/conversation). He contrasted this with 
Shanghai where peopleÕs focus tended to be on business opportunities rather than on 
the fortunes of specific political figures or events:   
I think Shanghai has more of a commercial and economic atmosphere. It has more 
of a commercial feel. Beijing has more of a political atmosphere [É] Many in 
Beijing speak Ôguan huaÕ (official talk). Official talk is likeÉ ÔAh, we are holding 
this meeting nowÉ What is this leader sayingÉ Oh, this leader is going up, that 
leader is coming downÕ. Many people are concerned about things like that, that 
includes taxi drivers! They have a lot to say! ÔOh, this leader is not good; this leader 
is great; this person is on the way upÕ [É] So there is a lot more talk about political 
stuff. This is much less so in Shanghai. (Local manager of private Chinese financial 
institution: #9, 27 February 2006; translated from Mandarin).  
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One could critique these stereotypes but they clearly influenced the perceptions and 
business decisions of financial actors who believed that the jawing culture in Beijing 
was in contrast to people in Shanghai whom they viewed as more practical and 
focused on producing results. Another local respondent from a Chinese state-owned 
bank compared this practical culture in Shanghai to the tendency to rely on Ôempty 
talkÕ in Beijing where there was plenty of discussion but little concrete 
accomplishment:  
[I]f I take you to BeijingÉ the people in Beijing are very good at talkingÉ They 
will talk and are very good at saying this and that, very convincing, very skilled! 
They can talk to you as a stranger and go on and on about everything. I think in 
Shanghai we are more practical, we will work on producing results. Maybe we are 
not as good in talking but our execution is stronger, thatÕs what I think. So I think 
we should produce some results and then use that to support our case, and that is 
better than Ôkong tanÕ (舜併; empty-talk) [laughs]. (#27, 19 April, 2006; translated 
from Mandarin)  
The history of Shanghai as a commercial and financial hub in the early-20
th
 
century was often brought up when comparing Beijing and Shanghai and how that 
might account for the more open-minded approach and efficiency of the latter 
compared to the more relationship-driven approach of the former in which who you 
knew was much more important. According to my respondents, this could account 
for why foreigners might feel more welcomed and comfortable living and working in 
Shanghai compared to Beijing, which as mentioned above was a significant factor for 
its success:  
And the thing is of course Shanghai has the history, soÉ [É] I think itÕs the fact 
that, itÕs not so much to do with us but it has to do with the Shanghainese. They are 
much more comfortable dealing with foreigners. So for us, you feel much moreÉ at 
ease here than in Beijing. In Beijing thereÕs much more of an inner crowd, where 
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you have no ideaÉ Much more patriotic, much more political, much more slow. 
Shanghai has a much higher productivity per employee than other places in China. 
But it seems to be much more accepting of foreigners. English is much better. I 
think quality of living, thatÕs it. (Foreign manager of foreign bank: #36, 18 October 
2006) 
He went on to describe how who-you-know and personal connections were much 
more important in Beijing due to the relationship-driven nature of interaction there:  
In Beijing itÕs very important which family youÕre from, how old is your family, 
how many generations have you been in Beijing and all that stuff. And so the lady 
that runs our Beijing rep office, her family have been in Beijing for five generations, 
something which is supposedlyÉ like, she knows a lot of people or something. 
(Ibid.) 
Therefore, Beijing and Shanghai were clearly not seen to be competing as 
financial centres due to the very different political and corporate cultures in those 
localities. A Chinese respondent stressed that, even within financial services, both 
cities had different emphasis in terms of sectors and areas of expertise, with Beijing 
being tasked with policy-making and macro-planning while Shanghai was dedicated 
to testing new products and markets and financial innovation. As such, there is no 
contradiction or zero-sum-game competition:  
China has already set ShanghaiÕs role in developing its financial centre; that will not 
change. Beijing is also developing its financial markets, Shanghai is also developing 
its financial markets. They may emphasise different things. Shanghai may focus on 
financial innovation, new system and so on. Beijing may focus on regulation, macro 
adjustments and these aspects. The PBOC has just placed its second headquarters in 
Shanghai. The operational aspects are in Shanghai, the macro aspects, elements of 
control are in Beijing. Making policies, macro planning, these are in Beijing. After 
planning, the details are then carried out in Shanghai, thatÕs basically how it is. 
When foreign exchange has been relaxed, it is done in Shanghai. New financial 
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products are first tested out in Shanghai. So its main functions as a financial centre 
are different from Beijing. (Local vice-director of Chinese fund management 
company:  #26, 18 April 2006; translated from Mandarin) 
This distinction in the political and corporate cultures as well as financial 
specialisation between Shanghai and Beijing was reflected particularly in the 
business strategies and organisation structures of the foreign financial institutions 
whom I interviewed. One spoke of Beijing as an Òadministrative capitalÓ while 
Shanghai is a Òbusiness capitalÓ (foreign manager of foreign bank: #13, 7 March 
2006). Therefore, most foreign banks in China had a dual-strategy to reflect that 
specialisation by having offices in both Shanghai and Beijing. While almost all 
Chinese banks have their headquarters in Beijing (with the exception of BOCOM 
and China Merchants Bank) due to historical and political reasons, and the 
headquarters of regulatory bodies such as SAFE, PBOC and CBRC remain in 
Beijing, the head offices of foreign banks tend to be in Shanghai, and even the 
Chinese banks have moved their credit facilities, accounting departments, reporting 
branch and other functions to Shanghai, which reflect the volume and significance of 
business being conducted out of the city. Offices in Beijing remained very much as 
Òdiplomatic postsÓ (foreign president of foreign bank: interview no. 20, 11 April 
2006) with specific tasks allocated to them such as maintaining relationships with 
Chinese corporate clients, government and regulatory officials and lobbying on 
particular issues. It is not simply a matter of one city being seen as more important 
than the other but that they each have their own advantages and significance in the 
scheme of the banksÕ operations and they have to structure their network 
accordingly:  
Shanghai has its advantages and Beijing has its advantages. ShanghaiÕs advantage is 
that you are closer to the market, closer to your customers. [É] Our head office is 
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set in Shanghai so our branch manager at the Beijing branch has a special mission. 
His role is to maintain communication with the regulators in Beijing [É] the main 
role of the branch manager is to look after official relations and not bank operations. 
On the other hand, for banks that have head offices in Beijing, they would not 
neglect the Shanghai market either. They will have representative offices and branch 
offices in Shanghai as well. So itÕs not just a matter of where the head office is; there 
is a dual strategy. (Local manager of foreign bank: #11, 6 March 2006; translated 
from Mandarin) 
One of my foreign respondents said that their head office (and branch 
office) was in Shanghai for the simple reason that their customers were in Shanghai 
and not in Beijing. However, they still saw the value of maintaining a representative 
office in Beijing because of the opportunities to be had in keeping an ear close to the 
political centre:  
[We have the Beijing office b]ecause of the head offices of the Chinese companies, 
the Chinese conglomerates, thatÕs the reason. WeÕre close to the politics, to the 
policy makers, but also in this country itÕs like a big market place, of opportunity, 
ideasÉ So itÕs worthwhile, itÕs worthwhile. I wouldnÕt scrap that one [office]. 
(Foreign manager of foreign bank: #41, 27 October 2006) 
Another foreign respondent was equally direct in his view that: ÒFor [foreign] banks 
itÕs clear. You need a rep office. The minimum set up you need in China as a foreign 
bank is a branch in Shanghai and a rep office in BeijingÓ (foreign branch manager of 
foreign bank: #43, 27 October 2006). As mentioned earlier, the head offices of 
regulatory bodies and state-owned financial institutions and companies were located 
in Beijing, and this affected the locational strategies of foreign banks. For those 
whose target clients were the Chinese SOEs, it was more important to have a 
presence in Beijing; for those who were interested in business with other foreign 
TNCs, who tended to be concentrated in and around Shanghai and the Yangtze River 
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Delta, that would be the focus of the banksÕ business activities. Since most foreign 
banks in China had foreign companies as their primary client base, it was not 
surprising that they preferred to locate their head offices in Shanghai rather than in 
Beijing. The typical set up of a foreign bank was to have a branch office of between 
10 to 50 people in Shanghai that conduct business transactions and offer financial 
products and services, and between three to eight people in a representative office in 
Beijing who would maintain linkages with Chinese companies headquartered there, 
the relevant regulatory and government institutions and perhaps a research desk as 
well. When asked if they could only have one office in either Shanghai or Beijing, 
most of my respondents opted for Shanghai due to its geographical location in the 
middle of the eastern seaboard and the presence of a large international financial 
services community. The lack of proximity to political and regulatory decision-
makers did not appear to dampen ShanghaiÕs attraction. Unless a financial institution 
was targeting specific sectors such as energy, telecommunications and utilities, 
which were tightly controlled by the central government, they saw little need to have 
a large operation in Beijing:  
If you mainly target big Chinese companies, if you target the big Chinese banks, if 
you want to do [some] kind of political lobbying or whatever, then you better be in 
Beijing. If you more looking [sic] for your corporate clients then you better be in 
Shanghai. If you donÕt know, then you better be in Shanghai, because then youÕre 
just more in the centre. Because fromÉ this is just a logistical question, because 
from Shanghai to south China is faster than from Beijing. And of course you have a 
much bigger banking community here. (Foreign chief representative of foreign 
bank: #45, 1 November 2006)   
 
The team thatÕs got energy and utility clients, for example, they are in Beijing 
because they need to be close to the clients and the clients are close to the 
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government. From the bank business, Shanghai is in the centre of the financial 
markets and I think the foreign banksÉ I think they have all put their offices here in 
Shanghai. (Foreign manager of foreign bank: #13, 7 March 2006).  
For these banks, their Beijing offices had a clear mandate to build 
relationships with key contacts, maintain such linkages, be keyed in on major 
announcements and developments that might affect their targeted clientsÕ business 
sector and to conduct research sometimes on behalf of the branch offices or clients 
based elsewhere in China. This fits in with other descriptions of Beijing offices being 
Ôdiplomatic postsÕ where the routine of power lunches, cocktail parties and charity 
dinners assume more importance than actual business transactions or discussion. This 
foreign respondent, for example, described how their Beijing representatives work 
hard at establishing and maintaining good guanxi:    
Our rep is usually doing a lot of research, do a lot of lunching and cocktail parties, 
and they maintain contacts, build good relationshipsÉ And in China thatÕs very 
important, you know, the whole concept of guanxi is very important. (Foreign 
manager of foreign bank: #37, 19 October 2006) 
Another foreign respondent highlights the differences in the kind of information 
gathering that occurs in the two cities:  
The situation in Beijing is more political so she [the Beijing representative] talks 
more to institutions. Not really only the regulators but also theÉ kind of foreign 
institutions, like the European Union have a delegation there, of course you have the 
embassy, you haveÉ certain German institutions have their rep office in Beijing and 
there it is much more political contact. Also gathering information. Here [in 
Shanghai], the information we collect, this is more on the business side. There [in 
Beijing], it is on the political or macroeconomic side. (Foreign representative of 
foreign bank: #45, 1 November 2006)  
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According to a government official (SMG Office for Financial Services: 
#28, 20 April 2006), the above characteristics had led to a division or specialisation 
in the types of foreign financial institutions and functions found in Shanghai and 
Beijing. Most investment banks such as Goldman Sachs, BNP Paribus, Morgan 
Stanley and Credit Suisse located themselves in Beijing as they needed to be close to 
their target client group of Chinese SOEs in the energy, telecommunications and 
utilities industry and state-owned banks (which are still under tightly controlled by 
the central government). The latter had their headquarters in Beijing due to historical 
reasons, as they used to be part of different government ministries that were 
subsequently farmed out and corporatised. Commercial banks, on the other hand, 
such as HSBC, Standard Chartered, Citibank, Bank of East Asia, Deutsche Bank and 
ABN Amro, preferred to locate in Shanghai to serve their clients (foreign TNCs and 
local private enterprises) located in the Yangtze River Delta. For banks with both 
investment banking and commercial banking divisions, their investment banking 
function would be in Beijing but their equity research, trading, asset management 
functions would be placed in Shanghai. He called this emerging trend a Òdual-
headquarter structureÓ. This reflected the qualitatively different advantages that each 
locality enjoyed with their distinctive political, economic and social environments, 
with no one particular city being a clear ÔwinnerÕ in all aspects.    
8.3.2 Shanghai and Hong Kong: A Long Way Off 
During the 1980s and 1990s, Hong KongÕs strategic advantage as a link between 
global capital and China led to the rapid development of its financial industries and 
economy. But as China opens up its economy and establishes direct linkages with the 
world, the future of Hong Kong as a financial centre is increasingly tied to its special 
relationship to China. As China develops better economic infrastructure and 
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encourages more business investments, there is increasing concern that Shanghai 
may usurp Hong Kong as the pre-eminent financial centre within China, if not the 
wider Asian region. With the rapid development of financial services in Shanghai, 
will Hong Kong be bypassed as its traditional role if it is rendered obsolete? The 
general consensus that I gathered from my field research revealed that such fears 
were often exaggerated and did not take into account the regulatory complexities and 
shortcomings that still plagued the immature financial markets in Shanghai (for all its 
hype and rapid development) and the comparative advantages that Hong Kong 
continued to enjoy.  
The growing stock market in Shanghai was one such area of possible 
competition since a Chinese mainland company could, theoretically, list on either the 
SSE or HKSE. When asked whether a Chinese company considering an IPO would 
prefer to list in Shanghai or Hong Kong, most of my respondents thought that, given 
the opportunity, most companies would prefer a public listing in Hong Kong 
although some might prefer a Shanghai listing for specific reasons. Table 8.4 lists 
some of the reasons for listing in Shanghai or Hong Kong. The biggest advantage 
that the Hong Stock Exchange (HKSE) enjoys is that it is much bigger and more 
liquid compared to the SSE. A-shares and B-shares listed in Shanghai are subject to 
different rules (see chapter 7) with the locals-only A-share market seen as 
particularly restrictive. The HKSE is not hindered by such regulatory restrictions 
regarding the listing of shares on the primary market and buying and selling of shares 
on the secondary market. Since international investors are allowed to trade freely on 
the stock exchange, listed companies are able to raise more capital from their IPOs. 
Due to the international reputation of the HKSE and Hong Kong as a financial 
centre, a public listing there is seen to boost the international brand recognition of the 
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company. The choice is also related to the companyÕs business expansion plans and 
internationalisation strategy; if it intends to expand overseas into, for example, Hong 
Kong, New York or other parts of Asia, a listing in the relevant markets would raise 
its regional and international profile ahead of actual expansion:  
It has to do with the companyÕs business strategy. The location of a companyÕs IPO 
will definitely increase the brand recognition and reputation of the company in that 
country. If Hong Kong is my target market or if New York is my target market, I 
will try to get myself listed there because then locals will be more aware and 
familiar with my companyÕs name and products. That is publicity, save on 
advertising! It also has to do with the differences between the stock markets 
themselves. (Local manager of foreign bank: #11, 6 March 2006; translated from 
Mandarin)  
 
Table 8.4 Some reasons for a mainland Chinese company to list in Shanghai or Hong Kong  
Reasons for listing on SSE Reasons for on HKSE 
! Lower fees  
! Shorter listing process  
! Large RMB capital market, 
possibility of obtaining better price 
per share 
! Politically motivated choice for 
listing on a mainland stock market 
! Bigger and more liquid market, able 
to raise more capital  
! Improves international reputation and 
increases brand recognition  
! More stringent listing process seen as 
a boost to corporate governance  
! For private companies, a better option 
compared to queuing with SOEs on 
the mainland  
 
Many respondents pointed to Hong KongÕs prudent regulatory system as a 
key advantage and reasoned that being listed successfully on the HKSE would 
therefore reflect positively on the companyÕs accounting standards, corporate 
governance and business management:  
To list in Hong Kong, the company will have to fulfil the requirements of the Hong 
Kong securities regulators. This has a positive impact on the brand recognition and 
status of the company. It is different if I say that my company is listed in the US, in 
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Hong Kong, or on NASDAQ. That is because everybody knows that to get listed 
there you have to fulfil certain requirements set by the local regulators. So there will 
be the impression that your company has very good corporate governance and is 
very well-managed and that could affect the valuation of your company. (Local 
manager of foreign TNC: #12, 6 March 2006; translated from Mandarin)  
A foreign interviewee, for example, said that when assessing a local company as a 
potential client, he would look at not only whether they are publicly listed but also 
where they are listed for some form of assurance regarding their financial status and 
stability:  
Sinopec, 85É nearly 90 percent of their balance sheet is actuallyÉ listed company 
in Hong Kong and that gives us confidence because once youÕve got a listing in 
Hong Kong or whatever, we know that your accounting is going to be of a better 
standard than your regular Chinese company. Even if itÕs listed in Shanghai, I donÕt 
know [how robust that company is] (Foreign manager of foreign bank: #37, 19 
October 2006)  
The opaque listing criteria and procedure for the SSE has been under 
increasing scrutiny and criticism (see Chapter 6.4). The discriminatory practice by 
the CSRC and other state institutions in their treatment of SOEs and private 
companies has resulted in unequal treatment with SOEs given special consideration 
(see section 7.2.1). This regulatory bias is especially apparent in the IPO process on 
the mainland. With a long queue of companies waiting to be approved by the CSRC 
for IPOs, SOEs often get to Ôjump the queueÕ and have their applications fast-tracked 
and be publicly listed ahead of smaller, private companies. In this case, the latter 
often find Hong Kong a much more attractive option for a public listing. On the other 
hand, a company might prefer to list publicly in Shanghai due to the lower fees 
(accounting, brokerage etc.) and relatively less stringent listing requirements. For a 
cash-strapped SOE who might be Ôfast-trackedÕ, the SSE could be a better option for 
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raising capital quickly. For a company that is looking to expand its operations 
overseas, it might be more advantageous to get the exposure of listing in Hong Kong 
and to obtain foreign currency in capital, but for a company that wants to focus on 
the large Chinese domestic market, it might get a better price per share with an IPO 
in Shanghai (where it is already well-known on the mainland) compared to an IPO in 
Hong Kong (where it might have to spend more money on advertising and publicity 
ahead of the IPO to raise investor awareness and interest).    
The decision to list publicly on the SSE or HKSE could also be politically 
motivated. Special permission has to be given by the state for a mainland company to 
be publicly listed in Hong Kong. There had been some local concerns about the 
number of mainland companies who are listing in Hong Kong, particularly in the 
past three years when the Shanghai stock market was performing badly and new 
listings were halted in the midst of share reforms. The general impression was that 
the best Chinese companies were going abroad for public listings while the mediocre 
companies were the ones who stay and list in Shanghai (or Shenzhen). This 
generated some concerns about having the countryÕs wealth and opportunities 
ÔleakingÕ out of the mainland to Hong Kong and foreign investors rather than 
benefiting the Chinese citizenry:  
If the good companies choose to go to Hong Kong, the opportunities of China from 
its reforms and growth will end up being distributed to Hong Kongers or other 
foreigners, and the Chinese people donÕt get to benefit from these good companies, 
the benefits of reforms. If only mediocre companies stay in China and the good 
companies go to Hong Kong, that is an unequal situation. I think this situation will 
change, China is now also aware of this problem. Good enterprises should come 
back and issue shares here. (Local vice-director of Chinese securities/fund 
management company: #26, 18 April 2006; translated from Mandarin) 
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While this was arguably a myopic view, it reflected rather accurately the sentiments 
of some locals that I spoke to, both in formal interviews and casual conversation.  
When asked about whether Shanghai could take over Hong KongÕs position 
as the financial centre for China and the East Asia region, there seemed to be a divide 
in opinions between my local and foreign respondents. Most of my Chinese 
respondents were fairly confident about ShanghaiÕs future and thought it had 
particular advantages over Hong Kong due to state support and its achievements thus 
far. In their view, the past and present success of Hong Kong was too reliant on 
China as its hinterland and its success in attracting high-profile IPOs of mainland 
companies was dependent on the Chinese state giving special permission for them to 
do so. Therefore, they saw the continued success of Hong KongÕs financial markets 
as being dependent on ChinaÕs economic and political development and since the 
central government was keen to promote and develop ShanghaiÕs financial sectors, 
Hong Kong would likely become less important in the future. There was also a 
tangible sense of patriotism in the way the local interviewees responded to the issue 
of competition between Shanghai and Hong Kong. Although they acknowledged that 
there was still a considerable gap between the two in terms of regulatory 
frameworks, legal structures and skills and expertise in financial market and 
products, they tended to be almost dismissive about such concerns, being very 
confident that Shanghai would catch up and bridge that gap very quickly in a few 
years (five to 10 years were the most common estimates).  
This was in sharp contrast to the sentiments of foreign interviewees who are 
more cautious in their assessment. In their opinion, Shanghai was in no way 
comparable to Hong Kong at the moment. One foreign respondent saw this 
comparison as almost meaningless, like comparing apples and pears, two entirely 
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different entities, and that ÒitÕs only when you have two apples that you can make a 
financial centre out of one of themÓ (Foreign manager of foreign bank: #39, 24 
October 2006). For many others, the scenario of Shanghai being on the same footing 
as Hong Kong in order to compete was as far away as 20 to 30 years in the future. 
For another foreign interviewee (foreign branch manager of foreign bank: #43, 27 
October 2006), the non-convertibility of the RMB and the free port status of Hong 
Kong (within the setting of Greater China) were key factors holding back ShanghaiÕs 
progress. Even though the headquarters of many companies were moving to Beijing 
and Shanghai, which had pulled some sales and services functions of banks onto the 
mainland as they followed their clients, the production functions such as dealing and 
treasury business were still conducted out of Hong Kong or Singapore as the non-
convertibility of the RMB and foreign exchange restrictions were such that those 
activities were simply not possible in Shanghai at the moment:  
On the banking industry, itÕs definitely not comparable because Hong Kong is one 
of the freest economy [sic] in the world, itÕs a financial centre with convertible 
currency, so therefore it is completely not comparable. On the business side, it is 
different. Already the headquarters of many of the companies have moved away 
from Singapore and Hong Kong into Shanghai. So if you look at the client base, 
Hong Kong is losing out big time. But on the banking side, not yet, because the 
RMB is not convertible. (Foreign branch manager of foreign bank: #43, 27 October 
2006) 
Due to the very different regulatory and business environments, Hong Kong and 
Shanghai were developing as parallel markets rather than competing directly:  
As long as that kind of differentiation is still tolerated, for the financial market, that 
means there are two standards. And for the time being the Hong Kong is better and 
more appreciated than the Shanghai standard. And as long as Beijing is not willing 
to give Shanghai that kind of same treatment as Hong Kong, then I think that 
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[Shanghai taking over Hong Kong] is not going to happen. (Foreign manager of 
foreign: #39, 24 October 2006).  
Since the mid-1990s, Hong Kong has effectively taken on the role of 
international capital intermediation centre for China. In conjunction with the PRC 
authorities, it has helped develop a number of financial products and services, 
including the listing of PRC equities on the Hong Kong stock exchange, the listing of 
red chip companies
3
 and the development of China-related venture-capital, private-
loan syndications and planned renminbi (RMB) options. In addition to Hong KongÕs 
link with China, regional consolidation of business in Hong Kong is another 
important focus for the business community. Both the organisation and distribution 
of regional financial services are managed out of Hong Kong and financial 
institutions have been focusing on attaining critical mass, enhancing productivity and 
differentiating their client relationship capabilities as the industry matures. There are 
minimal barriers to entrepreneurship and business entry, no discrimination against 
foreign investors, no special conditions attached to foreign investment, no exchange 
controls and no restriction on overseas remittance of capital or profits. Taxation is 
straightforward and rates are low by international standards. Hong Kong also 
benefits from a legal system that is based on the rule of law and the independence of 
the judiciary.  
My foreign interviewees were careful not to dismiss the growing importance 
of Shanghai, especially in the light of the rapid changes over the past decade, but 
while Shanghai would continue to play an important role in the region and even exert 
some influence on the global market, they agreed that it would take a long time for 
its regulatory capacities to catch up to the level that it could really compete with 
                                                
3
 Hong Kong incorporated companies whose assets and business interests are predominantly in the 
PRC. 
 286 
Hong Kong. As one of them put it rather bluntly, Òthere is no competitionÓ (foreign 
manager of foreign bank: #41, 27 October 2006). Compared to other international 
financial centres in the region such as Hong Kong and Singapore, Shanghai was still 
very much in its infancy, as pointed out by the following two foreign interviewees:  
I think Shanghai will be important in global terms but itÕs going to be a long time 
before it could really compete. Because markets like London or Singapore, which 
are regulated, but in a sort of free market way, are able to offer products, you know, 
sophisticated products and financial services without all the control, and I think itÕs 
just difficult. (Foreign manager of foreign bank: #37, 19 October 2006)  
 
I mean, take a look at Singapore, take a look at Hong Kong, on taxation issues. 
FromÉ what other issues are there to run a bank, how much quota do you have, 
feesÉ many issues. Regulatory issues, thatÕs mainly the point. ThatÕs going to take 
a long, long time. Those are specific areas [that needs to be addressed before] 
Shanghai will become a financial centre but overall financial centre, I would say 
Hong Kong or Singapore. (Foreign manager of foreign bank: #41, 27 October 2006) 
Although there seemed to be a general divide between the local and foreign 
respondents to regarding competition and comparative advantages between Hong 
Kong and Shanghai, there were a few (mainly Chinese officials and foreign 
interviewees) who did not see it as a purely competitive relationship between the 
two. The dual listing of companies on the Shanghai and Hong Kong stock exchanges 
was brought up as an example of the mutual dependence of Hong Kong and 
Shanghai. China Life, Sinopec, China Merchants Bank and ICBC were the biggest 
companies trading in both Hong Kong and Shanghai. While some companies such as 
ICBC opted to launch its IPO simultaneously in both centres, others had an initial 
listing in Shanghai and then sought a secondary listing in Hong Kong (or in London 
or New York). This strategy enabled the company to gain some experience in public 
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listings and capital injection from the large Chinese domestic market before 
venturing overseas to woo foreign investors. This enabled them to benefit from the 
different advantages of listing in Shanghai and Hong Kong. For a number of foreign 
respondents, Hong Kong would also continue to have a niche market in offshore 
products, especially for foreign banks with limited business licenses on the mainland. 
Business operations on the mainland in cities such as Shanghai would thus 
complement operations in Hong Kong to serve their customers in the China and East 
Asia region with a holistic range of products and services.   
Hong KongÕs future role will depend on the development of its stock 
market, the maintenance of stable exchange rates, the development of its capital and 
debt markets and basic financial laws that guarantees that the financial sector 
remains intact after 1997 and the smooth financial cooperation between Hong Kong 
and China in the years to come. Much of those anxieties have been addressed by the 
Basic Law
4
, which embodies the concept of Ôone country, two systemsÕ, a term that 
has been most often used in a political sense. However, Ôone country, two systemsÕ 
also describes the financial systems, monetary authorities and currencies of China 
and Hong Kong, and describes not only the relationship that exists between these 
polities but also the stages of development of the two financial systems (Li, 1995: 
40). Over the past decade, there have been concerted efforts at enhancing the market 
orientation of the finance industry in mainland China and to develop Shanghai as a 
financial centre. While Shanghai may grow to become an important domestic 
financial centre, China is still working to put in place several of the key elements that 
Hong Kong already possesses and its financial services market is still comparatively 
                                                
4
 The principles of free enterprise and supporting legal framework were enshrined in the Basic Law of 
1995, which became Hong KongÕs constitution in July 1997. The Basic Law states that the 
government of Hong Kong SAR shall provide an economic environment that maintains Hong KongÕs 
status as an international financial centre and promotes investment and trade.  
 288 
restricted. China, as an evolving market economy, is only beginning to develop a 
suitable legal system while Shanghai also lacks an efficient banking sector, which is 
vital for a financial centre. Moreover, financial centres consist of more than banking 
systems; they are a network of financial markets and those in Shanghai are still in 
their infancy, in spite of rapid growth since the late-1990s. Even as Shanghai 
continues to upgrade its regulatory environment, Hong Kong already offers an 
internationally accepted regulatory environment and legal system with minimal 
government intervention. Finally, the development of an international financial 
centre in Shanghai is hampered by the lack of an internationally tradable currency. 
To believe that Shanghai and Hong Kong are destined for competition rather than 
complementarity neglects the differences, comparative advantages and challenges 
that each faces. Gaeta (1995), for example, argues that over time Shanghai is likely 
to evolve as the leading domestic financial centre and international gateway to North 
and Central China, while Hong Kong will emerge as the leading international 
financial centre and gateway to South China. This regional specialisation would be 
akin to the current specialisation of Singapore as financial hub for Southeast Asia 
and Hong Kong for East Asia (H. Yeung, 1998; Ho, 2000).  
 
8.3.3 Functional Coordination 
From the above, it is clear that Beijing, Shanghai and Hong Kong, in spite of 
common perceptions of rivalry and competition, each have their own distinctive 
characteristics and comparative advantages. Both my local and foreign respondents 
clearly saw distinctive roles for each city with Beijing being a Ôpolitical centreÕ, 
Shanghai as a Ôbusiness centreÕ and Hong Kong performing the role of an Ôoffshore 
financial centreÕ. This regional division of labour was reflected in the operations of 
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the financial institutions located there, such as representative offices and investment 
banks in Beijing, commercial banks in Shanghai and treasury business in Hong 
Kong.  
This concurs with Shi and HamnettÕs (2002) study which compares the roles 
and development of Hong Kong, Shanghai and Beijing and suggests some form of 
functional coordination among the three centres to make up for each otherÕs 
limitations. They suggest that Hong Kong would be kept as an international financial 
centre as it possesses distinct advantages in administrative capability, stability, 
knowledge and international reputation. The continued prosperity of Hong Kong is 
also important as the lack of confidence in the latter could have serious knock-on 
impacts on other Chinese cities, as well as affect the relationship between Taiwan 
and mainland China.
5
 Beijing, on the other hand, could relinquish some economic 
functions and focus on its role as a cultural and political centre, giving Shanghai 
more room to develop its national economic and financial role. This is already 
evident in the moving of more market-based functions of the PBOC to its second 
headquarter in Shanghai, for example, while maintaining its policy-based and 
macroeconomic functions in Beijing. Hong KongÕs role could parallel that of New 
York in the US economy as it continues to serve as the largest international financial 
centre linked to China and as the frontier on ChinaÕs path towards globalising its 
economy, at least for the next few decades. Its superior administrative and regulatory 
expertise, free port status and international reputation are too far ahead of ShanghaiÕs 
at the moment for them to be comparable. As Shanghai develops and acquires the 
necessary institutions, systems and skilled labour over time, it could then play a key 
                                                
5
 Hong Kong is BeijingÕs bridge to Taiwan; the concept of Ôone country, two systemsÕ was devised 
with Taiwan in mind and is the basis for the policy of peaceful unification. Apart from political 
considerations, Hong Kong has also been instrumental in facilitating capital flows between Taiwan 
and the mainland, acting as a conduit for economic relations for those in South China and Taiwan to 
circumvent their respective governmentsÕ sanctions and controls (see Knox and Taylor, 1995).  
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role as the premier national financial centre with economic influence in the Asia 
region, similar to the role of Chicago in the USA, while Beijing would hold the 
position of national political and cultural centre with relatively weaker economic 
functions (Shi and Hamnett, 2002: 133). This view of complementary roles and 
functions was echoed by some of my respondents who view the relationship between 
Shanghai and Hong Kong as Òhuxiang fubuÓ (宏翼興絢) (Chinese chairperson of 
private Chinese company: #1, 10 December 2004; translated from Mandarin) Ð 
mutually compensating and complementing, in their roles as financial centres. When 
one considers that China is the geographical size of Europe, notes the number of 
financial centres within Europe, and then also considers the size and potential of 
ChinaÕs growing economy, it would be fallacious to expect China to have only one 
large international financial centre. London, Frankfurt, Paris, Amsterdam and Madrid 
are of varying sizes and importance in the regional and international economy, 
specialising in particular financial markets, products and services. New York, 
Chicago and San Francisco in the USA are further examples. Therefore, it would be 
reasonable to expect similar developments in China as its economy and institutional 
capacities develop with the need for more sophisticated and specialised financial 
products and services in different parts of a large country.  
8.4 CURRENT ISSUES AND FUTURE CHALLENGES  
Shanghai has made remarkable progress in the past 15 years in opening up its 
economy to foreign investors, implementing policies conducive for capitalist market 
development, developing the financial capacities of its firms and institutions, and 
raising its international profile as a prime location for business activities. In spite of 
these achievements, however, it still faces particular challenges in its aspiration to 
become an international financial centre, some of which have been alluded to in the 
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preceding section as well as in Chapters 6 and 7. Most of my respondents from 
foreign financial institutions do not think Shanghai will become a financial centre on 
a similar calibre to Hong Kong for at least another 20 to 30 years. This finding 
concurs with other studies which conclude that while there has been astonishing 
progress, ShanghaiÕs aspiration to be the financial centre of Asia will not be fulfilled 
for many years (Y. Yeung, 1996; Xu, 1998; Yatsko, 2001; Yusuf and Wu, 2002; 
Zhang, 2003).  
In terms of building up the ÔhardwareÕ of a financial centre, such as setting 
up stock markets, establishing brokerages, and listing companies, it is catching up 
rapidly with other financial centres but the slow introduction of a financial centreÕs 
ÔsoftwareÕ is holding the city back (Yatsko, 2001: 62-63). The ÔsoftwareÕ capacities 
of information standards and regulatory structures need to be developed to match 
ÔhardwareÕ provisions in order for Shanghai to achieve its financial centre aspiration. 
This is an issue that the local government and regulatory authorities are aware of and 
often refer to as a discrepancy between the ÔformÕ or ÔstructureÕ (倫叛; xingshi) and 
ÔcontentÕ (苔奈; neirong) of development. A local interviewee who used to work on 
research projects for the SMG examining the development of Shanghai as an 
international financial centre agrees that there is a gap in achievement which the 
local municipal government acknowledges but finds it difficult to redress:    
When I was in the municipal government, we talked about ÔformÕ and ÔcontentÕ. The 
ÔformÕ was very well done, look at all the things that have been built up, but the 
ÔcontentÕ, many measures and such were not done properly. Service levels not raised 
and so on. [É] Now, these things [hardware aspects] are already put in place but I 
feel that it is [still] very difficult. Although you have set up the framework, the 
structure, it doesnÕt really feel like an international financial centre. But I canÕt say 
why. I canÕt really put my finger to it. (Local analyst for Chinese securities 
company: #34, 17 October 2006; translated from Mandarin)  
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This interviewee was unwilling to go into detail what precisely is lacking in ÔcontentÕ 
but other respondents were more forthcoming with their views based on their 
experience of setting up and seeking business opportunities in Shanghai.
6
 I asked my 
respondents what they thought were the most pressing issues and challenges 
currently facing Shanghai that must be addressed or resolved in the next five years in 
order for its financial sector and markets to move forward. The most frequently 
occurring topics included the regulatory environment, shortage of skilled labour, 
RMB convertibility, restrictions on foreign financial institutions, financial education 
and literacy, and corruption. Almost all of these fall under the ÔsoftwareÕ or ÔcontentÕ 
aspects and concurs with views reflected in other studies. According to Morgan 
StanleyÕs Jack Wadsworth (quoted in Yatsko, 2001: 62), Shanghai needs Òa yuan 
convertible on the capital account; high-quality listed companies; a series of reliable 
intermediaries (i.e. securities companies); and finally the development of derivatives 
instruments and options [before it can be] an international financial centre of 
extraordinary proportionsÓ. Xu (1998) cites similar concerns in listing the criteria for 
a developed securities market that Shanghai has to meet: high standards of 
information reporting and disclosure; a substantial supply of stocks, well-developed 
information and communications systems and high standards of trading floor 
regulations (p. 119).  
 
8.4.1 Improving Regulatory Frameworks & Environment  
I donÕt think Shanghai can really compete with the other Asian financial centres 
until youÕve got a market that allows people to do what they want to do. And I think 
for the Chinese, with all the best will in the world, I think they know where they want 
to be but they just canÕt let go yet and they donÕt let go yet. (Foreign manager of 
foreign bank: #36, 19 October 2006) 
                                                
6
 This reluctance to commit themselves to particular opinions or details about specific projects is 
remarkably consistent with other interviews I conducted with other local regulatory and government 
officials. For more details, see Chapter 4.   
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Improvement to the regulatory frameworks and environment was the top cited issue 
that needed to be addressed. This was unsurprising given the regulatory problems 
discussed in chapters 6 and 7, be it due to over-regulation with too many rules and 
bureaucratic procedures, too many grey areas and unclear guidelines, opaque system 
of applications and approvals, or the lack of information and regulatory confusion 
between different regulatory bodies and branch offices. Although both local and 
foreign respondents agreed on the need to improve in the above areas, foreign 
financial institutions often bore the brunt of frustrations with the lack of regulatory 
clarity and lack of information particularly when they are new to the environment. A 
foreign respondent who opened a representative office recently in Shanghai was 
particularly confused about the types of activities permitted as they were not clearly 
specified. As argued in chapter 6, this allowed the regulatory bodies to fine tune its 
rules and regulations over time but created uncertainty for foreign banks who did not 
how far they should push the boundaries, particularly when they had to explain their 
actions and situation to the head office which might not appreciate the type of 
regulatory environment that they were operating in:   
I suppose from my perspective, we could do with some clearer regulatory rules and 
understanding of what can and canÕt be done, and what the limits are. I think thereÕs 
a lot of grey areas which any society or regulatory legal framework has when itÕs 
developing. It simply doesnÕt know quite where the boundaries are. [É] I still think 
there are lots of grey areas that is not crystal clear on what we [as a representative 
office] can and canÕt do. [É] So, interpretationÉ And sometimes that works in your 
favour, thatÕs in your advantage. But in other ways, you simplyÉ particularly when 
youÕve got an audit team based in London who have a very clear black and white 
and then youÕve got this grey area here. (Foreign representative of foreign bank: 
#16, 9 March 2006)  
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Other respondents pointed out that reporting criteria and procedures, which were 
currently onerous and tedious, needed to be whittled down. Complaints about how 
Òevery time you do any transaction, if you do a loan, there are probably six work 
processes here that donÕt exist abroadÓ (foreign manager of foreign bank: #37, 19 
October 2006) were common. The latter compared the situation between loan 
repayment in London and in Shanghai:  
In London, when a loanÕs repaid, the company pays in dollars, heÕll pay our account 
at the bank, weÕll see it on our account, when the loan matures, and that goes up 
against that and itÕs done. Here, when the loan is repaid, the money comes into our 
account, then we have to put the money off there onto a specific repayment account, 
which then goes against the loan account, which then goes into a SAFE declaration 
system to declare that weÕve got a million dollars thatÕs coming in from this 
company, we have to input who itÕs come from, we have to get a tax code or a code 
number from the company, we have to match it up with the invoice we originally 
financed, which is in another system over thereÉ WeÕve got about four or five 
different computers which haveÉ one is a PBOC, one is a SAFE one, and you have 
to input in all these data and itÕs just a real headache! (Ibid.; original emphasis)  
Therefore, even as regulatory standards and expertise are being raised through 
learning from counterparts in other financial centres and recruiting overseas Chinese 
with relevant market experience into the fold, there needs to be greater clarity in 
existing rules and agreement between different offices about their interpretation. 
Unlike the FSA in London, China has different regulatory bodies for banking, 
insurance and securities, as well as SAFE for foreign exchange and the PBOC 
(central bank). Communication across all these organisations is far from seamless. 
Sometimes foreign banks found that they even contradicted one another in terms of 
specifying requirements and application process; better coordination and clarity were 
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clearly needed. Regulatory procedures for daily reporting and common transactions 
also need to be simplified so as not to impede on business activities.  
On the industry level, more needs to be done to improve the professional 
standards of the securities market, in terms of implementing stricter rules governing 
the behaviour of brokerage houses and security companies, improving accountability 
and upgrading the skills and knowledge of workers to cope with new ideas and 
products. This is of particular concern to the Chinese government as well as foreign 
investors in the light of scandals involving Chinese securities companies, accounting 
firms and listed companies over the past few years, which have increased calls for 
tighter rules and punishment.
7
 In Shanghai, for example, there are two types of 
brokers dealing with local and foreign shares respectively. The existence of two 
share markets, a domestic A-share and an international B-share, has led to a 
divergence in professionalism between the two markets. They differ significantly in 
their information requirements in that issuers of B-shares have to meet higher 
standards of disclosure, according to international accounting standards, compared to 
issuers of A-shares. The continued existence of two parallel and divided markets, one 
strictly controlled by state-planning mechanism while the other is encouraged to 
introduce market forces and international standards into its operations, may not be 
sustainable. Part of the on-going share reforms is meant to address this divergence in 
standards between the parallel stock markets by closing the gap between A and B 
share requirements but only time will tell how successful these reforms will be.    
 
                                                
7
 See BBC NEWS, 15 February 2002; Chung, 2005; Sun, 2005.  
 296 
8.4.2 Raising Legal and Accounting Practices to International Standards 
Many of my respondents (particularly the foreigners) suggested that the management 
and operation of the market economy system must change in ways that were 
consistent with normal international practices in order for the financial markets to be 
fully developed and ShanghaiÕs aspirations to be realised. Although ChinaÕs 
centrally-planned system has changed significantly since the adoption of Open Door 
policies, there is still substantial political motivation in governmental economic 
management functions. Since the mid-1980s, China has been gradually building a 
legal infrastructure, expertise and instituting legal procedures towards international 
standards, but the nature of Chinese legal and regulatory practices, as well as 
approach to enforcing regulations, still differ markedly from that of more open 
industrialised countries. Banking regulations in China are divided into Ôpublished 
lawsÕ and ÔregulationsÕ, in which Beijing publishes the law while regulations are 
interpreted and implemented by local entities. This creates uncertainty, inhibits 
business dealings and raises transaction costs, particularly for foreign investors 
(Yusuf and Wu, 2002: 1222). Yatsko (2001: 77) relates how local investorsÕ focus on 
anticipating government actions explains some of the volatility of ChinaÕs capital 
markets. Instead of focusing their investments on companies with long-term 
prospects, most individual investors in China buy for short-term gains based on 
government policy changes, rumours, and the behaviour of particular government-
backed market participants. There is a paucity of reliable information about public 
companies for investors to make informed decisions. With the governmentÕs 
unwillingness to promote an independent press, and the poor standards of disclosure 
of listed companies, it is unsurprising that local investors prefer to speculate rather 
than depend on unknown company fundamentals.  
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A foreign manager of a foreign bank gave an example of the difficulties of 
assessing a potential Chinese client as the numbers and accountancy data they 
provided proved to be unreliable:  
[This company was] selling to one of our very big clients in Italy, an Italian group 
that has production in France and Germany and so on. And we said, thatÕs 
interesting, weÕll go talk to them. We talked to them and we looked at the numbers. 
The numbers were OK. They had a parent company and the municipal government 
had about 40 percent ownership here, you know, the numbers were OK. There was a 
rating, a double-B plus or triple-B minus, around that level, sort of top end of non-
investment grade. [É] WeÕve havenÕt actually done any dealings because they 
havenÕt actually exported any. And I went up there one day and had a look around 
and I said, ÔWhere is everyone?Õ And he said, ÔOh, we sent them all homeÕ. ÔWhy is 
that then?Õ ÔBecause weÕre not producing at the moment.Õ ÔWhy not?Õ ÔOh, thereÕs 
some problem with the parent companyÉ issues.Õ [É] And then a couple of days 
later it was out in the papers that there was some accounting scandal in the parent 
company. We would have been OK because we have the Italian company to finance 
but itÕs just, you just really donÕt have a clue whatÕs going on. (#37, 19 October 
2006)  
The caricature of the Chinese company with three different accounts books 
(for the tax bureau, for the bank, and for themselves) is a real and persistent problem. 
This form of Ôaccounting with Chinese characteristicsÕ is problematic in hindering 
accurate assessment of accounts and valuation of companies especially on the part of 
foreign banks who are unfamiliar with the local environment and frameworks. The 
Chinese MOF, which has the responsibility for regulating accounting matters in 
China, has set itself the objectives of fostering investorsÕ confidence in financial 
information, increase transparency of financial reporting, and harmonising Chinese 
national accounting standards with International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS), so as to reduce the costs of raising capital by enterprises and alleviate the 
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risks of financial crisis. In 1993, with funding from the World Bank, the MOF 
engaged Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu as consultants to develop a body of Chinese 
Accounting Standards (CAS) broadly in line with accounting and financial reporting 
practice used internationally. Progress was slow up till the late 1990s due to the lack 
of perceived urgency at that time and the MOF has since adopted a Ôneed-basedÕ 
philosophy of standards issuance. Since 2001, however (possibly due to the influence 
of WTO accession), efforts to further develop and implement CAS have stepped up. 
On 16 February 2006, the MOF announced that it had adopted a new basic standard 
and 38 new CAS that were substantially in line with IFRS, with a few exceptions. 
The MOF now requires all listed companies to start using the new CAS in their 2007 
annual financial statements and the new CAS will be expanded to all SOEs starting 
in 2008, and then to all large and medium-sized companies in China starting in 
2009.
8
  
However, there are still particular obstacles as China develops and improves 
its national accounting standards to international requirements. A very significant 
portion of the economy is dominated by SOEs. Even after enterprises are restructured 
into joint stock enterprises and branched out from the government structure, 
functional or regional government that remain stakeholders still exert significant 
influences over the enterprises and their trading partners and their transactions. 
Unsurprisingly, many transfers of assets are government driven rather than motivated 
by pure business considerations. Financial statements are multi-functional, serving 
not only the needs of the investors but also other interested parties including the state 
and local government for supervisory and management purposes, which are not 
                                                
8
 See http://www.iasplus.com/country/china.htm  
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accounted for in the IFRS. Enterprises and professional intermediaries such as 
auditors and valuers are also at the developing stage and will take time to mature.  
 
8.4.3 RMB Convertibility  
The convertibility of the RMB and relaxation of foreign exchange controls was 
another issue frequently cited as being crucial to further development of the banking 
products and financial markets in Shanghai. Although the RMB is no longer fixed to 
the US dollar and is now weighted against a basket of currencies, the margin within 
which it is allowed to float is very small. It is also so tightly controlled that most in 
the industry do not see it as really a floating currency Ð ÒItÕs not ÔfloatingÕ, itÕs 
ÔjigglingÕÓ (foreign chamber of commerce: #18, 14 March 2006).   
Without full convertibility of the RMB, the banks are restricted not only in 
terms of derivatives and treasury products that they could offer (which restricts the 
development of capital markets) but are also limited in the more mundane business 
of loans and trade financing. SAFE is indirectly regulating the amount of foreign 
currency and RMB-denominated business that financial institutions as well as 
companies can conduct by controlling their individual licenses and foreign exchange 
quotas that each are subjected to individually, so as to manage the impact on RMB 
appreciation or depreciation. Foreign banks and other companies that wish to expand 
their operations in China are prevented from simply bringing money in from their 
headquarters or transferring from other operations in their global company network 
as foreign exchange controls limit the amount of money that they can bring in from 
abroad each year as well as remit back to their home countries. A foreign respondent 
was adamant that it is only when the RMB is fully convertible that treasury products 
and capital markets in Shanghai will take off and enable it to achieve the aspiration 
 300 
of becoming an international financial centre. Until that moment, everyone is just 
waiting and preparing for that day with under-utilised dealing rooms and having their 
treasury desks operating out of Hong Kong where there are no such restrictions:  
Actually there is only one moment when the financial markets in China can really 
take off and that is when the RMB becomes convertible, fully, freely convertible. 
Until that time, itÕs all lip service and itÕs all a little bit experimenting left and right 
but itÕs extremely annoying that for [some] financial products itÕs no longer possible 
because SAFE decides the impact is too big on the exchange rateÉ ItÕs all ÔMickey 
MouseÕ until the RMB becomes convertible. So when it becomes convertible, then 
treasury [business] becomes interesting. Until that time, everyone is building up 
dealing rooms to prepare for that moment. How long it will take? Hard to say. Five 
to 10 yearsÉ? (Foreign manager of foreign bank: #43, 27 October 2006)   
There was also some concern about the transparency of the process through 
which the exchange rate was set. A Chinese respondent related how, in spite of the 
best efforts of his team, they could not figure out how the RMB exchange rate was 
determined, even using the set basket of currencies stated by the SAFE. This was 
problematic for the bankÕs own projections and business planning:  
Because although we have taken a small step, although now we have moved towards 
floating, I think it is quite difficult for [the RMB] to free float and the change is very 
small. They say itÕs linked, or pegged to a basket, but when we calculate it, we say it 
cannot be a basket because the weighting cannot be calculated! [laugh] We canÕt 
solve this problem, very difficult to tell howÉ what is the mechanism to determine 
the exchange rate. At the same time, not only the foreign exchange rate, but also the 
conversion, when corporates or customers, when they come into the bank to convert 
RMB into US dollars or back into RMB, a lot ofÉ they still need to provide 
supporting documents to the banks, which means so many things [to be done]É 
(Local deputy head of capital markets for foreign bank: #15, 7 March 2006) 
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The tight restrictions surrounding foreign exchange also require a lot of 
documentation on the part of customers and the bank for every foreign currency 
transaction. The onerous reporting and documentation requirement is a recurring 
complaint for businesses in China in general; a freely convertible RMB would allow 
SAFE to do away with many of the documentation requirements and quotas which 
are currently limiting financial and non-financial institutions in their daily business 
transactions as well as expansion plans.  
 
8.4.4 Greater Role for Foreign Banks  
The foreign banks that I spoke to, in particular, were eager to push for regulatory 
changes to open up the finance sector further to foreign competition as well as a 
lighter regulatory touch on existing business sectors. A local interviewee who 
worked for a foreign bank (#15, 7 March 2006) expressed the frustration faced by 
others in the industry:  
China is really a highly regulated market. Without the approval or policy from 
PBOC, CBRC, or other regulators you just cannot do it! ItÕs only with the 
introduction of new regulations, with the opening up, with the further liberalisation, 
that we can have access to certain markets. Even these markets, when we do some 
business, we are subject to some kind of restriction [É So the question is] when, 
how and to what extent will they release these kind of restrictions. The whole 
market is still under the full control of the regulatorsÕ side. (Original emphasis) 
Foreign banks are required to establish a representative office for two years 
before they could upgrade to branch status; during that period, they have to pour 
large sums of money into the country under the minimum capital requirement. The 
minimum ÔtierÕ of license that they can hold is foreign currency business with foreign 
corporate customers; to move up the ÔtiersÕ to RMB-denominated business and 
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Chinese retail customers would require more capital commitment for each level of 
business license. The most recent requirement for local incorporation and the 
significant increase of registered capital to 1 billion yuan (to offer RMB banking 
services to the Chinese retail market) is a case in point (see section 5.5). Banks face 
no such restrictions in Hong Kong while they are severely restricted in Shanghai and 
other parts of mainland China. One reason for this is to restrict foreign competition 
until local banks have shaped up and can compete on better terms (see section 7.4.2), 
otherwise they are more than likely to collapse, and bankruptcy is unacceptable due 
to local social and political implications. A foreign respondent acknowledged that 
regulatory restrictions could not be removed all of a sudden but believed that they 
also could not continue without hindering ShanghaiÕs development:  
Restrictions have to be taken away, but they canÕt do that suddenly, but thatÕs what 
has to happen. We were saying at the meeting today, the European banks 
representation, there are so many rules and regulation on the banking industry and 
thatÕs whatÕs got to go away to create a free market. You have to have a free market 
for it to be a commercial, for a true financial centre. YouÕve got all these regulation, 
a lot of which are geared clearly to keep the foreign elements out, therefore the 
competitive element out. Then youÕre not going to have a true financial centre. No 
way, cannot be. (Foreign president of foreign bank: #20, 11 April 2006) 
Due to the various restrictions and difficulties for foreign banks, many were 
now less optimistic than before about the prospect of the financial sector in 
Shanghai/China; the initial euphoria has dissipated, especially over the past three 
years. When asked about foreign sentiments, a foreign respondent replied that, 
Òpeople in the banks will, in public, still chant the mantra of Shanghai as an 
international financial centre, because to do otherwise would be political suicide. But 
in private, they know that it is not ÔthereÕ yet and will take another 20 yearsÓ (foreign 
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chamber of commerce: #2, 17 August 2006). The Chinese regulators cannot force the 
local banks to undergo reforms on their own and need the help of foreign banks to 
raise the standards of local banks through competition. This means they have to be 
careful not to drive the foreign banks away through too much regulatory bias. 
Restrictions on products and services permitted for foreign financial institutions will 
have to be relaxed in order for the latter to have more influence in quickening the 
pace of marketisation and improving the finance sector through competition or joint 
ventures. This will be of particular benefit to Shanghai which already has the largest 
concentration of foreign bank presence in China.  
 
8.4.5  Shortage of Skilled Labour  
In terms of labour requirement, the local Chinese labour market has not kept up with 
the rapid growth of the finance industry. A number of local and foreign interviewees 
pointed out the problem of labour shortages particularly for local Chinese middle-
managers. Over the past few years, salaries have spiralled ever upward in the search 
for Chinese workers with the necessary financial knowledge, language skills and 
professional experience. A local Chinese (not necessarily Shanghainese) with about 
five yearsÕ experience in the industry and English language skills could expect to 
earn almost as much as expatriate staff. Both local and foreign banks were also 
facing the problem of high staff turnover as people hop from one lucrative position to 
another in the tight labour market.  
Table 8.5 shows the requirements posted by a foreign bank in a job 
advertisement for a relationship manager and credit analyst. The demand for English 
language skills is similar to other foreign banks that I have spoken to. However, this 
is not an issue only for the foreign banks; many domestic banks are increasingly 
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looking to overseas markets and also need workers with English and other foreign 
language skills on board. A local respondent who was working in a financial 
institution as a result of a foreign-Chinese joint venture explained some of the 
problems faced by Chinese workers in a new environment where they had more 
responsibilities than they were used to and had to catch up on language and technical 
skills. He pointed out that this would not be a persistent problem as each generation 
attained more skills suited to the marketplace than those before but that it would be a 
slow process that takes time to develop:   
Actually there are many such finance managers in China who are very experienced 
and knowledgeable but they are unable to do all these things [É mainly due to] 
language, and also some technical skills. For example we are now using some IT 
systems from the foreign partners and for those that are around 40-50 years old, 
those who have never encountered these things before, they may find it more 
complicated. [É] So if you go into a new company and want to learn something, the 
instructions are all in English and this can be difficult for those people. You need to 
have the professional knowledge, to be able to communicate, do presentations, travel 
and so on [É] But I think things will get better. [Another interviewee in the same 
company] is a little younger than me, and their English is already much better than 
ours, and we are also better than those before us. For example when I am on 
business travel, most people cannot immediately tell that I am Shanghainese. If I am 
10 or 20 years older, a Shanghainese on business travel, I may not even speak 
Mandarin, ChinaÕs language, very well. This is a slow process. (Local analyst for 
joint-venture fund management company: #48, 3 November 2006; translated from 
Mandarin) 
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Table 8.5 Lists of skills requirements in a job advertisement from a foreign bank in Shanghai (Source: 
Bank website; emphasis added).  
 
Relationship Manager  
! Knowledge of the local market (customers and products)  
! University bachelor degree in finance and accounting or related disciplines  
! At least 4 years working experience in international bank, with marketing, credit 
knowledge and relationship with medium sized companies; or at least 6 years working 
experience in local bank, with solid credit knowledge and know SMEs market very well.  
! Must be detail-oriented, with good analytical, interpersonal, communication and sales 
skills  
! Possess personal qualities of independence, integrity and professionalism  
! Self-motivated, hard-working, willing to travel 
! Fluency in spoken and written English are mandatory 
Credit Analyst 
! University bachelor degree in finance, accounting or related disciplines  
! Minimum 3 years solid experience in credit analysis or risk management in banking 
sector with sound knowledge of bank products 
! Solid knowledge of credit assessment for corporate customers with industrial 
background, familiar with SMEs is an advantage  
! Familiar with techniques of quantitative analysis  
! Familiar with regulations of CBRC,PBOC and SAFE 
! Must be detail-oriented, with good analytical, interpersonal, communication and 
presentation skills  
! Possess personal qualities of independence, integrity and professionalism 
! Self-motivated, hard-working  
! Need to travel occasionally 
! Fluency in spoken and written English are mandatory 
 
A regulatory official pointed out that language skills were important not 
only to facilitate business communication on a purely transactional basis, but was 
also significant in learning and professional education, in the transfer of particular 
concepts and philosophies that were not present in the local languages. He described 
how English language skills had become important for promotional prospects even in 
the regulatory and government departments as they were seen as an indicator of the 
candidatesÕ open-mindedness and grasp of foreign ideas and concepts. He described 
a recent recruitment drive for a new department in the Beijing office:  
They also used English during the interviews. So even if we are very good in our 
knowledge, if we canÕt get past the English language barrier, it is useless. We have 
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many friends and colleagues who are very good but because they are not very good 
in their English, they have been passed over, which is a shame. Because language is 
not just a tool for communication, it also has cultural significance, it affects how you 
think, your ideology. If you can speak a particular language, it does not only involve 
a grasp of the language but also ideas, ways of doing things, all these things have to 
do with the language as well. (Local regulatory official: #25, 16 April 2006; 
translated from Mandarin)  
As pointed out by Thrift (1994, 1998), the continued success of international 
financial centres such as the City of London is sustained not only by its geographical 
location, urban infrastructure and regulatory environment; its competitive edge is 
also constituted and sustained by communities of practice as highly skilled finance 
workers form a network of information, knowledge and interpretation that is crucial 
to the workings of a financial centre as it relies on the generation and interpretation 
of monetary information. The social and cultural constructions of a financial centre, 
particularly in terms of labour markets, need to be further developed. This situation 
should improve over time as the local labour force gain more experience, language 
skills and technical expertise. New graduates from Chinese universities are 
increasingly trained in English language communication. However, the pace of 
development in labour skills can also benefit from more resources and attention 
being put towards professional education and enrichment for those currently in the 
industry, to improve their skills and knowledge of new financial products and 
systems as well as a renewed emphasis on bilingualism in English and Mandarin. At 
the moment, there is little evidence of that happening in terms of professionalisation 
of the industry except on an ad hoc and individual (or bank-specific) basis.  
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8.4.6 Other Considerations  
Corruption was not seen as particularly problematic in comparison to issues listed 
above. However, it was raised a couple of times as an issue generic to the Chinese 
business environment and not just for the finance sector or as a problem in Shanghai. 
One of my foreign respondents spoke of his occasional encounters with corruption in 
Shanghai and highlighted it as an area of reform that requires government attention:    
I thinkÉ giving someone particular favours or to speed up the process, thatÕs 
bribery, thatÕs corruption. And that does exist here. And that is something that IÕm 
not familiar with. IÕm not familiar with it in Hong Kong and IÕm not familiar with it 
in London where IÕve worked. But I am beginning to be aware of that in ChinaÉ I 
mean, itÕs not a bigÉ it doesnÕt affect us hugely but I am certainly aware of that. 
And again sometimes as a foreign entity, youÕre not sureÉ [É] In the environment 
where IÕm at, no, itÕs not across the board, but I have come across it. And IÕve gone 
oohÉ! [expression of surprise and aversion] ItÕs a bit like being touched by a very 
cold poker, not sure that I like that very much! (Foreign representative of foreign 
bank: #16, 9 March 2006)  
The Chinese government has certainly been very aware of the negative 
impact of corruption not only on international perceptions of China but also of costs 
to business and the social and political implications within its domestic sphere. In 
recent years, there have been many high profile charges and court rulings against 
characters such as the former head of ChinaÕs food and drug administration, Zheng 
Xiaoyu (CBS News, 29 May 2007), the Vice-Mayor of Beijing (responsible for 
completing construction of sporting sites for the 2008 Olympics), Liu Zhihua 
(Financial Times, 11 June 2006), and the former Vice-chairman of the Bank of China 
in Hong Kong, Liu Jinbao (China Daily, 14 July 2005), on charges of embezzlement 
and taking bribes. According to the Xinhua news agency, almost two percent of the 
Chinese Communist Party, around 115,000 people, has been indicted and jailed for 
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corruption and related charges.
9
 The Chinese government has clearly indicated 
tackling corruption as a priority and some headway has been made. However, it will 
take time to resolve such a deeply rooted and pervasive practice and efforts at 
eradicating corruption and related practices must not slacken just as investors are 
gaining confidence of the governmentÕs determination to root out and punish 
perpetrators.  
Other issues that could affect ShanghaiÕs aspiration to be an international 
financial centre and continued development of its finance sectors include the 
sustained growth of the national and regional economy in order to sustain demand 
and growth for financial products and services, and political stability of the country. 
These are areas that the Chinese state is keenly aware of due to implications on its 
own political legitimacy and are addressing even now with national policies directed 
at resolving the income and regional inequalities, under President Hu JintaoÕs goal of 
developing a Ôharmonious societyÕ.  
 
8.5 CONCLUSION 
A lot of issues areÉ I wonÕt say being written off, but looked through a lens that is 
quite rosy in terms of the long term. I think that in itself has worked very much in 
ChinaÕs favour. People are very hopeful, and because they are very hopeful, they 
are willing to be very patient and thatÕs something that other developing countries 
have not had that kind of chance. (Foreign director of foreign bank: #23, 14 April 
2006) 
  
While almost all my interviewees were optimistic about ShanghaiÕs future and 
eventual success, most of them agreed that the success of Shanghai as an 
international financial centre will be a long-term process and unlikely to happen for 
another two to three decades as there were numerous issues still outstanding and 
                                                
9
http://news.softpedia.com/news/Chinese-Vice-Mayor-Fired-Following-Corruption-Charges 
-26287.shtml 
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regulatory frameworks, skilled labour and market infrastructures to be developed. In 
this chapter, I examined the factors contributing to ShanghaiÕs success, from 
narratives of historical success and eminence and central government policies to 
geographical location and cultural factors. ShanghaiÕs achievements to date have also 
raised the issue of competition with other Chinese cities, primarily Beijing and Hong 
Kong. My research revealed a qualitative distinction in the roles of these cities, with 
Beijing as a Ôpolitical centreÕ, Shanghai as a Ôbusiness and commercial centreÕ and 
Hong Kong as an Ôoffshore financial centreÕ. This was reflected in the operational 
structures and business strategies of financial institutions that I interviewed and 
suggested some form of functional coordination and complementary roles played by 
these top Chinese cities. In the second edition of The Global City, Sassen (2001) 
focuses on inter-city relations as Òthe emerging transnational urban systemÓ (p. xvii) 
in which Òspecialised service firms need to provide a global service which has meant 
a global network of affiliates or some other form of partnership. As a result we have 
seen a strengthening of cross-border city-to-city transactions and networks (Ibid.: 
xxi). This idea of connections and systemic linkages is reiterated in her other 
writings (e.g. Sassen, 2000, Sassen, 2002) as she argues that global cities must 
engage with each other in fulfilling their functions, whether at a global or regional 
level, which gives rise to complementary forms of relations and alliances:  
In the initial stages of deregulation in the 1980s there was a strong tendency to see 
the relations among the major centres as one of straight competition among New 
York, London and Tokyo [É]. But in my research on these three centres I found 
clear evidence of a division of labour already in the 1980s. What we are seeing now 
is an additional pattern whereby the cooperation or division functions is somewhat 
institutionalised: strategic alliances not only between firms across borders but also 
between markets. There is competition, strategic collaboration, and hierarchy 
(Sassen, 2002: 24, emphasis added).  
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Castells (2000) also argues that Òthe global city phenomenon cannot be 
reduced to a few urban cores at the top of the hierarchyÓ (p. 380) and postulates a 
global network that connects centres with different intensity and at different scales, 
integrating them at a global level. He provides a new context through which to view 
global cities: cities are a part of a space of flows that, in turn, constitutes the new 
network society. This approach has inspired geographers such as Peter Taylor (Knox 
and Taylor, 1995) and others at the Globalisation and World Cities (GaWC) Network 
and Research Group (Beaverstock, 2002). Taylor (1995), for example, assesses 
global cities in terms of their network connectivity by sector and by regions by 
analysing the location strategies of 100 leading global service firms across 315 cities. 
Instead of economic date, Smith and Timberlake (2001 [1995]), on the other hand, 
utilise data on flight connections between various cities as a tool to conceptualise 
inter-city linkages. All these points to the necessity of thinking about cities 
relationally, as the product of networking activities (Knox and Taylor, 1995: 27). The 
international financial system has reached levels of complexity that requires the 
existence of a cross-border network of financial centres to service the operations of 
global capital. This network of financial centres around the world is increasingly 
fulfilling gateway functions for the circulation of national and foreign capital. The 
incorporation of a growing number of financial centres is one form through which 
the global financial system expands; each of these centres is the nexus between the 
economic development of that country and the global market, and between foreign 
investors and that countryÕs investment opportunities.  
There will be an increase in specialised collaborative efforts between 
financial centres as the globally integrated financial system is not only about 
competition between centres. Nobody would really gain from crushing Hong Kong 
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or Shanghai or Shenzhen. The ongoing growth of London, New York, or Frankfurt is 
in part a function of a global network of financial centres. Take SassenÕs global 
cities, for example. New York, London and Tokyo are very similar in terms of their 
roles and functions as major hubs within the global financial network, but it is the 
differences that connect these cities in meaningful ways and integrate them into a 
network of capital, labour and information flows. A simple and obvious example is 
how their location in different time zones enables them to operate as a 24-hour unit. 
Their different geographical locations also offer different strategic advantages in 
terms of the products and services they can offer to the global market. These cities 
are highly interdependent and differentiated from one another at the same time. It is 
the very differences that make the networks/networking desirable and worthwhile in 
the form of Òantagonistic cooperationÓ (Friedmann, 1995: 21).  
The idea of flows and networks is vital in conceptualising global city 
networks but the place-based geographies of such flows are also important. Cities 
accumulate and retain wealth and power because of what flows through them and 
embedding cities in a space of flows thus directs our attention beyond simplistic 
concerns for what they contain to their connections with other cities. But by denying 
the global city the status of a place, CastellsÕ view of a global city as Ònot a place, but 
a processÓ is in danger of abstracting it from its real geography (Knox and Taylor, 
1995). We should not neglect the ÔgroundingÕ of flows, which is what transforms 
these cities, and is made possible only because global cities are also places. SassenÕs 
(2000) Òstrategic placesÓ and StorperÕs (1997) Òprivileged sitesÓ are just two of many 
conceptualisations that view global cities as localised knowledge complexes based 
upon their particular mixture of innovation potential and capacities. London and New 
York are becoming more integrated, not only in terms of economic flows but also in 
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terms of social and cultural linkages, into what has been called the ÒNY-LON 
phenomenonÓ (Newsweek, 13 November 2000). However, this is not so much the 
effect of a general death of distance, but an indication of how the space of flows 
connects places to one another and is actively reconfiguring the space of places. This 
perspective highlights the importance of historical, geographical and cultural 
contexts in explaining why particular ÔmarketisationÕ processes are taking place in 
Shanghai instead of other Chinese cities.  
In the last section, I discussed the top cited concerns of my respondents 
regarding possible obstacles and future challenges for Shanghai in its aspiration to 
become a financial centre for China, if not the wider region. Top of the list were 
improvements to the regulatory environment, raising legal and accounting standards, 
relaxing controls on the RMB and the activities of foreign financial institutions. The 
shortage of skilled labour with the necessary language skills, financial knowledge 
and experience, issues of corruption and wider concerns about economic 
sustainability and political stability also need to be addressed. As stated in the 
opening quote to this chapter, most foreign investors in China, and even the locals, 
were very optimistic due to the enormous potential and opportunities available. This 
optimism had coloured their perspective such that they tended to be rather forgiving 
and patient and more willing to bear with what they saw as temporary obstacles in 
the hopes of future gain. However, if the above issues are not resolved in near future, 
the Chinese government and regulators may run the risk of using up this well of 
optimism and damaging business sentiments and its international reputation.  
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Chapter 9  
Conclusion  
Opening the Black Box of ÔMarketsÕ 
 
The fundamental difference between socialism and capitalism does not lie in more 
planning or more market. Planned economy does not equate with socialism Ð 
capitalism also has planning. Nor does market economy equate with capitalism Ð 
socialism also has [a] market. Both planning and market are economic meansÉ 
Planning and market that serve socialism are socialist; whereas planning and 
market that serve capitalism are capitalistÉ The essence of socialism is to liberate 
and develop the productive forces, to maintain the public ownership system as the 
mainstay of the economy, to eliminate economic exploitation, to avoid polarisation 
of rich and poor, and to achieve ultimate common affluence. (Deng Xiaoping, 
quoted in Yao, 1998: 27) 
  
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
China has undergone enormous transformation since the Open Door policy in 1979. 
As one of the most open cities in China, ShanghaiÕs economy has been at the 
forefront of those changes. ShanghaiÕs state-sanctioned role as the ÔdragonheadÕ to 
connect China to the global economy is best exemplified in the development of its 
financial sector. While expectations were high, particularly in the early 1990s with 
the opening of the first stock exchange (the SSE) in China, the process of developing 
financial services, products and markets in Shanghai had been fraught with 
difficulties and contestations over the form, structure and pace of reforms. Recent 
efforts at share reforms, further relaxation of rules regarding foreign participation 
and investment in the financial sector and ChinaÕs WTO accession have provided a 
unique opportunity for using the changing empirical reality to critically interrogate 
the extant literature on the geographies of money and finance and conceptualisations 
of markets.  
In this chapter, I reflect on the theoretical and empirical strands of the thesis 
as I situate my research within broader debates in geographies of money and finance 
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and the literature on ÔmarketsÕ in the wider social sciences. In section 9.2, I analyse 
the different approaches to ÔmarketsÕ presented in the preceding chapters and 
highlight their empirical and theoretical significance. I also consider what might be 
the ÔrightÕ approach from the perspectives of different actors involved, such as 
foreign financial institutions and investors, domestic financial institutions, local 
investors, the central Chinese government and local governments. Section 9.3 
reflects on and justifies the major strengths and weaknesses of the research as a 
whole and suggests ways in which it might be extended empirically, to include 
comparisons and co-analysis with other Chinese cities and international financial 
centres, and theoretically, through developing a research agenda centring on the 
complex and contested nature of market formation and issues of global standards and 
governance. Finally, in section 9.4, I reflect on how deconstructing markets, market 
relations and market ideologies can enrich our understanding of the processes taking 
place in financial centres and the spatialities of global capital, and challenge the 
neoliberal market discourse.  
 
9.2  ANALYSING APPROCHES TO MARKETS  
The central aim of this thesis has been to critically engage with the concept of 
ÔmarketsÕ and Ôfrom-plan-to-marketÕ economy in order to expose its multiple 
identities and conceptualisations and the contested nature of the ÔmarketisationÕ 
process. The tendency to treat market exchange as the atomic structure of all 
economic processes and as the default form of economic coordination is problematic 
as other forms of organisation become marginalised or treated as problematic 
exceptions. The market optic (Sayer, 2003) and its normative presumption mystifies 
capitalist dynamics and social relations without actually examining how they operate 
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in different historical and geographical contexts. This is particularly significant given 
the prevalence of neoliberal dogmatism and fatalism, which hails a particular model 
of economic development as the only workable model. The assumed progression of 
market practices in socialist economies is a case in point. During the post Cold War 
period, governments, economists and commentators often focused on the 
privatisation of formerly communist economies and policies aimed at a transition 
from planned to market economy. This approach, however, neglects the complexity 
of institutional legacies that differ across Eastern Europe and China and assumes a 
form of market essentialism that forecloses alternative forms of exchange relations 
and structures.  
9.2.1 States and Markets  
In the opening quote of this chapter, Deng Xiaoping demonstrates particular insights 
into the mutually constitutive roles of planning and market mechanisms in economic 
development.  In this thesis, I have used the term ÔmarketisationÕ to refer to the on-
going process of instituting market-led practices into the Chinese economy. Instead 
of an unproblematic and progressive journey from centrally-planned to market 
economy, ChinaÕs experience demonstrates the complex and highly contested nature 
of market systems and practices. Rather than the wholesale adoption of neoliberal 
market practices and principles, the Chinese state continues to exercise considerable 
control over the pace and structure of reforms with clear political and social 
objectives in mind. In this thesis, I have therefore sought to highlight the unique 
conceptualisation and utilisation of ÔmarketÕ practices by the Chinese state and 
institutions and to distance myself from the conceptual baggage often implicated in 
popular discourse about market-based economies and practices.  
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In acknowledging that markets are the products of social relations that vary 
across time and space, my empirical research in Shanghai examined how financial 
markets were being constructed, regulated and reproduced in a complex and highly 
contested process. ChinaÕs experience of developing financial regulatory standards, 
in particular, demonstrated how different interpretations and agendas affected the 
process and outcome of re-regulation. According to the concept of hegemonic 
stability, a particularly strong state is likely to impose order on international financial 
system according to its standards. In the case of China, however, there appears to be 
no one ÔpreferredÕ system for financial regulatory standards and control. Although 
there seemed to be a preference for LondonÕs model  la the FSA
1
, China was also 
developing its financial regulatory framework by incorporating expertise and 
elements from other financial centres such as Hong Kong and Singapore. In 
developing the CAS, for example, it also drew heavily from the IFRS championed by 
the US. This cherry-picking demonstrated how China was developing standards and 
frameworks unique to its economic environment and political context. Clark et al.Õs 
(2001) study on the adoption of international and US financial accounting standards 
by German corporations revealed that the process of harmonisation to international 
accounting standards is not one of complete submission to the forces of global 
finance and economic logic. Instead, they highlight the coherence and persistence of 
German institutions and traditions and how new methods and systems are often 
accommodated within these institutions rather than overwriting them. The 
importance of Ôdifang huaÕ, or localisation, as a guiding principle was echoed 
                                                
1
 On 13 September 2007, Northern Rock received an emergency bank loan from the Bank of England 
due to the tightening of inter-bank lending over fears of the sub-prime market in the US. The 
following four days saw the first bank run in the UK for decades and doubts were raised regarding the 
regulatory division of labour between the Bank of England, the Treasury and the FSA. It remains to be 
seen whether this have had any impact on the desirability of the UKÕs mode of financial regulation to 
counterparts in China.  
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throughout interviews with government officials and local respondents, and provided 
a strong critique of the market optic that prescribes a unidirectional journey from 
ÔplannedÕ to ÔmarketÕ economy. ChinaÕs experience demonstrates a world of Ôpost-
hegemonyÕ, whereby different state actors are linked into different policy 
communities as they increasingly operate within transnational networks, with the 
agencies such as the CBRC and PBOC establishing networks with counterparts 
abroad as well as with multinational financial institutions to access particular 
knowledge networks and develop the necessary skills and expertise for an 
international financial centre in Shanghai.  
In response to the common critique of a lack of administrative transparency 
and ÔfuzzinessÕ in Chinese regulatory standards, many of my respondents pointed out 
it was a misconception that there were insufficient laws in China to govern property 
rights and rules of exchange; the real problem lie with their execution and 
enforcement. Their characteristic vagueness allowed for more specific treatment and 
interpretations by local authorities according to local contexts, but the lack of clarity 
proved highly confusing and frustrating for foreign investors who might not 
understand their rationale and mode of operation. Through consultations, working 
groups, position papers and training programmes, foreign financial institutions and 
regulatory bodies had contributed to greater clarity of new and existing regulations 
with some success as seen from the on-going drafting and re-drafting of laws and 
policies to govern new and existing products and markets. However, the Chinese 
regulators clearly valued the ability to control market activities through an opaque 
system that granted them the power and flexibility to quicken, interrupt or slow down 
the process of ÔmarketisationÕ. It also allowed for adaptation to local needs by local 
branches in the context of a large country with varied regional and local political 
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economies. As such, the ÔfuzzyÕ characteristic of Chinese laws and regulations is 
likely to continue while particular areas within are refined in response to changing 
local, national and international considerations.  
In examining the role of the state in the process of ÔmarketisationÕ, it is 
interesting to note the extent to which the views and perceptions of my Chinese 
respondents appeared to be strongly influenced by state actions. This was particularly 
evident in the view of local respondents that Hong Kong as an international financial 
centre and its dominant role in the Asian region would eventually give way to 
Shanghai as the former was too dependent on Chinese IPOs, which had to be 
approved by the Chinese state. By that extension, the success of Hong Kong becomes 
dependent on the ÔapprovalÕ of the mainland government who will surely not 
jeopardise the success of Shanghai as an international financial centre on the 
mainland Ð at least from the perspective of my Chinese respondents. This ÔpatrioticÕ 
reading of the future of Hong Kong and Shanghai reflects more than the cultural bias 
of mainland politics; it reveals how the dominant role of the state in the finance 
sector is such that its actions or policies are seen as determining possibilities and 
likelihood of success or failure for what are commonly seen as ÔmarketÕ decision. 
Likewise, even foreign banks have taken on the ÔstateÕ lens in believing that the 
SOEs are too big and too important to fail because they have government backing, 
and are thus Ôgood investmentsÕ. The Chinese state, I would argue, is central to the 
operation and development of financial markets in Shanghai, not only in terms of 
allowing products and services to be offered (especially for foreign financial 
institutions) but also in terms of being an important actor in financial markets (by 
controlling the amount of shares being offered in the primary market and liquidity in 
the secondary market) and by being a key consideration for business strategies for 
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both local and foreign financial institutions. Therefore, if one considers the argument 
of neoliberal market capitalism, that the Ôrolling backÕ of the state is necessary for the 
development of successful ÔmarketÕ conditions, there are undeniable contradictions 
in the Chinese context where the ÔmarketsÕ are made possible on account of the 
strong role of the state. If the state should completely withdraw its influence and 
control over the SOEs, for example, that could trigger a massive loss of confidence 
as foreign and local investors have few other reliable criteria to judge these 
companies with.  
 
9.2.2 Contested Visions of Markets 
In this thesis, I have sought to incorporate issues of power and conflict in examining 
the socially constituted economic systems and practices, following SayerÕs (2003) 
critique of the tendency to produce an overly benign view of economic relations and 
processes in theorising about embeddedness, networks and trust. This idealistic and 
ÔsoftÕ conceptualisation of networks downplays issues of power and inequality. In 
this vein, my research reflects FligsteinÕs (2001) conceptualisation of market 
institutions as emergent and forged through political contestation. In my research, I 
have highlighted the variety of actors and interests within a market setting and 
emphasised the importance of power, conflict and processes of negotiation and 
resolution in understanding ÔmarketsÕ in Shanghai. The development of the Shanghai 
stock market demonstrated how the concept of a stock market presented different 
opportunities and different purposes to different groups of actors. The different 
perspectives of foreign and Chinese actors in the banking market regarding financial 
sector reforms were reflected in their business strategies in Shanghai, which varied 
from an aggressive move towards offering comprehensive banking services, to 
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selective joint-ventures with local financial institutions (in areas such as securities, 
asset management and insurance), to focusing on niche markets.  
More significantly, there were multi-scalar dimension to these contestations 
over the structure, direction and pace of financial sector reforms, between central 
government, local municipalities and regulatory bodies, between foreign and local 
financial institutions, between financial institutions and Chinese regulatory bodies, 
and even within financial institutions themselves. While the central government and 
regulatory bodies in Beijing might be keen on maintaining a slower pace of reform 
for fear of creating social and political instability, local officials and regulatory 
bodies who were in more frequent contact with the finance and business community 
might be in favour of further and more rapid regulatory changes that would allow for 
higher levels or more innovative forms of business activities to boost local 
economies. Foreign financial institutions were understandably frustrated at having 
their business growth curtailed due to the many tiers of licensing and capital 
requirements meant to limit their ÔthreatÕ to domestic financial institutions and 
viewed such restrictions as unfair. Domestic financial institutions, on the other hand, 
were adamant that they should have enough time to develop their own capacities 
before being subjected to foreign competition due to different conceptualisations of 
Ôfair competitionÕ. Both groups of actors were constantly pressuring regulators to act 
in their favour as regulatory standards and reforms were being developed and 
implemented. Organisational politics were also implicated in the ÔmarketisationÕ 
process as foreign banks within Shanghai and their head offices situated elsewhere 
had different visions of the Chinese ÔmarketÕ. Therefore, an analysis of the 
development of ÔmarketsÕ in Shanghai needs to be embedded in a network of 
political power, interests, and capital flows that extends not just to rest of China but 
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also transnational actors beyond. Developments in Shanghai are arguably the 
outcome of political and economic processes elsewhere, with institutional forces in 
Beijing still determining the pace and process of ÔmarketisationÕ in Shanghai, and the 
influence of the international business community on developments in Shanghai 
depending on how Shanghai (or China as a whole) fits into their globalisation 
strategies.  
 
9.2.3 Placing Markets 
In this thesis, I have argued for a geographical sensibility to the treatment of market 
relations and processes. The world of money and global finance has a distinctive 
geography, particularly in terms of its multi-scalar and place-based nature. In the 
preceding chapters, I have shown how the development of financial markets in 
Shanghai was driven and influenced by processes elsewhere (be it in Beijing, Hong 
Kong or other financial centres in Europe) and this process was negotiated amidst 
contesting perspectives regarding the form, structure and pace of these market 
reforms. Sensitivity to the importance of scalar politics in such processes is a useful 
geographical contribution to the money and finance literature as these flows and 
processes operate at a number of different spatial frames or scales.  
The place-based geographies of such flows and processes are important as 
they do not simply occur Ôout thereÕ in electronic space. The ÔgroundingÕ of capital or 
knowledge networks, which is what transforms these global financial centres, is 
made possible only because financial centres are also places. SassenÕs (2000b) 
Òstrategic placesÓ and StorperÕs (1997) Òprivileged sitesÓ are two such 
conceptualisations that view global cities or international financial centres as 
localised knowledge complexes based upon their particular mixture of innovation 
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potential and capacities. In the case of Shanghai, the ÔmarketisationÕ process was 
enabled by a variety of place-specific factors that led to its government sanctioned 
role and current development as an international financial centre for China, ranging 
from its history, geographical location, state support and business culture (as 
discussed in Chapter 8). There were geographically specific reasons for why such 
processes were happening in Shanghai rather than, for example, Beijing or Shenzhen. 
The historical image and contemporary branding of Shanghai as a cosmopolitan 
world city and international financial centre played a particularly significant role in 
its development strategies as seen in its prominence not only in official discourses 
and (state-controlled) media representations, but also in the expectations of foreign 
investors. These expectations, in turn, influenced the business practices and activities 
of financial institutions. The ÔmarketÕ in Beijing, for example, was concerned with 
research activities, lobbying and regulatory matters, while the ÔmarketÕ in Shanghai 
dealt with actual business transactions such as trade financing, commercial lending, 
and foreign exchange. Distinctive roles were thus carved out for each city with 
Beijing being a political centre, Shanghai as a business centre and Hong Kong 
performing the role of an offshore financial centre. This regional division of labour 
was reflected in the operations of the financial institutions located there, such as 
representative offices and investment banks in Beijing, commercial lending and trade 
financing in Shanghai and treasury business in Hong Kong. The socially inflected 
approach that I have taken in teasing out the motivations, rationale and practices of 
market actors in Shanghai has thus contributed to a more nuanced understanding of 
the ÔmarketisationÕ process taking place in Shanghai. A geographical sensibility in 
analysing market structures, relations and processes is vital to our understanding of 
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the international financial system, relationships between state actors and global 
capital and how financial centres operate within international monetary networks.  
ShanghaiÕs experience also highlights the importance of context in the 
critique of neoliberal conceptualisation of market reforms. History matters; there is a 
need to understand the past in order to explain present phenomena and processes. In 
terms of policy-making and recommendations, this has implications for the 
transferability of solutions; the same rule or solution may not create the same type or 
magnitude of development in different places due to their specific historical 
experiences and institutional configurations. In the formation and adoption of 
regulatory standards and frameworks, for example, the Chinese authorities were 
keenly aware of such constraints in economic and political models and their 
relevance in cross-applications, even as they were eager to learn from the experience 
of other regulatory regimes. In contrast to models of stage-by-stage linear economic 
development with the input of the requisite economic factors, the ÔmarketisationÕ 
process in China pointed to the possibility of alternative approaches to markets and 
highlighted the importance of contextualising such approaches to local historical, 
geographical, social, cultural and political circumstances.  
 
9.2.4 The ÔRightÕ Approach to Markets?  
In the response of my interviewees Ð particularly foreign respondents but also some 
of my Chinese respondents in regulatory capacities who had overseas experience Ð 
there seemed to be an implicit assumption of what is the ÔdesirableÕ or ÔrightÕ 
approach towards ÔmarketisationÕ of ChinaÕs finance sector. A foreign president of a 
foreign bank (#20, 11 April 2006) in Shanghai, for example, insisted that: 
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You have to have a free market for it to be a commercial, for a true financial centre. 
YouÕve got all these regulations, a lot of which are geared clearly to keep the foreign 
elements out, therefore the competitive element out. Then youÕre not going to have a 
true financial centre. No way, cannot be. 
From the perspective of foreign investors in the banking or securities 
sectors, the right approach would be to remove regulatory restrictions and barriers to 
entry. This would enable foreign financial institutions, most of whom have more 
experience and expertise in financial products and systems that China was just 
starting to develop, to have greater influence in quickening the pace of marketisation 
and improving the finance sector through competition or joint ventures. Without 
restrictions on foreign exchange or capital requirements, for example, they would be 
able to expand their business activities in China much more quickly, which would 
increase the growth of financial markets as well as the China business of their clients 
in manufacturing and other sectors. For local financial institutions, however, the right 
approach would be to restrict the activities and expansion of foreign financial 
institutions in order for the former to develop their own skills and capacities so as to 
avoid being overwhelmed by foreign competition. While domestic banks were 
mostly keen to learn and adopt new techniques and systems, there was widespread 
concern about the time it would take for them to be brought up to par with foreign 
financial institutions (be it in terms of credit systems, customer service, or 
international experience and networks). Joint ventures and other limited forms of 
participation for foreign financial institutions was seen as helpful for knowledge 
transfer to domestic banks and buying them time for implementing reforms and 
improving skills and standards, so that they could then compete ÔfairlyÕ with a strong 
domestic financial sector.  
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To the central government and regulatory authorities, the right approach 
towards ÔmarketisationÕ was to develop a Ôsocialist market economyÕ that would 
uphold the principle of preserving Ôpublic ownershipÕ (by the state) and Ôcooperative 
ownershipÕ (based on contractual arrangement among the employees, enterprise, and 
the state) as the mainstay of ChinaÕs economic system. This was reflected in the 
practices of a quota system for the primary equity market, segmented share structure, 
restrictions on the trading of shares held by the state (and its affiliates) in the 
secondary stock market, and significant state influence over the activities of state-
owned banks such that it resulted in the dominance of state ownership amidst private 
ownership. Controlling the structure and pace of reforms to the finance sector such 
that it limited foreign participation and the implementation of new financial products 
and services might restrict the growth potential of this sector and the development of 
Shanghai as an international financial centre. But this cautious approach enabled the 
central government to observe the impacts of new market systems and practices, to 
limit negative externalities that might have social and political consequences. From 
the perspective of local government and regulatory officials, having the freedom to 
interpret broad and ÔfuzzyÕ guidelines from the central government and implement 
them according to local contexts was highly useful. This freedom to interpret and 
implement specific regulations could be abused to satisfy personal agendas (such as 
favouring particular individuals or local institutions over other Chinese or foreign 
counterparts) but such a multi-tiered system of governance helped to avoid the 
problem of inappropriate policies for a country with enormous social and economic 
disparities. Therefore, while foreign financial institutions might complain that 
regulatory Ôgrey areasÕ and ÔfuzzinessÕ were obstacles to developing robust, 
transparent and efficient markets, these characteristics offered enormous flexibility to 
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local officials in ways that took into account local contexts and interests, to develop 
market systems and practices that were appropriate for local economies.  
In this thesis, I have highlighted the multiple and contested visions of 
markets in the banking and stock markets from the perspective of different actors. In 
this vein, the ÔrightÕ approach to markets very much depends on whose vision of 
ÔmarketsÕ is more persuasive, or rather, who has the power to determine or influence 
the version(s) of markets that is implemented, even though this process is fluid and 
unstable and subject to constant negotiation. Therefore, there is nothing ÔnaturalÕ or 
ÔunstoppableÕ about the move towards market-based economic structures and 
activities, at least in the neoliberal conceptualisation most commonly represented in 
the media. In the preceding chapters, particularly in terms of the responses from my 
foreign interviewees, there seemed to be an implicit assumption that China must 
inevitably embrace a neoliberal agenda, to remove regulatory restrictions and open 
up its financial markets to foreign participation and competition, if it is to develop 
further. This thesis has thrown doubts on that assertion by showing how the process 
of developing market systems, structures and practices is far from straightforward 
and fraught with the difficulties of balancing different visions and agendas, and by 
highlighting the dominant role of the Chinese state, which, to some extent, might 
even be necessary for the success of Shanghai by providing a source of investor 
confidence and the basis upon which actors in the market assess market conditions 
and opportunities (or lack thereof) and adjust their business strategies and activities 
accordingly.  
In The Writing on the Wall, Hutton (2007) argues that China has no choice 
but to complete the full transition to capitalism that it has embarked on, that it cannot 
continue with its current model of market socialism due to inherent contradictions. 
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The past two decades of reforms have been extraordinary as China introduced what 
Hutton calls the ÔhardÕ processes of a market economy, such as free movement of 
prices, wages and rents, permitted (albeit limited) ownership of private property, and 
opened up to overseas investors. But he argues that the ÔsoftÕ institutions of 
capitalism are as integral to growth and sustainability as the hard processes and these 
have been neglected thus far by the CPC leadership due to its formal adherence to the 
doctrines of Marxism, Leninism and Maoism and emphasis on political control. 
Examples of the soft institutional infrastructure that are lacking include Òimpartial 
courts, clear property rights, commercial processes for bank lending, independent 
auditors, accountability to a free press, independent trade unions, effective corporate 
governance, transparent anti-monopoly rules, free intellectual inquiry and even a 
properly functioning welfare systemÓ (p. 6). He highlights the delicate balance being 
maintained at the moment between reform and control and argues that the Chinese 
economy is in danger of being upset by a banking crisis, or a crisis of excess supply 
(thus the recent concerns regarding an overheated Chinese economy), which will 
provoke social reactions that might endanger the political status quo. As such, the 
current situation of trying to maintain political control over what might be seen as 
only half a market economy is unsustainable. The only way a market economy can 
flourish, he argues, would be for China to accept and develop institutional 
infrastructures that promote economic pluralism and confer political pluralism.  
Sayer (1995, 2003), on the other hand, argues for a more nuanced approach 
to markets in terms of its characteristics, and as systems and practices. He points out 
how Ôthe marketÕ has become something of an icon, fetishised as having powers and 
authority of its own, to which people and institutions must conform. More 
importantly, the pervasiveness of the Ômarket opticÕ (Sayer, 2003) has led to the 
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normative treatment of capitalist social relations of production and neoliberal 
systems of regulation. In the former socialist countries, for example, ÔmarketsÕ (in the 
neoliberal sense) have been treated as a panacea even though their recent experience 
is already demonstrating the inadequacy of liberal market theory. Sayer (1995) is 
particularly clear regarding the importance of multiple conceptualisations of markets 
and the dangers of conflating market and capitalism: Òmarkets can exist outside 
capitalism, and hence they should not be seen as equivalentÓ (p. 81).  
Finance capitalists (be they individuals or institutions) have come to wield 
considerable power due to the amount of capital they control and the ability to switch 
the location and direction of capital flows in acts of regulatory-spatial arbitrage. This 
has led to speculations about the imperative of financial power overtaking the state as 
the latter becomes caught up in the desire to attract and retain these capital flows. 
This decline in state power vis--vis finance capital is not readily evident in the case 
of ChinaÕs approach to ÔmarketisationÕ and the development of Shanghai as a 
financial centre; state control is still undeniably dominant at the central and local 
levels of governments and state institutions continue to play vital roles in the 
financial markets. Perhaps this particular approach to markets will limit ShanghaiÕs 
success in a global financial architecture where the rules governing monetary flows 
are structured according to neoliberal market principles different from its own (such 
as the IAS, systems of determining foreign exchange and interest rates, and 
prudential regulation). On the other hand, if one considers the benchmark for success 
from the perspectives of the Chinese state and state institutions and domestic 
financial institutions, ShanghaiÕs success could also be measured by the willingness 
of foreign financial institutions to play by the Chinese rules of limited engagement 
and activities while allowing for the continued dominance of Chinese financial 
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institutions, Ôpublic ownershipÕ, and state control in the financial markets. The 
findings of this thesis highlight the politics of market systems and practices and the 
limits of financial power vis--vis the state. Just as Ôthe marketÕ, as conceptualised by 
the far right and neoliberalists, is shown to be contested and unstable ÔmarketsÕ with 
multiple interpretations and identities, the ÔstateÕ, so often thought of as a monolithic 
entity particularly in a socialist regime like China, needs to be acknowledged as a 
fragmented entity with different agendas and visions at the levels of the central, 
regional, and local governments, and within the regulatory bodies spread across 
different spatial scales. Research on geographies of finance and regulation, therefore, 
needs to go above as well as below the ÔstateÕ (in its conventional conceptualisation) 
to examine supra-national and sub-national networks and processes of governance, 
through the roles and actions of transnational and local agents.  
 
9.3 REFLECTIONS ON THE RESEARCH  
Having highlighted the empirical and theoretical strands of the thesis and identified 
its contributions to a geographical perspective on ÔmarketsÕ in understanding 
financial centres and global capital flows, this section reflects on some weaknesses 
and limitations of the research. Given the complex economic geographies of 
ÔmarketisationÕ as identified in the preceding chapters, some facets have invariably 
been overlooked in writing up the research to product a logical argument within the 
time constraints of a PhD programme. It is not my intention in this thesis to produce 
an assessment of which approach to ÔmarketsÕ is the most desirable or Ôbest practiceÕ. 
Instead, my aim has been to highlight the multiple conceptualisations of markets, and 
the contested process of instituting reforms driven by a variety of actors with 
differing politics, agendas and power.  
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Empirical research undertaken for this thesis took place at a particular time 
when the Chinese stock markets were undergoing major reforms, when IPOs were 
recently halted on the mainland with major listings turning to Hong Kong and other 
overseas markets, and when China was in the final stage of fulfilling its WTO 
commitments. If this research had taken place in the 1990s, it might have taken a 
different direction in focusing on the success of the newly established SSE, when the 
stock market was on a bull run and expectations were high on the part of both foreign 
and local investors. During the course of my research, the Chinese stock markets 
were just recovering from a slump and new IPOs were suspended as share reforms 
were carried out to erase the division between tradable and non-tradable shares and 
to allow for greater participation by foreign and domestic investors in previously 
restricted segments of the stock market. During this sensitive stage of reforms, it was 
impossible to obtain interviews from people working in the SSE as they were 
unwilling to speak in an official capacity. Due to the timing of the research as well as 
lack of personal contacts that could connect me directly with specific people in the 
SSE, I was not able to undertake any participant observation within the SSE that 
could have enriched my understanding of the practices and perspectives of this group 
of actors from within this particular financial market. Following the snowballing 
method, interviewees who mentioned that they have friends working in the SSE were 
asked if they could put me in touch with those contacts. Invariably, however, those 
contacts declined to be interviewed as they felt uncomfortable about having an 
outsider enter their premises and scrutinise their operations in the light of on-going 
reforms. However, I was able to interview some locals from domestic financial 
institutions and a government official who used to work for the SSE, who did not 
feel the same constraints in sharing their views and experience.  
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Another limitation of the field research relates to the selection of actors 
interviewed. My ideal sample would have been an even number of respondents from 
three groups: Chinese government and regulatory bodies, foreign financial 
institutions, and domestic financial institutions. In the end, I was only able to conduct 
three interviews with government and regulatory officials and I had greater success 
contacting foreign respondents compared to local ones. Reasons for this include the 
specific Chinese environment of information dissemination and my positionalities as 
a not-quite-Chinese scholar (read differently by different respondents), as detailed in 
Chapter 5. I have tried to overcome this under-representation of government and 
regulatory actors by actively seeking the views of other respondents from financial 
institutions on local regulatory processes and frameworks and their encounters and 
interaction with officials and regulators. I also tapped into the expertise of some 
Chinese respondents who used to work for regulatory bodies. This provided a means 
of triangulation and helped me to corroborate what I read from official or publicly 
available reports with a spoken discourse. My interview success with individuals 
from foreign financial institutions meant that I was able to obtain unexpectedly 
detailed accounts of the experience and perspectives of this group of actors, which 
enabled me to learn more about their strategic practices and business activities in the 
face of regulatory bias, internal politics regarding conflicting visions of the Chinese 
ÔmarketsÕ within transnational organisations and their geographical readings of 
markets in Beijing, Shanghai and Hong Kong.   
Beijing and Hong Kong were initially considered as additional fieldwork 
sites, especially in the light of the significant regulatory and operational linkages 
between Shanghai and these important centres. Unfortunately, they had to be 
excluded primarily due to issues of practicality and time constraints. The importance 
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of regulators and decision-makers in Beijing was evident from my field research in 
Shanghai and in research by other scholars, but the difficulty of obtaining interviews 
and useful information during meetings with officials in Shanghai raised doubts 
about the usefulness of such interviews in Beijing. Given the reluctance of 
government and regulatory officials to grant interviews and their taciturn approach 
when such permission was obtained, I concluded that my limited time and resources 
in the field would be better spent obtaining richer and more in-depth accounts in 
Shanghai rather than spreading myself too thin by adding Beijing as another case 
study. My experience in Shanghai has revealed a very steep learning curve upon 
arrival into a new environment and it took a long time to establish local contacts that 
have proved vital in fieldwork. In the case of Hong Kong, while I already had a 
couple of contacts and anticipated less difficulties in obtaining interviews and 
materials such as reports and other published information, the relevance of a trip 
there seemed less important as my research focus shifted in the course of fieldwork 
to analysing developments in Shanghai itself, rather than a comparative study with 
Hong KongÕs experience. However, I have not ignored the important linkages 
between these cities and included them in my analysis by using interview data from 
respondents based in Shanghai to examine the different roles played by Beijing, 
Hong Kong and Shanghai in the development of financial markets in China, and to 
investigate how Beijing and Hong Kong are viewed by actors based in Shanghai in 
terms of competition or complementarities with Shanghai. In order to maximise 
resources at hand with the objective of enriching empirical data, I conducted some 
interviews in London, following up on pilot interviews as well as contacts obtained 
from foreign respondents in Shanghai. This included banks with operations in 
Shanghai and the FSA, who provided advice and consultations to the Chinese 
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regulators. The inclusion of London as an additional field site proved useful in 
obtaining feedback on preliminary findings, providing an alternative perspective on 
events and processes in Shanghai and acting as a check for possible bias in 
interpretation and highlighting issues relevant to those in the industry.  
There is clearly scope for further research in interrogating actors based in 
Beijing and Hong Kong to compare their perspectives on the roles of those respective 
cities and relationships with other financial centres in the region. An in-depth study 
on Hong Kong could focus on its regulatory environment, expertise and the networks 
of regulatory cooperation between Hong Kong and Shanghai. Having two rich case 
studies will provide a solid basis for comparing processes of ÔmarketisationÕ in 
different contexts to enrich our understanding of multiple conceptualizations of 
markets. Instead of studying markets in one locality, further research could also 
employ a network approach to examine how groups and individuals negotiate, 
circumvent, challenge, and re-create the complex webs that entangle them in the 
production of market ideologies, systems and practices. Future studies could trace 
flows of capital, people and knowledge as they touch down in particular localities 
such as Hong Kong, Shanghai and Beijing to investigate how regulatory, institutional 
and financial capacities are enacted through the entanglement and negotiation of 
market discourses and practices, and how such ideas and practices are circulated, 
adapted and implemented in specific localities even as they traverse geographical 
space and boundaries.
2
 The ways in which financial institutions with operations in 
both cities use these locations in strategies of spatial-regulatory arbitrage, how they 
visualise the functions, advantages and future direction of both financial centres will 
                                                
2
 For more on multi-sited approach to fieldwork, see Burawoy (2000). 
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also address business and policy concerns of the financial and regulatory 
communities.  
 
9.4 Conclusion  
Deconstructing markets, market relations and market ideologies means confronting 
the messy reality of economic behaviour and economic structures instead of 
assuming them away in the tradition of orthodox economics or impoverished 
accounts of the economy. In this thesis, I have sought to open up the black box of 
ÔmarketsÕ in the context of ShanghaiÕs experience to examine the underlying 
processes taking place in the city, as well as across spatial scales, in order to 
elucidate the complex processes of market making. In doing so, my intention is to 
undermine the power of a seemingly unified (neoliberal) market discourse. Although 
the Ôblack boxÕ metaphor alludes to the increasingly popular SSF approach to 
markets, I have chosen instead to highlight the political economy aspects, broader 
structural issues and the nature of regulation pertaining to financial markets. The 
political economy approach is less popular now compared to the 1980s and early-
1990s but, as I have demonstrated in this thesis, it can be particularly useful for 
understanding specific local or national scale phenomena by embedding them within 
an international context that emphasise flows, interconnectivity and power Ð aspects 
of which tend to be neglected in the micro- and meso-level studies of the SSF.  
At the same time, I am also mindful of the social and cultural embeddedness 
of finance capital and financial markets. In the introduction to a collection of papers 
on the Ôcultural economyÕ, Amin and Thrift (2004) argue for a hybrid model of 
culture and economy in which the two terms are dispensed with as separate 
categories. Instead of an add-and-stir approach of adding cultural overtures to an 
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economic core, or examining how the economy is culturally embedded or how 
culture is mobilised for profit, Òthe pursuit of prosperity must be seen as the pursuit 
of many goals at once [É] through hybrid and temporary coalitions [É] set against 
the background of various kinds of ordering frames (ibid.: xiv) (see also Zelizer, 
1988, Krippner, 2001). By emphasising the variety of actors involved in economic 
transactions, organisational arrangements and the development of regulatory 
standards, rules and practices in market-building, I argue for a more variegated 
account of what constitutes economic practice and the construction of values by 
focusing on multiple approaches to markets.  
This thesis also emphasised the importance of embedding concepts of power 
and governance into the theorisation of markets and how they not only enrich 
accounts of market formation and processes but are crucial to their explanations. 
Rather than harmonious cooperation ensured by the invisible hand or the coercive 
power of the state, concrete social groups construct ÔmarketsÕ through power 
struggles against other groups and other possible forms of markets (see Lie, 1993, 
Lie, 1997, Fligstein, 2001). This recognition of the variety of actors and interests 
within a market setting and an emphasis on power and conflict and processes of 
negotiation and resolution has been central to my research. The form, structure and 
pace of market formation taking place in Shanghai is a contested process that has to 
be negotiated amongst the different interests of incumbents and challengers, 
involving a variety of actors including local firms, foreign firms, national and local 
state bodies, foreign state institutions and transnational organisations. My research 
has also taken FligsteinÕs (2001) political-cultural approach further by highlighting 
the distinctive geographies of global finance and the development of financial 
markets that operates at a number of different spatial frames or scales, such as how 
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the development of financial markets in Shanghai was driven and influenced by 
institutions and actors based elsewhere (e.g. Beijing and other international financial 
centres) with different understandings and interpretation of ÔmarketsÕ and power to 
influence that process. The ÔmarketisationÕ process in Shanghai was also enabled by 
a variety of place-specific factors such as its history, geographical location, state 
support and business culture.  
The key role of states and state institutions in the process of market building 
is another important aspect. In theorising about conceptions of control, governance 
structures and rules of exchange, Fligstein (2001) demonstrates how issues of 
governance and regulation are central to market enquiries. The question should thus 
be: how and with what methods does the state contribute to the performance of 
calculative agencies and the organisation of their relations? This implies the 
existence of a wide range of possible configurations. The term Ôtransitional 
economyÕ reflects the old paradigm; there is nothing of a transition in the 
developments observed or in the diversity between countries such as Poland, Ukraine 
or China. It is more useful to conceptualise them as reconfigurations, combinations 
and re-arrangements peculiar to their historical contexts. In these rearrangements, the 
state often plays a crucial role and the dynamics in place, in turn, impact on its own 
position and contribution to the economy. The case of Shanghai should therefore not 
be seen simply as a transition Ôfrom plan to marketÕ but a process of reconfiguration 
specific to its historical and geographical context, of which the constitutive role of 
the state is crucial. The experience of market building in Shanghai illuminates how 
different constructions of capitalism evolve, how they intersect, and how a 
geographic sensibility makes a difference to the form and function of variegated 
capitalist economies. The world, therefore, remains a patchwork of different financial 
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spaces or systems; the patchwork that is the nation-state, to a certain extent, 
represents changing geographies of capitalisms. In the face of neoliberal fatalism, the 
active construction of neoliberal market ideology needs to be exposed through 
theoretically informed empirical research and this thesis is a contribution towards 
that effort.  
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Appendix A  
Profiles of Interview Respondents  
#  Date Venue  Institution (Country) Position 
1 10 December 2004 Nottingham Private Chinese 
property group 
Chairman 
2 17 August 2005 Shanghai Foreign Chamber of 
Commerce 
Executive Director  
3 12 December 2005 London UK-based international 
bank  
Director  
4 11 January 2006 London UK-based international 
bank 
Chief economist, 
head of global 
research  
5 13 January 2006 (Via email from 
Hong Kong) 
UK-based international 
bank  
Associate Director 
6 21 February 2006 Shanghai TNC (France)  Director  
7 22 February 2006 Shanghai  Foreign bank (UK)  Economist 
8 23 February 2006 Shanghai TNC (Netherlands) Regional manager, 
Asia 
9 27
 
February 2006 Shanghai Chinese private 
financial institution 
Executive manager 
10 28 February 2006 Shanghai UK Consulate-General  Trade and 
investment officer 
11 6 March 2006 Shanghai Foreign bank (UK) Head of operations 
12 6 March 2006 Shanghai TNC (Netherlands) Finance manager 
13 7 March 2006 Shanghai Foreign bank (UK) Corporate relations 
manager 
14 7 March 2006 Shanghai Foreign bank (UK) Vice-president of 
corporate relations 
15 7 March 2006 Shanghai Foreign bank (UK) Deputy head of 
capital markets 
16 9 March 2006  Shanghai Foreign bank (UK) Country 
representative 
17 9 March 2006 Shanghai Foreign bank (UK) Country head, 
China and branch 
manager 
18 14 March 2006 Shanghai Foreign Chamber of 
Commerce 
Executive Director 
19 10 April 2006 Shanghai  Lujiazui Finance Zone  Deputy Director 
20 11 April 2006 Shanghai Foreign bank (Germany 
& Thailand) 
President  
21 11 April 2006 Shanghai  Foreign bank (Germany 
& Thailand) 
Board of 
Management  
22 12 April 2006  Shanghai Chinese securities 
company  
Research analyst 
23 14 April 2006  Shanghai Foreign bank (Germany 
& Thailand) 
Board of 
Management  
24 15 April 2006 Shanghai Chinese private 
financial institution 
Consultant  
25 16 April 2006 Shanghai China Banking 
Regulatory 
Commission 
Legal Counsel  
26 18 April 2006 Shanghai Chinese fund 
management company   
Vice-director 
27 19 April 2006 Shanghai Chinese state-owned 
bank 
Secretary-General 
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28 20 April 2006  Shanghai Office for Financial 
Services 
Deputy Director-
General 
29 12 October 2006 Shanghai  Foreign bank (UK) Chief 
Representative 
30 12 October 2006 Shanghai Foreign bank (UK) Deputy 
Representative 
31 13 October 2006 Shanghai TNC (France) Chief Executive 
32 13 October 2006 Shanghai Foreign bank (Germany 
& Thailand) 
President  
33 13 October 2006 Shanghai Foreign bank (Italy)  Deputy General 
Manager 
34 17 October 2006 Shanghai Chinese securities 
company 
Analyst 
35 18 October 2006 Shanghai Chinese securities 
company  
General Manager, 
M&A Department 
36 18 October 2006 Shanghai Foreign bank 
(Netherland) 
Senior Manager 
37 19 October 2006 Shanghai Foreign bank (Italy)  Deputy General 
Manager 
38 20 October 2006 Shanghai Foreign bank (Germany 
& Thailand) 
Regional 
Marketing Head 
39 24 October 2006 Shanghai Foreign bank (Belgium) General Manager 
40 25 October 2006 Shanghai Foreign fund 
management company 
(France) 
Deputy General 
Manager 
41 27 October 2006 Shanghai Foreign bank 
(Germany) 
General Manager  
42 27 October 2006 Shanghai Foreign bank 
(Germany) 
Head of German 
Desk 
43 27 October 2006 Shanghai Foreign bank 
(Netherlands)  
Branch Manager & 
Head of 
International 
Clients, China  
44 27 October 2006 Shanghai Foreign bank (Australia 
and New Zealand)  
Business 
Development 
Manager  
45 1 November 2006 Shanghai Foreign bank 
(Germany) 
Chief 
Representative 
46 2 November 2006 Shanghai Foreign bank (Belgium) Senior Account 
Manager 
47 3 November 2006  Shanghai Fund management 
company (Chinese and 
foreign joint venture)  
Marketing Officer  
48 3 November 2006  Shanghai Fund management 
company (Chinese and 
foreign joint venture)  
Investment 
Analyst and 
Advisor  
49 3 November 2006 Shanghai Foreign bank (UK)  Head of Cash 
Management 
China 
50 12 March 2007 London UK-based international 
bank  
International 
Advisory Services 
51 10 April 2007 London Financial Services 
Authority  
Manager 
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Appendix B  
Glossary of English and Chinese Terms Used During Interviews  
 
 
English term Mandarin  Pinyin 
ÔMarketisationÕ, transformation 
into a market system 
飯韻化 Shichang hua  
ÔStockificationÕ, transforming 
(SOEs) into a shareholding 
form 
股௷化 Gufenhua  
Adjustment (period of) 噛整（孜段） Tiaozheng (jieduan) 
Administrative regulation 行政管理 Xingzheng guanli 
Advantage 剴班 Youshi  
Chairman of the board  董事宇 Dongshizhang 
Challenges 峯嚥 Tiaozhan 
China Banking Regulatory 
Commission  
中国冏行倔冴督管理委吽会 Zhongguo yinhangye 
jiandu guanli weiyuanhui 
Client  出巧 Kehu 
Competition 悉塢 Jingzheng 
Contracting out  承包 Chengbao 
Contradictions 矛盾 Mao dun  
Exchange (stock or futures) 讃僥復 Jiaoyisuo  
Financial Administration and 
Regulation Office 
金融行政管理鴬 Jinrong xingzheng 
guanlichu  
Financial centre 雌呑奩稜 Jinrong zhongxin  
Flexible, flexibility ⅋活（性） Linghuo (xing) 
Fundamental analysis 基本分析 Jiben fenxi  
Futures  紬腰 Qihuo 
Hardware 凰撮 Yingjian 
Interfere  干ᾙ／干厰 ganshe/ ganyu 
Internationalise 国才化 Guojihua  
Liberalisation 自由化 Ziyou hua  
Market analysis 市韻分析 Shichang fenxi  
National State Assets 
Administration Bureau 
国家国有尨胤管理局 Guojia guoyou jichan 
guanli ju  
Non-governmental organisation 民榊机ᯊ Minjian jigou  
Not-for-profit organisation 非盈利机ᯊ Fei yingli jigou  
Official  官方 Guanfang 
Operate/control  操岫／作 Caozong/ zuo  
Participate  参与 canyu 
Policy  政策 Zhengce 
Power, authority 陶 Quan 
Price differential  差价 Chajia  
Private enterprise 廟辨碇倔 Siyou qiye  
Progress 寺嚊 Jinzhan 
Quality 素奚 Suzhi 
Regularise, normal 潔范（化） Guifan, guifanhua  
Regulate 冴督管理 Jiandu guanli 
Relax/ loosen (a policy) 放松 Fangsong 
Reputation  名气，声誉 Mingqi, shengyu  
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Risk  糾謡 Fengxian 
Shanghai Foreign Investment 
Services Centre 
上海市外商投尨服薬中心 Shanghai shiwaishang 
touzi fuwu zhongxin 
Shanghai Securities Regulatory 
Commission  
上海墟券管理委吽会  Shanghai zhengquan 
guanli weiyuan hui  
Share reform 渓暁 Gu gai  
Short-term/long-term 艦紬M宇紬 Duanqi/changqi 
Software 軟撮 Ruanjian 
Special  特殊 Teshu  
State Council Securities Policy 
Committee 
国薬院墟券委吽会 Guowuyuan zhengquan 
weiyuanhui  
State-owned enterprise 拳辨碇倔 Guoyou qiye  
Stocks  股票 Gupiao  
Strategy 謂跡 Cele 
Systemisation 制度化 Zhiduhua  
Technical analysis 技尾分析 Jishu fenxi  
Turnover rate  成交量 Chengjiao liang 
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Appendix C  
Equity Structure of Listed Companies in China, 2006  
 
 
 Absolute  
numbers 
Percentage 
I. Number of Listed Companies 
Shanghai Stock Exchange 886 58.79 
A shares 832 55.21 
B shares 54 3.58 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange 621 41.21 
A shares 566 37.56 
B shares 55 3.65 
Total 1507 100.00 
II. Number of shares (in billion) 
Non-tradable shares 925.98 72.40 
State shares 522.13 40.82 
Legal person shares 11.59 0.91 
Others 392.26 30.67 
Tradable shares 352.98 27.60 
A shares 330.08 25.81 
B shares 22.90 1.79 
Total 1278.96 100.00 
III. Market capitalisation (in US$ billion)  
Non-tradable market capitalisation  825.34 72.05 
Shanghai Stock Exchange 707.19 61.74 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange 118.15 10.31 
Tradable market capitalisation 320.22 27.95 
Shanghai Stock Exchange 210.40 18.37 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange 109.81 9.58 
Total 1145.55 100.00 
(Source: CSRC, 2007) 
 
 
 
 
